I. Introduction

The Taiwan Strait is one of the few places in the world where the United States may be drawn into an armed conflict with an existing nuclear power. Though it is in the U.S national interest to reduce the probability of armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait, U.S. policy of arms sales to Taiwan endanger long term stability of the region.  Since the abrogation of the of the formal defense treaty between the United States and Taiwan, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan under the guidance of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) have served as a de facto defense treaty.[1] U.S. arm sales to Taiwan play a defining role in this post-1979 defense agreement. Section 2 of the TRA requires that the United States provide Taiwan with the necessary defense assistance to maintain Taiwan’s self-defense capability.[2] The People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s dissatisfaction with the terms of the TRA spurred the Reagan administration to issue the 1982 Joint Communiqué which reassured that,

“The United States Government states that it will not seek to carry out a long term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution.“[3]

Despite the reassurances of the Joint Communiqué, U.S. presidents George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush have greatly elevated, rather than reduced U.S. arm sales to Taiwan. McClaran reflects, “The contradictions between the TRA and the Joint Communiqué have thus been revealed as a major source of PRC ire toward the U.S…[placing] the U.S. squarely in the middle of what the PRC leadership believes is an unsettled issue of civil war.”[4] With the growing cooperation and exchange between Taiwan and mainland China currently underway, the time is ripe for the United States to reverse its problematic policy of arms sales to Taiwan. The U.S. policy of arm sales to Taiwan escalates an arms race with China, entraps the United States in Taiwan’s defense, and creates the incentive for Taiwan to shirk its responsibilities in defense. Reversing the policy of arm sales would ameliorate many of these negative consequences while not compromising U.S. strategic aims in East Asia.

II. U.S. Aims and the Policy of Arm Sales

The United States has adopted the policy of arms sales to Taiwan, as part of its China strategy, to achieve three major strategic objectives in the Taiwan Strait.

First, the U.S. seeks to deter China from attempting to reunify Taiwan by military force. Guided by deterrence theory, the U.S. has maintained a steady resolve over the past fifty years that it will not tolerate the violent reunification of Taiwan. By providing Taiwan with modern weapons, the U.S. effectively increases the cost of military intervention for China and decreases the likelihood of success of such an action. In other words, the U.S. hopes to pursue deterrence by denial through its policy of arms sales to Taiwan.

Second, the United States wishes to protect the democratic institutions and the free market economy of Taiwan. Taiwan is one of the “Asian Tigers” and is the eighth largest trading partner of the United States.[5] Since the late 1980s, Taiwan has also repealed martial law and democratized. Therefore, it is in U.S. interest to maintain both Taiwan’s economic and political structure.

Third, the United States seeks to prevent China from becoming a hostile rival in the Pacific. This complicates its other aims in the Taiwan Strait. Arming Taiwan to deter China elevates tensions with China. The policy of U.S. arm sales to Taiwan therefore represents a classic case of the security dilemma. On one hand the U.S. wishes to provide Taiwan with weapons to deter Chinese aggression; on the other hand, these efforts are perceived as U.S. attempt to divide China and result in greater arms build up in China. The consequence is an even more unstable Taiwan Strait with a greater accumulation of weapons on both sides. The U.S. aim of deterrence through arm sales therefore produces severe consequences and security challenges.

III. China’s Aims and Response to Arm Sales

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) views the U.S. policy of arm sales to Taiwan as a threat to its national sovereignty and prestige. The PRC perceives U.S. efforts to arm Taiwan as an attempt to undermine China’s sovereignty. From Beijing’s perspective, “Taiwan is the last unresolved territorial issue (after Hong Kong and Macao) dating back to the pre-communist period of China’s national weakness and territorial dismemberment.”[6] As such, the Taiwan issue has become a rallying point for Chinese nationalism. Thus, “anything that occurs on Taiwan that suggests permanent separation from China and any U.S. policy that could be construed as aimed at this outcome, in essence, becomes a severe security threat to Beijing and what remains of the compact between the regime and its citizens.”[7] Given the domestic consensus on the Taiwan question, the cost of capitulation for the PRC in the event of Taiwanese independence would be very high. This shifts the balance of resolve away from the United States towards China. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s asymmetrical military modernization program signals of its resolve to risk war with the U.S. over Taiwan. The PLA has invested in submarines, Sovremenny-class destroyers, as well as medium and short range ballistic missiles that are area denial weapons designed to destroy the power of U.S. aircraft carriers. [8] These weapons would effectively raise the costs of deploying a carrier group in the Taiwan Strait and act as area denial deterrence.

Additionally, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan represent a challenge to China’s sense of national prestige. According to a report to Congress, “Many of Taiwan’s traditional arms suppliers have stopped out of respect for China’s position and the prospects for more lucrative commercial trade with the mainland.” The report continues, “This has effectively isolated the U.S. as a major threat to China’s national prestige and sovereignty, and hence made it the de facto focus of the PLA’s strategic and military modernization effort.”[9] China’s resolve to achieve its aims in the Taiwan Strait outweigh the resolve of the United States; while Taiwan is a peripheral concern of U.S. foreign policy, it lies at the center of Chinese foreign policy. China has demonstrated its strategic resolve in the Taiwan Strait through its investments in asymmetrical warfare. Thus, in the collapse of the “One China” consensus, the policy of arms sales places Washington uncomfortably in the middle of Beijing and Taipei and may draw the U.S. into an unwanted war with China.

The U.S. policy of arms sales creates a Chinese security paradox paralleling the U.S. security paradox. “The PRC’s motivation to push Taiwan onto a path toward unification increases in direct proportion to the degree to which Beijing perceived Taipei to be drifting away. To deter that drift’s reaching the point of independence, the PRC increased its military projection…this, of course, induced Washington to enhance its own deterrence”[10] by pushing Taiwan to accept more U.S. weapons.

IV. Consequences of Policy of Arm Sales

Both China and the United States are plagued by this shared security dilemma. Both sides contribute to the security dilemma by attempting to shift the balance of arms in the Taiwan Strait in order to achieve its own strategic aims. The U.S. policy of arms sales to Taiwan as outlined in the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) lies at the crux of its own security dilemma. The policy of arms sales produces three major consequences for the U.S. First, it creates a destabilizing arms race with China. Second, it emboldens the Taiwanese to be more aggressive in their foreign policy and may lead to entrapment. Third, it creates incentive for Taiwan to shirk its defensive duties.

The Arms Race Problem

The U.S. policy of arm sales to Taiwan empowers PLA hardliners and creates a destabilizing arms race across the Taiwan Strait. “U.S. arm sales to Taiwan significantly reduce Beijing’s options in dealing with Taipei and greatly increases the prospects of military confrontation. The net effect is that these arms sales have become the single biggest obstacle to establishing fully normal relations between the U.S. and China and narrow the options for both sides to either conflict or cooperate.”[11] The policy of U.S. arm sales reinforce Beijing’s suspicion that separation is Washington’s scarcely concealed agenda.[12]This is because U.S. weapons in Taiwan undermine the credibility of China’s threat to use military force in response to Taiwanese independence. Thus, it induces China to modernize its military to continue to make credible its threat of military force. This security dilemma gives the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) strong political influence over the PRC’s Taiwan Policy, allowing hardliners more sway within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). [13] These hardliners have pushed for Chinese military modernization in order to challenge the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait. Chinese modernization in term provokes the U.S. to approve of even larger arm sales to Taiwan. According to the spiral model of arms races this will increase tensions across the Strait as the build up in arms increases mutual hostility and fear. This nascent arms race, if continued, could lead to greater instability in the Taiwan Strait and lead to war between the U.S. and China.

The Entrapment Problem

While U.S. arm sales to Taiwan may deter the use of military force by China in the short run, it also makes the U.S. vulnerable to entrapment in the long run. McClaran writes, “With the Taiwan Relations Act, Congress came within a micron of committing the U.S. to Taiwan’s defense.”[14] The role of arm sales in U.S. commitment to Taiwan were outlined when the TRA ensures that the U.S. will provide Taiwan with weapons it deems necessary for “defense”. However, since 1979, a number of Taiwan’s procurements have been more closely allied with U.S. foreign trade prerogatives and lacked credible links to its real military needs.[15] A major portion of U.S. arms received by Taiwan since 1979 were primarily made to satisfy the influential advocates and beneficiaries of the U.S. domestic industry and for political gains. [16] From Taiwan’s perspective, this indicated an increased level of U.S. support for its de facto independence.[17] This perceived deepening of U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s defense compromises U.S. strategic aims in the Taiwan Strait by creating the problem of entrapment. Arm sales that go beyond Taiwan’s real defense needs may encourage Taiwan to pursue an aggressive foreign policy objective such as independence. In this event, China will be forced to retaliate with military force as it has committed itself to do, and the United States would be drawn into the war due to its defensive commitment to Taiwan. The U.S. came dangerously close to being entrapped by Taiwan when China made known its outrage over Chen Shui-bian’s campaign for diplomatic and U.N. recognition of Taiwan. Chen deviated from his campaigned platform of 2000, in which he pledged the Five Nos[18], because he perceived strong U.S. support in 2001 when President Bush approved the largest Taiwan arms sale since 1992.[19] The strong support of Taiwan by the Bush administration was capitalized upon by the Taiwanese president to adopt otherwise overly ambitious foreign policy objectives with impunity.

The Shirking Problem

The Bush administration entered office with a more pro-Taiwan Policy than any of his predecessors. He sought to reverse the policy of strategic ambiguity in regards to Taiwan and was in favor of “declar[ing] unambiguously that [the U.S.] would come to Taiwan’s defense in the event of an attack or a blockade against Taiwan.”[20] The logic was that this would clarify America’s commitment to protect Taiwan, decrease the potential for miscalculation by Beijing, and reduce Chinese interest in military conflict over Taiwan. President Bush significantly reduced U.S. strategic ambiguity by stating that the U.S. will “do whatever it takes” to protect Taiwan.[21] In 2001, the Bush administration coupled its rhetoric by approving the largest Taiwan arms sale since 1992 a package which included 8 diesel-electric submarines, 12 ASW aircraft, and 4 Kidd class destroyers (weapon systems designed to offset the Chinese superiority in submarines). Though this may have heavy-handedly achieved its intended goal of reducing Chinese miscalculation, it also created room for Taiwanese politicians to shirk in their own defense. In 2001, Taiwan’s defense budget would suffer a reduction from $12.9 billion to $8.0 billion and continue to be reduced to $7.5 billion in 2003. Taking advantage of the guarantee of American support provided by the Bush administration, the Taiwanese legislature sought to shirk defense spending, to the great frustration of U.S. policy makers. In 2004, Richard Lawless, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, made it clear to Chen Chao-min, Taiwan’s vice Defense Minister, that Taiwan “should not view America’s resolute commitment to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait as a substitute for investing the necessary resources in its own defense.”[22] The Bush administration recognized the problem of shirking produced by their arm sales. The fear was that Taiwan will be unwilling to adequately provide to its own defense and thus shift the burden of deterring Chinese aggressing to the United States. In 2004, the rhetoric of the Bush administration reversed almost completely. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly clarified U.S. policy by making it clear that the U.S. “does not support” Taiwanese independence, that it would be “irresponsible” to treat the PRC’s statements as “empty threats” and that U.S. efforts to deter the PRC “might fail” if Beijing is convinced that Taiwan is embarking on a course of independence and concludes that Taiwan must be stopped.[23] President Bush had seemingly put a freeze on Taiwan’s arms requests in 2006 and delayed notifying Congress of eight pending arm sales.[24]

V. Alternative Policy

The policy of U.S. arm sales to Taiwan generates instability in the long run: sparking an arms race across the Taiwan Strait, while at the same time enabling Taiwan’s shirking of its own defensive responsibilities and making the United States vulnerable to entrapment where Taiwan’s aggressive diplomacy may provoke a Chinese response and draw the United States into a war that it wishes to avoid. Ceasing annual arms sales with Taiwan would eliminate the consequences of the policy without necessarily endangering U.S. aims. It would actually create a new opportunity that may enable the United States to achieve more of its aims in East Asia such as the disarmament of North Korea.

Ceasing regular arms sales does not mean eliminating U.S. deterrence against a Chinese attempt to unify Taiwan by force. The conventional strength of the U.S. navy serves as a powerful deterrent for China not to invade Taiwan. In fact, the ceasing of arms sales should be coupled with a reiteration of U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan if China seeks a military solution. Additionally, China and Taiwan are making great diplomatic progress through the Three Links, which make Taiwan and China even more interconnected and decrease the risk of armed conflict in the Strait. In other words, China would have no incentive to change the status quo even if the U.S. ceased arm sales to Taiwan because it can more effectively entice Taiwan towards reunification economically. In fact, a reiteration of the 1983 Joint Communiqué would be a gesture of good that can enlist Chinese cooperation on tough issues in which it also has a stake, such as North Korea.

Along the same lines, the U.S. aim to preserve the democratic government of Taiwan and its free market would not be jeopardized by ending arm sales. Taiwan is now the biggest investor in China, trade across the strait have grown and will continue to grow with the Three Links.[25] The PRC has stated that it is more than willing to allow Taiwan to maintain its own way of governance as a democracy if it was to become reunified with China.[26] It has also made clear that Taiwan would be allowed to keep its own defense force in the event of unification. Chinese conduct in Hong Kong makes it promise credible. The return of Hong Kong to China has not resulted in the collapse of Hong Kong’s democratic government and economy.

Most importantly, the U.S. objective to avoid the rise of a hostile power in the Pacific will be realized if arm sales to Taiwan ends. China’s economic growth and consequent power cannot be wished or ignored away; they are realities that the United States will continue to live with. The key for U.S. foreign policy therefore should be to prevent China from becoming a hostile power. Additionally, if the U.S. ends arm sales on the condition that China toughens up its policy towards North Korea, regional allies will be placated. South Korea and Japan’s concern over North Korean nuclear program dwarfs their concern over the security of Taiwan. The overture to end arm sales can be part of a tit-for-tat bargaining strategy with China to enlist its help with the otherwise unsolvable problem of North Korea. If China fails to cooperate, then the U.S. would still have the freedom to resume arm sales in Taiwan. In the spirit of the 1982 communiqué, a halt of U.S. arm sales to Taiwan would allow all three U.S. objectives in the Taiwan Strait to be achieved without any of the consequences.

Some would see ceasing arm sales to Taiwan as a form of appeasement for China that will result in Chinese “salami slicing”. These fears are largely unfounded; the relaxing of tension over the Taiwan would deny hardliners in the CCP their favorite diversion from festering internal problems. Additionally, a military unification of Taiwan is highly unlikely in the short run, given the success of China’s diplomatic and economic overtures to Taiwan. It is equally, if not more, unlikely in the long run as cross-strait interdependence grows.

The major obstacle facing arms sale reduction is US domestic politics. The TRA places the issue of arm sales to Taiwan in the jurisdiction of Congress. The Taiwan lobby is a powerful force in Washington and among its advocates are large U.S. weapons contractors who may be forced to cut production even further in this state of the economy.  In fact it has been clear since the 1980s that “Taiwan does not need more arms for the U.S…. the U.S. must shift its policy from providing arms overtly to a discreet strategy of advice and assistance designed to improve and rationalize Taiwan’s force structure with its military objectives.”[27] Nevertheless the policy of arm sales continued because contractors such as Lockheed Martin and Raytheon make massive profits from this unique form of trade with Taiwan. Even though the policy of stopping U.S. arm sales to Taiwan on the condition of Chinese cooperation on North Korea is a sound foreign policy, it will face significant opposition in Washington.

VI. Conclusion

A policy to end U.S. arm sales to Taiwan while reiterating U.S. opposition to the use of force in the Taiwan Strait would be consistent with American aims in the region. Arm sales simply are not a sustainable long term policy; impetus for change should come sooner rather than later. The current climate of cooperation between the PRC and Taiwan reduces Chinese reliance of military coercion and offers the Obama administration the unique opportunity to end U.S. arm sales at the lowest possible cost internationally. Taiwan’s sagging economy means that the Taiwanese military budget is under pressure domestically and demand for U.S. arms is low. Additionally, the belligerence shown by North Korean’s ballistic missile testing means that South Korea and Japan are more eager acquiesce to a deal where ending arm sales to Taiwan would increase Chinese pressure on North Korea. This policy reversal sacrifices none of the major U.S. goals in the Taiwan Strait and eliminates all the unpleasant consequences. The U.S. could avoid escalating the arms race with China and at the same time protect itself from Taiwanese entrapment and shirking. The U.S. will be much freer to maneuver diplomatically in East Asia as a result and even have the potentially opportunity enlist China’s cooperation in other major objectives such as counter-proliferation in North Korea and Iran.

References

[1] Austin, Kevin Cox, Sr. “U.S. MILITARY ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN: DETERRENCE OR PROVOCATION”, NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Thesis, 2002, p. 35

[2] Bush, Richard C., “Scared Texts” of United States –China- Taiwan Relations”. At Cross Purposes- U.S.-Taiwan Relations Since 1942. p.155

[3] Marsh, Christopher and Dreyer, “Appendix 1”, U.S-China Relations in the Twenty-First Century, p. 120

[4] McClaran, John.P, “U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan: Implications for the Future of the Sino-U.S. Relationship”, Asian Survey, 2000

[5] Needham, Michael A, and Tkacik, John, “The Grim Future for Taiwan’s Defenses” Heritage Foundation, 2006

[6] Lampton, DM and Ewing, RD, “U.S.-China Relations in a Post-September 11 World” Nixon Center, p. 72

[7] Lampton and Ewing, 72

[8] Austin, 70

[9] Kan,Shirley A, “Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990”, Congressional Research Service, 2009

[10] Lampton and Ewing, 72

[11] McClaran, 639

[12] Lampton and Ewing, 73

[13] McClaran, 639

[14] McClaran,  628

[15] Austin

[16] Testimony of Lora Lumpe Director, Arms Sales Monitoring Project Federation of American

Scientists Subcommittee on Foreign Operations Appropriations Committee, U.S. Senate 23 May 1995 Hearing on

U.S. Conventional Arms Export Policy.

[17] Lampton and Ewing

[18] The five nos: no declaration of independence; no change in the “national title”; no “state- to-state description in the Constitution”; no referendum to change the status quo; no abolition of the National Unification Council nor the Guidelines for National Unification., Sicherman, Harvy, “Taiwan’s New President: One if and five nos”

[19] Lampton and Ewing, 76

[20] Ibid,  75

[21] Ibid, 75

[22] Kan, 40

[23] Ibid, 38

[24] Ibid, 37

[25] Lampton and Ewing

[26] Ibid,

[27] McClaran

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