Abstract

The China International Famine Relief Commission (CIFRC) stands out in history as an institution that was decades ahead of its time. Created in the aftermath of a particularly massive famine in Northern China in 1921, the CIFRC was designed for the purpose of administering emergency relief, and fulfilled this mission in innovative ways that worked to prevent further famine and to catalyze economic development in poor rural areas. When compared with the meager institutional measures of the Qing government and the undertakings of contemporary international relief organizations such as the Red Cross, the projects of the CIFRC stand out as superior in complexity and diversity. How exactly was the commission able to achieve so much more success in terms of sustainability and economic improvements? The answer to this question lies in three characteristics of the commission’s organization. First, the efficacy of its leadership can be attributed to the particular composition of its staff and workers, which rendered the CIFRC resistant to corruption. Second, the sustainability of its relief efforts can be attributed to skillful business procedures that established charity projects as loans and investments rather than handouts, which not only enabled the commission to maintain self-sustaining projects, but also imparted a sense of economic responsibility to those who were being relieved. Third, the CIFRC utilized a preventative approach to food shortages in China, treating the improvement of public facilities and rural economies as the keys to preventing the onset of famine.

Historical Context of the 1920-21 North China Famine

“The Chinese subcontinent is characterized, as everyone knows, by a high degree of uncertainty as far as climate and water resources, hence agriculture, are concerned.”¹ The agricultural infrastructure of pre-modern China existed in a precarious equilibrium, especially in the arid north, as droughts and floods were common and devastated the source of food for millions of poor rural peasants. The North China Famine of 1920-21 affected the populations of five provinces, Chihli, Shansi, Shensi, Honan, and Shantung. According to the report of the Peking United International Famine Relief Committee, each of these provinces, in their own right the size of many European countries, contained populations of some 20 to 25 million.² Using this rough estimate, the famine zone would have included between 100 and 125 million people.

At this point in history, the Chinese government was still weak and insecure; the country was fractured, still under the divided rule of over a dozen warlords. The central government vacillated between periods of stability and chaos as the Chinese National Party (KMT) attempted to organize itself into the more powerful body it would become in subsequent years. “In its relief and engineering programs, the commission had to contend against overwhelming odds in a period of extreme political and economic dislocation.”³ Leading up to the crisis itself, a three-year drought had already caused the area covered by these provinces to undergo severe hardships. Another supply problem came from the misuse of arable land. At the time of the drought, opium was a far more lucrative good than grain; without a sufficient ruling system to enforce the laws against its distribution, many areas that traditionally would have been devoted to producing food were instead taken up by poppy fields. Affected areas were especially susceptible to flooding as, due to poverty and the lack of a solid central government, there was widespread neglect of facilities such as flood dikes and river embankments that might have lessened the impact of sudden flooding. In addition, unchecked deforestation, which had created loose soil useless for agriculture, had also stripped away natural water barriers. Conditions were ripe for an all-out disaster.

The Peking United International Famine Relief Committee (PUIFRC) was the precursor to the CIFRC, and would be responsible for administering the immediate relief that saved millions during the 1920-21 famine. The commission was a combination of federated Chinese relief organizations and an International Executive composed of members of groups from a number of nations. Through international donations and the assistance of the Chinese government, a large budget of over $17 million had been successfully generated. With these funds, the PUIFRC approached famine relief with a view to not only provide an emergency food supply for the starving, but to also implement more modernized measures to provide defenses against the future onset of famine. The committee would, over the course of the six-month relief period, engage in innumerable relief projects, such as constructing public facilities to promote health and agriculture, providing education for refugee children, and establishing centers to teach vocational skills to displaced families. Public facility projects ranged from repairing roads and digging wells to building locks to facilitate water travel, and were based on “the wishes and requirements of the local people.”⁴

In early 1921, the PUIFRC in conjunction with other relief organizations that had engaged in the effort initiated the CIFRC, described as “the only organization in China under international control which is designed not only to relieve famine but to carry out comprehensive conservancy projects on a national basis.”⁵ The CIFRC was initiated to follow the legacy of the PUIFRC’s public works projects and far-sighted anti-famine measures. Over the course of its roughly 17-year life span, the commission undertook a wide range of public works endeavors with the goal of modernizing economic and social institutions. The commission, which was overseen by a joint Chinese-international committee, is remarkable for its success in a number of different investments that established public facilities improvement and economic modernization as key elements of food shortage prevention in under-developed regions.

The CIFRC Leadership and Resistance to Corruption

A first factor that contributed to the success of the CIFRC was the resistance of the commission’s leadership to the corruption that had greatly impaired the Qing’s institutions, which were plagued by the mishandling of resources by bureaucrats and overseers. Two corruption-prone famine-prevention granary systems that were organized during the dynastic period were the charity granaries and the ever-normal granaries. Charity granaries were established to provide loans of grain to farmers in time of need. Stores were accumulated through donations obtained by persuasive officials, who would work to convince the members of a community, from elites to common peasants, to provide contributions. While these institutions were somewhat helpful at the time of their inception in 1654, over time the program lost its ability to successfully operate. “Like other imperial institutions, the [charity granary] was influenced by the quality of local administration. Just as official enthusiasm imparted strength to these local granaries, official negligence never failed to impair their vitality.”⁶

Similarly, the ever-normal granary system proved somewhat useful following its inauguration in 1655, but its effectiveness gradually declined into complete uselessness. As the name suggests, ever-normal granaries were designed to maintain grain prices at a steady level. To accomplish this, officials would buy up excess grain in times of plenty to avoid the dramatic price-lowering effect of excess supply. On the flipside, in times of scarcity, the stored up grain would be sold to add more supply to the market and to avoid price gouging. While this idea seems sound in theory, inept or corrupt oversight led to a number of issues. Officials would dishonestly underreport stocks and take grain from the reserve, or would even less subtly resort to outright stealing. “…the rich took advantage of the system, and the people failed to get the benefit.”⁷ In addition, administrative negligence could lead to the rotting of emergency stores. In short: “The system of famine control was prevented from successful operation by an officialdom which was often as corrupt as it was incompetent…”⁸

In comparing the average Qing-era bureaucrat with the members of the CIFRC leadership, it is easy to see why the more modern institution was free of this ever present corruption. In addition to the numerous layers of sub-bureaucrats and clerks, the royal administration was led by career-bureaucrats, individuals whose entire lives had been spent in the expensive pursuit of an official position and who, it was implied, would utilize their positions to amass a large enough fortune to comfortably retire. Famous contemporary Qing scholars frustrated with dishonest practices realized that the widespread corruption was not so much a case of “moral degeneration”, but rather endemic of the bureaucratic system. One, Gong Zizhen, wrote that poor pay was the cause of scholarly immorality, and that “Self-interest comes before public-mindedness.”⁹ Another, Feng Guifen, explained “It is the state that has forced officials to become avaricious, they are not avaricious by nature.”¹⁰ In addition to poor pay, lengths of official careers were unpredictable, and the total income of a short professional career could not both account for the debts incurred from educational costs and provide enough savings to ensure a comfortable retirement with enough provisions to take care of dependent family members.

Whereas granary relief structures were directed by officials and clerks whose positions more or less assumed a degree of corrupt profiteering, the CIFRC was organized and led by a corruption-resistant mixture of Chinese and foreign individuals. The ranking Chinese personnel were almost exclusively composed of western-educated men of significant material background. Most spoke English, almost all had attended universities of the highest reputation—three had attended Yale, one Cornell, and one Columbia just as a few examples—and by profession they were engineers, diplomats, or followers of other high-income careers. These individuals represented the elite class of China following the demise of the imperial dynasty: they were wealthy, well-educated, and had strong ties with the west. On the foreign side, most non-Chinese members of the CIFRC leadership were missionaries, YMCA workers, or were otherwise of backgrounds associated with famine and disaster relief.¹¹

This composition of leadership represents a vital component that enabled the CIFRC to successfully maintain its relief institutions. While the Chinese individuals represented some of the most elite members of society, the foreign involvement with this project was much more subdued, and international board members did not so much represent their governments as they did the charitable intentions of their respective societies. A worldwide depression, fear of provoking Japan through meddling in Chinese affairs,¹² and general lack of interest limited the investment of foreign organizations and governments in the CIFRC. This distinction between the Chinese and foreign leadership demonstrates that the CIFRC could not rely on foreign governments as the source of the funding for its relief efforts. As will be explored below, this led the organization to adopt certain practices which would allow it to financially sustain itself. While foreign financial support might have been lacking, the absence of governmental ties among the non-Chinese leaders of the CIFRC meant that they were operating independently of any sort of political agenda. They were drawn to the cause of famine relief in China not for the purpose of exerting some influence in the country, but rather at the behest of their respective organizations to help alleviate human suffering as well as, in the case of the missionaries, to spread their respective religious doctrines through these charitable acts.

The CIFRC was founded on the principle of famine relief and not born out of a governmental mandate; as a result, the nature of the organization was drastically different from that of the Qing institutions. “On the Western side, we see individual Westerners, philanthropically motivated…On the Chinese side, we see the new ruling class of China that had replaced the traditional gentry.”¹³ The organizers of the commission were acting out on charitable impulses, and many general insights can be drawn from their respective backgrounds. Religious personnel and relief-institution workers choose their careers not out of a desire for personal gain, but rather to affect some kind of greater good. Missionaries are motivated out of a religious compulsion, and thus receive their reward through their work and the perceived good they are contributing to their causes. Similarly, workers for organizations like the YMCA are often sent to distant locations to carry out the mission of their organization. Few would have families to support as this lifestyle is not conducive to maintaining close-knit relationships. They would have no desire to extort or skim relief funds as, as demonstrated in their chosen profession, they would prefer to derive satisfaction out of helping others, not out of personal gain. The Western CIFRC organizers were more resistant to corruption than Qing officials because they derived non-monetary utility out of their aid-relief work.

The Chinese organizers were acting on a similar mind frame. They were of such rare backgrounds that they would have to have been of already significant personal means to receive their educations and maintain their relative social positions. It would have been illogical for them to have organized a relief commission with the intent to personally gain as there were much more lucrative endeavors that they could have instead opted to undertake with their time. Conversely, for a Qing official, administering famine relief was merely one facet of their position that, along with other jobs, would have been seen as one more way to build up a nest egg.

This large difference between the CIFRC leadership and the Qing administration is further cemented by the type of organization and resources the commission was overseeing. Rather than directly administering grain distribution and storage with little or no oversight, decision-makers were planning and implementing public works projects with modern accounting practices. The CIFRC made a point of utilizing laborers that were relief beneficiaries or famine sufferers, and were thus paid in grain. With no need to distribute monetary wages, there were no centralized collection centers that could have served as an outlet for embezzlement as there were during the Qing era. Funds for the purchase of grain and building materials and for the payment of skilled workers such as engineers or architects were allocated through banks with checks.¹⁴ Whereas the Qing bureaucrats had physical, material resources that were easy to relocate, hide, or generally misuse, the CIFRC representatives were dealing in intangible assets and complicated investment funds that would have been much harder to exploit.

While there would still have been plenty of opportunities for low-level employees to steal grain or for financial officers to have taken advantage of the system—especially in the repayment for relief by the communities which would likely not have had much knowledge of banking procedures—there is limited information available about any specific, village-level CIFRC financial transaction protocol, so it is difficult to infer how much, if any, exploitation might have occurred on this level. Even assuming a certain level of loss attributable to such petty corruption, in most cases the commission’s resources were of a less physical nature and would have been much less susceptible to thievery. This fact, combined with the personal characteristics of the CIFRC leaders who would have seen no benefit in corrupt financial practices, allowed the commission to operate in a smooth fashion that would have been impossible for institutions during the dynastic rule to achieve.

The Sustainability of CIFRC Financial Practices

While quality of leadership allowed the CIFRC to smoothly operate, the mission of the organization—social projects and economic development—required long-term work and a sustainable future. The commission had to adopt several innovative financial techniques to achieve this success. As the report of the PUIFRC notes, the quality of relief administered by this parent organization was significantly higher in a variety of ways. The needy were provided “not a full rice bowl for a few days and then starvation, but a fixed amount at regular intervals.”¹⁵ Previously, the Chinese government—no longer maintaining the granary systems of the dynastic period—would respond to crises by sending large quantities of grain to impoverished areas. These efforts, however, were poorly administered and were often over-distributed to communities that were not as threatened as others. As a result, steady supplies of food were rare, and victims could not depend on relief. Just as the PUIFRC’s aid was characterized as stable and dependable, the CIFRC’s efforts to implement social projects to provide anti-famine measures were implemented with great regularity and sustainability.

In the historical context of the period, as mentioned above, donations would have been an unreliable source of funding; rather, the CIFRC had to implement a budgetary system through which it would be able to independently maintain its flow of resources and work. Previous anti-famine institutions in China were plagued by unreliability both in terms of their quality of administration and the amount of financial aid that was provided by the central government.¹⁶ While the Qing relief practices were dependent on the central government’s unstable contributions, the CIFRC was able to implement a “revolving fund.”¹⁷ In essence, they viewed their principal investments in construction projects as a loan to the community benefiting from the improvements, and then provided means by which the community could repay the CIFRC over time. While the commission still relied on external factors for some degree of their operating budget, the practice of providing relief on a revolving basis and relying, as noted above, on the labor of those being aided allowed for a significant degree of comfortable independence.

In addition to common exchanges, such as building a canal or repairing a road for a village and then being paid back through the proceeds derived from use of the new facilities, the CIFRC also managed an innovative cooperative credit movement through which small collectives of farmers could jointly work to utilize a loan and offer mutual security on the payback. By providing these “mutual aid societies,” the CIFRC could provide the initial resources small communities needed to expand their local infrastructures.¹⁸ Through this program, the CIFRC catalyzed economic development without having to dedicate personnel or administrative resources, and benefited rural communities, helping them prevent future outbreaks of famine, while still eventually getting their funds repaid. The CIFRC was effectively running its own banking service and providing micro-credit loans to farming communities, all without external support or government supervision as far back as the 1930’s. This is one example of how the commission maintained profitable enterprises outside of direct rural development that greatly assisted rural economic development without the added costs associated with administrative infrastructures.

In addition to designing relief efforts that would provide long-term payback, the CIFRC also tried a number of other approaches to obtaining funds when the supply of foreign donations became less dependable. An attempt at motivating the Chinese government to impose a customs surtax to help fund the organization was initiated in 1924, but was mostly unsuccessful. Not only did it take years until the tax was implemented, but the proceeds were also funneled through a government commission before reaching the CFIRC, further retarding the process. An attempt was also made to generate funds through the selling of a series of stamps and seals also starting in 1924, but this attempt proved similarly unsuccessful. Interestingly, though the stamp project never realized more than a few thousand dollars, it did have “a supplementary value as publicity.”¹⁹ Additional activities such as collection drives supplied small contributions to the CIFRC’s income, but the major sources of the commission’s externally-supplied budget were American and Chinese donations. Without the revolving funds and creative income-generating projects like the rural-credit movement, these donations would not have allowed the CIFRC to sustain its presence in the country as long as it did. Bureaucratic institutions, acting as extensions of the central government, proved ineffectual in providing stable and sufficient relief to famine victims, but the CIFRC succeeded by acting as an independent corporation and employing creative financial techniques to maintain a healthy budget.

The CIFRC’s Focus on Famine Prevention

The CIFRC’s goals of the long-term economic and social improvement are well explained by the five founding principles that the institution was based upon. The first of these principles defined famine as an event not necessarily involving “any immediate perceptible increase in the death rate”²⁰ of a region. This meant that the efforts of the CIFRC would not be limited to responding to disasters, but would rather extend its role to seeking out instances of smaller-scaled but still threatening situations. Whereas most relief organizations, especially governmental institutions, would wait for a full-blown crisis to respond, the CIFRC would keep itself busy at all times looking for ways to forestall such incidents. This kind of preemptive thinking was lauded in a 1930 article in the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, which praised the CIFRC for its “constant effort to build up a structure that insures against the recurrence of famine.”²¹ At the time of the article, the CIFRC was the only relief organization in China to be following such a path.

The second, third, and fourth principles were related to an economic strategy that would prove to both help the CIFRC sustain itself and to provide the relieved communities with an outlet to “earn food for themselves and their families through the dignity of labour.”²² The second principle expounded the desire for the projects of the CIFRC to be carried out by laborers whose compensation would be the relief provided by the organization. This process of work for food would not only avoid “pauperizing” the populations by giving them work, but would also provide the commission with a free source of labor.²³ The workers would be willing to contribute as, according to the third principle, “labor projects should contribute to the economic improvement of the community.” The fourth principle prescribed that, except in dire emergencies, communities benefiting from CIFRC projects should be expected to repay the organization, further instilling the idea that this relief was not so much a handout as a kind of temporary loan. The fifth and final principle was not so much concerned with emergency relief as it was the maintenance of flood prevention mechanisms. To this end, the commission organized several distinct bureaus that handled the construction of such projects in periods of non-famine, and would serve to both boost economic conditions in impoverished, rural areas and to prevent further incidents of disastrous famine.

Comparing these principle guidelines to those of the Qing government that have already been discussed, the difference is clear. During the Qing era, relief institutions consisted of formalized bureaucratic systems that were carefully organized so as to properly allocate emergency relief to those peasants that most needed it. In addition to provisions for emergency grain transport, local officials were also in charge of dike maintenance, irrigation control, and other local public structures to check flood and drought crises. Finally, different granary systems were implemented by the central government for various purposes relating to the prevention of famine-inducing conditions. Though there were many different types of granary systems, they all invariably suffered from poor management and, by the turn of the twentieth century, were more or less defunct. “…the difficulties of the office [of granary manager] were such that those who were competent to handle it did their best to avoid it, and those who volunteered were likely to be scoundrels.”²⁴ These institutions, though effective when first introduced, were gradually put under the influence of corrupt local powers and became defunct.

In short, beyond these failed granary experiments, the Qing government focused on famine at the crisis stage. “The government itself only took vigorous measures to relieve its distressed people only in times of grave disaster, such as widespread famine.”²⁵ The non-governmental PUIFRC, in contrast, saw famine not as a perennial occurrence, but rather investigated the underlying causes of food shortages and sought to relieve the widespread distress through the construction and maintenance of agricultural and irrigational projects. This practice became the foundation for the CIFRC; though the commission did partake in scattered emergency grain distribution, its primary mission was to build up the economic infrastructure of famine-threatened communities.

The commission was acting less as an emergency famine relief organization and more as a replacement for inept or absent governmental maintenance and repair institutions. This mission was criticized by members of the Red Cross leadership who protested the audacity of the CIFRC, an NGO, taking over roles the government should be responsible for handling. A 1924 report by the Red Cross criticized the CIFRC on several points. One qualm was that the goal of public works construction necessitated a long-term organization, requiring salaried workers who, dependent on consistent foreign donations for their livelihood, would seek out situations to apply their services. As a result, they would, in times of stability or low-impact shortages, forcibly apply their method of relief instead of allowing local institutions to respond to the situation with “more normal methods”.26 Second, the report questioned whether the presence of a long-term foreign relief agency would “prevent native initiative and responsibility,”²⁷ basically positing that the government and the people of China would become dependent on the CIFRC and would not seek to solve their own problems. Finally, the Red Cross criticized the notion of labor relief as detrimental to the famine sufferers, arguing that the setting up of the networks of accountants, supervisors, engineers, etc. would lengthen the process of getting aid to the needy and that the costs for such peripheral staff would divert funds away from the sufferers.

The first criticism might have been legitimate if the CIFRC were approaching its work using the Red Cross method of organization—of working short-term on funds obtained through external donations—but analysis of the structure of the commission renders this complaint obsolete. From its inception, the CIFRC planned to operate on a long-term basis and, unlike the Red Cross, was not wholly dependent on foreign donations for its operation. As discussed in the previous section, the commission carried out its projects under a loan-mentality, providing terms for communities benefiting from relief to pay them back over the course of a few years, during which time they could utilize their new facilities to financially develop and pay back the loan with ease.

Second, the intimation that the commission would clandestinely seek out ways to apply itself ignored the founding doctrine of the organization. As seen in its first principle, the CIFRC had openly declared its intention to apply engineering projects to poor areas in times of stability to prevent further onset of famine. There was never any question as to the commission’s intent to use the funds for various methods of improvement outside of simple distribution when the lack of need for emergency action made it possible.
The author of the Red Cross report described the “normal methods” that should take precedence over the commission’s work as the utilization of already-existing government bureaus and native relief organizations. This point calls into question the nature of the disasters the commission was working to prevent. There was considerable resistance from the Red Cross and other international organizations against providing relief for situations caused by political negligence or upheaval because, as the second complaint explained, it was thought that governments might take advantage of such assistance, solely relying on relief organizations to deal with domestic issues. The CIFRC executive council responded that “…the primary consideration in determining whether relief should be given, and the form that the relief should take, should be the severity of the need and the possibilities of effective relief rather than satisfactoriness or otherwise of the political conditions.”²⁸ Further, the council concluded that since the famine sufferers themselves were not responsible for bringing about the political conditions that allowed their situation to become so dire, they should not be held accountable.

The limited focus of the commission’s development projects as well as its dependence on the cooperation of relief laborers demonstrate that the contention that the CIFRC was taking the place of government is flawed. The commission was not simply handing out aid to whoever needed it; rather, their work came with a provision for repayment, and was performed through the labor of the benefiting community. Further, not all of the improvement projects were of a nature that could serve as a substitute for government institutions. For example, the rural credit movement provided a necessary banking service rather than an interventionist public works maintenance service. The Red Cross also failed to note that the CIFRC was largely organized and operated by Chinese individuals, and was not solely a “foreign” influence. The report seems to assume that the Westerners involved in the commission were really the ones responsible for the commission’s success. The Red Cross’s misunderstanding of the importance of Chinese leadership within the organization is indicative of embedded Orientalist condescension, as if to say that the Chinese could not have been responsible for such success.

The final assertion that the administrative infrastructure required to maintain long-term projects would negatively impact relief efforts is also flawed. Revolving financial practices showed that the complex administration of the commission was indeed sustainable and did not take resources away from famine sufferers. The argument that administrative delays would prove detrimental to relief efforts is also faulty as, even if setting up such an effort would require a lot of time, the focus of the CIFRC on pre-disaster famine prevention meant that time was not a critical factor.

Though not mentioned in the response by the CIFRC, one final point worth noting is that long-term prevention efforts like those carried out by the commission provide defenses against the chaos that can result from extended food shortages. Commonly in cases of famine, those without food would migrate to look for work or useable land. In China, starving peasants would often form bands and roam the countryside in groups. Not able to find means to produce their own food, these bands would then be forced to raid neighboring communities to procure the supplies they so desperately needed. Interestingly, the Mongolian conquest of most of the Eurasian continent in the Twelfth Century initially began as a long-distance food raid. Similarly, the Taiping Rebellion of 1851-1864 grew out of an organized resistance to banditry. Following a series of natural and political disasters (droughts and the Opium Wars), food shortages caused widespread raiding and violence. The sect that grew into the rebel movement was initiated as a defense army against such threats. The ultimate result of this formation was a civil war that lasted over a decade and claimed an estimated 200 million lives, second in number only to World War II. Even if the situations that led to the abject conditions that the CIFRC sought to improve could be attributed to political negligence, by implementing their development projects the commission may have prevented even more disastrous political situations.

Conclusion

The CIFRC effectively saved vast numbers of Chinese peasants by relieving famine and, more importantly, preventing it. A contemporary humanitarian noted that “The China International Famine Relief Commission recognizes that the entire problem cannot be solved at once.”²⁹ Indeed, it is impossible to estimate the casualties that could have occurred had water crises or other issues led to a famine in the areas that were fortified by the work of the commission, but it is safe to place the minimum number in the hundreds of thousands. Because the organization was led by individuals motivated by charitable influences who were not dependent on their work for income, the commission was able to operate relatively smoothly without the interference of corruption. The projects initiated by the organization were successfully implemented over an extended period due to the financial practices utilized by the CIFRC to ensure long-term sustainability. Finally, the commission’s work was so effective because it did not wait for famine to set in, but rather sought out new and innovative ways to build up communal facilities to prevent the onset of food shortages. These three vital characteristics enabled the CIFRC to build up the economic landscape of rural China in the first half of the Twentieth Century and to prevent famine.

Footnotes

1. Will, Pierre-Etienne. Bureaucracy and Famine in Eighteenth-Century China. Stanford University Press: Stanford California, 1990. Page 3.
2. “The North China Famine of 1920-21 with Special Attention to the West Chihli Area.” Peking United International Famine Relief Committee. Peking, 1922. Page 7.
3. Nathan, Andrew James. A History of the China International Famine Relief Commission. Harvard University Press, Cambridge: 1965. Page 71.
4. Ibid, Page 65.
5. Ibid, Page 13.
6. Hsiao, Kung-Chuan, Rural China, Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century. University of Washington Press, Seattle. 1960. Page 149.
7. Chen, Huang-Chang. The Economic Principles of Confucius and His School. Gordon Press, New York. 1974. Page 576.
8. Hsiao, Page 180.
9. Lin, Man-houng. China Upside Down: Currency, Society, and Ideologies, 1808-1856. Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 2006. Page 208.
10. Ibid.
11. Nathan, Pages 23-26.
12. Nathan, Page 24.
13. Ibid, Page 25.
14. Nathan makes several references to the CIFRC allocation of funds to various banking institutions and its use of checks in emergency situations to make large purchases. For example, see page 37 for an account of financial dealings with multiple banking institutions.
15. PUIFRC report, Page 64.
16. Shiue, Carol H. “The Political Economy of Famine Relief in China, 1740-1820.” Journal of Interdisciplinary History, xxxvi: I (Summer, 2005), 33-55. Page 38.
17. Nathan, Page 15.
18. Ibid, Page 36.
19. Ibid, Page 43.
20. Nathan, Page 14.
21. Outerbridge, Rev. Leonard M. “Seeds for China’s Arid Areas: A Famine-Prevention Project.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 152, China. (Nov., 1930), pp. 99-104. Page 99.
22. PUIFRC Report, Page 77.
23. Nathan, Page 15.
24. Will, Page 203.
25. Bohr, Page 27.
26. Nathan, Page 18.
27. Quoted in Nathan, Page 18.
28. Quoted in Nathan, Page 21.
29. Outerbridge, Page 99.

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