Abstract:This essay examines the significance of various factors that create and shape social movements through a brief study of ‘A Million Voices Against Corruption’, the most stirring and audacious phase of the 2006 Anti-Corruption Movement in Taiwan. ‘A Million Voices Against Corruption’ arose out of a synthesis of political and cultural opportunities with resource mobilization. Though this movement occurred in a particular historical and cultural context, I believe its analysis can offer general insight into how and why social movements come to be, and how they reflect and impact society.

Introduction

Movements throughout the ages and around the world have been subject to the studies of sociologists who wish to find a coherent explanation of how movements form, expand, continue or decline. But as more recent sociologists have come to comprehend, social movements are so complex that it is not possible to confine each movement to a certain set of processes and reasoning. In my reflection of the 2006 Anti-Corruption Movement of Taiwan, I realized that for this specific case, a synthesis of resource mobilization and political process theory was useful for understanding what had happened and why. But those were not the only important theories involved; as Crossley very astutely asserts, “some social movements can be explained with the resource mobilization theory, but cannot be fully understood without considering the cultural side of the analysis” (2002, p.103). He goes on to say, “without grievances of the public and tension between the larger society and ruling class, even a well-resourced and networked organization would not be able to mobilize.” That was very true of the anti-corruption movement. With the concepts above in mind, I will attempt to explain the formation and decline of the movement known as ‘A Million Voices Against Corruption,’ and my experience as a fresh social protester in high school.

Political and Cultural Opportunities

Collective Grievances

“Grievances may do little to explain the timing of a movement’s emergence, but without a grasp upon these grievances we would find it very difficult to make any sense of what the movement was attempting to do or of the moral nature of their actions” (Crossley 2002, p.84). In reflection, the political climate in 2006 was particularly auspicious for mass mobilization in terms of both political context and public grievances. Principally, the country underwent a surge in crime and unemployment rates starting from the late 1990s after the Asian Financial Crisis; this was difficult for a society that had experienced decades of wealth and social stability. Moreover, the nation’s pro-independence president was constantly infuriating the People’s Republic of China across the strait and antagonizing the United States (Taiwan’s biggest ally) in the process. The Administration’s anti-China policies not only hurt the economy but caused widespread unease as well, for it is widely acknowledged that China has a legion of missiles aimed directly at the island of over twenty million people. Finally, it was six years into Taiwan’s successful party rotation during which the Democratic Progressive Party (pro-independence) seized the presidency from the Kuomintang Party, ending the latter’s five-decade reign. The Kuomintang, or Chinese Nationalist Party which had relocated from China after losing to Mao Zedong’s communist regime, had long been seen by the native Taiwanese as a corrupt party of non-native elites that had its roots in China. In contrast, the native party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) vowed to rid Taiwan of decades of corruption and bring power to the people. To demonstrate its commitment, in 2000 the party established an anti-corruption investigation unit in the government (Freedom House 2008). Thus, the exposés of corruption committed by those in the chief executive household, in addition to discoveries of widespread corruption in the DPP itself, disillusioned and angered the Taiwanese public, driving them to become open to mobilization.

Political Context

2006 marked the nineteenth anniversary of the abolition of martial law in the Republic of China. Taiwan experienced nearly forty years of strict adherence to martial law from 1949 to 1987; throughout that period, “residents of Taiwan were not permitted to organize, assemble or march publicly in support of social causes that were not officially endorsed by the ROC government.” In Hsiao’s words, “the lifting of martial law and the establishment of the DPP… gave popular forces a great opportunity to influence the legislature and the people’s representative”; it also “legitimized and legalized” street protests by the revision of the Civic Organization Law (2001, p.169). This fostered a good environment for social mobilization efforts, for the public now had open and legalized access to the government. The absence of repression ushered in two decades of social change prior to the 2006 anti-corruption campaign.

Tactical Lessons from Precedents

Since the early 1980s, Taiwan has experienced waves of social welfare movements which all had moderate to high degrees of success. Three waves of social movements brought issues ranging from disabled persons rights to child prostitution to the foreground and concluded with the maintenance of newly established programs and centers operated by movement organizations and the government (Hsiao 1996). How did they achieve these results? All forms of lobbying, petitioning, and fundraising were used, but the most conspicuous symbol of public support were the staged street protests, including street marches and sit-ins that existed in every successful case — these acts ensured media attention and sympathy that transgressed to the public via television and newspaper. These certainly served as precedents to the biggest street protest Taiwan would see in 2006.

Resource Mobilization

Leadership and Elite Support

According to Jasper, leaders serve both as the symbols of organizations and of movements, which means in each case the public looks to them to get a grasp of a movement’s intentions, power, tactics — and I think to a good extent — legitimacy (2007, p.91) . The movement entrepreneur at the center of ‘A Million Voices Against Corruption’ campaign was Shih Min-Teh, who was the former chairman of the DPP and a long-time political dissident. With his credentials as a champion of democracy, he was able to garner supporters from constituents of both parties, but especially the KMT party supporters and middle-of-the-road voters who had shifted towards the KMT during Chen’s increasingly disappointing presidency. As to the elite, many KMT party members could not publicly endorse him with respect to party alliance, but some maverick legislators went as far as to publicly support and participate in the protests. Shih caused uproar within his own DPP party; the party split was between those who wished to show solidarity with the president and those who were ready to disown Chen. I think elite support was fundamentally essential to the organization’s mobilization efforts. Unlike the Civil Rights in America, which relied heavily on the organization and networks of the black churches , ‘A Million Voices Against Corruption’ lacked a default support system to mobilize (Morris 1984). Thus the movement welcomed prominent politicians and celebrities to partake in the sit-ins and speak on its behalf to increasingly solicit the public to join the protests. Overall, Shih and his movement benefited from good elite backing, even if some of it was clandestine.

Mass Mobilization and the Zealous Media

Not only do movement organizations frame issues, but the mass media has a role in it as well, and in the process, distorts the messages of movements. In the ‘Million Voices Against Corruption,’ the movement’s message was simple enough that there was not really a way to misrepresent it. Regardless of Shih’s motives for deposing the president (Why not attack other corrupted officials as well?), the movement’s aim was uniformly transmitted to the public as an anti-corruption campaign with the ultimate goal of overthrowing Chen. However, because “media organizations have their own interests and routines that influence their coverage,” there was still a discrepancy in the collective action frames of the movement and the media (Staggenborg 2008, p.39). For instance, some frames that the movement did not craft nor endorse surfaced and became the main focus of the media, and thus a major focus of the peope — the media began to portray the movement as a party battle between the constituents of the DPP and the KMT (Zu 2006). Moreover, some critics complain that other news was given, if any, lukewarm attention — even the incident regarding a policeman who had died of exhaustion from greatly overextended on-duty hours due to the protests (Wu 2006). Viewers also became tired of the subject, a result of watching broadcasts of similar protest scenarios week after week on television. I think it is plausible that these issues, to an extent, contributed to the premature end of the movement.

Despite these shortcomings, the movement would never have taken off without the help of the media; it was completely built by media attention. Smith and Fetner (2007) talk about the need of organizing effort to channel a sustained flow of resources and energy into the movement; the campaign headquarters did just that, while the media served as the most effective form of promotion that Shih knew it would be. On August 12, 2006, Shih held a press conference in Taipei announcing his intentions and the establishment of the ‘Million Voices Against Chen Campaign.’ He pleaded for every citizen to each donate 100 NTD (New Taiwan Dollars) to the cause, a mere equivalent of 3 USD; the goal was to accumulate a hundred million NTD to symbolize the support of a hundred million people. Within ten days, the movement headquarters halted the collection: the combined sum in the three bank accounts that accepted the donations was way past the asked amount (Hwang 2008).

Most adherents to the anti-corruption movement became constituents, simply because it was virtually effortless to become one. People were not required to make donations; and physical participation involved going to scheduled sit-ins or marches that were announced on television. Moreover, the sit-ins appealed to people, whether they were KMT sympathizers, opposed to Chen, or opposed to corruption in general. Oliver explains ‘…how events are understood (as successful or not, as promising, as fun) influences whether they are likely to be repeated” (1989 cited Jasper 2007, p.95). And it was indeed perceived as fun and low-risk by the viewers, as they flocked to the scenes in red to join the protests. Live broadcasts overlooked the sea of red supporters as they sang movement songs led by celebrity musicians, and enjoyed good food and drink for free, courtesy of the enthusiastic movement supporters. The success of the sympathetic media brought out crowds that filled the seats, curbs, and pavilions at all times of the day: the housewives and the elderly who sat-in during the daytime, and students and workers who arrived in the evening to join the social event.

The goal of the movement could not be reached: Chen simply refused to step down. This was clear by mid-October when the campaign came to an abrupt halt after two months of rigorous protests. The movement’s lack of a steady default mobilization base and inability to convince all sectors of society that deposing Chen was both “urgent and subject to change” was central to the failure (NOW News 2006; Jasper 2007, p.29). The corporate community had refused to participate in the proposed work strike; the majority of the public refused to disrupt the international airport as the Red Shirts in Thailand’s protest had done; the legislators refused to support the impeachment of Chen and the DPP legislators that refused to support the government. But those were only external factors. There were questions of how the $111 million that the campaign collected was spent and, very crucially, conflict within the leadership that separated Shih and the key Red Shirts at the campaign headquarters.

Outcomes

Despite the inability of the movement to unify both supporters of the DPP and KMT to rally against Chen for a prolonged period of time with fresh tactics and successful developments towards the movement’s goals, the campaign has, in effect, incited a new wave of anti-corruption activity. In 2008, the DPP lost footing both in the legislative elections and the presidency; KMT won by a landslide, and is currently under the same degree of scrutiny by the opposition and the media (and thus the public). Chen and his family were indicted for all their corruption crimes, and have been on trial since; his wife, son and other members of his family have pleaded guilty to embezzlement and fraud. In the years subsequent to the movement, Taiwan has elevated its government transparency and accountability, perhaps owing much to the awareness and mass-scale animosity towards corruption that the movement aroused within the people. This is success in its own way.

Conclusion

‘A Million Voices Against Corruption’ was a culmination of political and cultural opportunities that were shaped into a force of social change, made possible by the leadership of prominent political figures and their organization of all the resources that became available to them once the plea was made for caring citizens to take to the streets. Mass mobilization would not have been possible without the degree of public resentment, which included much of the elite, geared towards the government and especially the president, which underscores the significance of political and cultural opportunities and its synthesis with resource mobilization in social movement theory.

References

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