Abstract: In Social States, Alastair Iain Johnston sets out to investigate two related questions: 1) whether realpolitik state preferences and practices are a function of material conditions or realpolitik norms (198) and 2) why Chinese foreign policymakers, in a threateningly “unipolar” environment of 1980-2000 and in the absence of positive or negative incentives, chose to cooperate in multilateral security institutions (37). Johnston employs three micro-processes of socialization—mimicking, social influence, and persuasion—to systematically address these questions. My review of Johnston’s scholarship proceeds in the following order: First, I summarize Johnston’s chapter on mimicking, discuss the theory’s inability to address states’ decisions to join international institutions, and derive from his empirical work a hypothesis that an increase in demand for mandatory information by international institutions may generate domestic “sunk costs” potentially conducive to cooperation. Second, I provide an overview of Johnston’s chapter on social influence, question whether China is a “hard case” for socialization, and cite the popularization of the term “responsible major power” as evidence that material reality may actually aid socialization. Third, I summarize Johnston’s work on persuasion, question whether international institutions are attracting multilateralists rather than persuading skeptics, suggest an alternative method of assessing how participation in international institutions may be influencing Chinese discourse on “cooperative security,” and finally, employ the power transition logic to question whether China will remain bound to international institutions when it approaches parity with or dominance over the United States.

Introduction

In Social States, Alastair Iain Johnston sets out to investigate two related questions. The central theoretical question concerns whether realpolitik state preferences and practices are a function of material conditions or realpolitik norms (198). The empirical question concerns why Chinese foreign policy makers, in a threateningly “unipolar” environment of 1980-2000 and in the absence of positive or negative incentives, chose to cooperate in multilateral security institutions (37). Though Johnston’s questions seem to spring from his perceived limitations of the rational choice framework employed by realists and institutionalists, it is notable that Johnston also finds existing social constructivist explanations to be unsatisfactory.

In fact, Social States is Johnston’s systematic attempt to address the variance in state behavior left uncaptured by the cost-benefit framework emphasized by rational choice theorists and the internalization of pro-social norms emphasized by social constructivists. Between these “end[s] of the spectrum,” Johnston believes, exists a vast amount of important pro-social behavior, such as mimicking, social influence, and persuasion (22). Johnston employs these three micro-processes, which he labels “socialization,” to analyze Chinese foreign policy behavior within international institutions—where material conditions of anarchy and pro-social norms and discourses of multilateralism are said to present divergent observable implications (29).

Johnston’s method of analysis is primarily qualitative, as he process-traces select cases to illustrate how socialization operates. His criteria for case selection are the presence of relative power concerns and the absence of other material incentives (40). For evidence, Johnston relies on data from a wide range of sources—scholarly works by regional specialists, papers written for NGO conferences, documents circulated in international institutions by Chinese actors, and some internal circulation documents. A constraint, Johnston concedes, is China’s policy of “asymmetric transparency,” which restricts access to data on security issues (40). Nevertheless, Johnston has conducted over 120 interviews with diplomats and arms control experts from China and various countries, most of whom had exposure to Chinese foreign policy processes (42). Johnston claims to account for interviewees’ potential incentives to misrepresent with careful attention to their positions in the policy-making process and other surveying techniques (42).

Mimicking: Overview

Johnston describes mimicking as a process by which the agents of a new signatory state, in order to cope with the uncertainty and technical demands of joining an international institution, mechanically adopt its procedures and work habits. This may involve creating domestic agencies to better develop and articulate national interests within the institution as well as adopting the institution’s behavior routines and discursive practices (51). Interestingly, Johnston labels mimicking a “path-dependent lock-in” process, where it becomes increasingly costly for the actors to back out, ignore, or defect from the norms of the institution (51). Analyzing China’s involvement in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) from 1980, he observes that the CD arm of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) expanded from a small division in 1982 to an Arms Control Disarmament Department in 1997 (55). Johnston also observes the formation of an interagency process involving the MOFA, a community of weapons scientists, and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to aid Chinese diplomats within the CD (62). He supplements his analysis by graphically comparing an increase in the number of working papers Chinese diplomats submitted to the CD and a similar increase in the number of studies conducted by China’s weapons scientists from the 1980’s to 1994 (65). He also presents some evidence of changes in Chinese discourses.¹

Critical Engagement

First, it is notable that mimicking, as a micro-process, cannot explain a state’s initial choice to join an international institution. Because Johnston claims to limit his “units of analysis” to the interactions between “international institutions” on the one hand and “individuals and small groups” on the other (27), states leaders’ decisions to join an institution in the first place—and the preferences therein—are essentially exogenous to the mimicking framework. Thus, in his empirical analysis, Johnston falls back on ideas from his next chapter, “Social Influence,” to argue that China’s decision to join the CD “seems to have been a spillover effect” from joining other UN agencies. Chinese leaders believed that as a “great power,” China should join this institution (53). Since this is beyond the scope of his mimicking theory, it seems fair that he provides little evidence for this prediction.

In my view, it may be interesting to ask how much agency state leaders enjoy over mimicking and its consequences. In other words, mimicking of agents may be a product of conscious choice on the part of the principal. Why did state leaders choose to place diplomats within the particular environment in the first place? To what extent did Chinese leaders foresee the growing expansion of their arms control community and the changes in discourses prior to joining the CD? In other words, it may be interesting to investigate the accuracy with which state leaders make ex ante calculations about not only the initial costs and benefits of joining an international institution, but also the potential costs and benefits of staying in it. One would begin by obtaining data on state entrances to international institutions and then identifying cases where no material incentives or sanctions were present. The latter step simplifies calculations of costs and benefits (since issue linkages can be complicated) and controls for the role of coercion in states’ decisions to join. Having identified such a limited set of cases, one could then turn to primary and secondary sources to qualitatively assess the accuracy of state leaders’ ex ante calculations of potential costs and benefits of joining an institution.

Second, it seems that Johnston’s work uncovers another potential cooperative effect of the mandatory exchange of information within institutions. Johnston limits the observable implications of institutionalist theories to “side payments, sanctions, reputational gains or losses linked to other issue areas, and information that indicates the costs of cooperation were lower than expected” (40). Setting aside this “market-failure” definition of information for the moment, it seems that the Committee for Disarmament is an environment where an increase in demand for mandatory information forces actors to invest more heavily in the institution or the issue area. Such information may include technical annual declarations, mandatory presentations, or even working papers. From this perspective, one could argue that China expanded its arms control division within the MOFA and brought in a scientific community into its policymaking to process the increasing amount of information required for participation in the CD.

Though data may be difficult to obtain, one could potentially conduct a cross-national study of the extent to which an increase in demand for information by an international institution affects states’ domestic spending in that particular issue area. Ideally, one would identify a large group of “novice” states within the same institution whose domestic structures are similarly unsophisticated to deal with the increased demand in information. A good place to start may be within international institutions whose issue areas are relatively new or require substantial research and development. This is to minimize the number of leading states in the issue area, whom we should drop, and maximize the number of “novice states,” whom we can proceed to test. The goal is to control for any exogenous variable that gives any state a competitive edge, i.e. reduces the amount of spending necessary to adapt to the increased demand for information. With this square circled, we can proceed to investigate under what conditions an institution’s increase in demand for information leads (or does not lead) to an increase in states’ investment in that issue area. The next, but separate, question is whether these “sunk costs” actually bind states to these institutions.

Social Influence: Overview

Johnston’s theory of social influence begins with the assumption that actors in world politics value image and status as ends in themselves, and that they often make difficult trade-offs between status and material power or wealth (76). From this angle, he argues that normative pressures, such as backpatting and opprobrium, can induce cooperative behavior. For these pressures to operate, however, there must both be a normative consensus on “good behavior” and a forum that makes such behavior observable (86). Given these conditions, an increase in the size of cooperating audience should, ceteris paribus, increase backpatting benefits if the actor cooperates, and increase “shaming markers” if the actor free-rides (91). For this chapter, Johnston seems to blur the distinction between the principal and the agent by assuming that state leaders and publics take criticism and praise of the state within institutions personally (96).

For his empirical analysis, Johnston process-traces China’s participation in Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations within the CD from 1994 to 1996.² Fearing that its nuclear capability would be frozen in inferiority (99), China initially insisted on two “treaty killers,” No First Use (NFU) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) (104). China also insisted that all 8 nuclear powers sign before entry into force (EIF) (106). After the Chinese language on PNE came under heavy criticism of 20 states in March 1996 (104), China abandoned its NFU and PNE positions in May and abandoned its position on EIF in August (106). The realist explanation, which Johnston rejects, is that the CTBT was costless to sign anyway because China had finished testing its second-generation warheads by July (107). Johnston argues that forgoing tests was costly to relative security (107) and that China did so because mounting accusations of “moral hypocrisy”—for not upholding its commitment to the Non Proliferation Treaty and the CTBT—jeopardized its image as a “responsible major power” (114). On a separate note, Johnston graphs China’s voting behavior in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to illustrate its fear of public isolation (136).

Critical Engagement

First, Johnston states that China is a “hard case” for socialization due to the prevalence of realpolitik views within the country (33). This is a valid claim. Since Johnston makes no assumption of unitary states, their internal features should “matter” to the extent that they influence the behavior of his units of analysis, “individuals and small groups.” However, there may also be other cultural factors within China actually coexisting with realpolitik views. Though I make no claim to explain its origins, the concern for one’s own image may be one such cultural factor. For example, the Chinese word 面子 (mianzi), meaning “face,” figures quite prominently in Chinese discourses. In conversations, Chinese people often say 你不给我面子 (ni bu gei wo mianzi) to convey that one has lost face because of something another person has said or did. Closing the black box for the moment, it seems worthwhile to ask whether there may be variance in states’ sensitivity to status concerns. To be sure, this possibility does not undermine the logic of social influence theory. It does open up the possibility that China may not be a hard case, and thus lend only limited support to the theory.

In fact, I found the same UNGA graph Johnston uses to support his social influence theory to be instructive in this regard (See Figure 3.8 from Social States reprinted below). Given that the UNGA employs roll calls as a voting procedure, Johnston predicts that China’s tendency to abstain should vary with size of the yes majority on resolutions it does not support. Indeed, the difference in rates of abstention when the majority is 1/2 or less and when the majority is more than 2/3 is inordinately high. In fact, Johnston calls China on this graph a “clear outlier” (136). My first question concerns whether there is variance in states’ starting positions (in terms of their sensitivity to self-image) when they enter an international institution. If data is available, we could plot voting behavior similar to Johnston’s for each state in its first year of participation in the UNSC. My second question concerns whether social influence affects all states evenly over time. If we were to compare states’ UNSC voting behavior in their first year and say, five years later, would we observe similar movements in the residuals? Both these suggestions point out the limitation of this graph, which simply aggregates voting behavior from 1989 to 2000. One would need to disaggregate the data to capture the potential dynamic elements of social influence.

Second, in explaining China’s decision to drop its positions on NFU and PNE, Johnston states that condemnations of China’s nuclear tests from 1993 to 1996 by most developing states and middle powers stressed themes that had negative resonance with Chinese leaders’ increasing self-identification as a “responsible major power” (113). In support of this claim, Johnston uses line graphs to show an increase in frequency of articles using the term “responsible major power” in People’s Daily and academic journals (147). Indeed, Johnston is right that these terms have significance, since they represent a new feature of Chinese foreign policy, a concept related to image, and a concept associated with participation in multilateral institutions (149). However, the words “major power” also imply that certain material conditions have already been met for this actor to actually care about this particular status marker. This may be indicative of a change in normative consensus as to what constitutes a major power (87), but the fact remains that its material capability allows this particular actor to place a premium on this status marker in the first place.

This question becomes more interesting when we consider whether similar discourses exist for middle powers or small powers. Using the same criteria Johnston uses to judge that “responsible major power” is a significant term (new feature of foreign policy and associations with image and multilateralism) (149), if Johnston can provide evidence of increasing frequency in the use of similar terms in discourses of non-major powers, then he could plausibly claim to have removed the significance of “major” from the “responsible major power.” In other words, the goal is to demonstrate that normative markers that only international institutions reward can have meaning even divorced from realpolitik notions of prestige. Another interesting line of inquiry is whether the popularization of the term “responsible major power” may itself be a product of material conditions of anarchy. Consistent with the soft-balancing literature, it may be possible that middle and small powers are using such discourse to further bind and constrain major powers to international security institutions (See Pape 2002).

Persuasion: Overview

Johnston views persuasion as the internalization of norms (22). He theorizes that persuasion works in an environment where a persuadee is highly cognitively motivated, autonomous from principal, exposed to the argument repeatedly, or has few prior or ingrained attitudes. It also helps if the persuader is an authoritative member of a high-affect group the persuadee wants to join (159). According to Johnston, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and related Track II activities (which provide new ideas and filter controversial issues for the ARF) are fairly conducive to persuasion on these counts and embody “counter-realpolitik ideology” such as “cooperative security” (164-166). On the other hand, China is said to have been deeply ingrained in realpolitik norms when it joined the ARF in 1994 (167). Johnston observes an increased interest in “cooperative security” among Chinese officials from 1996 on, expressed through papers, unofficial channels, commissioned studies, public speeches, and references to the Five Power Treaty on Confidence Building Measures (a more intrusive and formal security institution) as a model for the ARF to follow (170-171). Johnston supplements his analysis with graphs showing increases in references to “multilateralism” in academic journals and People’s Daily and an increase in references to the ARF in articles (168). The argument is that the ARF and the Track II led to an emergence of a constituency of Chinese policymakers and analysts who internalized the norm of multilateralism (179).

Critical Engagement

Granted that realpolitik preferences and practices are changeable, what I consider is the possibility that persuasion within institutions may not be doing all of the explanatory work. In fact, there may be other variables informing the preferences of Chinese policymakers before entering these international institutions.

First, Johnston assumes that the composition of the staff at the Comprehensive Division of the MOFA in charge of ARF activities remained constant over the years (179). This is to be expected, since persuasion, which takes time, cannot take place if there is a regular turnover of actors (179). Moreover, it seems intuitive that there may be greater transaction costs associated with regularly replacing staff, since diplomats would be forced to spend the time and the energy they could otherwise have spent on negotiations on adjusting to new institutions. However, Johnston’s empirical analysis in the mimicking chapter also provides evidence to the contrary. From 1980 to 2000, Johnston tells us, the MOFA rotated 60 ministry officials through the CD delegation to acquaint them with multilateral negotiations. Including personnel from the Chinese military and other research institutions, the figure is as high as 110 (54). If China was willing to experiment with such rotations in its delegation to the Conference on Disarmament, an institution that often requires highly technical knowledge, one could predict that similar turnovers happen during the ARF negotiations as well.

Thus, it seems plausible to argue that Chinese diplomats and analysts, already favorably disposed toward multilateralism, may have gradually selected themselves into the ARF negotiations over time. What we arrive at is an endogeniety problem. It seems unclear whether the ARF is creating a so-called multilateralist constituency within China or whether a pre-existing multilateralist constituency is selecting itself into and driving the ARF. Since Johnston interviewed many who are close to the policymaking process in China, acquiring data on rotations may not be difficult. If borne out by empirical evidence, this would mean that there is little by way of persuasion that takes place within the ARF itself, since the preferences of Chinese diplomats are shaped and formed elsewhere. Some candidates include formative experiences, favored scholarly works (as I will suggest later on), cultural bonds with other nations, and other international institutions (which would support Johnston). This would explain the Chinese ARF diplomats’ ready willingness to adopt the “mutual security” discourse (170-171). If multilateralists had selected themselves into the ARF and related processes, we would not be very surprised to find that they indeed favor regional security.

Second, the causal link between participation in the ARF and an increase in references to multilateralism is less than conclusive. Johnston writes: “From the mid-1990s on, however there were some noticeable changes in the discourse” (167). Johnston further develops this claim with two graphs showing “exponential increases” in the mention of “multilateralism” in academic journals and People’s Daily, and a third graph showing an increase in the frequency of articles with references to the ARF (168). The causal implication is there, but not very convincing at first (See Figures 4.2 and 4.3 from Social States reprinted below). The ARF was established in 1994, but the frequencies of articles on “multilateralism” only take off in the early 2000’s. More convincing is the small, but similar increase in references to the “ARF” in the early 2000’s. However, it is still possible to argue that there could have been some exogenous shock near the 2000’s, which increased references to both multilateralism and the ARF.

In addition, the breadth of the term “multilateralism” makes it more difficult to argue for a direct causal linkage between an increase in references to the ARF and an increase in references to “multilateralism.” For example, the increasing use of the term “multilateralism” starting in 2000 could be a product of an increase in publicity enjoyed by economic institutions and their influence on the Chinese economy. It could also have to do with an increase in publicity enjoyed by multilateral security efforts conducted outside the ARF framework. Last but certainly not least, one could legitimately argue that the anticipation for and the publication of Robert Keohane’s After Hegemony in Chinese, 霸权之后 (ba quan zhi hou) (2001), caused the observed increase.³

To strengthen Johnston’s causal argument, then, one could utilize similar documentary methods to measure the frequency of references to “cooperative security” (instead of “multilateralism”) in Chinese journals and People’s Daily, which would more readily associate itself with ARF, a regional security institution. If Johnston is right that the concept of “cooperative security” is a relatively new one for policymakers in China, our findings should reflect this. The references should gradually increase from 1996 (or soon afterwards) when the ARF policymakers and analysts are said to have begun writing on this concept (170). If we indeed observe such a trend, we would be more likely to accept Johnston’s causal argument that it was the ARF at the forefront of this trend (179), since this institution is one of the few directly involved in the so-called “cooperative security” issues. As it stands, however, a causal link between an increase in the talk of “multilateralism” and an increase in that of the ARF remains weak.

Third, “material conditions,” as expressed through the power transition logic, may have aided the “persuasion” of Chinese policymakers. When setting up observable implications for his competing theories, Johnston’s account of realism suggests that in a “unipolar world” we should observe “candidate poles,” such as China, “trying to balance against the United States, eschewing arms commitments that might place constraints on relative power capabilities” (37). This is a fair articulation of one realist prediction. Another interesting realist prediction, initially entertained (but soon discarded) by AFK Organski, is that a “wise challenger, growing in power through internal development,” may “hold back from threatening the existing international order until it had reached a point where it was as powerful as the dominant nation and its allies” (Organski, 333). In this light, international security institutions may serve as vehicles for China to keep other states at bay, while continuing its own internal buildup. Thus, it may actually make sense for China to uphold “cooperative security” within the ARF, since China’s current priority is maintaining stable conditions for its economic growth and development. It seems that “material conditions” may have actually aided China’s rhetorical turn toward multilateralism. ⁴

It is important to note, however, that the power transition logic remains agnostic as to whether institutions impose independent constraints—social or material—on state behavior. For example, joining an institution and subjecting its diplomats to pro-social processes, such as mimicking, social influence, and persuasion, may be costly for the state and its relative security. It may still make sense to join if the costs of joining at the time are outweighed by the perceived benefits, such as the potential avoidance of a “preventive war” launched by the dominant power (Organski, 333). Thus, a more rigorous test of Johnston’s socialization theory may rest on whether the social benefits of cooperation and social costs of defection within a security institution are sufficient to bind a rising power to it even after it reaches parity with or dominance over the current hegemon. Another interesting test may ask whether an increase in the number of diplomats who have “internalized” norms of a security institution will be sufficient to bind a rising power to it even after it reaches parity with or dominance over the current hegemon. I do not mean to imply that these institutions will somehow prevent states from ever engaging in military disputes or wars. Nonetheless, it seems socialization will have worked if it makes defecting costly enough for China to remain in an international security institution even after reaching material dominance.

Closing Remarks

Overall, Johnston’s Social States is a successful effort to systematically analyze socialization, an understudied phenomenon in World Politics. This book helpfully outlines how three important processes—mimicking, social influence, and persuasion—may operate. During the process, Johnston has also led me to ask several interesting questions. How accurately do leaders of states calculate not only the initial but also the future costs and benefits of joining an international institution? Can an increase in demand for information by an international institution affect a state’s domestic spending in that issue area? Does China present a special case for socialization in its unusually strong concern for national self-image? To what extent is this concern for self-image grounded in the material reality of the international system? Do international institutions teach participating diplomats the inherent value of multilateralism, or do they simply attract multilateralists in the first place? How has participation in a security institution influenced China’s domestic discourse on “cooperative security”? Last but not least, can socialization continue to bind a rising power to an international institution after it reaches parity with or surpasses the dominant power in capability? By directing our attention to and laying the groundwork for further theorizing about international institutions and their socializing effects, Johnston has undoubtedly made a novel contribution to the field of World Politics.

References

• Angell, Norman. 1913. The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power to National Advantage (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons), chapter 3.
• Johnston, Alastair Iain. 2008. Social States: China in International Institutions: 1980 – 2000 (Princeton: Princeton University Press)
• Pape, Robert. 2002. “Soft Balancing Against the United States.” International Security 30 (1): 7-45

Footnotes

1. For example, he graphs changes in the ratio of Chinese statements on superpowers to statements on arms control issues within the CD to suggest that the Chinese adoption of the CD’s discursive practices forced them to tone down their anti-Soviet rhetoric (68, 69). He also draws from primary sources to argue that previously “Western” terms, such as “verification” and “arms control,” entered the Chinese discourse through the CD over the 1980’s (70).
2. He actually presents three cases, though I review only the first. As his second case, Johnston analyzes China’s participation in negotiations to revise the landmine Protocol of Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (1981) from 1995 to 1996. Despite the PLA’s reservations that further restrictions on landmines would undermine security of sparsely manned borders and lucrative transfers/exports of dumb mines (123,125), China not only announced a moratorium on exports on dumb mines in April, but also signed the revision in May due to an emerging anti-landmine “bandwagon” that threatened China’s image (128, 129). The third case is the Ottawa Treaty of December 1997, which sought a de-facto ban of landmines (138). Despite overwhelming support within UN, China never signed because of PLA’s reservations (137). Instead, Canada and China struck a deal—Canada would not pressure China to join and China would not pressure Asian states to oppose the treaty (139). China also sent an observer to Ottawa to minimize criticism (140) and abstained from UN resolutions demanding non-signatories to accede the treaty (140).
3. This is a representative work of political science on the importance of multilateralism and international institutions.
4. In Johnston’s ARF case study, it seems that Chinese diplomats have indeed “internalized” the instrumental value of multilateralism, but not quite its normative value. This helps explain Johnston’s finding that Chinese multilateralists, who strongly support regional cooperative security, actually oppose the expansion of US-Japanese security cooperation (177).

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