Abstract: As prominent political scientists often state, a country’s foreign policy is strongly linked to its domestic policy.¹ Taking this simple idea, no other crisis in the history of the world complicates and yet reinforces it much like the current Taiwan Crisis. Here is a scenario which, if you believe Taiwan to be independent, is a matter of foreign policy, and if you believe Taiwan to be part of China, is a domestic matter. Here is a scenario in which the government of the PRC must deal with domestic pressures to “reclaim Taiwan” as well as foreign pressure from the United States, Japan, and the West to leave the island alone. Here lies the question which cuts to the core of every nation: what is the definition of sovereignty, and how much or how little is sovereignty dictated by internal (domestic) or external (foreign) forces? In today’s interconnected world, is there any difference between the two? Taiwan is not just an island, a nation, or a region in crisis—it is an anomaly that forces us to rethink political norms that have functioned for centuries, and, if a nonviolent solution is to be found, to readapt them for a changing geopolitical order.

A History of Missed Opportunities

The history of China and Taiwan is a story that begins in a missed opportunity and chronicles many more, both for China to reclaim Taiwan and for Taiwan to make a permanent break. The first missed opportunity, however, was that of having a newly liberalized, united China. Instead, in 1927, Nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) General Chiang Kai Shek’s attempt to purge Chinese Communist Party (CCP) members sparked civil war after the fall of the Qing Dynasty. The Chinese Civil War, interrupted by World War II and Japanese invasion, lasted until 1949 when the KMT was defeated and fled to Taiwan. As China moved to invade Taiwan and oust the KMT for good, the Korean War broke out and China was obliged to help its revolutionary neighbor, North Korea.

Shortly after the end of the Korean War, the First Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954 ensued. Because the stated goal of the KMT was to reoccupy the mainland and overthrow the CPP, Chiang Kai Shek sought to take advantage of heightened U.S. animosity toward the CCP to begin military occupation and fortification of two islands between mainland China and Taiwan: Matsu and Quemoy. As Taiwan fortified these islands and called on U.S. support to re-invade the mainland, Premier Zhou Enlai of the CCP announced bombardment of Matsu and Quemoy. Thus, the First Taiwan Strait Crisis erupted, with the U.S. threatening to use nuclear weapons to destroy CCP military potential. Upon China’s failure to gain assurance from the Soviet Union to also use nuclear weapons if the U.S. did so, both the CCP and KMT backed down—the PLA stopped bombardment on May 1st—although no issues were resolved.

In August of 1958, bombardments across the Taiwan Strait began anew. The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, much like the first, was a test of the United States by the CCP to investigate the possibility of an invasion of Quemoy and subsequently Taiwan. Again, a stalemate followed, although this time bombardment continued, with the CCP and KMT bombarding on alternate days until 1979. In total, approximately 450,000 shells were fired on Quemoy.

In the sixties, the United States and much of the world recognized the KMT on Taiwan as the sole representative of China, and Taiwan held China’s seat at the United Nations. However, a growing rift between China and the Soviet Union was becoming more and more apparent, and the Soviet’s seemingly unstoppable edge in the Cold War prompted a realignment of powers. Thus, with Kissinger’s visit to China in 1971, the CCP found its seat at the UN and with Nixon’s visit in 1972, Taiwan’s quest for reinvasion of the mainland went from a distant goal to an unattainable fantasy. Its new goal would be the struggle for survival as a quasi-state against the political gravity of its mainland neighbor.

After formal U.S. withdrawal of diplomatic relations in 1979, Taiwan remained in political limbo and the status quo remained relatively unchanged as China was content to adopt a “wait and see” attitude while focusing on its own economic development, and Taiwan began its ascent into the economic powerhouses of East Asia along with its movement to democratize.² In 1986, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) became the first opposition party to the KMT, forcing the KMT and its successive President Lee-Teng Hui to reform. On the international stage, Taiwan began to switch its policy, becoming more politically flexible and not requiring other nations to recognize it over the PRC.³

In 1995 and 1996, the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis was much different from the first two. Sparked by Lee’s visit to Cornell in 1995, in which he described Taiwan as “sovereign”, the Crisis consisted of PRC missile tests off the coast of Taiwan, followed by the sending of the U.S.S. Nimitz aircraft carrier to the strait by the U.S. Later, in 1996, on the eve of Taiwanese elections, China again conducted missile tests. The economic and political cost to Taiwan was great, but the third crisis also showed U.S. willingness to protect Taiwan, as well as increased U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

In 2000, the DDP candidate for President, Chen Shui-bian won election in Taiwan, a sign seen as ominous by the PRC. Chen Shui-bian is seen by many as an independence-leaning politician. In 2004, Chen was re-elected amidst strong condemnation by the mainland, which passed the Anti-Secession Act, authorizing the use of force against Taiwan or any province which declares independence. Chen’s presidency has seen increased U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, a higher international profile, and a greater discourse among Taiwanese for independence.

Sovereignty and Strength

To the PRC and Chinese on the mainland, the role of Taiwan as a province of China should be a given. The fact that in reality this is not a given is seen as yet another challenge and humiliation to China’s national integrity posed by an imperialist and hegemonic West, particularly the United States, as well as regional interlopers, particularly Japan. To an established country with a government that has run relatively smoothly for over two hundred years, the idea of such measures to save face may seem absurd; however, for a country newly emerging from over a century of strife and weakness, the loss of Taiwan would be not only symbolically and ideologically ruinous to China’s projected strength, but also poses a very real threat to the domestic stability of China. Furthermore, on the foreign front, the loss of Taiwan would be a disastrous national security failure, as Taiwan serves not only as a stronghold for the United States in the Pacific, but could ally with both the U.S. and Japan to create an offensive coalition hostile to Chinese interests.⁴

China’s strategy to engage Taiwan is twofold, and is easily recognizable to any purveyor of history. China uses incentive and coercion in step to tempt and force Taiwan’s return, or what China expert Suisheng Zhao calls “peaceful offense” and “coercive strategy”.⁵ In 1979, China first began with accommodation, offering a “one country, two systems” solution, which would allow Taiwan to keep its autonomy in all respects save name. Furthermore, China engaged in the “three links, four exchanges” system, attempting to bridge the Taiwan Strait through commercial, postal, and travel links and academic, cultural, economic, and sports exchanges.⁶ The incentives to Taiwan were great—China’s vast low-tech market is perfectly suited to Taiwan’s high tech economy. Because Taiwan’s cultural ties to China are so great, cultural exchange would help to enrich both countries and lessen hostility. The incentive system of China’s attempts to woo Taiwan were meant to allow for Taiwan to naturally re-integrate into the mainland, and attempt that, for all purposes, failed in 1996.

With the more adventurous statements of Lee in the 1990’s, as well as policy actions to remove mainland influence in Taiwan (disbanding of National Yuan and National Assembly of mainland constituents), China became ever more desperate, as Taiwan was not drifting further toward the mainland, but rather further away. Strong showings of force reaffirmed the PRC pledge to use force if necessary, prompting a new stalemate in which both the PRC and, ironically, the U.S. wished for a continuation of the status quo, whereas Taiwan, under Chen, sought more room to maneuver for independence.

Struggle for Recognition

Taiwan’s struggle throughout its short lifetime has not always been for independence in the political sense, although this has manifested itself quite prominently recently, but rather recognition as a state unto itself, along with its astonishing record of achievement despite overwhelming odds. Taiwan’s goal is not lost to China, yet it is a goal China cannot accept. Thus, Taiwan must play a game of acquiescence to a much more powerful mainland, yet at the same time draw on support from reluctant allies.

To counter China’s incentive strategy of “three links, four exchanges”, Taiwan used its own “lenient out, strict in” policy. In short, exchange to the mainland was accepted and even encouraged, but any exchange into Taiwan was kept to a minimum (from 1988, 50,000 mainlanders visited Taiwan as opposed to 7 million visits by Taiwanese to the mainland).⁷ Also, whatever exchange did occur was kept officially non-political, frustrating the PRC efforts to build political rapport with the ROC officials.

Internationally, it is no secret that Taiwan relies almost exclusively on U.S. support to back its policies, although the United States nominally supports the “One-China Rule” as named in the Shanghai Communiqué. Much has been made of the Taiwan lobby in Washington and its donations of millions of dollars, and also of Taiwan’s “money diplomacy” to gain recognition of other countries by monetary means.

War and Peace

If a war is to be fought in the Taiwan Straits, it would most likely spiral into a global affair, halt or permanently retard China’s development as a regional and international power, create long-lasting ill-will among Taiwanese residents, and cost substantial damage in terms of lives and treasure. It is indeed a testament to the willingness of China to go to war for an idea and only an idea, that of “One China” and “One country, two systems”. As the United States is bound by both treaty and national interest to aid Taiwan, and as Japan is already wary of the Chinese military threat, both nations would probably come to the aid of Taiwan, and the EU and UN would lend moral, if not material support. I do not see a long, drawn out war, but rather aid given to Taiwanese forces in the form of weapons and naval support, coupled with strong political pressure. The result of the crisis would possibly be a costly Chinese “victory” in capturing Taiwan, but an end to Chinese development both economically and politically, a rebuilding phase for a decimated Taiwan, and an era of isolation and containment for the PRC.

Resolution through peaceful means is much harder to envision, as it is probably many years, if not decades, away. China, at least in the near future, has no room to deviate from its “One China” policy, lest it wish a domestic firestorm of outrage at “giving up” Taiwan. This leaves Taiwan, which, as the older generation fades and loses memory of the mainland, is gaining a more separate cultural identity as well as an already autonomous political one. Meanwhile, the rest of the world would like to see the status quo remain, and a select few (U.S., Japan) would like to see an independent Taiwan, if Chinese threat of force were not in play. Exchange through trade, culture and travel could continue on its path, but unless concessions are made, I see a more and more distant resolution to the Taiwan Crisis in the near future.

A New Plan

Rarely has compromise been reached in international relations, as great power politics will almost always allow the will of the greatest power to have its way. Yet, because the Taiwan Crisis is so unique to our time, there is hope that the unprecedented interconnectedness of the world we live in will lead to an innovative, peaceful solution.

The first and only step for Beijing to resolve the issue peacefully without risking potential domestic strife would be to accept a new version of the “One China” system, with Taiwan being a politically equal, not subordinate entity. Taiwan would have to not only be completely assured of the safeguarding of its political institutions, but also convinced that these institutions would be allowed to affect greater change in the mainland, so as not to have Taiwan eventually “swallowed up” by the gravitational pull of the PRC.

Eventually, this would mean a partial democratization of China or at least a coalition government. However, China need not take drastic steps to this end. Increasingly liberal treatment of Hong Kong will serve China well in sending positive signals to both Taiwan and the United States about its intentions. Those who argue that the PRC will lose its ideological base and legitimacy if it begins a process of democratization have failed to notice that the PRC long ago lost its ideological legitimacy—its legitimate rule comes now from a call to nationalism more than anything, a call that will ring hollow if Taiwan is lost. To sacrifice political ideology for nationalist unity would strengthen the PRC, not weaken it.

For Taipei, the great hurdle must be to recognize that China’s rise is unavoidable, and sooner or later the will of China will be imposed upon Taiwan. In the time that it has, Taiwan must utilize its strengths as a democracy and its ties with its allies to reap safeguards for its own preservation—that is, to change the will of China sufficiently that it is in line with the will of Taiwan’s residents and identity. Taiwan’s charge is to preserve a Taiwanese identity, even if it cannot preserve a Taiwanese state.

For the U.S., the loss of Taiwan to China would be almost as disastrous as—a loss of Taiwan to China. However, due to geography and a shifting focus from the China-threat theory, and depending on how China handles future crises, the U.S. may be well-advised to engage China rather than contain it. The U.S. can contribute to a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan Crisis by fostering an atmosphere of trust and mutual understanding.

The perfect scenario outlined above would take decades, yet even if part of it were to occur, then violent conflict in the Taiwan Straits could be avoided. The Taiwan Crisis marks a fundamental shift in global politics; how we deal with it will serve to be our legacy and our addition to the study of world politics.

Footnotes

1. Lieberthal, 43; Hunt, 1.
2. Zhao, 211
3. Wang, 33
4. Bernstein and Munro, 165
5. Zhao, 211
6. Zhao, 212
7. Zhao, 217

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