Deprived of state support and squeezed between domestic and multinational giants, few Chinese private enterprises can compete internationally… While it is no match for China’s rate of growth at the macrolevel, India has managed to produce many more private enterprises that are competitive in the international market.

The decision to censor vague references in the Obama Inaugural address reveals the insecurities of the CCP leadership. At a time when America was at her weakest vis-à-vis China, when her democratic system seems too inefficient to deal with the enormity of the challenge, Chinese leaders did not find the courage to let the Chinese public decide the merit of Obama’s words. While Obama is calling for the people to choose hope over fear, the CCP fears its own people.

This survey was commissioned by the National Image and Public Diplomacy Research Team at the Arts and Humanities Research Institute, Shanghai Jiao Tong University and carried out by the Center for Survey Research, Indiana University during June and July 2010. 810 valid responses were collected.

For the moment, the US remains the most powerful actor with the ability to shape the rules, norms, and institutions of the international system. Beijing will act as a responsible stakeholder only in an international system which it believes to be just and equitable. Thus, whether or not China will be a responsible stakeholder in the future depends largely on how the US chooses to define the system today.

The Korean nationalism of Mujong reflects the conflicted relationship between the author and colonial modernity. On the one hand, he desperately wants the Korean people to become strong, but on the other, he feels separate from and indeed repulsed by the common Korean person. He identifies himself as a member of the nation but cannot find community within its masses…

The geopolitical determinist would argue that the stage for the 1962 border dispute was set from the start; because the north-east and north-west extremities of India’s Himalayan border with China lacked buffer states, the two would eventually come into conflict. However, this oversimplifies the events that led to war. Domestic politics and national pride played a key role in China’s decision to go to war in 1962. The border conflict was far from inevitable.

This article is an excerpt from The China Brief, reprinted here with the permission of the Forum for Chinese American Exchange at Stanford (FACES). FACES is an international organization dedicated to promoting constructive, bilateral US-China relations in the global community by fostering personal relationships and mutual understanding among future leaders in the US and China. Please find the original article at: http://faces.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/

As the balance of power equalizes, strategic thinking based on the balance of resolve becomes increasingly dangerous. Chinese military modernization necessitates recognition of the inherent dangers of a Chicken game by all policymakers involved.

[Ending US arm sales to Taiwan] sacrifices none of the major U.S. goals in the Taiwan Strait and eliminates all the unpleasant consequences. The U.S. would avoid escalating the arms race with China and at the same time protect itself from Taiwanese entrapment and shirking.

A new era of East Asian security, marked by the triangulated relationship between the United States, China, and Taiwan, began in 1978. By officially establishing diplomatic relations with China and simultaneously establishing unofficial diplomatic relations with Taiwan, the United States was able to maintain the status quo of Taiwan independence and deny China the concessions it desired.