Abstract: A decades old question of democratization in China has been revived by its resurgence as a world power under the non-democratic leadership of the CCP. The historical origin of liberal democracy extends back to the early 20th century with Liang Qichao’s Constitutionalist Party and Sun Yat-Sen’s Nationalist Party. The Republic of China was established in 1912 but quickly disintegrated; it was reestablished under the KMT in 1928, but this too fell apart after a bloody civil war against the CCP. The current debate over the possibility of democratization in China revolves around its compatibility with Confucianism. Confucianism in China has survived many regimes, from dynastic rule to the dictatorship of the KMT, and finally, the CCP. Although the future of a hypothetical Chinese democratic regime is unclear, what is clear is that Confucianism must be accounted for and integrated into any new political picture to arise.

I. Historical Context

Political scientists have offered compelling historical arguments both for and against the likelihood of democracy in China. Before an analysis of these arguments can take place, it is helpful to have a brief understanding of the historical context of Chinese democracy.

Internal Reform

Although Chinese history spans thousands of years, one needs only to look back a mere century or so to analyze the development of liberal democracy. Chinese democracy originated in 1895 on the heels of China’s humiliating defeat in the Sino-Japanese War. In the waning days of the last ruling dynasty of China, the Qing, a man by the name of Liang Qichao started a call for reform. A traditional Confucian scholar, journalist, and politician, Liang was a member of the traditional intellectual elite. He called for constitutional reform that would lead to a constitutional monarchy—propelled by widespread unrest over the war, he held the first political protest of its kind in China, calling for greater political participation by the people in order to strengthen the state. He appealed to his fellow intelligentsia and gained a following of liberal elites through the translation and publication of Western liberal democracy’s founding theorists including Hobbes, Rousseau, Locke, Hume, and others. In 1898, Liang was exiled for his reform efforts—he consequently traveled around the world raising support for a Chinese democratization and modernization movement, meeting with U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt in 1903. Thus, the party of reform from within was embodied in Liang’s Constitutionalist Party.

In contrast to Liang was U.S. educated Dr. Sun Yat-sen, a medical doctor who sought to reform China through a more drastic political and cultural revolution, analogous with his own personal spiritual revolution. Returning to China as a doctor in 1883, Sun originally aligned himself with the traditional elites, including Liang’s Constitutionalists. Ten years later, a frustrated Sun, whose lack of Confucian schooling and foreign Christian faith sabotaged his efforts to win over Confucian intellectual elites, traveled back to Hawaii to found the Revive China Society. The society was a launch-pad for revolutionary activity back in China—it was supported by revolutionary Chinese expatriates who appealed to a large majority of the lower social classes. Sun’s populist approach suffered a setback the same year Liang called for constitutional reform. While Liang’s protest had peaceful intentions, Sun’s failed coup of 1985 did not. Sun was then exiled and would not return until the fall of the Qing in 1912—this time as head of the newly formed Republic of China (ROC).

A New Republic

After the revolution of 1912, Liang, representing the old intellectual elite, and Sun, representing the new elite with populist support, would eventually cross paths over the actions of warlord Yuan Shikai. Yuan was a strong provincial warlord and the last obstacle to a Chinese republic. Sun promised Yuan the presidency of the ROC if he laid down arms, a move he would later regret. The fledging republic consisted of a National Assembly legislature and was composed of three major parties: the Nationalist Party (KMT) led by Sun, the renamed Democratic Party led by Liang (former Constitutionalists), and the Republican Party led by Yuan. In 1913, Sun led a revolt against Yuan, who had become ever more dictatorial in his rule. Critically, Liang, believing in the need for a strong central government, lent his support to the new president. After the failed revolt and exile of the KMT, the Democratic and Republican parties were merged into the Progressive Party, and all real competition in the National Assembly was quashed. Later, Liang would realize his error and condemn Yuan when Yuan attempted to crown himself emperor—the paralyzed Progressive party, split between pro and anti-Yuan factions, ended its short life in 1916. With it, the hopes of a Chinese republic were left in a comatose state.

From Chaos and Civil War – A New Movement

From the period of 1917 to 1932, China became embroiled in internal warfare among regional warlords. Sun returned to the mainland, setting up a military government led by generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek after Sun’s death. Eventually, the KMT led by Chiang and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) led by Mao Zedong would engage in a bloody civil war, interrupted by a second Japanese invasion and World War II.

After Liang’s and Sun’s respective failed attempts at constitutional monarchy and democratic republic, the standard for liberal democracy was taken up by the China Nationalist Socialist Party in 1932, a new group of progressive elites disillusioned with war, especially the KMT abandonment of its liberal principles. This party would later form the China Democratic League as an umbrella organization of small Chinese democracy parties, and would argue against the dictatorship of the KMT and later, the rule of the Chinese Communist Party. Taking cues from both Liang’s reformist movement as well as Sun’s more progressive democratic principles, the CDL aspired to be the third force in Chinese politics of the time.

The CDL was ultimately unsuccessful due to internal division. Initially supportive of the KMT, the CDL became increasingly pro-communist after the Civil War in 1950. Instead of pushing for post-war reform, the CDL itself split, with the pro-Communist faction staying on the mainland, and the more democratic element leaving for Taiwan with the defeated KMT. The pro-communist CDL still exists today as a largely nominal and uncompetitive political party in the PRC. The democratic wing of the CDL, renamed the China Democratic Socialist Party, would play a minor role in Taiwanese politics until the 1980’s, when free elections cost them all seats in the National Assembly.

II. What History Can Tell Us About Democracy In China

Although the three major threads of Chinese democratization all failed quite early in their efforts, the context and processes of their failures reveal much about the historical barriers to democracy in China.

First, both Liang and Sun, and later the CDL, were pushed to democratize, or at least institute Western liberal reform, purely due to short and long term threats. It could be argued that the Qing, as a Manchu (conquering) dynasty, was on its last legs, but, given the noninterference of the West, China would have probably been content to cycle through another millennia of dynasties. Yet the world was an increasingly dynamic and connected place. In the short term, the Sino-Japanese war left China both financially and politically bankrupt. The Qing Dynasty was clearly inept and was no longer either willing or able to serve the interests of the people. In the long term, the Sino-Japanese War was the latest in a series of humiliating defeats for not only the Qing, but Chinese civilization as embodied by dynastic monarchical rule. In addition to the Opium Wars and its consequences, Chinese elites of the day were scrambling for the answer to China’s fall in the world. This elite, who had viewed China as the forefront of civilization, now looked toward the West for guidance. However, democracy was only one choice in this search for an answer, with other possible answers perhaps more enticing to those looking for the quickest route to a stronger state, rather than a stronger, or more involved or liberalized citizenry.

Thus, historically speaking, democracy or democratic-minded thinking was only one byproduct of a much larger “self-strengthening movement”. Within this movement, the strongest advocate of true democratic reform can be said to be Sun. Yet even in his now famous Three Principles of the People—nationalism, democracy, and social welfare—only one principle is devoted to true democracy in the sense of ordinary citizen’s freedom to express political wishes. However, this was a freedom foreign to the Chinese people. A Chinese concept of freedom was more in line with Liang’s view in which freedom of the citizen was undifferentiated from freedom of the state. Taking the state as a unit, freedom for Liang meant only the freedom of China to resist external influence and protect its right of self-determination. As for the rights, including the right of self-determination, of citizens, Liang was willing to sacrifice these rights for the centralization of power and creation of a power state. Because China experienced the forces of democratization during a time of imperialism, its experience was inevitably confounded with the nationalism of self-preservation.

Modern Implications

In the post-Maoist era, the same historical attitude is displayed by a new generation of leaders. Although China as a state is no longer threatened with colonialism or invasion, the CCP views itself engaged in both a “clash of civilizations” as well as self-preservation in the realm of the global economy. Therefore the attitude of “development first, democracy later” is still prevalent not only throughout the CCP but also in the elite and even the growing middle class.

III. Compatibility of Culture and Demoncracy

There has been much written about the (in)compatibility between Chinese culture and Western Democracy. Political scientists who argue against the universality of democratic principles use China as a main argument, and past failures at democratization in China have been blamed by liberals on China’s cultural burden. Whether Chinese culture has thwarted the efforts of democracy or it has been used as a convenient excuse given the strength of the authoritarian regime, it is safe to say that culture plays a significant if not fully understood role in China’s democratization.

The Confucian State

Despite modernization theory and all accounts that link economics and democracy, the theory of democracy itself is undeniably rooted in the Western Greco-Roman tradition. Therefore, it would make sense to view the failings of Chinese democracy through the lens of Confucian tradition. There is little disagreement that China is a Confucian state—political scientist Lucian Pye has even argued that China is “a [Confucian] civilization pretending to be a nation state.” What Pye means is that even the concept of a nation-state is foreign to China. Instead, China views itself in terms of a civilization, at the same time a much more ambiguous yet stable view of government. A nation state is governed by laws—a civilization is governed by culture. China, as a Confucian state/civilization, is thus controlled more through an ultra stable culture than through easily malleable laws, lacking the dynamism for quick change. Confucian cultural norms, in relation to democratic ideals, are generally incompatible due to (1) the epistemological focus on harmony and (2) social emphasis on strict hierarchy.

The view of nature, including human nature, as one of harmony directly contradicts the state of nature arguments given by Western thinkers such as Hobbes, who emphasized a competitive and conflictual life that was famously “nasty, brutish, and short”. This view of the state of nature will have further implications for the rule of law, discussed later. Harmony, furthermore, prioritizes compromise over conflict at all costs. It also emphasizes the greater good over individual interests, and discourages manifestation of these interests. Socially, a strict hierarchy was viewed as the best form of social governance. Political equality was not granted by birth—political rights were rather granted from those above you in the social hierarchy. After centuries of hierarchical rule, citizens of the Chinese state held no concept of natural right theory, but saw the withholding of what would be considered essential Western democratic rights necessary for state stability. For the Confucian state, holding a political right one “does not deserve” is viewed as not only troublesome but ineffective and potentially detrimental—surely the rulers know better than peasants how to run a state. It can surely be seen how a culture focused on the greater good and rigid social structure was a fertile ground for authoritarian rather than democratic regimes.

Rule of Law

The rule of a state by law is essential to the rise of any stable democratic regime—there must be checks on abuse of power which apply principally to all citizens, regardless of social class. The very emphasis on law and the importance of law is, ultimately, rooted in the Western, Judeo-Christian view of original sin and the state of nature. Because of the concept of original sin and man’s self-interest, Western societies, even before democracy, have relied on law to govern and keep in check man’s vices. Confucianism, in contrast, views human nature to be fundamentally benign. Rather than rule by law, Confucianism advocates leadership by example—the higher level of social hierarchy serves as an example for the level below it. In principle, Confucianism discouraged law-making as it believed laws were counteractive to the nature of mankind. Ironically, it is this very reliance on the good of man that has led to historic abuses of power. Even in the face of a growing legal reform effort, the hierarchical underpinnings of society make the concept of universal law hard to comprehend—instead, law as a right still struggles against the Confucian concept of different laws for different classes of the citizenry.

Cultural Center vs. Periphery

Many prominent political scientists, including Samuel Huntington, argue that democracy can overcome the shortfalls of Confucian civilization, and cites as examples Confucian states such as Japan, South Korea, and notably Taiwan, which have managed to democratize fairly quickly. Zheng Yongnian gives a brief and excellent rebuttal to this argument, which both answers the intriguing question of why China has not followed these states, and also deepens the understanding of just how profound an impact Confucianism has on the Chinese state. On the surface, the cultures of countries such as Japan and Korea are noticeably more Confucian than China—no doubt due to the large scale crackdown on Confucianism during the Cultural Revolution. Clearly, democracy and Confucian culture have managed to coexist. Zheng argues that this puzzle can be solved through a center vs. periphery model. Because China was at the center of Confucian civilization, all Western developments (including democracy) needed to be internalized first, and then incorporated. He states that, for China, Confucian thought is used as the political philosophy of the state, and Western thought is used for its functionality and utility. In contrast, because Japan, Korea, and Taiwan are on the periphery of Confucian influence, they easily adopted a Western regime. For them, Western thought replaces Confucian thought as the political philosophy of the state, and Confucian thought is used for its functionality and utility. In other words, even a democratic China would be a Confucian state with democratic mechanisms—the peripheral states are merely Western states with Confucian mechanisms.

Culture, Nationalism, and Neo-Confucianism

Confucian culture, in addition to fundamentally favoring an authoritarian state, has been used artificially to support authoritarian regimes through its combination with nationalism. Although repeated attempts have been made to rid China of its Confucian past, both in the self-strengthening movements of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, as well as through the Maoist Cultural Revolution, most regimes have realized the impregnable cultural and political place Confucianism holds in China. Most recently, this has led to a slow re-introduction of Neo-Confucian values by the CCP. Neo-Confucian emphases on kinship, education, and social harmony have supplanted outdated Marxist/Leninist philosophy in a state which lacks any other consistent spiritual dimension. Furthermore, China’s rise as a regional and global power has largely been characterized by the CCP as a “peaceful rise”, stressing the common Confucian values of East Asia and its commitment to harmony internationally.

Confucianism in China has survived many regimes, from dynastic rule to the dictatorship of the KMT, and finally, the CCP. Although the future of a hypothetical Chinese democratic regime is unclear, what is clear is that Confucianism must be accounted for and integrated into any new political picture to arise.

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