The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou won a landslide victory on March 22, 2008, defeating Democratic People’s Party (DPP) candidate Frank Hsieu and ending eight years of DPP rule over Taiwan. His victory has largely been attributed to two closely related campaign planks—(1) improvement of Taiwan’s stagnant economy and (2) increased economic and cultural ties with the mainland. However the strength of Ma’s victory, diametrically opposed to the DPP’s values of national identity and Taiwan independence over economic gains, belies the existing tensions within Taiwan itself. These tensions leave Ma little room for error as he navigates the fine line between internal and external dangers.

Three societal rifts in Taiwan make Ma’s job exceedingly difficult: the ethnic Han-Taiwanese rift, the economic and developmental North-South rift, and the ideological (and generational) reunification-independence rift. As one can imagine, these rifts are interrelated and, in most cases, inseparable—for example, most aboriginal ethnic Taiwanese live in the comparably underdeveloped South, and of these, most support independence and the DPP. Yet, although overlap is expected and prevalent, lines of distinction cannot be so clearly drawn. Although many urban Northerners may not have roots in the south, they make up a substantial portion of the independence minded political constituency. At the same time, these urbanites may shift to a more moderate KMT position in times of economic difficulty, or during a period of corrupt governance, both characteristics of the DPP Chen Shui-bian era. Thus, Ma’s political “mandate” of easing tensions along the Taiwan Strait may not be as powerful as once hoped by either Beijing or Washington.

Consequently Ma’s Taiwan Strait policy of “three no’s”—no to unification, no to independence, and no to military action— is more of a throwback to the 1992 China-Taiwan agreement of a constructively ambiguous “one China” than a progressive, revolutionary step toward a new era of reconciliation. The warm welcome given to Ma from Beijing is largely a byproduct of a collective sigh of relief—relief that the 2008 Olympics won’t be used as a staging ground for Taiwan independence. The true test begins after the Olympics, as goodwill becomes a less valued political commodity. Similarly, the U.S. praise comes at the heels of the inflammatory and gaffe prone Chen—praise that, closely examined, points to less and not greater support from an overburdened superpower wishing for the status quo.

When President Ma Ying-jeou is inaugurated on May 20^th, the regional and international community can expect a honeymoon period where many of Ma’s Taiwan Strait policies will reap economic and political dividends—direct flights allowing 650,000 Taiwanese businessmen living on the mainland convenient travel, increasing mainland tourism in Taiwan to a million visitors per year, and creation of an economic market for China-Taiwan trade. However, loftier goals set by the hopeful media and analysts, including a peace treaty that officially ends the civil war between the CCP and KMT, will be difficult if not impossible to meet, barring drastic domestic and international changes. In short, even correctly implemented, Ma’s policies will do much to restore the status quo circa 1992, but little to move beyond it. Hopefully these evolutionary and not revolutionary steps will be enough to fulfill the promise of such a heralded new leader.

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