A nation’s concern for its future often crystallizes around the status of its young women. As the literal and figurative keepers of the bloodline, young women in various cultures have been the subject of intense scrutiny. The patriarchal structure of Japanese society in particular upholds the traditionally chaste and obedient girl as an exemplar of womanhood, thus placing young Japanese women squarely at the “center of national racial defense” (Kinsella, 152). Yet identifying women as “the bodily vessels of national ethnicity” necessarily introduces conflicts of interest between repression and freedom, conformism and individuality, and of course, between patriarchal and feminine ideals (Kinsella, 152). In the midst of male-dominated society, young women have nevertheless managed to stage a silent but pervasive rebellion. In this paper, I will analyze women that consciously manipulate their styles, such as Lady Gaga and the ganguro (Black Face) girls, to reflect their critiques of society to expose the hidden maladies that the dominant society seeks to conceal.

Yet despite the wholehearted efforts made by these female subcultures to challenge social preconceptions, their attempts often fall flat in the face of a hegemonic social structure that ultimately absorbs new subcultures and often uses them for monetary gain. Subcultural protests are effectively and silently stripped of their power by the mass media and marketing machines that counter instances of iconoclastic self-portrayal. While they may not persist, the objections raised by these young women perpetuate the tensions between dominant and subordinate culture that ultimately enables the reshaping of society.

Changes in social perceptions are often precipitated by a traumatic national event. In Japan, WWII and the subsequent U.S. occupation intensified the conservative, traditional view of women that gave rise to the current male-dominated social structure. At the time, the threat to ethnic purity posed by American GIs raised fears that “Japanese womanhood would be raped and impregnated indiscriminately” by the incoming U.S. army (Kinsella, 153). The purity of Japanese girls required protection at all costs, and women who associated with the enemy were seen as licentious traitors by the “painfully emasculated male imagination” of the post-war period (Kinsella, 153). Indeed, the Japanese girl became a “panic site” in the sense that “visions of disaster…[and] spiritual collapse” coalesced around her image (Napier, 329). The post-WWII male establishment reincarnate is in the modern Japanese mass media. It is a field dominated by a conservative male press that decries female rebellion with racial slurs, derogatory names, and satirical articles. Regarding Japanese women as the “biological reproducers of the nation,” the press espouses traditional gender roles that view faithful schoolgirls as the “natural and enduring…partners of heroic young kamikaze pilots” (Kinsella, 152). In the context of the male media establishment, the pure girl becomes a national symbol and the torchbearer for the survival of the Japanese nation.

Yet the industrialization and commercialization that followed the Occupation resulted in a dramatic rise in disposable incomes that ushered in a new generation of young women. Unlike their forebears, these women possessed both the time and the money to cultivate a “full engagement with the culture of consumption” (Yoda, 13). The postmodern girl thus fulfilled the stipulations of time, energy, and money necessary for a rebellion against the traditional moors of society. These characteristics, coupled with an environment where “virtually any kind of person [could] be a celebrity or star,” produced a generation of self-aware, socially liberal young women not afraid to speak their minds or dress their bodies unlike any group before them (Sato, 96).

The outrageous fashion choices of these young women represent a purposeful challenge to the traditional social order. Running completely counter to the image of the faithful schoolgirl or obedient wife, women like Lady Gaga and the Japanese ganguro girls consciously use their styles to critique the underlying problems of society. Often dressed in skimpy, futuristic costumes with elaborate stage makeup and false eyelashes, Lady Gaga utterly and completely flouts existing social conventions. Although her risqué outfits – like the suit of raw meat she donned for the 2010 MTV Music Awards – draw fire from both male and female critics, she justifies her fashion choices as a pointed message against female objectification: “if [women] don’t fight for our rights, pretty soon we’re going to have as much rights as the meat on our bones” (Gaga quoted in Kit, 1). With such an explanation in mind, Gaga’s stylistic choices can be interpreted as a protest against the continued sexual objectification of women.

Like Lady Gaga, the dark-skinned, theatrically-accessorized styles of the ganguro (Black Face) girl subculture of the 1990s ran brazenly counter to traditional Japanese values. By donning tropical flowers on strings of necklaces and sporting dark fake tans, ganguro girls took on the various “hybrid ethnicities” that alternately confused and horrified media critics (Kinsella, 144). Their dark suntans prompted comparisons to “animals walking on the continent of Africa” and other social Darwinistic implications that stripped them of their humanity while denigrating darker races (Kinsella, 147). The ethnocentric, racially-tinged remarks elicited by the ganguro subculture exposed Japan’s continual insistence on ethnic purity, a national preoccupation since the years following WWII. Though the ganguro subculture may not have begun as an outright critique of racist ideology, its existence and various permutations (kogyaru and yamamba, for example) indicate that the girls discovered a racial sensitivity in the dominant Japanese culture which they relentlessly exposed in their desire to assert a new female independence. Like the ganguro girls, various other female fashion subcultures, such as the lolita and the cutie, also manipulate style as an assertion of individuality and rebelliousness.

On the whole, critics’ responses have been resoundingly negative. The media’s reception of Lady Gaga and the ganguro girls has been remarkably similar in their respective nations, with portrayals of these women as mindless, traitorous, and even less-than-human. In addition to drawing protests from PETA, Gaga’s meat outfit was derisively speculated to “smell like the rotting flesh that it is…[and] be crawling in maggots” (Collins, 1). Likewise, the ganguro girls have been not only been “accused of undermining tradition,” but have also been subjected to racial slurs and dehumanizing insults (Kinsella, 247). Epithets leveled at them include “ugly witches,” “moron black faces (ōbaka no ganguro),” and “girl-animal (gyanimal)” (Kinsella, 145-148). The harmless girls were labeled as “infantile” and “tasteless” in the uptight, conservative view of the mass media (Kinsella, 248). Criticisms by the male-dominated press clearly indicate the panic sites that these young women have become. The media sees in their blatant rejection of social standards the dissolution of traditional social moors that have ensured an orderly, smoothly functioning society. Although some critics are more sensitive to the young women’s cause, it is no wonder that the majority of popular media regards the new generation of girls as “inscrutable, amoral, and apocalyptic” (Yoda, 21).

In their experimentation with self-presentation and style, Lady Gaga and the various female subcultures in Japan may in fact be exercising a deeper form of power. The rise of such iconoclastic girls heralds the new role of sexuality as a vehicle for female ambitions – a so-called “lady power” (Bauer, 1). Starting in the post-war era and spurred by the availability of consumption, young women began to control their image as both the “objects and subjects of sexual desire,” affirming their femininity and using it as a form of control (Yoda, 20). Women like Gaga and the ganguro girls now revel in the power that overt sexuality endows, both over men and over the mass media. Yet inherent in lady power is the positive self-affirmation of a negative image. As Kinsella writes, “women debased as infantile and irresponsible began to fetishize and flaunt their shojo [girl] personality still more, almost as a means of taunting and ridiculing male condemnation” (250). Lady Gaga and the ganguro girls respond similarly to female objectification and racism, respectively—they exaggerate sexual and racial characteristics to the extreme. Such an active affirmation is inherently dangerous (for reasons described further below), but it allows the girls to turn social constructs around and “manipulate [sexism and misogyny in the society] to [their] own advantage” (Yoda, 5).

Not only does lady power grant more leverage in masculine society, it increases popularity in a capitalist social sphere. Popular Japanese bands such as SMAP often manipulate femininity as a marketing strategy and a way to attract an audience of both women and homosexual men. SMAP and their producers understand that “feminine sexuality is a social construct, [that] anyone, even a man who’s willing to buck against gender norms, can wield” to increase their popularity (Bauer, 2). Popular ever since their teens in the 1990s and featured on advertisements, billboards, and TV, SMAP clearly illustrates the power that feminine sexuality – even when completely constructed – has in the mass media. (That Lady Gaga also understands the construction of femininity is evident in the high-heeled men featured in her music videos.) Men like SMAP willing to take on more effeminate appearances are rewarded with increased popularity and a larger share of the consumer market.

Yet the wielding of such feminine power is, on the flip side, a dangerous gamble. By so clearly championing their sexuality, young women ironically risk being interpreted as the very image they seek to reject – a sexualized object. As Bauer writes, “the more successful the embodiment, the less obvious the analytic part is” (2). For Lady Gaga and her ganguro counterparts, the continuous self-affirmation of sexuality and race may in fact jeopardize the strength of their protests; the validity of their underlying messages is easily obscured by the glitz of their constructed appearances. Responses from many male critics indicate that this is in fact what is happening. Most are unable or refuse to see past the girls’ superficial getup to their implicit social critiques, preferring instead to categorize the girls in magazines resembling “illustrated picture books about birds, fish, or insects” (Kinsella, 150).

In addition to jeopardizing the very principles they fight for, female subcultures are also easily absorbed into society due to their transient nature. Like the Candies, a 1970s girl idol group, youth subcultures, such as the ganguro girls, spring up with a fervor that often lasts only as long as the adolescence of its members. Indeed, girlhood and its associated fashions and protests are seen as a transient “detour”—a “liminal girl-time” between birth and the eventual assimilation into society through marriage (Yoda, 17). Capitalizing on the transience of youth, the popular TV series Sunset Kitties marked the departure of each member into society and womanhood as a celebratory “graduation” (Yoda, 18). Although the sentimental gesture rarely occurs in real life, the entry into wifehood or motherhood in Japan is nonetheless considered a worthwhile achievement (Yoda, 17). A young woman’s time as a ganguro girl is thus clearly demarcated as a moratorium before the reincorporation of true adulthood. Given the fleeting nature of adolescence, female subcultures may only be able to protest for as long as their girlhood lasts; even Lady Gaga and the ganguro girls seem to realize the ephemeral nature of their existence and imbue its briefness with all the intensity they can muster.

These female groups are assimilated into society not only due to the transience of girlhood but also due to mass media’s active role in their incorporation. Once a new subculture is discovered, the intense media coverage that follows results in a dilution of its originality and forcefulness. Through large-scale coverage and advertising, the popularization of countercultural styles pulls subcultures into the mainstream and divests them of their unconventionality. The power of Lady Gaga and her ganguro girl counterparts does rest on public recognition to a certain extent—otherwise, their protests would never reach a wide enough audience. Yet popularity exceeding a critical point is ultimately detrimental. Mass media’s dissemination of subcultural styles relentlessly pushes the equilibrium towards the tipping point, until finally, what was once novel becomes banal. Like the “commercialization of bosozoku [motorcycle gang] style [that] facilitated nationwide diffusion of bosozoku symbolism and mass participation in the subcultural style,” the rising popularity of female subcultures only signals their eventual demise (Sato, 97).

The distinctiveness of countercultural groups is further diluted by mass market capitalism. Capitalist enterprise aggressively promotes lesser-known styles to the mainstream, “[scrambling] over one another to invent new goods, services, and gimmicks to sell on the expanding domestic consumer market” (Kinsella, 247). The resulting replicas of countercultural objects dramatically decrease the exclusivity of the subculture. Such propaganda primarily targets the mainstream population, but even the subcultures themselves fall into the lures of material gain. Female groups like the ganguro girls are characterized by their “notorious faddishness, eagerness to try new product ideas and technology, and sharp radar for detecting new trends on the horizon” (Yoda, 2). Such vehement consumption is perhaps necessary for the continual upkeep of appearances, but it ironically perpetuates the very system that the girls protest. Regardless of the target audience, capitalist marketing strategies duplicate once-exclusive subcultural styles and thus dilute their unconventionality, just as replicas of a statue diminish the aura of the original. Although motivated primarily by monetary gain, these capitalistic practices actively reincorporate nonconformist groups into society. The various imitators and duplicates produced by such fervent marketing ultimately render the original groups and their protests obsolete. When operating under both media coverage and capitalist strategies, the reincorporation of subcultures becomes continuous and complete.

Despite their transient nature and their eventual assimilation at the hands of mass media and mass markets, Lady Gaga and the ganguro girls raise issues that perpetuate long after the women themselves have reentered the dominant culture. Lady power, for example, will remain a complex issue long after Lady Gaga herself has graduated into womanhood; the gender dynamics she toys with will remain open to debate. Each subculture also has the potential to inspire new groups that branch out or supersede their predecessors and continue the implicit critiques of society. Although the ganguro girl was a phenomenon of the 1990s, the subcultures it spawned (the amazoness, yamamba, mamba, celemba, and kogal, for example) continue to work to the same ends in exposing ethnic contradictions and social prejudices (Kawamura, 788-789). Though short-lived, subcultural movements revive debates relegated to the fringes of society. Without such voices of dissent, society risks the gradual assumption of immorality and ignorance.

In analyzing the complex dynamics of rebellion versus coexistence among female subcultures and society, it becomes clear that mass media and the social constructs it espouses have the final say. The media not only perpetuates the ideal images of society—like the devoted schoolgirl and her kamikaze companion—it consequently eradicates subcultures by popularizing once-exclusive trends. In addition to the media, mass markets and the transient, consumption-dependent nature of youth subcultures also cement their eventual demise. Despite the attempts of Lady Gaga and her Japanese ganguro counterparts to dismantle or at least challenge existing preconceptions, the media and markets never fail to present an effective counterattack. In popularizing and replicating unconventional styles, the mass media and marketing machines incorporate social subcultures to maintain a homogenous, like-minded population. In the face of such opposing forces, the brazen young women of these subcultures nevertheless raise objections that perpetuate the tensions between dominant and subordinate culture. Through their efforts, issues once relegated to the edges of social consciousness become at once visible and contentious. Only in the push and pull between culture and subculture does society have a chance of evolution and ultimately, of improvement.

References

Bauer, Nancy. “Lady Power.” The New York Times Opinionator. 20 June 2010. The New York Times. 12 Oct 2010 <http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/20/lady-power/>.

Collins, Leah. “Lady Gaga’s meathead move.” The Province. 15 Sep 2010. The Province. 12 Oct 2010 <http://www.theprovince.com/business/Lady+Gaga+meathead+move/3526440/story.html>.

Kawamura, Yuniya. “Japanese Teens as Producers of Street Fashion.” Current Sociology 54.5 (2006) : 784-801.

Kinsella, Sharon. “Black Faces, Witches, and Racism against Girls.” Bad Girls of Japan. Ed. Laura Miller and Jan Bardsley. Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. 142-157.

Kinsella, Sharon. “Cuties in Japan.” Women, Media, and Consumption in Japan. Ed. Lise Skov and Brian Moeran. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1996. 220-254.

Kit, Zorianna. “Gaga insists meat garb is no cheap gag.” The Vancouver Sun. 14 Sep 2010. The Vancouver Sun. 12 Oct 2010 <http://www.vancouversun.com/entertainment/Gaga+insists+meat+garb+cheap/3522906/story.html>.

Napier, Susan. “Panic Site: The Japanese Imagination of Disaster from Godzilla to Akira.” Journal of Japanese Studies 19.2 (1993): 327-351.

Sato, Ikuya. Kamikaze Biker. Chicago: U of Chicago Press, 1998.

Yoda, Tomiko. “Kogyaru and the Economy of Feminized Consumer Society.” Zappa: the Social Space and Movements of Contemporary Japan. Ed. Sabu Kohso and Yutaka Nagahara (forthcoming), Autonomedia.

Kang Kyong-ae published From Wonso Pond in 1934 when communist organization in colonial Korea was failingAmong many contemporary revolutionaries who attempted to effect change through writing, Kang stands out for her ability to link the peasant and working class struggles in a realistic and relatable way. By paralleling the peasant and proletariat causes, Kang attempts to arouse revolutionary fervor and leadership in her audience. . Forty years later, Cho Se-hui published The Dwarf in the midst of South Korea’s rapid economic growth as a result of Park Chung-hee’s economic initiatives. The Dwarf is a story of those South Koreans who are left behind by progress. The second-class citizens of The Dwarf, like their counterparts in From Wonso Pond, must battle corporate exploitation, political repression, and social injustice in order to survive. However, Cho does not propose revolution as a solution for Korea’s impoverished population. Rather, by successfully highlighting subtle elements in society, he demonstrates a need for greater mutual understanding and cooperation among social classes. Despite this difference in perspectives, Kang and Cho imply that social change cannot happen without collective effort that includes support of the higher classes.

In 1934, Communist movements in Korea strove to unite the Korean people, improve social conditions, and ultimately win independence for Korea from Japanese rule. These movements, which were led by intellectuals and students, were successful especially in making Korea’s lowest classes realize “political consciousness” (Suh 113). However, by 1928, four Korean Communist parties had all failed mostly as a result of repression by the Japanese police and factionalism of the intellectual Communist leaders (Suh 113). After 1928, a national Korean Communist Party could never be re-established during Japanese colonial rule (Suh 127). While political activists worked to organize the proletariat and peasant masses for revolution, Korean writers prolifically produced proletariat literature. Korean socialist literature, which was mostly produced by the Korean Proletariat Artist League (KAPF), was strongest from 1924 to 1934. However, the Japanese police arrested most of its members by the end of 1934, officially disbanding KAPF in 1935. Thus, Kang Kyong-ae published her novel when Communism was clearly failing in Korea. With this background to contextualize her work, From Wonso Pond reads like a rally call to the peasants and proletariat that may have been intended to reinvigorate the Communist effort. Kang reminds the reader of the hardships that both peasants and proletariats were equally facing and challenges the reader to take actions.

For the first half of the novel (published as a series in the colonial journal Tonga Ilbo), Kang presents the reader with the oppressive conditions of colonial rural life. It quickly becomes apparent that Tokho, the local loan shark and landlord, contributes greatly to the peasants’ hardships. In one scene, Tokho cheats the farmers to turn a profit while keeping them in debt. By keeping interest rates high, he forces the farmers of Wonso Pond to borrow millet once they have run out of everything they have grown that season. The farmers pay Tokho with their own high quality millet while he loans them “coarse” one “as though it had been half mixed with chaff” (Kang 43). The peasants are depicted as helpless with “no place they could make an appeal” (Kang 44).

Soon Tokho becomes the mayor of Wonso Pond. Though Kang avoids explicitly mentioning Japanese rule, it seems likely that Japanese authorities appoint Tokho to the position. Thus, Tokho represents not only the traditional repressive landlord, but also an extension of Japanese rule. Under the imperial rule, the peasants are told that taxes are meant to help them “enjoy a richer, healthier life” and that they will “all be rich men one day” (Kang 103) as long as the peasants follow the government’s advice. However, hypocrisy Tokho shows to Kaettong gives readers difficult time trusting the words of any government official. When Kaettong goes to jail, his mother pleads with Tokho to set him free. Tokho eventually assents to securing Kaettong’s release only because “the rest of the rice still had to be threshed” (Kang 97). By doing so, he is able to serve his own interests, assert his power, and reinforce his benevolent image all at the same time. Through this incident, Kang effectively illustrates a self-serving attitude of contemporary officers that has little regard for the people.

Similarly problematic is the law that cannot protect the farmers from such corrupted officers. This message is reinforced by Chotchae’s character. Previously surviving as a tenant farmer, Chotchae loses his tenant rights soon after he and Kaettong are released from jail (Kang 105). Without a means to sustain himself, Chotchae laments his poor prospects and questions how the punishment could be just for “[breaking] some so-called law by smashing a wagon” (Kang 104). Kang juxtaposes supposed progress and government propaganda against a reality of corruption and desperation. She highlights how Koreans are asked to follow “the law” so that they can realize a brighter future that they will not see. Indeed, Chotchae sardonically thinks to himself, “Hell, I’ll probably be breaking the law if I don’t do what the magistrate said today either,” alluding to the perceived arbitrariness of the legal system at the time (Kang 104).

The 1934 Korean audience would have strongly sympathized with difficulties farmers—tenant farmers in particular—had recently faced. From 1920 to 1932, Japanese officials reported 4,804 tenancy disputes, which involved a total of 74,581 landlords and tenants (Shin 55). These disputes were most often centered on how crops were distributed between the landlords and tenants as is the case in From Wonso Pond (Shin 54). In 1926, crop prices began to decline, and thus so did farmer incomes (Shin 68). Also as crop prices fell, so did the rate of tenant victories in tenancy disputes. From 1920 to 1926 tenants won 29.3% of disputes whereas from 1927 to 1932 tenants won only 14.7% of disputes (Chin 68). Global depression in this time period led to a climate in which peasants were driven to debt and starvation while receiving little aid from the legal system (Shin 95). These conditions forced many farmers to leave the countryside, and Kang narrates the mass migration of farmers to the cities when falling rice prices ruined them (Kang 189).

Using Chotchae’s character, Kang links the peasants to the proletariats. After losing his tenant rights, Chotchae travels to the city and becomes a laborer. As a farmer, Chotchae struggled against a combination of landlords, taxes, and corruption. As a laborer, Chotchae struggles against measly wages and poor working conditions. Workdays can last as long as fourteen hours, and some days, Chotchae is unable to make any money at all (Kang 189, 196). Chotchae’s loneliness and miserable lifestyle lead him to “smoke and bottle” (Kang 227). But after meeting Sinchol, Chotchae gives up his vices and is reinvigorated with “something more courageous that glowed” (Kang 227). Indeed, Sinchol embodies the efforts of some intellectuals at the time to directly engage and organize Korea’s labor class as endorsed by KAPF in the late 1920s and early 1930s (Suh 134). Sinchol, the well-off intellectual student turned proletariat champion, has difficulty navigating working life. In addition to the poor conditions and wages, Sinchol encounters corruption as he is “duped out of missing four chon by yet more people who were out to exploit him” (Kang 189). But Chotchae helps Sinchol adjust to the laborer lifestyle while Sinchol helps Chotchae realize class-consciousness (Kang 189, 229). Together the two introduce political activism to the proletariat in Inchon by handing out leaflets, and Chotchae believes Sinchol as “important” to helping laborers obtain class-consciousness (Kang 229). Chased by spies and police, Sinchol gives the reader a glimpse into the life of the Korean Communist revolutionary that sacrifices on behalf of the working class (Kang 225, 229). Thus the reader clearly sees the connections between the peasant and proletariat struggle. Not only are many of the issues the same, but also a large group of proletariats came from the countryside.

However, Kang does not only focus upon these populations through Chotchae and, to some extent, Sinchol, but also includes women in defining the proletariat struggle by narrating Sonbi’s story. She represents women in both the peasant and proletariat struggle. Sonbi, in servitude to and raped by Tokho, escapes to Inchon where she finds work in the Taedong Spinning Mill (Kang 128, 208). However, Sonbi, despite transitioning from the rural, traditional Korean lifestyle to the new industrial centers, still cannot escape oppression. Via the Taedong Spinning Mill, Kang shows the reader some of the inhumane aspects of colonial Korea’s booming textile industry such as the “ear-splitting” noise and continuous burns from boiling water (Kang 210-211). In addition, her character reinforces the idea that little changed for the lower classes of Korean society in the colonial era.

However, more importantly, Kang ties what many people probably already knew about industrial working conditions to commonalities found in other struggles. While Tokho and the country magistrate tell the farmers that all their actions are in the best interests of the farmers, the supervisors tell Sonbi and the other textile factory workers that they give “special consideration” to the workers’ “everyday convenience” (Kang 214). This way, as the supervisors assert, the workers will have the “easy life” and will “have cash in the bank to pay for [their] weddings” (Kang 215). Yet at the same time the factory owners feed their employees cheap imported rice that cause diarrhea, similar to how Tokho gives the farmers millet mixed with chaff (Kang 213). The owners do not actually give the workers any money, but instead keeps it in savings accounts where they can deduct penalties for any kind of “slacking” (Kang 215-216). Kang ensures that the reader sees past the “wool” that the higher classes try to pull over the proletariats’ and peasants’ eyes (Kang 218). By drawing these parallels between the difficulties that different working populations face, Kang effectively shows how peasants and workers, male or female, can unite under a common cause. The original title of this series, Human Problems, supports this interpretation of the universality of social injustice in colonial Korea.

Mirroring her own society, Kang ends the series with a completely failed revolution. Sonbi dies, and Sinchol settles down with a wealthy wife after renouncing Communism (Kang 268-269). Kang may be criticizing the failing revolutionary intellectual class because Cholsu responds to Chotchae’s surprise when learning of Sinchol’s conversion by asking, “What do you expect from the so-called intellectual class?” (Kang 268). Of the revolutionary characters, Chotchae is left alone to contemplate society’s injustices. Abandoned by Sinchol, Chotchae stares at Sonbi’s body and wonders how “human problems” can be solved when nobody has yet to solve them after so many years (Kang 168). Finally, Kang asks, “which human beings will actually solve these problems in the future? Just who?” (Kang 269). While it could be argued that Kang’s ending depicts the hopelessness of the Korean peasant and proletariat situation by 1934, it seems plausible that Kang is actually challenging the reader to become a new leader in the political arena. By writing the failure of her revolutionary characters, Kang acknowledges the defeats that Korean Communists had been suffering from the late 1920s to 1934. She does not try to mislead her 1934 readership into thinking that Communists held a strong position at the time. Instead, she reminds the reader of all the hardships that peasants and proletariats face, while arguing that their causes are essentially the same. By thus blurring all class divisions, Kang challenges and pushes her audience to political action.

Roughly forty years later Cho Se-hui published his own series of short stories centered on Korean society. At the end of Park Chung-hee’s rule, many of the social issues that Kang wrote about reappear in Cho’s The Dwarf. Elected on a democratic platform, Park Chung-hee declared a national state of emergency in 1971 as a combined result of the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam, reduced international demand for Korean goods, and rapid urbanization (Pike 315). Park’s policies led to rapid expansion of the Korean economy, which grew at an average rate of 9.5% per year from 1960 to 1975 and at an average rate of 12.3% per year from 1976 to 1979 (Pike 316). However, working conditions were often terrible as revealed by a statement by a women’s textile union in 1978 detailing exhausting hours, abusive supervisors, and poor living conditions (Panayiotopoulos and Capps 146). As a result of these conditions, labor unions fought for reform but did not significantly affect politics until 1979 to 1980 (Cumings 372). Park viewed unions and labor movements as threats to his economic “big push” in the 1970s and routinely used the KCIA and police to disrupt their activities (Cumings 375-377). Though society at this time could be perceived as government and capitalist elites repressing the working class in a similar fashion to 1930s Korea, Cho, unlike Kang, avoids representing society in a dichotomous fashion.

Shinae’s story is one of the first to appear in Cho’s series and the first in which the dwarf theme appears. Having a brother who went to college and married to a man able to support their daughter through school, Shinae is likely a member of the middle class (Cho 19, 92). Even so she sees herself as a “tiny dwarf” who has yet to receive the promised “good life” (Cho 14, 18). Though by no means among the poorest members of society, Shinae cannot help but feel small when both her neighbors ostentatiously listen to their televisions (Cho 19). As a result, she experiences a visceral reaction upon seeing the defenseless dwarf who helped her with her water collection problems be beaten by the man from the pump shop (Cho 30). It is also interesting that she identifies herself the dwarf’s ally because earlier she wonders what the sides in society are. Though there may be no objective “good” or “bad” in society, Cho establishes dwarfism as a “side” (Cho 18, 31). Whatever moral judgment that accompanies dwarfism is left up to the reader. Yet, when combined with the Moebius strip allegory preceding Shinae’s story, the reader can already see part of the message that Cho is presenting.

The Moebius strip, introduced when a teacher educates his class in The Dwarf, can be made from a strip of paper. When twisted and joined end to end the strip has only one side and this surface is called a Moebius strip (Cho 2). Though Cho does not explicitly state, the Moebius is an analogy for society. The teacher wants his students to keep the Moebius strip in mind as they enter college and learn more about the world. He tells the students that the universe itself is like a solid Moebius strip with no inside or outside (Cho 12). As a pseudo-preface to the rest of his story, Cho uses the Moebius strip to introduce the idea that sides are irrelevant in society. Society is a continuum where all people are a part of the single side of the Moebius strip. By aligning Shinae with the dwarf’s side, Cho lays the foundation of his social commentary by suggesting that everyone in society is somehow connected through metaphorical dwarfism. This idea of dwarfism is central to Cho’s story. Throughout the series, Cho builds upon the idea that the one “side” in society is dwarfism. Almost all of the characters have either personal or emotional connections to the dwarf. Cho uses this metaphor to show the reader the dwarf inside each character across the social status spectrum.

The dwarf and his family are the traditional social dwarves and used to narrate much of the working class’ troubles. The dwarf who is never named in the series is unable to support his children through school, whom all eventually become laborers (Cho 59). Interestingly, the labor struggles presented via these characters mirror the proletariat cause from Kang’s writing. In the beginning the two sons work in a factory, where they cannot socialize or rest and receive just enough pay to survive. To keep the workers in line, the factory owners tell the workers that hard work is necessary so that they may become wealthy, but neither conditions nor wages ever improve (Cho 65). After being evicted and having their home demolished, the family moves into a slum (Cho 132). The three children, Yong-su, Yong-ho, and Yong-hu, work in various factories, struggling to earn enough money to survive. They endure horrendous conditions, including dangerous noise levels, heat, long hours, and physical exhaustion in order to make roughly 20,000 won, which is less than the minimum cost of living (Cho 134-135, 140). Though labor unions exist, and Yong-su tries to use the union to improve working conditions and wages, nameless employers denounce such efforts as “subversive” and accuse the laborers of having “already broken the law” (Cho 154,156). By not explicitly specifying who the employers and laborers are when he writes about a meeting between union and company representatives, Cho suggests that the names could be replaced with any employer/laborer pair, as he illustrates the difficulty of reasoning with company owners. When this fails Yong-su attempts to kill the president of the factory’s parent company because of the way he treats his employees (Cho 198).

Though it could be argued that these stories undermine a sense of Cho’s view of society without clear delineations, Cho uses Kyong-hun and his cousin to depict the dwarfism among the wealthy elite. While these characters are certainly not socioeconomic dwarves, their personal lives reveal a different kind of dwarfism. As the Ungang Group chairman’s third son, Kyong-hun constantly strives to escape from his two older brothers’ shadows and is paranoid that they would turn on him to minimize his share of the company (Cho 182). In addition, he admires his father who was responsible for Ungang’s massive expansion and success (Cho 185). While the reader may be sympathetic, he can understand the heavy burden that Kyong-hun bears that influences his aggressive attitude towards his uncle’s murderer. Kyong-hun’s unnamed cousin is in an even more precarious position in the family than Kyong-hun. As the only wealthy character who is sympathetic towards the laborers’ cause, he has little chance of inheriting any part of the Ungang Group. Even Kyong-hun decides that he would side with his brothers in disowning their cousin (Cho 192). It is sad that the cousin’s humanity makes him a dwarf in his world. Though he has the potential to help improve Ungang Group workers’ situation Cho suggests that his potential is unlikely to be fulfilled, suggesting that the Korean elite mentality must change.

Though the characters in The Dwarf certainly do not all share the same social or economic status, Cho complicates traditional social class definitions. Despite the convenience of classifying classes as upper, middle, or lower, Cho blurs the distinctions by highlighting the universality and wide-reaching ramifications of social and economic issues. The dwarf and his family are most obviously affected by 1970s Korean economic practices as they suffer from housing disputes, low wages, and unhealthy conditions. Shinae, while somewhat better off than the dwarf’s family, feels suffocated by the luxuries her neighbors enjoy that she cannot afford due to debt. As the youngest son of prominent family, Kyong-hun struggles to meet his family’s expectations in a competitive capitalist environment. His cousin, a figure of hope for the working class, faces strong opposition from his family because of his liberal attitudes. While the reader may naturally categorize characters in traditional social classes, Cho shows the reader that society makes each class feel like a dwarf. Cho does not offer an easy solution for this social dwarfism. However, by revealing the commonalities and interconnectedness among social groups, Cho rejects an antagonistic view of social issues. He shows several perspectives of society, and this complicates a hard stance against corporate executives. This approach suggests that he believed in the necessity of a collective effort to institute social change in the 1970s. Workers and intellectuals were insufficient, rather members of the political and corporate system had to be recruited as well. Social injustice, symbolized by dwarfism, is a challenge that faces the Korean population as a whole and therefore cannot be solved by an individual group of people.

Kang and Cho both recognize some of the major problems plaguing their societies in the 1930s and 1970s respectively. Despite some uncanny similarities between the two socioeconomic landscapes, Kang describes the issues in terms of a peasant and proletariat problem, whereas Cho presents the issues as more of a collective problem. In Kang’s society the capitalist regime suppresses the proletariat and peasant populations. Cho, on the other hand, presents a society in which the pressure of industrialization victimizes diverse groups of people. The acknowledgement of similar abuses and injustices, within commentaries stretching from the 30’s to 70’s, reveals a persistent recruitment for political action. Yet the changing rhetoric shows an effort to appeal to a wider base, encouraging a cooperative movement for social change.

Reference

Cho, Se-hui. The Dwarf. Trans. Bruce Fulton and Ju-Chan Fulton. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2006.

Cumings, Bruce. Korea’s Place in the Sun. New York: W. W. Norton & Comapny, Inc., 2005.

Kang, Kyong-ae. From Wonso Pond. Trans. Samuel Perry. New York: The Feminist Press at The City University of New York, n.d.

Panayiotopoulos, Prodromos and Gavin Capps. World Development: An Introduction. London: Pluto Press, 2001.

Pike, Francis. Empires at War: A Short History of Modern Asia Since World War II. London: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2010.

Shin, Gi-Wook. Peasant Protest & Social Change in Colonial Korea. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1996.

Suh, Dae-sook. The Korean Communist Movement 1918-1948. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967.

Introduction

In their influential 2003 Foreign Policy article, Yasheng Huang and Tarun Khanna made the bold proposition that India’s economy could overtake China’s in the long term because its bottom up approach of reform creates better micro level conditions than China’s top down approach of state-driven economic liberalization. Though controversial at the time, this proposition no longer seems far-fetched. In recent years, the two systems seem to be converging: India has been attracting more foreign direct investment (FDI), while China has been taking steps to encourage innovation in its private sector. China is trying to slow down its GDP growth even as India speeds up.[2] Even as the two Asian giants move to adopt each other’s best practices, the dissimilarities between their two systems become even more apparent.

The vast differences in Chinese and Indian economic landscapes may appear puzzling upon initial assessment. Both nations have undergone economic liberalization while having massive labor supply, planned economies, large bureaucracies, and a history of one party rule. Yet China has become the “world factory”, relying on FDI fueled export-driven growth for rapid GDP growth. On the other hand, India’s reform and growth has been more gradual; it has become the “world office”, developing a very competitive IT sector and a vibrant private sector. A systematic comparison of the two economies reveals that the differences are rooted in differences in their political systems.

The fundamental dissimilarities between the centralized authority of the CCP party-state in China and the multiparty democratic system in India explain much of the variation in respective state attitudes towards FDI, role of organized labor, and the balance of state-owned enterprises and the private sector.

China

The State’s Role in Economic Control

The People’s Republic of China represents a developmental paradox.  Politically, it remains an authoritarian state, but, economically, it has embraced the free market. Under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) initiated process of reform and opening to unleash market forces in order to generate economic growth.  In the 1980s, collective farming gave way to a “responsibility system” which allowed farmers to profit from their surplus crops and special economic zones (SEZs) were established to encourage foreign investment. Beginning in the early 1990s, the CCP began the painful process of SOE restructuring, ending state price control policies and protectionist regulations that shielded China’s inefficient SOEs from market competition. However, the state has retained control of so-called strategic enterprises and dominates key sectors of the economy. In 2003, the state directly accounted for 38% of Chinese GDP[3] and employed 85 million people (Pei 2006).  To sufficiently understand Chinese economy, therefore, it is essential to recognize the central role the state plays in economic affairs (Gao 2009).

Economic Reform under One Party Rule

China dealt with the pressure to reform through a three-pronged effort: FDI liberalization, SOE restructuring, and private industry development. Since FDI liberalization, China has received more FDI than any other developing countries (Gallagher 2005). It attracted FDI through policies such as the creation of SEZs and the lowering of export tariffs. Though these policies were controversial at the time, the concentration of power within the CCP ensured their steady implementation. FDI has spurred capitalism and competition, incentivized development, and sparked political reform to transform China’s markets into globally competitive ones (Gallagher 2005). This foreign sector of investment also provided the experimental grounds to test the reactions to labor reforms and company restructuring (Gallagher 2005). This was done with no direct consequence to the state, specifically SOEs.  Finally, these FDI reforms prompted an ideological shift, transferring value from public ownership and control to value in national ownership.

Because these reforms to attract FDI happened before SOE restructuring, the SOEs complained of an unfair advantage enjoyed by multinational companies. SOEs could neither make autonomous decisions pertaining to worker retention and compensation nor could they escape the provision of social welfare provision requirements. The struggling SOEs were desperate for a way to motivate productivity and efficiency in performance.  Therefore, the central government implemented structural reforms of the SOEs that liberalized these processes, leaving the enterprises with more autonomy to be competitive with multinational corporations.  From 1979 to 1983, new features were implemented in the following ways: taxable profit (enterprises paying taxes rather than turning over all profits to the state) and loans for fiscal grants (turning government appropriations into loans to improve efficiency).  These changes were more efficient on two fronts – the government sinks less money into unprofitable ventures and the individual enterprises increase their profit intake, thereby providing an incentive for continued growth and success (Lin and Zhu 2001).

The establishment of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), a specially commissioned group under the State Council charged with managing China’s SOEs, in 2003 marked a new phase of SOE reform. The founding of SASAC launched a process of redefining the relationship between the central government and the so-called “central enterprises” (zhongyang qiye), the key SOEs that have been selected by the government to form the basis from which China’s future top global companies will be created. Central enterprises account for the bulk of SOE profits and around a quarter of SOE corporate investment (Mattlin 2007). The SASAC represents yet another way that the Chinese state, particularly the central government, exerts its power in the economic realm.

The Public and the Private Sector

According to the SASAC, there are 123 centrally owned companies within China. The centrality of China’s SOEs leaves a minor role for homegrown private companies. Strategic SOEs— such as telecommunications, electricity, and railroads—are particularly important to the CCP because they allow the party to have monopoly of power within the state. Additionally, SOE assets tied to these industries make up a large proportion within the Chinese market, making these ventures a very important factor:

The 2nd National Economic Census conducted in 2008 reveals that of all the 208 trillion RMB total assets of the secondary and tertiary sectors, 63 trillion, about 30%, was held by SOEs. …Meanwhile, in terms of enterprise number, there were 154,000 SOEs at the end of 2008, only accounting for 3.1% of the total enterprise number…SOEs control a substantial part of total enterprise assets in China, despite the fact that their total number is marginal.”(Xu 2010)

While China has continued to privatize non-profitable SOEs and has encouraged competition among SOEs through restructuring, SOEs remain central to the Chinese economy. Though SOEs account for an ever smaller portion of China’s industrial output, they have become increasingly concentrated in large, capital-intensive firms that are important to the state not only economically but also politically. Many of the executives of the SOEs are party members, and are appointed to their positions by the CCP through the tradition of nomenklatura[4]. The rotation of SOE executives and government officials through party politics creates perverse incentives to stifle private sector competition.

The precarious nature of one-party CCP rule meant that China has been far bolder with external reforms but has imposed substantial legal and regulatory constraints on indigenous, private firms. As Huang and Khanna’s study reveal that numerous Chinese entrepreneurs tried, and failed, to circumvent the restrictions placed on their activities to set up private firms. Some registered their firms as nominal SOEs (all the capital came from private sources, and the companies were privately managed), only to find themselves ensnared in title disputes when financially strapped government agencies sought to seize their assets (Huang and Khanna 2003). China faces competing priorities in its economic reform agenda; political pressures push the CCP must preserve certain SOEs, but economic pressures pull it down the path of private industry development. Though China’s political system has performed admirably in attracting FDI to fuel China’s economic reform, it has also inhibited the establishment of internationally competitive industries in the private sector.

India

Consociational Politics

Unlike the centralized one-party state of China, multiparty pluralism and democratic elections characterize Indian politics. John Stuart Mill famously asserted that democracy is next to impossible in multiethnic societies and completely impossible in linguistically divided communities (Mill 1958). India flies in the face of this paradigm. Political scientists have puzzled over how India, with its deeply divided population, has managed to remain a majoritarian democracy since independence.

Arend Lijphardt shed light on this puzzle by arguing that Indian democracy has demonstrated all the crucial elements of power sharing theory and represents a consociational system. (Lijphart 1996) A consociational system is characterized by (1) grand coalition governments that include representatives of all major linguistic and religious groups, (2) cultural autonomy of these groups, (3) proportionality in political representation, and (4) a minority veto with regard to vital minority rights (Lijphart 1996). Thus, though the Congress Party (and the Nehru-Gandhi family leadership) continues to dominate India’s political arena, the multi-party democratic process of Indian politics distinguishes it from the politics of one party rule under the CCP. Without having to win majority of popular votes in parliamentary elections, the Congress party has managed to remain in power consistently since independence by balancing the interests of various interest groups(Rudolph and Rudolph 1987). This illustrated that, although India’s associational life has proved too fragmented to agree or act on alternative national political doctrines that challenge Congress’s centrist consensus, Indian politics remain a dynamic and competitive multi-party system, characterized by high levels of social mobilization, a plethora of voluntary organizations, and conflicting sets of elite interests. This stands in stark contrast to the party-state politics of CCP-ruled China where there is a much more pronounced concentration of interest within the ranks of the CCP and no outside parties pose a viable threat to force the CPP to compromise its position.

Economic Reform under a Pluralistic Democracy

India’s democratic political order defined the process of economic reform just as one party rule shaped the development of China’s economic reform; logically, the two different political systems produced very different economic configurations. The Indian system necessitated compromise among divergent set of interests, this impeded and compromised the process of economic reforms. Indian politics is dominated by coalition building amongst interest groups with divergent interests whereas Chinese politics under the CCP has been very centralized. Democratic politics also empower labor unions in India and foster local protectionism which hinder the inflow of FDI; these are challenges China did not have to tackle when it initiated reform in the 1979.

India initiated reform much later than China; indeed, the impetus for large-scale economic reform might not have ever materialized if not for a moment of crisis. In 1991, the Balance of Payments Crisis dismantled the License Raj and allowed for private sector competition against state monopolies. However, India has taken the gradualist approach to economic reform, a process that appears piecemeal and haphazard to the casual observer. In contrast to China, India pursued a policy of divestment rather than privatization (Ahluwalia 2002). Disinvestment allowed the state to retain managerial control while mobilizing revenue for the budget. This policy had very limited success for disinvestment receipts were consistently below budget expectations (Ahluwalia 2002). Many economists have criticized the gradualist approach, complaining that the gradual process of privatization also increases the chances of favoritism to self interested and rent seeking politicians, bureaucrats, and labor unions (Ahluwalia 2002).

The Economic Landscape of Post-Reform India

The reforms of 1991 reduced the number of exclusive areas reserved for the public; by 2002, this list had been subsequently reduced to only three sectors: atomic energy, atomic minerals, and railway transport. Nevertheless, the fact that 246 enterprises remain in the ownership of India’s central government shows that reform has been slow. According to The Economist, “These companies employed almost 1.6m people in 2008 and accounted for 8.3% of the country’s GDP.”[5] It is well established that the state-owned and mixed sectors of the Indian economy are significantly inefficient as compared to the private sector (Bhagwati 1993; Majumdar 1998), but due to entrenched local interest, the Indian state has been unable to proceed efficiently with SOE privatization. Thus, while the number of loss-making SOEs has fallen from 110 to 53 between 2001 and 2008, the scale of the losses has crept up again in recent years.[6] As the number of state-owned companies has held steady, countless private outfits have grown up, encroaching on their turf and liberating their customers.

Yet, despite its efforts at reform and liberalization, India’s economy continues to lag behind that of China’s and faces significant challenges. Still, the success of the private sector is encouraged by the Indian government’s following projects: industrial de-licensing, protection of property rights, devaluation that had been implemented previously. This process has been slow, the central planners of economic reform are frustrated by local elites (Majumdar 1998). Small and medium scale companies still suffer from lack of finances and state barriers to expansion. Additionally the absence of a regulatory structure and infrastructure also hinder growth.

The modern Indian economy excels in the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) sector but lags behind China in manufacturing. Its economic landscape is shaped by local interests at the state level due to the legacy of licensing. A divergence in performance has taken place—firms in those states and sectors with the best institutions gaining, and those in the more tightly regulated states and sectors falling further behind.[7] The need for further institutional reforms is urgent, focusing on product and labor market regulations at the central and state levels.[8] However these reforms have been slow in coming due to India’s democratic politics, where the centrist Congress party consensus is increasingly challenged in recent years by political mobilization pressing for immediate and hard-to-fill demands, by the rise of religious fundamentalism and class/caste divisions, and the deinstitutionalization of the Congress party and state structure (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987).

Role of Labor Unions

Organized labor play a much more active role in the Indian economy than their Chinese counterparts. The number of unions grew considerably after independence; in the early 1990s, total membership rose to over 9 million. Many unions are affiliated with regional or national federations, the most important of which are the Indian National Trade Union Congress, the All-India Trade Union Congress, the Centre of Indian Trade Unions, the Indian Workers’ Association, and the United Trade Union Congress (Heitzman 1995). Politicians have often been union leaders, and some analysts believe that strikes and other labor protests are carried out primarily to further the interests of political parties rather than to promote the interests of the work force (Heitzman 1995). Thus, labor unions also play a strong role in the reform the Indian economy. Organized labor is an important player in democratic coalition building; thus, they have a distorting influence in labor market regulation. It is only India’s organized sector that is subject to labor market regulation, and here employment has actually fallen. Unsurprisingly, private sector gains in India have arisen primarily in the unorganized and informal sectors of the economy, where productivity and wages are generally much lower than in the formal organized sector, where unions are entrenched.[9]

The Role of FDI

Due in part to the weakness of organized labor in China, foreign investment and foreign firms played a much greater role in China’s economic development than they did in India. As Huang Yasheng notes in Selling China, “foreign firms, either singly or as JVs with Chinese firms, have established a ubiquitous presence in China”(Huang 2003). The inflow of FDI has allowed the Chinese government to shift the political dynamic from a public vs. private sector issue to a Chinese vs. foreign issue, diverting attention from the painful process of SOE restructuring which resulted in massive job loss. In India, FDI has been a much less important part of export; today, FDI driven exports accounts for less than 10% of India’s total. Chinese domestic firms lack the political clout available to their Indian counterparts because of nondemocratic CCP one party rule; they could not protect themselves against competition from the influx of foreign firms. However, strong state control allowed China to develop more business-oriented, FDI-friendly policies than India, where regulations caused excess bureaucracy (Wei 2005). According to the World Bank Group, it takes 90 days to start a new business in India compared to 30 days in China (Wei 2005).

Conclusion

India and China, the largest developing countries in the world, garner a great deal of attention individually and in comparison.  The roles two governments play in private companies and state owned enterprises are very different mostly due to the political differences between the two countries. These differences have motivated fundamental changes in market participation, creating each distinctive economic landscape that reflects a political structure.  

The Chinese party-state under the CCP has historically favored SOEs and foreign MNCs over domestic enterprises. Deprived of state support and squeezed between domestic and multinational giants, China’s private sector has exhibited rapid growth (largely due to the weakness of organized labor) but few enterprises can compete internationally. On the contrary, India’s democratic system retards the rate of reform and restricts labor law. Indian economic reform began later and has proceeded haltingly, attracting a much smaller inflow of FDI than its Chinese counterpart. While it is no match for China’s rate of growth at the macro level, India has managed to produce more private enterprises that are competitive on the international market.

As time continues and policies change, the two states seem to be growing towards a point of convergence.  China began with great inflows of FDI and little additional investment in SOEs and local, private companies.  India saw a lack in FDI and developed very insular private corporations.  In recent years however, China is now more focused on encouraging research and development within its national corporations to further growth.  India is welcoming FDI as a way to improve many of the structural deficits it faces in furthering its development.  It remains to be seen what this second phase of reforms will do for either country politically and economically.

References

Ahluwalia, M. (2002). “Economic reforms in India since 1991: has gradualism worked?” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 16(3): 67-88.

Bhagwati, J. (1993). India in transition: freeing the economy, Oxford University Press, USA.

Gallagher, M. (2005). Contagious capitalism: Globalization and the politics of labor in China, Princeton University Press.

Gao, B. (2009). “The Rubik’s Cube State: A Reconceptualization of Political Change in Contemporary China.” Research in the Sociology of Work 19: 409-438.

Huang, Y. (2003). Selling China: foreign direct investment during the reform era, Cambridge Univ Pr.

Huang, Y. and T. Khanna (2003). “Can India Overtake China?” Foreign Policy 137: 74-81.

Lijphart, A. (1996). “The puzzle of Indian democracy: A consociational interpretation.” American Political Science Review 90(2): 258-268.

Lin, Y. and T. Zhu (2001). “Ownership restructuring in Chinese state industry: An analysis of evidence on initial organizational changes.” The China Quarterly 166: 305-341.

Majumdar, S. (1998). “Assessing comparative efficiency of the state-owned mixed and private sectors in Indian industry.” Public Choice 96(1): 1-24.

Pei, M. (2006). “The Dark Side of China’s Rise.” Foreign Policy 153: 32-40

Rudolph, L. and S. Rudolph (1987). In pursuit of Lakshmi: The political economy of the Indian state, University of Chicago press.

Wei, W. (2005). “China and India: Any difference in their FDI performances?” Journal of Asian Economics 16(4): 719-736.

Xu, G. (2010). “State-Owned  Enterprises in China: How Big are They?” World Bank.

In today’s increasingly globalized world, China’s role as an international superpower is a topic of constant discussion as the country continues to define itself within the complicated realities of current geopolitical structures. In addition to its growing importance in the global economy, China’s identity as a superpower is rooted in its increasing political power in the world theater. Although the exact advent of China as a global political force is debatable, its potential power on a global scale certainly came to the fore in 1971 when the People Republic of China’s assumed China’s seat in the United Nations. Since then, China’s role in the UN has changed from that of a passive one to an active one, and I will argue that as China has grown more confident in its role in the international sphere throughout the years, it has become more assertive in pursuing its strategic and foreign policy goals, as evidenced by its performance in the UN. Like all states, China has sought to use the United Nations as a forum for projecting its foreign policy and achieving its national interests. This was especially apparent in its early years, during which time China’s objectives were (1) to advance its reputation in the international community, (2) to enhance its national security, and (3) to seek solidarity with the developing world so as to avoid isolation in the international community. These three themes have been consistent throughout China’s track record in the UN and have continued to mark its involvement and performance in the UN up to the present day, though with notable changes from a passive to a more active approach. The underlying motivation for this change has been China’s desire to be seen as a leader in the UN and the international community.

Historical Overview

An understanding of the context of Beijing’s complex entrance into the UN is necessary before analyzing China’s participation in the United Nations. In 1945 during the founding of the UN, China was one of the five permanent members of the Security Council after it ratified the Charter alongside France, Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. At this time, China was governed by Chiang Kai-Shek’s Nationalist government as the Republic of China (ROC). However, shortly after the Chinese Civil War was won by Mao Zedong’s Communist Party in 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded, and Chiang’s Nationalist government was forced to retreat to Taiwan. Since “China” itself was an original Permanent Member of the UN Security Council, the question was not one of admission, but one of deciding which “China” – Taipei’s Republic of China or Beijing’s People’s Republic of China – would represent China in the UN. The two parties’ simultaneous claims to China’s UN seat defined the 22-year representation issues that marked China’s first phase of UN involvement.

From 1949 until 1971, the issue of representation was at the center of the PRC’s UN agenda. The legal status of China’s UN representation by the Nationalist delegation was first questioned in 1949, when the PRC assumed control of the Mainland and the Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China sent a letter to the President of the General Assembly. This challenge was then supported by the Soviet Union’s representative to the Security Council who also challenged the Nationalist government’s claim to represent the Chinese people. China’s contested representation from 1949 to 1971 can be understood as three stages. First, there were substantive discussions in 1950, during which the General Assembly and the Security Council dealt directly with specific reference to the China participation and recognition issue. From 1951 to 1960, known as the moratorium period, the General Assembly, under the influence of the U.S. and its allies, postponed consideration of the China question by rejecting proposals to include the discussion onto the official agenda. Using these procedural maneuvers, the U.S. led a campaign to block the PRC’s UN recognition as part of its menu of items used to contain Chinese Communism expansionism. Substantive discussion then began in 1961 when China’s case was first included in the official agenda. The question was then considered and debated, with U.S.-backed Taipei slowly losing ground to Beijing over the 10 years until 1971 when Beijing was recognized and Taipei removed as China’s representative in the UN. Because this resolution was on an issue of credentials rather than one of membership, it was possible to bypass the Security Council where the United States and the ROC could have used their vetoes. From 1950 to 1955, the Soviet Union was China’s most active supporter due to the two countries’ Communist connections, and from 1955 until the Sino-Indian border conflicts of 1960, India was also China’s advocate. However, as Sino-Soviet relations worsened over the course of the 1950s and further deteriorated in the 1960s, Albania and Cambodia introduced draft legislation on China’s behalf in 1965, and in 1966, eleven countries submitted a proposal to seat the PRC: Albania, Algeria, Cambodia, Congo, Cuba, Guinea, Mauritania, Mali, Pakistan, Romania, and Syria.

The eventual seating of Beijing in 1971, marked the first major defeat of the U.S. in the General Assembly and also signified the emergence of developing countries with China emerging as the “self-appointed champion of the new actions initiated by the Third World”. The turning point occurred on October 25, 1971, ten years after General Assembly discussion began on the China question. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 passed with 76 votes in favor, 35 against, and 17 abstentions, and declared “that the representatives of the Government of the People’s Republic of China are the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations.” The PRC, with the support of the newly-recognized developing countries in the General Assembly, was finally granted China’s seat in the UN, and Beijing would not forget these roots.

Analysis of Abstention Strategy

China’s track record of abstentions has led many to describe China’s UN participation as that of a “non-participant” policy. China’s non-participation and use of abstentions stems from a historical ideological aversion to interfering in the domestic affairs of countries or undermining their sovereignty and territorial integrity in addition to its own aversion to taking a firm stand on issues. Since Beijing’s ascension to the UN in 1971, China has used its veto power very sparingly, instead opting for non-participation in voting in the 1970s and abstentions in the 1980s. Although it no longer employs a strategy of passive non-participation and has a much more active role in UN activity as compared to its early years, Beijing still retains abstentions as a key part of its UN strategy. By abstaining, Beijing has been able to send a message and yet avoid the necessity of taking sides and alienating allies.

China’s justifications for its non-participation and abstentions have remained fairly consistent over time. As mentioned earlier, China considers sovereignty and territorial integrity to be its banner issues and dislikes interfering in what it considers to be the domestic affairs of other countries. Beijing has been particularly sensitive to sanctions and use of force under the UN name, particularly when its own interests are at stake. However, because it does not want to be labeled as an obstructionist or stand in opposition to the West – particularly the United States and its allies – Beijing has never voted against the imposition of sanctions or the use of force.

During the 1970s, China created and consistently used a policy of non-participation in the Security Council voting process. Of the 101 resolutions adopted by the Security Council between November 24, 1971 and December 22, 1976, China posted a 39 percent rate of abstention and non-participation. Beijing was especially apprehensive about the legitimacy of UN peacekeeping operations, and opposed such actions for ideological reasons. First, China viewed such UN peacekeeping as a means for the U.S. and the Soviet Union to play out their power struggle, and Beijing disagreed with both Washington and Moscow. Second, state sovereignty and non-intervention were of utmost importance to China, especially in light of its own domestic situation with the continued Taiwan problem. This commitment to non-intervention is seen in China’s track record throughout the years, but especially during its first few years in the UN, ideological issues played a major role in Beijing’s avoidance of UN participation.

Another factor for China’s passivity during then 1970s was its relationship with the developing world. Beijing was aware of the support it received from developing nations during its 21-year struggle to claim China’s UN seat prior to 1971. To the PRC, this proved that its efforts in supporting decolonization had paid off politically. As the only developing country on the Permanent-Five Security Council, China felt that it had both a responsibility and an advantage in protecting the interests of developing nations. In 1974, Mao Zedong outlined the “Three-World Theory” and Deng Xiaoping, who was Vice Premier at the time, further outlined this theory at the Special Session of the UN General Assembly of that same year. As succinctly noted by Yeshi Choedon, “China identified itself with the Third World.” As such, China had an additional interest in using sovereignty and non-intervention as reasons for sitting out on UN activity.

However, despite this aversion to UN activity and participation, China’s inactivity did not translate to vetoes against peacekeeping operations. In response to the U.S. and Soviet Union’s power struggle, China did not want to appear to take sides and was unwilling to take its commitment to sovereignty and non-intervention to a level where its newly-recognized international reputation would be put on the line and on the record. Perhaps even more importantly, China did not want to appear obstructionist to either Washington or Moscow, or even relevant Third World countries who had interest in seeing such resolutions pass. As a result, China started its practice of non-participation: being present during the Security Council voting process but not voting. Thus, Beijing chose not to participate in or was absent from the vote on almost every UN peacekeeping operation during the 1970s.

This attitude changed with the adjustment of China’s foreign policy in the early 1980s, and China began participating in UNSC voting. Though most votes were actually abstentions, this was still a move towards a more participatory approach. During this period, China’s increased interactions on both bilateral and multilateral levels, particularly its newly normalized relations with the U.S. as marked by President Richard Nixon’s 1979 visit to China, helped Beijing to realize the importance and potential of the UN as a platform to slowly increase its activity and presence in the international community. Also during this time, Deng Xiaoping began rolling out his Reform and Opening Up policies. New leadership gave higher credence to engaging in international cooperation and multilateral diplomacy. This new international and domestic environment caused Beijing to re-evaluate its approach to the UN and led to its adjusted voting behavior in the 1980’s. However, China’s concern for sovereignty and non-intervention still ranked high among its issues with UN involvement, and China maintained a rather passive approach in the 1980’s.

Up to this point, China’s position in the UN was one of consistent passivity, frequently abstaining from resolutions that would interfere with what it considered a country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. But starting in the late 1980s into the 1990s, China began to take steps toward more active participation in UN activities, particularly peacekeeping. Between 1988 and 1998, 36 UNPKO were established, and China voted in favor of all missions that carried out traditional peacekeeping tasks and those that were continuations of traditional missions established during the Cold War era. However, it still chose to abstain from new peace enforcement missions with the exception of voting in favor of the United Nations Operations in Somalia II.

Between 1990 and 1999 China abstained 41 times when contentious issues, like the use of force, humanitarian intervention, and the establishment of international criminal tribunals, were at the negotiating table. Between 1992 and 1996, China voted in favor of a resolution authorizing the use of force seven times and abstained seven times. China maintained its commitment to sovereignty and non-intervention concerns, but allowed itself flexibility to make decisions dependent on the situation at hand. This can be seen in two of its decisions during the 1990s – Iraq and Cambodia. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 led to Resolution 678, the UNSC’s first peace enforcement action. Beijing disagreed with Iraq’s invasion, but did not want to vote for a U.S.-led coalition attack due to its historical apprehensions about use of force. However, this occurred on the tails of the PRC’s near-universal condemnation for the Tiananmen Incident of 1989, and Beijing was anxious to regain its reputation and credibility within the international community. Thus, China relied on its tried and true tactic of abstention to allow the vote to past, and its cooperation with the West – or at least its lack of obstruction to U.S. leadership – was viewed favorably, thus putting Beijing back on track to be seen as part of the international community.

Cambodia in 1991 was an easier decision for China. In the aftermath of decades of civil war in Cambodia, China joined the rest of the Security Council’s vote for Resolution 745. This established the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), the UN’s first mission that involved taking over the administration of an independent state, organizing and running elections and overseeing human rights at a national level. China was eager to improve its international image and viewed Cambodia as a relatively straightforward and safe mission that Beijing felt comfortable supporting along its foreign policy goals of increased engagement with its Asian neighbors. As such, China sent 800 PLA engineering troops to UNTAC, marking the first time it contributed military troops for a UNPKO. Over the course of the decade, China also sent 437 military observers on five peacekeeping operations.

Thus, we see the beginnings of a flexible policy where Beijing has been more willing to change its historical policy of abstention and act in cooperation with other UNSC members based on both the particular situation and the stakes China itself stands to gain or lose from the international community.

Analysis of Veto Strategy

Despite these cautious steps towards activism, China is still sensitive to precedents that international peacekeeping could set for its domestic situation. Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, use of force, and intervention remain key points of concern for China. In order for Beijing to support any form of international intervention, three requirements must be in place: there must be UN authorization, the resolution must “respect sovereignty,” and action must be at the invitation of the target state. When China feels that such conditions are not met and does not want to support such a measure, its two options are to abstain or veto. China often chooses to abstain when it does not want to take a stand and when it disagrees with the policy – for example, Iraq in 1990 – yet does not want to go against countries such as the U.S. who wish to see the resolution through.

The second option – the veto – is much more rarely used by China, having occurred only six times since Beijing assumed China’s UN seat in 1971. China will veto a resolution only if it disagrees strongly enough to take a firm stand against other members of the Permanent-Five and stop the resolution from passing. Otherwise, Beijing usually expresses its disapproval via abstention. These six vetoes can be loosely categorized into: (1) vetoes directly related to its own national sovereignty, most notably issues related to the recognition of Taiwan; and (2) vetoes alongside the former Soviet Union and its successor state Russia, most notably on issues of sovereignty and intervention.

Of the six resolutions Beijing has vetoed, only three have been resolutions on which China was the sole veto, meaning that China’s active negative vote effectively prevented the resolution from passing. The other three would have failed regardless of China’s veto since the Soviet Union / Russia also vetoed the measure. Beijing’s first veto came in 1972, one year after its inclusion into the UN system. China vetoed the admission of Bangladesh into the UN because it had an alliance with Pakistan, from which Bangladesh sought independence. This vote is unique in China’s voting record, as the veto was not even in China’s own interest, but Pakistan’s. The fact that China allowed the resolution to pass two years later when the Bangladesh’s admission came to a vote again shows that China was uncomfortable with Bangladesh being denied admission solely because of Beijing’s veto, which did not even represent its own interests. From then on, Beijing was much more careful in deciding how to use its veto and even its vote. This experience evolved into the strategies of nonvoting and abstention we observed earlier. This more passive approach was one China was much more comfortable with, since it allowed the Chinese to send a message but avoided the necessity of alienating allies, taking sides, and assuming responsibility.

China’s other two deciding vetoes were regarding the ceasefire in Guatemala in 1997 and the extension of UN observers to Macedonia in 1999, both of which were vetoed because of the two countries’ recognition of Taiwan, which China considers to be a nonnegotiable threat to its own sovereignty. After China’s veto against Guatemala on January 10, it lifted its veto ten days later to allow peacekeeping troops into Guatemala after bilateral discussions that resulted in “a settlement to the dispute with Guatemala that had led to the veto.” In other words, Guatemala discontinued its diplomatic ties with Taiwan, and the Macedonia situation in 1997 played out similarly.

With the exception of its uncharacteristic veto in its second year of UN participation, these two vetoes mark the only times in Beijing’s 40 year history at the UN where it has been the determining negative vote that prevented a Security Council resolution from passing, and Beijing reasoning was clear – recognition of Taiwan, which Beijing views as an affront to its sovereignty. Beijing’s historical record shows that it unlikely China will disagree with an issue so strongly as to block its passing by veto unless the country in question recognizes Taiwan. As such, we can conclude that the issue of Taiwan is the only issue for China which is nonnegotiable.

China’s three other vetoes – regarding the Middle East in 1973, Myanmar in 2007, and Zimbabwe in 2008 – have all been alongside vetoes by the Soviet Union or its successor state Russia. In other words, these resolutions would have failed irrespective of China’s additional veto, so why was Beijing willing to take a firm stand on these three issues in particular, unlike the other resolutions it abstained from despite also disagreeing? Unfortunately, except for the commonality of a double veto with Russia, there is not a straightforward rule on such situations unlike those concerning Taiwan. However, we can still observe where China broke with its usual trend in these three situations.

In 1973 China voted with the Soviet Union against the ceasefire in the Middle East. Since the Yom Kippur War was during the Cold War, the U.S. was seen as the backer of Israel while the U.S.S.R. was considered the ally of the Arab states. China’s veto alongside the Soviet Union in 1973 was an aberration from its many Cold War-era abstentions, which reflected its desire to align itself neither superpower. As such, it is more difficult to pinpoint China’s rationale for its veto on the Yom Kippur War. China’s historical ties with the Soviet Union most likely played a role in its decision, though it is less clear why China gave a firm veto on this issue whereas it abstained from vetoing alongside the Soviet Union in many other issues during this era.

China’s rationales for its vetoes alongside Russia in the 2000s are more easily analyzed. In 2007, Beijing vetoed with Russia against criticizing Myanmar on human rights. China is particularly sensitive to criticisms on its own human rights record, which it sees as a domestic issue to be handled internally, not subject to international commentary. Clearly, it had a national interest to protect itself by vetoing the resolution, less China become the next target of such criticisms. In addition, because Russia was also going to veto the resolution, the political costs were significantly lowered since China would not have to singly bear the burden of being the reason for the resolution’s rejection.

China’s most recent veto was in 2008 against sanctions on Zimbabwe. Several factors distinguish it from other cases in which China expressed concerns about intervention, but did not feel strongly enough about to go beyond abstention and actually veto the resolution. First, Beijing was most likely willing to take a strong stance on nonintervention in Zimbabwe because it would be a sign of solidarity with the developing world, particularly one in Africa. China’s policy on nonintervention reflects its belief that a country should solve its own problems – and have the option of defining such problems itself – instead of having outside sources such as the UN, which China and the developing world often view as a proxy for the West, impose its values via sanctions and force. This policy of nonintervention protects China against possible future intrusions on its own domestic situation and builds solidarity with the developing world, as seen in this veto against Zimbabwean sanction.

A second reason the Chinese were perhaps willing to veto on Zimbabwe’s behalf in 2008 was Beijing’s relationship with Zimbabwe specifically and its hopes for future relations with Africa generally. In 2006, China signed a $1.3 billion energy deal with Zimbabwe that would provide the African country with coal mines and thermal power stations from Chinese companies. In addition to trade opportunities, Zimbabwe provided chrome. One commentator described it as: “For Harare, an international pariah, China represents its only major international supporter…” While China did not explicitly state its relationship with Zimbabwe alongside calls for nonintervention in defending its veto, it is doubtful China did not take such matters into consideration when deciding to veto measures against sanctions on Zimbabwe. Thus, the most logical conclusion for why China chose to go one step forward beyond its usual stance of abstention was because of existing bilateral ties with Zimbabwe and hopes for future ties with Africa and other developing nations.

Based on China’s historical record, the following conclusions on China’s veto strategy can be made: (1) China will be unlikely to use its veto unless there are very special circumstances. It has done so only six times since Beijing’s inclusion into the UN system in 1971, even though it has expressed disagreement with many more resolutions. (2) China will be unlikely to cast a deciding veto on a future resolution unless it feels that the country in question is challenging Beijing’s sovereignty on the issue of Taiwan. In this case, China will most likely use the situation to negotiate bilaterally with the country in question on the issue of Taiwan. (3) China will be unlikely to use its veto on an nonintervention issue unless an existing veto, most likely from Russia, is already established. In addition, China’s interests must also be fairly clearly at stake. Issues of highest concern are most likely: human rights precedence, current and future investments in Africa, and building solidarity with Africa and developing nations. In sum, China’s veto record reveals clear patterns and prerequisites that reflect China’s strategic objectives and how it selectively uses its veto power to achieve such goals.

Case Study: Sudan

Sudan is an important example of an issue where China has used its veto power to not only react to given situations, but to proactively shape the UN agenda through the threat of a veto in conjunction with its bilateral relationship with Sudan. The Darfur conflict has been described as guerrilla conflict, civil war, and genocide, and revolves around accusations of the Sudanese government oppressing and committing genocide against black Africans in favor of Arabs. Between 2004 and 2006, China abstained from six UN resolutions regarding Sudan, where the state-owned company China National Petroleum Corporation owns 40% of the consortium that dominates Sudan’s oil fields. In 2004, when the Security Council neared votes on a series of resolutions threatening to sanction Sudan’s oil sales,Wang Guangya, China’s ambassador to the U.N., confirmed China’s veto threats but dismissed suggestions that its oil interests played a role in the decision, instead saying that the resolutions would have eliminated the Sudan government’s incentive to cooperate. Based on the characteristics of the situation in Sudan, we can see that Sudan is a prime candidate for a potential Chinese veto based on its strategic objectives – (1) The proposed sanctions and use of force fall under China’s longstanding concerns of nonintervention; (2) China has vested interests in the country, most notably the large oil industry on which it depends for fuel; and finally (3) China sees its support and defense of Sudan as a way to build traction in its relationship with Africa and the developing world. These factors have given China’s threats of vetoes of the year a certain level of credibility, and as a result, the rest of the Security Council and world at large has learned to listen to or at least negotiate with China’s lead on Sudan-related issues.

However, China has never actually vetoed any sanctions on Sudan, despite threatening to do so on several occasions. As previously noted, China abstained on several votes, thereby expressing its disapproval but still allowing the resolutions to pass. For example, in 2006, when China chaired the Security Council, China allowed Resolution 1672 to pass, imposing sanctions on four Sudanese individuals – including government officials – accused of being involved in the Darfur atrocities. However, China’s lack of actual vetoes does not necessarily mean that the threats lack legitimacy or efficacy. On the contrary, China’s threats have successfully resulted in changed language in several resolutions. This is in line with its strategy of working behind the scenes before the voting record to convince other countries to drop or modify the severity of a resolution’s language. Resolutions 1564, 1591 and 1672 were passed with China’s abstention, but the penalties of the sanctions on Sudan were lessened due to China’s lobbying.

Sudan also serves as a useful case study in examining China’s increasing role in the international sphere. In 2007, China voted along with the Security Council in favor of Resolution 1769, which gave UN troops “all the necessary means” to protect themselves, defend civilians, and secure the safe passage of aid in the region under Chapter VII. Although China most likely would not have supported Resolution 1769 had it not received Sudanese government acquiescence, this was a decisive resolution nonetheless.

China’s changing policy on Sudan is yet another indicator that Beijing is in the midst of adjusting its stance on noninterference policy into one that is more flexible. Historically speaking, China’s policy towards nonintervention has stemmed from its fears that precedence for sanctions and other measures may be used against it in the future. Its behavior regarding such concerns have been based both on matters of principle, as in the many cases from which China abstained in its early years of UN participation, and on a practical basis, as seen on the issue of human rights in Burma, a sensitive issue for China. In the case of Sudan, China’s stance against sanctions was initially rhetorically couched in the language of nonintervention and more realistically concerned with protecting its oil supply in Sudan and relationship with Africa. However, China began to realize that it was not UN sanctions that would risk its investments in Africa, but rather the lack of sanctions leading to the deteriorating stability, growing public outrage, and increasing possibility of military intervention which would threaten its stake in the region. Thus, China began to leverage its relationship with Sudan to convince it to engage with the UN. This led to the breakthrough Resolution 1769 mentioned earlier – China played a key role in securing the Sudanese government’s acceptance of the UN peacekeeping plan. Chinese president Hu Jintao even raised the issue with Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir at a summit during his visit to Sudan.

As China’s record and initiative on Sudan within the UN structure shows, a new Chinese foreign policy practice is emerging. China’s willingness to use its Security Council veto on the issue of Sudan, whether actual or merely apparent, reflectes Beijing’s continued movement from its previously passive role in the UN to a much more proactive one. In addition to its relationship with Sudan and convincing its government to engage with the UN on the Darfur issue, China is clearly making marked moves towards a proactive role in the international sphere, one that may even be arguably considered as that of a leader on issue such as Sudan.

Conclusions

Analysis of China’s behavior in the Security Council over the past 40 years has shown an increasingly active and flexible UN policy in Beijing, especially on peacekeeping operations and voting pattern in the security council. This can be seen as part of China’s current efforts to present itself as a “responsible power” in the international community. There is no better place for China to pursue legitimacy, improve image, and develop political standing in the international sphere than the UN. China’s increasingly active role in international efforts such as UN peacekeeping has been a conscious effort by Beijing to present itself as a partner and leader in the UN and the international community at large.

The transition from passive observer to active participant in the UN can also be seen as part of China’s wider multinational diplomacy strategy. The foundations of China’s modern international diplomacy strategy comes from Deng Xiaoping’s idea of ensuring world peace to ensure domestic development. Throughout the mid-1990’s, China developed the “new security concept,” which saw security as something to be increased through diplomacy and economic interaction, not competition as in the Cold War. This merged with the “peaceful rise” and “peaceful development” concepts often used by Chinese leaders such as President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao to describe China’s goals of becoming a partner, not threat, to the international community. The application of this foreign diplomacy and engagement strategy to its UN policy has led to China developing a more engaged role in the Security Council.

China’s status as an emerging power and aspirations for becoming a great power have shifted Beijing’s approach to its UN policy over the years. Realizing that it needed to begin acting in a way expected of a “responsible power,” Beijing has begun a period of unprecedented international activism in the UN. As we saw in the Sudan case study, Africa has been one such key ground, and China’s relations with other pariah countries may be of use to both the UN, which needs a way to dialogue with difficult regimes, and also to China, who seeks to prove itself in the international community.

China has shown that it is willing to adapt its previous attitude towards nonintervention issues and use its diplomatic relations with problematic regimes to convince them to be more cooperative with the UN. China’s changing economic and political interests have partly driven this shift, with increased investment in developing countries and increasing hopes for others to see it as a partner and not a threat. Looking forward, we can expect China to continue to increase its presence in the Security Council and its role in the international community.

References

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Introduction

Election of Barack Obama was a landmark event in American history, many Americans hoped that the popular new president would be revive the image of the US abroad and correct the perceived blunders of the Bush administration. This paper seeks to explore the reaction to Obama in the world’s most populous country; more specifically, to situate the official media coverage of the Obama presidency within the wider context of Sino-American relations. I will assess Chinese attitudes and portrayal of the United States and the Obama administration by examining two newspapers: the People’s Daily (both the Chinese and English editions) and the Southern Weekend (Chinese online edition). These two papers target different segments of the Chinese and international audience and reflect very different organizational priorities but both ultimately speak on behalf of the state and the Party. The opinions expressed in the People’s Daily reflect the official position of the top leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) while the Southern Weekend, operating far from Beijing, represents the liberal end of governmental opinion in China. Analyzed together, they allow for interesting comparison within the spectrum of Chinese official attitudes towards President Obama and towards the United States. Contrasting the English and Chinese editions of the same story also sheds some light on the subtle differences in tone between the Party’s message directed towards domestic versus international audiences.

This paper focuses on coverage of one particular moment in the Obama presidency – his Inaugural Address on January 20, 2009 —  and its implications for US-China relations. The way these two state-owned media outlets frame Obama’s Inauguration speech reveal their image of the US and convey a certain image of the US to their readership. Obama’s inauguration not only drew a record breaking crowd to Washington but attracted millions of viewers across the world, including China, where, due to the time difference, viewers had to stay-up into the wee hours of the morning to watch the live event. Aware of the international reach of his speech, President Obama devoted a significant portion of his speech to address an international audience. It is thus important to note that these are precisely the sections of his speech that were not translated into Chinese and were not analyzed by either of the two newspapers examined in this study. Obama’s effort at public diplomacy along with a mention of communism was systematically expunged from the Chinese news coverage of the event. The People’s Daily in particular went to great lengths to highlight the ailing economy of the US; its English edition glibly contrasts the message of hope delivered by the new president and the “reality” of a struggling Wall Street. The Southern Weekend, was less critical of the US economy and more fixated by Obama’s race.

I. Historical context of the Obama Inaugural

The 2008 campaign and election of Barack Obama represented a watershed in American politics, one which sent ripples around the world. A powerful orator who effectively used new media, Obama cast himself as an agent to deliver much needed change to dishonest Washington politics. His campaign speeches drew adoring crowds at home and abroad and his candidacy inspired young people in a way that recalled the Camelot of John F. Kennedy.  To many, his presidency also represents a turning point in American politics; as America’s first African American president, Obama promised “change you can believe in” and represented hope against all odds.

Obama’s presidential campaign coincided with the height of the Global Financial Crisis, considered by many economists to be the worst shock to international markets since the Great Depression. The crisis, which began in late 2007 with the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the US real-estate market, led to the collapse of major financial institutions like Bear Sterns, Merrill Lynch, and Lehman Brothers in 2008, destroyed hundreds of billions of dollars worth of consumer wealth, and put millions out of work.[1] The crisis point came in September 2008, when the controversial $700 billion Emergency Economic Stabilization Act bought troubled assets–mainly mortgage-backed securities– from failing financial firms. Capitalizing on the popular disillusionment directed at Washington and Wall Street, the Obama campaign’s anti-incumbency message and promise of change proved very effective.

Dwarfed somewhat by the enormity of the Financial Crisis, foreign policy issues still loomed large in the 2008 campaign. The incumbent President Bush, who had reached an all time low in popularity at home and around the world, was blamed for waging the War on Terror and causing America’s disastrous invasion of Iraq. The unpopularity of Bush created challenges for the McCain campaign on foreign policy issues especially. However, as an early opponent of the War in Iraq, then Senator Obama made withdraw from Iraq and focus on Afghanistan central to his foreign policy. [2] His campaign also made rebuilding America’s image abroad, confronting nuclear proliferation, and diplomatic engagement with America’s adversaries important elements of his platform.[3]

Despite this popular platform, the success of Obama in the Democratic Party primaries came as a shock to many spectators at home and abroad when he defeated the favored Hilary Clinton. His campaign was able to mobilize previously marginal voters, raise funds at astonishing rates, utilize new information technology, to score a stunning victory against John McCain. It should be remembered above all that, President Barack Obama was elected amidst the direst economic crisis since the Great Depression, a crisis that shook the American establishment to its core and gave a Washington outsider with well run campaign a shot at the most powerful office in the world.

The Global Financial Crisis also created opportunity across the Pacific, where the CCP’s policies to restrict capital outflows shielded Chinese firms from the shock of the US sub-prime mortgage crisis. On November 10, 2008, China announced a historic $586 billion stimulus package aimed at encouraging growth and domestic consumption in ten areas of Chinese society ranging from infrastructure investment to environmental protection and disaster rebuilding. Thus as the governments of Europe and the United States struggled to keep pace with the crisis, the CCP’s stimulus plan was welcomed as a source of stability in the turbulent international economy.  While the Global Financial Crisis shook the confidence of Americans, it bolstered the confidence of Chinese. According to a 2008 Pew Survey, the Chinese were the most confident in their economy and the Americans the least. This in the aftermath of the successful 2008 Beijing Olympics looked to many to mark China’s emergence as a great power.[4]

Nevertheless, China shared great interest in the recovery of the US economy, which is the largest market for Chinese exports. Since China initiated economic reform in 1979, foreign direct investment (FDI) has played a major role in China’s rapid growth. The Chinese government estimates that the foreign trade sector employs more than 80 million people, of which 28 million work in foreign-invested enterprises.[5] Unemployment was a key issue of concern, “The Chinese government in January 2009 estimated that 20 million migrant workers alone had lost their jobs in 2008 because of the global economic slowdown.”[6]Thus, China which had been cautious with its hold vast foreign exchange reserves was compelled to boost its purchases of U.S. securities in order to help fund the hundreds of billions of dollars that are expected to be spent by the U.S. government to purchase troubled assets and stimulate the economy.

China’s decision to purchase American debt became controversial both in the US and within China. In May 2009, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao made an usually blunt comment about his concern for the safety of China’s one trillion dollar investment in American government debt.[7] Commentators have argued that “As the financial crisis has unfolded, China has become increasingly vocal about what it perceives as Washington’s mismanagement of the global economy and financial system, joining a chorus of foreign critics of unbridled American capitalism.”[8] The US owes China over $700 billion debt. Indeed, in the realm of US-China relations, Obama’s historic election is overshadowed by the shifting economic balance across the Pacific. The global financial crisis brought about a dramatic reversal in perceptions of geopolitical order, though as time passed the disparity of power between the US and China continues to remain great, the perception in 2008 and 2009 was very much that of a China with the upperhand, poised to overtake the US.

However, it should be noted that despite his unpopularity, President Bush did leave office with a sound China policy predicated on Robert Zoellick’s “responsible stakeholder” formulation. As Professor Thomas Christensen notes, “for addressing what is perhaps the greatest long-term strategic challenge facing the United States — managing U.S. relations with a rising China–change is not what is needed.[9] Bush’s second term reversed many of the policy blunders of his first term, and built a sound China policy which consisted of high-level exchanges, cooperation on a range of regional security issues, as well as engagement of economic issues.

It is within this context that the Obama’s election was viewed from the Chinese perspective. For the leaders of Zhongnanhai, China’s rapid response the Global Financial Crisis in contrast to the struggling American efforts represented milestone in the reemergence of Chinese power. The sharp criticism Chinese central bankers directed at US financial irresponsibility and the statement made by Premier Wen at the G20 all seem to affirm the growing confidence.[10] Yet the Chinese leadership was less confident on January 20^th than they appeared to be; the China-US relationship had improved markedly during Bush’s second term, they were uncertain whether or not America’s new president will take his message of change too far.  As the economy deteriorated in the US relative to China’s during the campaign season, the specter of protectionism reared its ugly head. At the same time, China increased its holding of US debt substantially in order to finance the US government bailout, further increasing the level of interdependence between the two nations. Thus, on the morning of Obama’s Inauguration, the question the future of the American economy no doubt loomed large in the minds of the CCP leadership.

II. Chinese Media Environment

To understand the newspaper coverage of the Obama inaugural requires an understanding of the Chinese media environment as well as the historical context.  Many of China’s major media outlets began their lives as part of the Soviet style propaganda wing of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). As Party mouthpieces, their duty was to propagate the Party line and give guidance to the people according to Party doctrine. The press’s role as an independent check on government power was explicitly rejected.[11] But since China adopted the “Open Door Policy” in the late 1970s, traditional Party-run newspapers, in particular, came under increasing pressure from the impact of China’s accession to the WTO and the information revolution, to move towards liberalization and commercialization. These traditional Party newspapers are still used by the political authorities to serve as a propaganda vehicle, but must now compete both with the new popular tabloids and with new media (Radio, TV, and increasingly the Internet) must attract their target audiences. After the 2003 “Marketing Economy” initiative, the Party set aside the “Five Big Publications” under its control—People’s Daily (人民日报）, Guangming Daily（光明日报）, Economic Daily（经济日报）, Liberation Daily（解放日报）, and the magazine Seeking the Truth（求是）— and announced that all other media would no longer received direct financial support from the government and, thus, must respond to market demand and seek out advertisers to support themselves financially.[12] The commercial liberalization of Chinese media have led to the proliferation of media groups; increasing competition, and driving diversification of content.

The People’s Daily Group

In China today, there are 39 press groups and more than 2,000 newspapers[13]. The giants within the Chinese media industry remain the state-run media outlets such as China Central Television, Xinhua News Agency, and the People’s Daily Group. Of the “Five Big Publications”, the People’s Daily is still the most widely distributed newspaper in China; ever since its founding in 1948, the People’s Daily has remained under control of the Party’s top leadership. Its editorials are regarded as official statements of government policy and it remains the public forum the Central Committee’s voice. Today, it is one of the five publications subsidized by the government and along with Xinhua News Agency and the State Administration for Radio, Film, and Television, one of the key media organs of the Party. [14] It reached its heyday of influence during the Cultural Revolution where it became Mao’s instrument of mass communication. However since “Opening and Reform”, it has been receiving fewer subsidies and must innovate to reform.  In 1997, the People’s Daily launched its website and has since maintained a popular BBS.

The Nanfang Media Group

While the People’s Daily represents one end on the spectrum of state-run newspapers, Southern Weekend published by the Nanfang Media Group represents the opposite.  Though the Nanfang Media Group is owned by the Guangzhou Provincial Communist Party, Southern Weekend and its sister publications (Nanfang Daily, Nanfang City News, etc) represent some of the most liberal voices in Chinese mass media. The media credibility and sense of social responsibility of Nanfang Media Group has earned it praises of the general audience. For six consecutive years, it had been elected as the nominees of the fifty “Most Respectable Enterprises in China” which was selected by the Management Case Center of Peking University. In 2001 and 2006, as the only print media who wins this reputation, Nanfang Media Group was in the gold list of “Most Respectable Enterprises in China”[15]. The content of Southern Weekend is still censored but its stories are on the whole much more colorful and less politically charged. Despite being a municipal newspaper, the Southern Weekend is one of the most widely circulated papers in China with a readership of nearly one million; it rivals the centrally owned People’s Daily in circulation. Being far from Beijing politics, it is operated with a greater degree of autonomy. It exists to generate profit and its worried more about consumer demand and less about party orthodoxy than the People’s Daily.

III. President Obama’s Inaugural Address

In this section, I focus primarily on the coverage of the inauguration of Obama in the English language (online) and Chinese language (print) versions of the People’s Daily and in the Chinese language (online) coverage by Southern Weekend. This comparison will identify how the CCP’s official account of the new President of the United States differs depending on the target audience. The analysis of Obama’s inaugural address provides a point of reference to examine the primary sources. What is emphasized and omitted from the inaugural address reveals more about the thinking of the Chinese Communist Party than about Obama or his speech.

Question of Censorship

President Obama’s inaugural address, delivered on January 20, 2009 to a live crowd of 400,000 on the mall, reached an audience of millions around the world, even in China. However, the live broadcast of this speech on CCTV was censored as was the transcript of his speech. When President Obama said: “Recall that earlier generations faced down fascism and communism not just with missiles and tanks, but with sturdy alliances and enduring convictions”, the CCTV broadcast promptly faded out before the translator could translate the statement, instead the announcer asking a question about the challenges Obama faces in the economy.[16]

The party decision in what to translate and what to omit is very telling of their attitudes towards the different audiences they must face. That entire passage was retained for an English-language version of the speech that appeared on the website of state-run Xinhua news agency. But in the Chinese-language version, the word “communism” was omitted from the translation.

Original Content

The full text of President Obama’s inaugural address, transcribed by the New York Times, can be found in Appendix A. His speech was humble in tone; acknowledge the weakness of the economy, but slowly builds to a rousing call for all Americans to face the challenges ahead with courage. It echoes the themes that were central to his campaign without downplaying the dire national situation. He calls for “A new era of responsibility”, confidently asserts, “challenges we face are real, challenges will be met”, and urges Americans to chose hope over fear.[17]

He is very much aware of his global audience and uses the opportunity to engage in direct diplomacy, stating “And so, to all other peoples and governments who are watching today, from the grandest capitals to the small village where my father was born: know that America is a friend of each nation and every man, woman and child who seeks a future of peace and dignity, and we are ready to lead once more.”[18] While asserting the return of US leadership in world affairs, he attempts to distinguish himself from his processor. He makes the case for soft power, stating that Americans could not “do as we please” but instead rely on “the justness of our cause, the force of our example, the tempering qualities of humility and restraint”.[19]

Aside from the aforementioned comment about overcoming fascism and communism, Obama’s inaugural contains another phrase that was not translated into the Chinese newspapers. He states, “To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history, but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.” This statement can be read as a direct challenge against the Chinese Communist Party, which is ironically scrambling to censor this very statement in its live broadcast. It seems that the CCP felt that this statement could be read by a domestic audience as critical to its legitimacy, which points to a guilty conscience of the leadership and an acknowledgement of the corruption, deceit, and oppression that exists within the Party.

English Language Coverage on the People’s Daily Website

The English language report on the People’s Daily website was an article taken from Xinhua news agency commenting on Obama’s speech. The headline of the article read “Obama’s inauguration gives hope on economy, but enormous challenges ahead”. Its coverage emphasized America’s failing economy, declining fortunes of America, and ignored major themes of the speech such as the call for responsibility, responsible exercise of power, and the restoration of American confidence. Instead, the opening paragraph reads:

Hope is one thing, the reality is another. On Tuesday, about 2 million people gathered in Washington D.C. to celebrate the inauguration of Barack Obama as new U.S, president, hoping he will save the economy, but the Wall Street plunged more than 4 percent in New York.[20]

Thus, the opening paragraph frames the entire speech in terms of false hope, casting serious doubts, from the onset, about the efficacy of the reforms that President Obama is setting forth. It also suggests that the exuberant crowds in Washington are simply misled, that the “reality” is the economic despair on Wall Street. It goes on to quote new president in a statement that apparently affirms this theme of American decline, “Our economy is badly weakened, a consequence of greed and irresponsibility on the part of some, but also our collective failure to make hard choices and prepare the nation for a new age.” The article does not dwell on the rhetorical power of the speech nor does it include any mention of foreign policy. The sparse quotes that they draw from the speech… The conclusion drives home the message of false hope:

But the Wall Street cannot wait. The U.S. stock market plunged more than 4 percent on Inauguration Day Tuesday as bank woes spread while investors failed to find confidence from President Barack Obama’s inauguration speech. The Dow Jones Industrial Average was down more than 330 points, or 4 percent, falling below 8,000 for the first time in 2009, while the Standard & Poor’s 500 and the Nasdaq indexes dropped more than 5 percent.[21]

Similarly, an article covering the “highlights of U.S. President Barack Obama’s inaugural address” on the People’s Daily website emphasizes the economic aspects of the address and completely omits the “sensitive” references. It does a better job of objectively covering the key elements of Obama’s speech that are not considered “sensitive”: US foreign policies, leadership, restoration of American confidence, and the importance of American responsibility.[22] The People’s Daily, the Communist Party’s mouthpiece published a translated text of the speech on its website, omitting the word communism. The line about dissent was cut entirely. However the content seem to have been removed. The message to the international reader echoes propaganda of a bygone era, dwelling on the challenges facing the US economy and casting doubt on the hope promised by the new president. However, its choice to censor statements that only ambiguously refer to China reveals that insecurity lurks below the venire of confidence brought about by American economic weakness.

Chinese Language Coverage in the People’s Daily Newspaper

The Chinese language coverage in the People’s Daily newspaper took a more measured and conciliatory tone. It frames the event within the context of US-China relations, acknowledging the importance of this bilateral relationship. The article acknowledges the impact of the financial crisis but it also urges cooperation, a word that is not mentioned in the English language story. It takes a much weaker editorial stance and more faithfully presents Obama’s intended message. The article states that, “责任”和“团结”是奥巴马就职演说的主题词(“Responsibility” and “unity” are the key themes of Obama’s inaugural address) and quotes him at his most eloquent:

美国正面临战争和金融危机所引发的各种困难。“我们今天聚在这里正是因为我们选择了战胜恐惧的希望，选择了团结。(America faces various difficulties, from its wars to the financial crisis but “We have gathered here today because we have chosen hope over fear”)[23]

The article also quotes many international newspapers: the Washington Post, the New York Times, Argentina’s Chronicle, Mexico’s El Universal and referencing the Russian media, European media. Despite the historic significance of the event, this article remained in page 3 of the People’s Daily newspaper, a page which is usually devoted to international news. Characteristic of the People’s Daily banal news about where prominent CCP officials visited took precedence over this story, which was honored with a picture. The decision to not print the Xinhua News Agency’s story, which was very similar to its English language edition in tone and dwells on the struggling American economy, is also very telling. Indicating that the story printed reflect the importance of the story to the Party leadership.

Nevertheless, the People’s Daily article also concludes with a healthy dose of skepticism. It quotes a Chinese expert at the Carter Center:

美国民众希望奥巴马带领国家战胜当前面临的严重危机。奥巴马的就职演讲仍维持了其一贯激动人心的风格。美国人关注奥巴马强调的希望和梦想，更关注他就任总统后的政策实施。目前奥巴马的支持率达到了80%，但从明天起，奥巴马的“政治蜜月”可能将宣告结束，他要面对的是来自内政和外交方面的一系列严峻的挑战。(The American people hope that Barack Obama can lead the country and prevail over the serious crisis that it faces. Obama maintained his motivating style in his inaugural address. Americans pay attention to Obama’s emphasis on hopes and dreams, but they will be paying even greater attention to his ability to implement these policies. Obama’s approval rating may be at 80% today, but tomorrow, Obama’s “political honeymoon” may be an end, and he will have to face a series of difficult domestic and diplomatic challenges.[24]

The overall tone of the People’s Daily article is very professional, following the conventions of journalism, any editorializing voice is hard to detect. However, it is important to note that it does not give anymore coverage to Obama’s efforts at public diplomacy than the English language Xinhua story published by People’s Daily Online.

Southern Weekend Coverage

The coverage of Obama’s inauguration was much less political than the People’s Daily’s reporting of the same event, instead it dwelled much more on President Obama’s identity as a black man. Given time constraints, only the online version rather than the hardcopies of Southern Weekend could be located for this paper. However, the story probably took front page news in this publication. The online version features a colorful photo essay displaying 20 pictures of the inauguration parade, of Obama and his kids, of the Obama family and the Bush family.[25] The article ran by Southern Weekend was by far the shortest, it also appears as if much of the content was added later and chronicles the first days of President Obama’s stay in the White House. Additionally, both the English and Chinese versions of President Obama’s speech are easily available on the website, unlike the People’s Daily website. However, probably obeying a central edict, the entire section of Obama’s message to the outside world is omitted from the Chinese translation of the speech while it is included in full in the English version.

Another noteworthy feature of the Southern Weekend article was its emphasis on Obama’s race. It article title, 白宫主人不再“白” (Owner of the White House No Longer “White”), immediately frames the event somewhat humorously through a racial lens. It describes Obama as “美国第一个非洲裔总统” (America’s first African-American President), refers to the “黑人第一家庭” (the first Black First Family), and followed up with an extensive discussion of Obama inauguration as riding on the “Lincoln Wind.”[26] This emphasis is completely missing from the People’s Daily coverage which reported Obama’s race only in passing and never more than once in an article. The Southern Weekend also ran another story a day later called “黑人掌控美国？(Blacks Controlling America?) which chronicles African-American history and Black culture in the US. [27] The Southern Weekend’s interest in Obama’s race may stem from the fact that a large portion of its readership is in Guangzhou, a city with the largest concentration of Blacks in China. [28] The so-called “Chocolate City” in Guangzhou is home to a growing community of African traders and has been the focus of some degree of racial controversy.

Conclusion

After eight years of what many perceived as American waywardness under President Bush, Americans looked to President Obama to revitalize America’s image abroad and rebuild American soft power. However, the unraveling of the Global Financial Crisis brought America to her knees and came to define the early days of the Obama presidency. As much as the Global Financial Crisis tarnished America’s image and appeal abroad, it seemed to strengthen China’s and reinforced the extent of US-China interdependence. This paper examines how President Obama’s election was reported in China by two state-owned newspapers: the People’s Daily and the Southern Weekend.

Despite the growing assertiveness of Chinese leaders after they led their economy through the most severe economic crisis since the Great Depression, their choices in the coverage of Obama’s inauguration speech reveal deeper insecurities that lurk beneath the venire of confidence. Because of the massive stimulus package put into effect in 2008, China maintained its rapid growth even as the advanced economies of the US and EU struggled. China also became the largest holder of US treasuries, playing a significant role in financing the government bailout. Yet the CCP still scrambled to censor parts of Obama’s inaugural address, making sure that mentions of communism and a vague reference to corrupt and repressive governments was omitted from Chinese versions of the speech. The English language edition of the People’s Daily takes the additional step of highlighting America’s economic hopelessness. The Chinese edition and the Southern Weekend both frame Obama’s inauguration in more favorable terms but neither included his mention of “sensitive” topics. The decision to censor vague references in the Obama Inaugural address reveals the insecurities of the CCP leadership. At a time when America was at her weakest vis-à-vis China, when her democratic system seems too inefficient to deal with the enormity of the challenge, Chinese leaders did not find the courage to let the Chinese public decide the merit of Obama’s words. While Obama is calling for the people to choose hope over fear, the CCP fears its own people.

References

“奥巴马宣誓就任美国总统”. 人民日报2009.01.21第3版。 《http://data.people.com.cn》

“美国当选总统奥巴马宣誓就职.” 南方周末。2009.01.21《http://www.infzm.com/content/23046?page=16》

“白宫主人不再’白’”. 南方周末. 2009.01.20《http://www.infzm.com/content/22925》

黑人掌控美国？南方周末. 2009.01.22《http://www.infzm.com/content/23032》

“Highlights of U.S. President Barack Obama’s inaugural address.” People’s Daily Online. 2009.01.21 <English.peoplesdaily.com.cn>

“Transcript: Barack Obama’s Inaugural Address.” New York Times. 2009/01/20. <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/20/us/politics/20text-obama.html>

“African Merchants Set up Shot in Guangzhou.” New Yorker.

< http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/02/09/090209fa_fact_osnos>

“Obama Speech Censored in China.” BBC. 2009. 01.21

< http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7841580.stm>

Christensen, T. (2009). “Shaping the choices of a rising China: recent lessons for the Obama administration.” The Washington Quarterly 32(3): 89-104.

Morrison, Wayne, 2009, “China and the global financial crisis: Implications for the United States,” Report to the Congress, RS 22984. Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC

Scharping, T. (2007). “Administration, Censorship and Control in the Chinese Media: The State of the Art.” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs-China aktuell 36(4): 96-118.

“War in Iraq.” Organizing for America. <http://www.barackobama.com/issues/iraq/index_campaign.php>

“Barak Obama” Council on Foreign Relations.

< http://www.cfr.org/bios/11603/barack_obama.html>

Appendix A

Transcript

Barack Obama’s Inaugural Address

Following is the transcript of President Barack Obama’s Inaugural Address, as transcribed by CQ Transcriptions:

PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA: Thank you. Thank you.

CROWD: Obama! Obama! Obama! Obama!

My fellow citizens: I stand here today humbled by the task before us, grateful for the trust you have bestowed, mindful of the sacrifices borne by our ancestors.

I thank President Bush for his service to our nation…

(APPLAUSE)

… as well as the generosity and cooperation he has shown throughout this transition.

Forty-four Americans have now taken the presidential oath.

The words have been spoken during rising tides of prosperity and the still waters of peace. Yet, every so often the oath is taken amidst gathering clouds and raging storms. At these moments, America has carried on not simply because of the skill or vision of those in high office, but because We the People have remained faithful to the ideals of our forebears, and true to our founding documents.

So it has been. So it must be with this generation of Americans.

That we are in the midst of crisis is now well understood. Our nation is at war against a far-reaching network of violence and hatred. Our economy is badly weakened, a consequence of greed and irresponsibility on the part of some but also our collective failure to make hard choices and prepare the nation for a new age.

Homes have been lost, jobs shed, businesses shuttered. Our health care is too costly, our schools fail too many, and each day brings further evidence that the ways we use energy strengthen our adversaries and threaten our planet.

These are the indicators of crisis, subject to data and statistics. Less measurable, but no less profound, is a sapping of confidence across our land; a nagging fear that America’s decline is inevitable, that the next generation must lower its sights.

Today I say to you that the challenges we face are real, they are serious and they are many. They will not be met easily or in a short span of time. But know this America: They will be met.

(APPLAUSE)

On this day, we gather because we have chosen hope over fear, unity of purpose over conflict and discord.

On this day, we come to proclaim an end to the petty grievances and false promises, the recriminations and worn-out dogmas that for far too long have strangled our politics.

We remain a young nation, but in the words of Scripture, the time has come to set aside childish things. The time has come to reaffirm our enduring spirit; to choose our better history; to carry forward that precious gift, that noble idea, passed on from generation to generation: the God-given promise that all are equal, all are free, and all deserve a chance to pursue their full measure of happiness.

(APPLAUSE)

In reaffirming the greatness of our nation, we understand that greatness is never a given. It must be earned. Our journey has never been one of shortcuts or settling for less.

It has not been the path for the faint-hearted, for those who prefer leisure over work, or seek only the pleasures of riches and fame.

Rather, it has been the risk-takers, the doers, the makers of things — some celebrated, but more often men and women obscure in their labor — who have carried us up the long, rugged path towards prosperity and freedom.

For us, they packed up their few worldly possessions and traveled across oceans in search of a new life. For us, they toiled in sweatshops and settled the West, endured the lash of the whip and plowed the hard earth.

For us, they fought and died in places Concord and Gettysburg; Normandy and Khe Sanh.

Time and again these men and women struggled and sacrificed and worked till their hands were raw so that we might live a better life. They saw America as bigger than the sum of our individual ambitions; greater than all the differences of birth or wealth or faction.

This is the journey we continue today. We remain the most prosperous, powerful nation on Earth. Our workers are no less productive than when this crisis began. Our minds are no less inventive, our goods and services no less needed than they were last week or last month or last year. Our capacity remains undiminished. But our time of standing pat, of protecting narrow interests and putting off unpleasant decisions — that time has surely passed.

Starting today, we must pick ourselves up, dust ourselves off, and begin again the work of remaking America.

(APPLAUSE)

For everywhere we look, there is work to be done.

The state of our economy calls for action: bold and swift. And we will act not only to create new jobs but to lay a new foundation for growth.

We will build the roads and bridges, the electric grids and digital lines that feed our commerce and bind us together.

We will restore science to its rightful place and wield technology’s wonders to raise health care’s quality…

(APPLAUSE)

… and lower its costs.

We will harness the sun and the winds and the soil to fuel our cars and run our factories. And we will transform our schools and colleges and universities to meet the demands of a new age.

All this we can do. All this we will do.

Now, there are some who question the scale of our ambitions, who suggest that our system cannot tolerate too many big plans. Their memories are short, for they have forgotten what this country has already done, what free men and women can achieve when imagination is joined to common purpose and necessity to courage.

What the cynics fail to understand is that the ground has shifted beneath them, that the stale political arguments that have consumed us for so long, no longer apply.

MR. The question we ask today is not whether our government is too big or too small, but whether it works, whether it helps families find jobs at a decent wage, care they can afford, a retirement that is dignified.

Where the answer is yes, we intend to move forward. Where the answer is no, programs will end.

And those of us who manage the public’s dollars will be held to account, to spend wisely, reform bad habits, and do our business in the light of day, because only then can we restore the vital trust between a people and their government.

Nor is the question before us whether the market is a force for good or ill. Its power to generate wealth and expand freedom is unmatched.

But this crisis has reminded us that without a watchful eye, the market can spin out of control. The nation cannot prosper long when it favors only the prosperous.

The success of our economy has always depended not just on the size of our gross domestic product, but on the reach of our prosperity; on the ability to extend opportunity to every willing heart — not out of charity, but because it is the surest route to our common good.

(APPLAUSE)

As for our common defense, we reject as false the choice between our safety and our ideals.

Our founding fathers faced with perils that we can scarcely imagine, drafted a charter to assure the rule of law and the rights of man, a charter expanded by the blood of generations.

Those ideals still light the world, and we will not give them up for expedience’s sake.

And so, to all other peoples and governments who are watching today, from the grandest capitals to the small village where my father was born: know that America is a friend of each nation and every man, woman and child who seeks a future of peace and dignity, and we are ready to lead once more.

(APPLAUSE)

Recall that earlier generations faced down fascism and communism not just with missiles and tanks, but with the sturdy alliances and enduring convictions.

They understood that our power alone cannot protect us, nor does it entitle us to do as we please. Instead, they knew that our power grows through its prudent use. Our security emanates from the justness of our cause; the force of our example; the tempering qualities of humility and restraint.

We are the keepers of this legacy, guided by these principles once more, we can meet those new threats that demand even greater effort, even greater cooperation and understanding between nations. We’ll begin to responsibly leave Iraq to its people and forge a hard- earned peace in Afghanistan.

With old friends and former foes, we’ll work tirelessly to lessen the nuclear threat and roll back the specter of a warming planet.

We will not apologize for our way of life nor will we waver in its defense.

And for those who seek to advance their aims by inducing terror and slaughtering innocents, we say to you now that, “Our spirit is stronger and cannot be broken. You cannot outlast us, and we will defeat you.”

(APPLAUSE)

For we know that our patchwork heritage is a strength, not a weakness.

We are a nation of Christians and Muslims, Jews and Hindus, and nonbelievers. We are shaped by every language and culture, drawn from every end of this Earth.

And because we have tasted the bitter swill of civil war and segregation and emerged from that dark chapter stronger and more united, we cannot help but believe that the old hatreds shall someday pass; that the lines of tribe shall soon dissolve; that as the world grows smaller, our common humanity shall reveal itself; and that America must play its role in ushering in a new era of peace.

To the Muslim world, we seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect.

To those leaders around the globe who seek to sow conflict or blame their society’s ills on the West, know that your people will judge you on what you can build, not what you destroy.

To those…

(APPLAUSE)

To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history, but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.

(APPLAUSE)

To the people of poor nations, we pledge to work alongside you to make your farms flourish and let clean waters flow; to nourish starved bodies and feed hungry minds.

And to those nations like ours that enjoy relative plenty, we say we can no longer afford indifference to the suffering outside our borders, nor can we consume the world’s resources without regard to effect. For the world has changed, and we must change with it.

As we consider the road that unfolds before us, we remember with humble gratitude those brave Americans who, at this very hour, patrol far-off deserts and distant mountains. They have something to tell us, just as the fallen heroes who lie in Arlington whisper through the ages.

We honor them not only because they are guardians of our liberty, but because they embody the spirit of service: a willingness to find meaning in something greater than themselves.

And yet, at this moment, a moment that will define a generation, it is precisely this spirit that must inhabit us all.

For as much as government can do and must do, it is ultimately the faith and determination of the American people upon which this nation relies.

It is the kindness to take in a stranger when the levees break; the selflessness of workers who would rather cut their hours than see a friend lose their job which sees us through our darkest hours.

It is the firefighter’s courage to storm a stairway filled with smoke, but also a parent’s willingness to nurture a child, that finally decides our fate.

Our challenges may be new, the instruments with which we meet them may be new, but those values upon which our success depends, honesty and hard work, courage and fair play, tolerance and curiosity, loyalty and patriotism — these things are old.

These things are true. They have been the quiet force of progress throughout our history.

What is demanded then is a return to these truths. What is required of us now is a new era of responsibility — a recognition, on the part of every American, that we have duties to ourselves, our nation and the world, duties that we do not grudgingly accept but rather seize gladly, firm in the knowledge that there is nothing so satisfying to the spirit, so defining of our character than giving our all to a difficult task.

This is the price and the promise of citizenship.

This is the source of our confidence: the knowledge that God calls on us to shape an uncertain destiny.

This is the meaning of our liberty and our creed, why men and women and children of every race and every faith can join in celebration across this magnificent mall. And why a man whose father less than 60 years ago might not have been served at a local restaurant can now stand before you to take a most sacred oath.

(APPLAUSE)

So let us mark this day in remembrance of who we are and how far we have traveled.

In the year of America’s birth, in the coldest of months, a small band of patriots huddled by dying campfires on the shores of an icy river.

The capital was abandoned. The enemy was advancing. The snow was stained with blood.

At a moment when the outcome of our revolution was most in doubt, the father of our nation ordered these words be read to the people:

“Let it be told to the future world that in the depth of winter, when nothing but hope and virtue could survive, that the city and the country, alarmed at one common danger, came forth to meet it.”

America, in the face of our common dangers, in this winter of our hardship, let us remember these timeless words; with hope and virtue, let us brave once more the icy currents, and endure what storms may come; let it be said by our children’s children that when we were tested we refused to let this journey end, that we did not turn back nor did we falter; and with eyes fixed on the horizon and God’s grace upon us, we carried forth that great gift of freedom and delivered it safely to future generations.

Thank you. God bless you.

(APPLAUSE)

And God bless the United States of America.

(APPLAUSE)

Appendix B

WASHINGTON, Jan. 20 (Xinhua) — Hope is one thing, the reality is another. On Tuesday, about 2 million people gathered in Washington D.C. to celebrate the inauguration of Barack Obama as new U.S, president, hoping he will save the economy, but the Wall Street plunged more than 4 percent in New York.

In his address just after taking the swearing-in oath, Obama admitted that the U.S. was “in the midst of crisis is now well understood,” listing war, economy, healthcare, home foreclosures, jobs, energy and other challenges.

“Our economy is badly weakened, a consequence of greed and irresponsibility on the part of some, but also our collective failure to make hard choices and prepare the nation for a new age,” said the new president.

But Obama assured Americans that although “the challenges we face are real, serious many,” and “will not be met easily or in a short span of time,” America’s goals “will be met.”

The new president’s words were echoed by Dean Glenn, an entrepreneur from Virginia, who told Xinhua that he is optimistic and believes Obama will save the economy and be great leader.

He said: “The economic crisis is a tough problem, it require some smart person to figure it out, I think he is surrounded himself with some very smart persons.”

Glenn, who had never been to inauguration before, said: “Today is a day we look forward to for long time,” adding that he believes Obama will bring changes to the U.S.. “We will have a new spirit of cooperation, hopefully a respect of the world.”

Witnessing Obama was sworn in as the 44th U.S. president, the first black president in America’s history, hundreds of thousands of people, like Glenn, erupted in roars of approval, and cheered in the same tone: “Obama, Obama!”

A recent national poll also showed that Obama’s approval rating had risen to nearly 80 percent, revealing people’s satisfaction with his work in the transition of power, establishment of his cabinet, as well as high expectations of his administration after Jan. 20.

“I think he (Obama) is going to do a magnificent job, he has several teams that would change the nation,” said David S. TorainII, head of Mathematics department of Hampton University, who joined the jubilation near the Washington Monument, which stands at the central of the National Mall.

As for the economy, however, he seemed to be not so optimistic. Inheriting a series of economic problems on a scale not seen since the Great Depression, Obama will have a hard time reviving the nation’s sagging economy, he noted.

“It might took long time to get out of the meltdown. I don’t think anybody can turn around in next 6 months,” he told Xinhua.

But he believed that Obama would help improve the situation. “I think he will be the greatest president since John F. Kennedy, he has great ideas, let’s wait and see what happens,” he said.

But the Wall Street cannot wait. The U.S. stock market plunged more than 4 percent on Inauguration Day Tuesday as bank woes spread while investors failed to find confidence from President Barack Obama’s inauguration speech.

The Dow Jones Industrial Average was down more than 330 points, or 4 percent, falling below 8,000 for the first time in 2009, while the Standard & Poor’s 500 and the Nasdaq indexes dropped more than 5 percent.

Appendix C

奥巴马宣誓就任美国总统 (人民日报2009.01.21第3版)

中方愿与美方一道推动中美建设性合作关系在新的时期长期健康稳定向前发展

本报华盛顿1月20日电  （记者李学江、马小宁）美国当选总统、民主党人奥巴马20日在华盛顿国会山宣誓就任美国第44任总统（见上图，新华社记者  张  岩摄）。来自全美及世界各地的200万人，共同见证了美国历史上第一位非洲裔总统宣誓就职这一历史性时刻。当选副总统拜登同日宣誓就职。

美国东部时间11时30分（北京时间21日零时30分）许，美国总统就职典礼在国会大厦西侧的露天平台上举行。除当天卸任的布什总统之外，美国前总统卡特、老布什和克林顿等前政要和社会名流也应邀出席奥巴马的就职典礼。

奥巴马在就职演说中呼吁美国民众树立坚强的信心、团结一致面对各种挑战和困难。他说，美国正面临战争和金融危机所引发的各种困难。“我们今天聚在这里正是因为我们选择了战胜恐惧的希望，选择了团结。”他呼吁全体美国民众端正心态，努力提高公民责任感，为克服危机、振兴国家经济贡献自己的力量。

奥巴马表示，美国将以“负责任的”方式撤离伊拉克，同时巩固在阿富汗得来不易的和平。他说，美国将为消除核威胁作出不懈努力。他还强调，美国将继续打击恐怖主义活动，并郑重宣布美国能战胜恐怖分子。美国政府将在相互尊重和互利的基础上，寻求与伊斯兰国家发展关系的新方式。

“责任”和“团结”是奥巴马就职演说的主题词。长期研究美国政治史的美国国会历史协会的柯农博士说，阐述具体内外政策是未来国情咨文的任务，就职演说的要义在于重温美国的政治理念，并将其应用于当今时代所面临的特殊问题。

奥巴马可谓“临危受命”。今天的美国正处于上世纪二三十年代大萧条以来最严重的经济衰退中。信贷停滞、消费冷清、房市下滑、股市动荡、失业率攀升，美国经济面临严重挑战。而导致这场危机的主要根源之一就是从华尔街到华盛顿的责任缺失。

现代经济本质是信用经济，而责任则是构成信用的基石。美国政府迄今所采取的一系列救市措施的实际效果表明，一旦责任缺失导致信用不再，要想恢复格外艰难。美国舆论认为，对奥巴马而言，赢得国会通过巨额经济复苏法案、短期内为经济注入强心针并非难事。真正的挑战是重建责任意识，恢复市场信心，这不仅是将美国经济推上复苏轨道的当务之急，也是保证美国经济健康运行的长远之计。

奥巴马就职适值美国前总统林肯诞辰200周年。其典礼主题“自由的新生”，取自林肯总统1863年发表的葛底斯堡演讲，就职宣誓时使用的《圣经》也是1861年林肯就职时使用的原件，此前，奥巴马乘火车从费城经巴尔的摩抵达华盛顿特区也是重温了当年的林肯“路线”。同奥巴马一样，林肯也来自伊利诺伊州，他一直是奥巴马心目中的英雄。1865年，林肯举行第二任期总统就职典礼时，非洲裔美国人首次参加了就职典礼游行。此间舆论认为，奥巴马希望借助林肯“元素”传达责任意识和加强团结共克时艰的信息。

本报洛杉矶1月20日电  （记者管克江）对于奥巴马宣誓就任美国总统将给美国社会带来何种变化，美国《华盛顿邮报》专栏作家尤金·罗宾逊20日撰文说，一名黑人当总统并不能魔法般地消除在收入上的种族不平等，无法改善内陆城市的学校、重建破落的社区或弥合不健全的家庭。但从心理上，“它改变了一切，整个国家满怀希望地等待他成功”。

一些媒体在评论时，再次强调了奥巴马提出的“变革”口号。《国家》杂志20日发表题为《历史性的转折点》的文章。美联社的文章说，奥巴马就职正值美国人民充满焦虑、期待，而又重新燃起希望的时刻。美国有线电视新闻网的网站则发表了题为《变革到了华盛顿》的文章。

《纽约时报》20日的报道强调说，奥巴马的就职演说显示，他的政府在国家安全上的某些政策与布什政府有明显的区别。

中国外交部发言人姜瑜２０日表示，中美关系处在承前启后的重要时期，中方愿与美方一道，坚持从战略高度和长远角度来审视和把握两国关系，不断加强对话、交流与合作，尊重和照顾彼此核心利益，推动中美建设性合作关系在新的时期长期、健康、稳定向前发展。一个良好、不断发展的中美关系不仅符合中美两国和两国人民的根本利益，也有利于世界的和平、稳定与发展。

俄罗斯媒体认为，俄美关系不仅是世界稳定的重要因素，而且对解决许多国际问题具有重要意义。俄罗斯期望奥巴马就职后俄美关系得到改善，双方在对等和坦诚的基础上发展建设性合作关系。但从目前形势来看，持续不断的北约东扩和美国在东欧部署导弹防御系统仍将成为影响俄美关系发展的关键障碍。国际文传电讯社评论说，奥巴马入主白宫后，俄美两国总统应在近期加强电话交流。

欧洲舆论认为，欧美能否抓住契机改善关系取决于两个因素：奥巴马必须改善美国在欧洲的形象、欧洲必须向奥巴马表明它是一个有效的盟友。如果美欧合作，从气候变化到伊朗核问题都可能处理得好些。问题是欧洲能否扮演有效的盟友角色，并动员其资源以应对重大国际问题。分析人士认为，跨大西洋关系的三个当务之急是：阿富汗问题、气候变化与能源问题、国际金融危机。

拉美媒体认为，奥巴马就职对拉美具有重要意义。阿根廷《纪事报》表示，奥巴马变革的成败不仅是美国的事情，且具有全球意义。奥巴马握有让阿根廷成功度过当前金融危机的金钥匙。墨西哥《宇宙报》发表社论，将奥巴马的就职称为一个新时代的象征，并将奥巴马称为“重生的希望”。委内瑞拉舆论认为，因为众所周知的原因，查韦斯与奥巴马的关系可能会面临一个较为缓慢的调整期。

美国卡特中心中国项目中心主任刘亚伟认为，美国民众希望奥巴马带领国家战胜当前面临的严重危机。奥巴马的就职演讲仍维持了其一贯激动人心的风格。美国人关注奥巴马强调的希望和梦想，更关注他就任总统后的政策实施。目前奥巴马的支持率达到了80%，但从明天起，奥巴马的“政治蜜月”可能将宣告结束，他要面对的是来自内政和外交方面的一系列严峻的挑战。

本报记者  丁大伟  于宏建  李永群  陈晓航  王新萍  张卫中  张慧中

【本文来源于人民数据库, 网址：http://data.people.com.cn】

Appendix D

1月20日：白宫主人不再“白”

“我谨庄严宣誓，我一定忠实执行合众国总统职务，竭尽全力，恪守、维护和捍卫合众国宪法。”

美国当地时间1月20日12时（北京时间21日凌晨1时），在美国最高法院首席法官约翰·罗伯茨主持下，贝拉克·奥巴马（Barack Hussein Obama）宣誓成为第44任美国总统，成为美国第一个非洲裔总统。

宣誓就职以后，在国会大厦西面一个半圆形木质讲台前，奥巴马发表了他历史性的就职演说。他以一段接近十九分钟的演讲，激励美国人民“必须凝聚力量，重新塑造美国”。

他首先谈及经济。奥巴马说，我们都知道，我们现在正处于危机中。人们失去家园，失去工作，企业关门；我们的卫生保健费用太高，我们的学校有太多不足；每天，都有更多的证据证明，我们使用能源的方式威胁到了我们的星球。

他说，数据和统计证明，我们正面临危机。我们的信心受到侵蚀，美国的衰退是不可避免的。挑战是真实存在的，情况严重，数量众多，不能轻易、在短 时间内解决。但奥巴马强调，美国必须面对这些挑战，并最终解决这些挑战，“选择希望而不是担心，团结而不是意见，克服抱怨和不切实际的承诺。”

奥巴马谈及责任感：我们需要一个有责任感的新时代。每个美国人都应认识到对国家、世界的责任。要推动这一责任感，塑造我们的个性。这是每个国民的承诺，是信心来源。

最后，奥巴马说：让我们告诉未来的世界，在隆冬时，只有希望和美德可以生存下去。美国正在面临我们共同的困难，在困境的严冬中，让我们铭记这些永 恒的话语。让我们勇敢的面对可能到来的冰流和风暴，我们不会回头，也不会动摇。我们将把自由这个伟大的礼物，安全的传给我们的后代。

就职午宴过后，首个“黑人第一家庭”将穿过白宫北门廊正式入住白宫，打破白宫主人一直“白”的历史，一个新的时代开始了。

【南方周末】本文网址：http://www.infzm.com/content/22925

估计有200万至400万人涌入华盛顿特区参加奥巴马就职典礼，打破1965年约翰逊总统就职典礼120万名参加者的最高纪录。估计全球有15亿人通过电视观看就职典礼。

当局调派7500名现役军人、1万名国民警衞队成员、2.5万名特工和警员，并有2.5万名现役军人做后备，规模比美国在阿富汗的驻军还要大。联邦政府首次宣布首都特区进入紧急状态，以便调配人力物力，这是美国历次总统就职典礼最大规模的保安。

值得注意的是，国防部长罗伯特·盖茨没有参加奥巴马的就职典礼。

美国白宫发言人佩里诺19日曾表示，如果第44任总统奥巴马在就职典礼当天因恐怖袭击或自然灾害而意外身故，将由国防部长罗伯特·盖茨担当领导国家的重任。

就职典礼强刮“林肯风”

此次奥巴马正式就职的主题是“自由的新生”，该表述来自林肯1863年在美国内战期间的盖茨堡演讲辞。而他宣誓就职使用的圣经就是林肯当年用过的那本。林肯圣经属于国会图书馆的收藏。总统就职典礼委员会表示，奥巴马将是头一位使用林肯圣经宣誓就职的总统。

奥巴马在宣誓就职后吃的午餐也与林肯总统当年享用的饭菜类似，就连就餐用具也力求还原当时情形。

1861年，林肯首度入主白宫，他就餐用的瓷器是时任第一夫人的玛丽·托德·林肯 挑选的。这些瓷器的复制品在时隔近150年后将出现在奥巴马就职午餐的饭桌上。

就职宣誓之后，奥巴马与200名宾客一切共享了就职餐，这顿就职餐由三道菜组成，同样基于林肯口味。正餐前的开胃菜是以扇贝和虾为原料做成的糕点——林肯当年酷爱海鲜；主菜是 酸辣酱野鸡配马铃薯——幼年林肯在印第安那州爱吃的东西；甜点是苹果桂皮软糕——林肯爱吃苹果。

餐厅的布置也是林肯式的。据报道，奥巴马餐桌的背后将悬挂“约塞米蒂峡谷风光”油画。该油画展示的是约塞米蒂峡谷黎明时的景象。此画也是为了纪念林肯在1864年宣布约塞米蒂峡谷作为国家公园供民众休闲观光。

“林肯午宴”在国会山“雕像厅”举行，与奥巴马共进午宴的大约200名宾客包括最高法院成员、奥巴马内阁成员以及国会领导人

The relationships between the producer, product, and audience have long been studied in the larger context of consumption practices and the social factors that affect them. In this paper, I will examine these relationships as articulated in the South Korean pop music industry to provide a check on Adorno and Horkheimer’s view of the culture industry as being an all-powerful, ubiquitous menace to the creative individual. First, I will briefly outline Adorno’s invectives of the culture industry and provide a brief overview of the South Korean pop culture industry. I argue that initially, through highly streamlined and rationalized corporate strategies, SM did hold considerable ideological sway over the production of popular music and culture. However, as I attempt to show in the second part of my paper, such a balance of power is undergoing a fundamental shift, as the corporate machine, which manufactures popular culture, is increasingly confronted and opposed by the users of its products. Through this study, I hope to gain insights into the nature of the pop music industry and the pop idol phenomenon in South Korean society, as well as to call into question Adorno and Horkheimer’s pessimistic conception of a society dominated by the culture industry.

In “The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception”, Adorno and Horkheimer present a clear stance regarding the balance of power between producers and consumers of cultural products. From Adorno’s perspective, the culture industry is an oppressive and impenetrable entity that works to homogenize culture. In a society where “something is provided for everyone so that no one can escape,” the individual is effectively marginalized within the economic structures imposed by the dominant capitalist order. All decisions regarding the production and classification of cultural commodities are made by corporate executives before any product reaches store shelves or screens, leading consumers to be passive and unquestioning of the status quo. Any perceived differences within a type of popular culture product are superficial and are only there to provide the illusion of choice. With the commodification of music, consumers are at no less of a disadvantage. Adorno views consumers of popular culture as powerless spectators whose passive intake of entertainment commodities requires no thought on their part and only serves to perpetuate the dominance of certain corporate interests. He writes, “Entertainment is the prolongation of work,” in that people seek it as a relief from the daily grind of work, yet it only serves to compel them to work more in order to retain their leisure hours. The work of the culture industry ultimately results in “the abolition of the individual”. By reducing individuals into customers and employees, it renders humans as “absolutely replaceable, pure nothingness.” From Adorno’s perspective, individuals are hopelessly disempowered and serve as mere material for those in control to use and manipulate to their sole benefit. Thus, he positions the culture industry as an indomitable entity and leaves very little room to consider consumer agency.

Before going on to discuss the dynamics of a particular producer-audience relationship in the South Korean music industry, some background information to the pop culture industry would help to situate that relationship in a larger historical and social context. The origins of popular music and a popular music industry in South Korea can be traced back to the 1920’s during the period of Japanese occupation. The term, yuhaengga, meaning “song in fashion” was first used in 1926 when the song “Adoration of Death” became an immensely popular hit. From then on, as more people recognized the profits that could be realized through a popular song market, recording companies emerged to capitalize on the demand. Initially, subsidiaries of foreign companies like Columbia and Victor produced the majority of recordings of Korean popular songs, and it was not until the 1930’s that Korean-owned recording companies would appear. In the years after World War II and through the Korean War, America’s presence was felt in most parts of South Korean society, not least in the significant influx and widespread popularity of Western pop songs, which would come to have a lasting influence on domestic pop culture. From the early 1960’s on, supported by the United States and Japan, South Korea embarked on an ambitious project of modernization in hopes to stimulate economic growth. Along with rapid industrial development from the early 1960’s on, the South Korean economy underwent a significant transformation to Western-style capitalism. During the 1960’s, the state began to see Western pop music as a corrupting influence on society and the rise of individualism promoted by globalization as potentially destabilizing, causing popular culture to be subject to strict censorship. When Chun Doo Hwan staged a military coup in 1979 and made himself head of state, he actively sought to control the media, shutting down commercial television stations and maintaining the practices of media censorship, effectively delimiting the kinds of music considered suitable for broadcast and airplay. During the 1980’s the “star system” also emerged, wherein singers who were perceived to have the suitable qualities for TV presentation were selected through contests and by talent scouts. After Chun Doo Hwan left office in 1987, anti-authoritarian activists succeeded in bringing democracy to Korea and the 1988 Olympics held in Seoul opened up Korea to a myriad of outside influences. As a result, state censorship of many forms of cultural expression was eased significantly, and the music industry, which had been resting in a rather uncomfortable slumber, was reinvigorated. The 1990’s saw a marked growth in the domestic music industry, with most of the growth attributed to domestic pop music rather than foreign popular music.

It was at the end of what has been a turbulent century in terms of Korean and South Korean history that the SM Entertainment Corporation emerged to become one of the leading manufacturers of pop culture. Officially founded by former singer and TV and radio host Lee Soo-Man in 1995, SM can trace its roots back to a small studio in Seoul in which Lee had first opened SM Studio in 1988. After Lee nearly lost SM because of the drug scandal involving one of his first protégées in the mid-1990’s, he was determined not to expose himself to the same risks of laboriously promoting a new artist only to have them fail to deliver on his investments later on. Lee set out to systematize his idol-making business. He modified and extended the scope of the “star system” which had emerged during the 1980’s to create his own system for training and developing young people into stars. After a student passed the audition process, they would be subject to training in a range of entertainment fields including singing, dancing, and acting. The aspects of personality, character, and looks thus become just as important, if not more, than their ability to sing and dance, since any minor shortcomings in the latter areas would be made up for by the rigorous training process that all SM trainees had to undergo in order to debut under the SM label. Thus, Lee effectively rationalized and industrialized the process of developing an idol star. In his efforts to minimize risk, he molded his trainees with a series of standardized procedures, just as factory machines manipulate and shape raw material: as a result, he created standardized cultural products, which were roughly interchangeable and also disposable, since there were always more copies coming down the production line. This type of star-production system has since become a norm among the companies that dominate the Korean music industry, such as YG and JYP Entertainment. In 2005, producers estimated the average cost of grooming and launching a new artist to be around $400,000, including music and dance training, the stars’ costumes, cars, managers, and other expenses. Since its inception, the idol-making machine has changed little besides becoming further streamlined with the help of information technologies, which help to identify what kind of pop star is currently in demand. SM has since begun to hold global auditions annually, and has moved to merge with or buy out other media companies, including a DVD distributor, a karaoke machine distributor, a music video channel, new media platforms, and more.

As a prime model of the rationalization and bureacratization that characterizes the modern production of culture in a capitalist framework, SM is an apt representation of the culture industry as characterized by Adorno. In his conception of a society where the “control of consumers is mediated by entertainment,” SM is a leading producer of pop culture products that serve to both pacify and suppress the masses. As Keith Negus writes on the nature of the Western pop music industry, corporate strategy “provides a means of rationalizing and ordering the activities of consumers and audiences. Record companies maintain extensive collections of consumer data, gathered from sources such as electronic monitoring of sales, consumer panels, and publications of industry-wide figures. They then utilize this data to develop and promote new stars and songs. Under such corporate strategy, consumers are reduced to charts and graphs, which is another aspect of the culture industry that Adorno rails against. With its assembly-line method of churning out the next idol stars, SM is also responsible for infecting everything with the homogeneity that Adorno sees as detrimental to the creative individual. Although it attempts to differentiate its idol stars from each other, such as by marketing them as purveyors of different genres (TRAX is marketed as a rock band, while Dong Bang Shin Ki is marketed as an acappella group), it hardly hides the fact that all these idol stars are products of the standardized SM training process. Any differences between them are therefore fabricated and intended to delude consumers. In some ways, the manufacturing process does not even end at the idol’s debut. The company often controls what costumes they wear in performances, their casual clothing, and even the kind of car they will drive. SM has to constantly monitor, shape, and repackage its idols according to current fads. With its recent evolution from a music label into a full-fledged media conglomerate, SM seems to be moving further to homogenize the experience of popular culture as well. From Adorno’s perspective, the commodification of music that is carried out by large media corporations like SM only serves to “intensify the impoverishment of the aesthetic material so radically that the identity of all industrial cultural products…will triumph openly tomorrow.” In many ways, SM’s cultural clout seems to have exceeded that point. Nowadays, it is rare to find someone who is at least somewhat immersed in Korean pop culture and cannot trace SM’s idol groups back to SM. Videos and pictures showing idols during their auditions and pre-debut training are widely circulated online and can be found on Youtube. By extensively marketing the audition process, SM even presents the opportunity to be an SM trainee as something desirable. In being widely identified with the idol-making machine, SM’s cultural products already seem to be recognized for what they really are: the products of an industrial process that are mass-produced for mass consumption.

SM is in the business of actualizing Guy Debord’s concept of the spectacle. In the context of this corporate strategy, music plays a minor role in the success of its cultural products, although idols put out scores of music albums. As Debord writes, a spectacle is “the omnipresent celebration of a choice already made in the sphere of production, and the consummate result of that choice.” It is “a social relationship between people that is mediated by images.” The dissemination and control of images is paramount in SM’s corporate strategy. Whether through music videos, magazine spreads, TV advertisements, or guest appearances on game shows, SM consistently manages to impose a pre-packaged, meticulously tailored image of their idol stars on their audiences. Because it establishes and maintains social relationships with its customers through images, SM can essentially hide the fact of an unequal power relationship between it and its customers. In accordance with Adorno’s characterization of the culture industry, Debord’s notion of the spectacle deemphasizes any notion of consumer agency, and individuals are depicted as powerless in the face of the spectacle and all the economic capital it embodies.

Manufactured to be spectacles, the cultural products, which SM puts out in the form of cute boy bands and spunky girl groups, often become objects of fetishization, especially among South Korean youth, to the extent that consumers develop solid, verging on obsessive, loyalties to particular artists. These loyalties manifest themselves in the formation of large fan clubs, each self-proclaimed to be exclusively devoted to a certain product of the idol-making machine. For the purposes of this study, I am only focusing on the fan club of Dong Bang Shin Ki, a boy band under the SM label, although many other SM idol groups, such as SHINee and Super Junior, have also gained significant followings since their debut.

All five members of the popular boy band, Dong Bang Shin Ki (officially abbreviated by SM as TVXQ), are products of SM’s star system. Each member was individually scouted out through auditions and then subjected to training in singing, dancing, and acting in the years leading up to their debut. TVXQ debuted in 2003, performing their hit single “Hug” during a showcase featuring Britney Spears and BoA, another pop star under SM. Since the release of their first single, they have rapidly acquired an impressive fan base. The fan site devoted to them on the Daum website, a large online community, now boasts nearly 760,000 fan members, comfortably beating the second largest fan page by more than 300,000 members. A quick Google search easily turns up more TVXQ fan communities based in countries around the world, including Malaysia, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United Arab Emirates. Despite geographical and linguistic barriers, all these various fan communities are self-consciously united under one name: Cassiopeia. In 2008, Cassiopeia made the Guinness Book of World Records for being the largest fan club of any artist, numbering at around 800,000 members, according to KBS, the state-owned television station.

Members of Cassiopeia, known as Cassiopeians and Cassies, are mostly internally organized and managed on many different fan sites and forums. There is no single website that claims to unite all 800,000 plus Cassiopeians within its servers, although the Daum fan cafe certainly comes close to it. These online gathering spaces for fans often demonstrate an impressive level of organization. The Daum fan site, for example, is housed in a neatly organized webpage, on which each member’s picture, date of birth, height, weight, and blood type are listed. In order to be a member, you must fill out the application and be accepted. Members of the fan site are organized hierarchically. Depending on various factors, such as the frequency with which you post and the nature of your posts, the president of the cafe can choose to upgrade your status within the club. The current president of the Daum fan cafe goes by the screen name of Cha-Jun. A series of tabs and links on the left side of the page direct you to the various divisions of the cafe. There is a forum where the daily schedules of each of the members are listed and another one about news of the members’ activities outside Korea. Pictures and cuts from television dramas are also provided and organized by members of the fan page. Another TVXQ fan site, Cassiopeia-Family, exhibits a similar structure of organization. Each of its nearly 14,000 members is given a rank based on the number of posts they have contributed. The rankings range from Dust (0 posts) to Red Giant (300 posts) to Cassiopeia (4000 posts). The structure of these rankings are detailed in a thread named “CSSPF Laws,” which was posted by the founder of the site to provide a comprehensive list of guidelines to govern the behaviors of members on the site. These rules range from dealing with etiquette issues, such as the use of vulgar language and personal attacks, to stipulating the dimensions of avatar and banner images.

Through their large numbers and sound organizational methods, Cassiopeians are able to carry out many of the promotional activities that normally would be left to SM and its marketing department. One forum of the Daum fan cafe organizes members to vote together on weekly music shows as well as international polls where TVXQ is featured, helping to increase TVXQ’s visibility at home and abroad. When Ellen DeGeneres uploaded a blog post on “The Ellen DeGeneres’ Show” website asking for international music suggestions, comments from Cassiopeians flooded the site recommending their favorite idol group. Cassiopeians also work to disseminate the images of TVXQ to a wider audience. In addition to providing pictures and clips on fan sites, Cassiopeians also add subtitles to many of TVXQ’s videos on Youtube. Whereas the official music video of “Mirotic” that is provided on SM’s official channel is only in Korean, further searching turns up versions with subtitles in English, Spanish, Thai, Chinese, and French. The noticeable group presence that they exert wherever they go helps to increase TVXQ’s presence in online discussions about Korean pop music. On Soompi.com, one of the largest English-language online communities dedicated to Korean pop culture, there are a total of five threads devoted to TVXQ while most other groups only have one. Cassiopeians also create avatars and banners using their favorite members of TVXQ and use these on other non-TVXQ forums, such as Soompi.com, as proclamations of their loyalties as well as advertisements for their idols. Cassiopeians have also helped improve the images of their favorite members. Last year, Cassiopeians donated a large sum of money under the name of Xiah Junsu (a TVXQ member) to Adra Korea, an international development and relief agency, to help them rebuild a small village in Cambodia. In gratitude, villagers named it Xiah Junsu Village.

Adorno would see these Cassiopeians as a deluded mass and as the victims of an oppressive manifestation of the culture industry. However, the limits to his argument are already becoming apparent. In his scathing portrayal of the culture industry, Adorno does not consider the possibility that audiences have the power to manipulate the images of cultural products. By donating to charity in Junsu’s name and improving TVXQ’s image in the process, Cassiopeians are demonstrating that it is possible for them to shape the cultural influences of their idols. In his outline of Lisa Lewis’ insights from her studies on fans and their activities at public events, Keith Negus writes, “fans create communities with a collective shared sense of identity,” and they are able to “contribute directly to the meanings attributed to performers.” Thus, through their impressive presence, Cassiopeians are able to influence how others understand and experience TVXQ and Korean pop culture in general. One of the major scandals that came out of the Korean pop music industry in 2008 involved unruly fan behavior at the “I Love Korea 2008 Dream Concert.” According to several online forums, when it came time for Girls’ Generation, an all-female idol group under SM, to perform, other fan groups, including Cassiopeians, banded together and gave them the silent treatment. Physical violence also allegedly erupted between the fan groups of different SM idol groups. Whether or not these events are exaggerated or even happened at all, the news provoked a flood of responses on web forums. On the thread devoted to this scandal on AsianFanatics.net, many forum members expressed their horror, disbelief, and disapproval. The user ‘marmar’ writes, “what the ppl in charge of the dream concert should do for next year should just banned all sm artists for just next year. since it’s mainly there fanclubs that are immature. don’t ruin it for the other artists that would like to perform for there fans…if they do need to invite an sm artist then invite one where there fans are not as immature & crazy like the soshi heads, elfs & cassies…”. Another user, ‘hippocathy88’, adds, “i cant really see anything hostile from them lol but what they did were so immature. such bad reputation for sm fans.” These forum posts demonstrate how the actions of fan groups like Cassiopeia are taken to reflect the general nature of fans of SM’s idol groups. The image of SM thus becomes inextricably linked to and shaped by the behavior of the consumers of its products, and thus SM’s cultural influence can no longer be considered a monopoly. That most of the groups involved in the conflict were fan clubs of SM idol groups only adds to the irony of the situation. More importantly, these fans do not at all resemble Adorno’s characterization of the passive and thoughtless consumer.

Another area where Adorno’s argument falls short is that for all the concern he shows for the individual, he also de-individualizes consumers and treats them as a homogenous mass. From Adorno’s perspective, the utility of a cultural product is destroyed as it is consumed. Michel De Certeau, on the contrary, views consumption as a form of production, in which consumers use the cultural products that are imposed on them to further their own interests. De Certeau argues that “the imposed knowledge and symbolisms become objects manipulated by practitioners who have not produced them.” A tour through a Cassiopeia forum will serve to substantiate his claims. On the forum Cassiopeia-Family, besides the usual personal blurbs, all members divulge their favorite member and favorite couple within TVXQ underneath their avatar. In fact, during registration, I had to provide my favorite member and my favorite couple. Although the TVXQ images that SM puts out rarely have any homosexual insinuations (most TVXQ music videos involve a female love interest), it has been very common for fans to portray pairs of members as romantic partners. On the Cassiopeia-Family forum, we thus find a salient example of SM’s cultural products being vastly reinterpreted to pursue interests and desires divergent from that of the dominant capitalist order. These reinterpretations also serve to distinguish Cassiopeians from each other and reflect the variety of personal preferences within the TVXQ fan community. The forum also features a large collection of fan fiction written by fans, in which they use the members of TVXQ as characters in their own original stories. In the fan fiction ‘Salvation of Love’, the author reimagines Jaejoong as a vampire and recasts Yunho as his lover, clearly straying from the images that SM seeks to spread of its idols. These authors literally “select fragments [being] taken from the vast ensembles of production in order to compose new stories with them,” effectively using SM’s cultural products to pursue individual interests and desires which are reflected in the stories they write.

Thus, the culture industry is not without its virtues. It provides the material with which consumers can use to fulfill certain individual interests. As Dick Hebdige writes, “All aspects of culture possess a semiotic value, and the most taken-for-granted phenomena can function as signs: as elements in communication systems….” Corporate giants such as SM provide a common ideological space in which subordinate groups are able to function and interact. Cassiopeians are only able to use the images of their idols to fulfill their personal interests and share their reinterpretations with other fans because there is a corporation like SM to produce those idols and build a fanbase for them. Thus, the culture industry might serve a social function by providing a common language of signs that audiences can creatively manipulate and practice what John Fiske terms “textual productivity,” as cited in Bertha Chin’s work on East Asian cinema fandom.

Recent high profile events involving Cassiopeia and SM seem to further challenge the validity of Adorno’s threatening characterization of the culture industry. On July 31, 2009, three members of TVXQ filed an application at the Seoul Central District Court for provisional disposition to terminate their contract with SM Entertainment. Within the month, Cassiopeians mobilized a boycott of SM products. In a lengthy official statement, they detailed their main reasons: “1) SM Entertainment’s own decision of cancelling SM TOWN LIVE ‘09 that ridiculed the consumers 2) The insincerity and neglect that SM Entertainment showed for years to consumers’ complaints, and 3) SM Entertainment’s unfair treatment of TVXQ that caused a great danger [to] TVXQ’s existence”. On August 28, Cassiopeians submitted a petition of 121,083 signatures to the Korean Human Rights Commission to defend the human rights of their idols. Through their actions and their stated reasons, Cassiopeians clearly demonstrate how they think the producer-consumer relation should be. They hold SM responsible for not providing the cultural products it promised and believe that SM should be aware and responsive to the needs and opinions of consumers, needs and opinions which diverge enough from the dominant ideology to be called “complaints”. These Cassiopeians thus demonstrate a capacity for consumer agency that Adorno does not consider them to be capable of. The third and last reason provided for the boycott in the official statement also shows that their ultimate loyalty rests with their idols and not with SM. They conclude their lengthy statement with a proclamation of their everlasting loyalty: “We always support TVXQ. Please always keep the faith! =)”.

The fact that Cassiopeians’ loyalties are firmly anchored to their idols rather than to SM points to an inherent weakness in the culture industry. Being in the business of manufacturing human spectacles, SM encourages the consumer to develop strong attachments to the cultural product while simultaneously distancing itself from it. In Bertha Chin’s summary of Christine Yano’s work on fan cultures, she writes that “this sense of intimacy is centered on the fan relationship to the star rather than a specific cultural text or event”. At the same time, the nature of the spectacle involves distorting SM’s role as the producer. The typical producer-consumer relationship is obscured by the images which mediate it, to the extent that in the minds of audiences the images themselves come to take precedence over the entities which produced them. SM is increasingly seen as a separate entity from its cultural products, and the two are perceived to have divergent interests, as exhibited by the Cassiopeian efforts to defend the rights of their idols against the transgressions of SM. These intimate idol-fan relationships come to take precedence over the relationship that Cassiopeians have with SM. When an event arises where fans have to make a choice between their idols and SM, the choice is clear. Hence, SM, and the culture industry in general, can be said to be at a natural disadvantage precisely because their cultural hegemony is sustained by the production of spectacles.

Adorno’s impassioned critique of the culture industry thus seems to overlook the very thing he is trying to defend. While he mourns the loss of the individual, he ignores the capacity of the individual to exercise their creativity and agency within the economic structures imposed by the dominant capitalist order. Consumers, as per the perspectives of De Certeau and Hebdige, retain much of their creative potential despite the cultural hegemony of giant entertainment corporations like SM. The many practices carried out by Cassiopeians serve to attest to the productivity that audiences are capable of, as well as to their ability to confront and challenge those in power. Another way to view the role of the culture industry is that it provides a common context in which audiences can interact and be textually productive. Such a notion suggests that it may have some redeeming qualities that Adorno does not acknowledge. This study also reveals a fundamental weakness of the culture industry which lies in its production of spectacles. By putting forward some of the weaknesses of both Adorno’s critique and the culture industry, I hope to lend some optimism to the gloomy view that Adorno presents of modern popular culture.

References

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Few decades in recent Japanese history have been as politically fraught as the 1960s. In historical accounts, authors typically characterize it as a decade of protests carried out by students dissatisfied with a host of social issues including the renewal of the US-Japan Security Treaty (Nichibei Anzen Hosho Joyaku, hereafter given as its abbreviated name “Ampo”), a troubled university system seen as desperately outdated, and the escalating war in Vietnam. These protests, which became very violent by the end of the decade, represented at one level a struggle over the ways in which the Japanese people would define themselves, specifically in relation to the United States in the post-Occupation period and to their own wartime history. The ideologies at work in this period can be further understood by studying two dominant forms of music that were produced at the time: protest folk and enka. In these two genres are reflected the conflicting visions of “Japan” that were formulated by the younger and older generations respectively, visions which both drew upon Japanese folk symbols to formulate a way forward for the postwar society, but which saw these symbols in very different ways.

Two protests in particular dominate the discourse on 1960s Japan, and using these two protests I shall show the changing sentiments of students that led to the rise of protest folk music. These protests took place in 1960 and 1969 and primarily focused on resisting the renewal of the Ampo treaty. As Tsurumi Kazuko notes in her comparison of the two protests, a heavy increase in violence was seen in the 1969 protest relative to its counterpart at the start of the decade. (Tsurumi, Continuity and Change 1970, 28) Concomitantly, the late 1960s also saw the rise of Japanese “folk” music – with “folk” here being used in the sense of the “folk movement” rather than traditional Japanese songs – a means by which students voiced their dissatisfaction with the status quo in what Carolyn Stevens calls “the first direct and overt politicization of popular music” in the postwar period. (Stevens 2008, 64)

In view of the students’ dissatisfaction with extant structures of power and authority, it is unsurprising that the music they produced also undermined traditional notions of authenticity and power. Stevens defines Japanese folk music as a genre “amateurs could take part in through production, rather than just consumption,” since folk musicians opted for the more economical, stripped-down sound of the acoustic guitar which could be easily bought by most anyone that wished to learn. This was in contrast to the amplified, professional sound of the electric guitar popular in the early-decade eleki and GS (Group Sounds) movements that had been inspired by foreign acts such as the Ventures. (Stevens 2008, 44) A monograph published by the Japan branch of the International Association for the Study of Popular Music states, for instance, “Many young people began to learn by themselves how to play the guitar in the ‘folk’ boom. Since then the guitar has been one of the main tools for Japanese young people’s self-expression.” (International Association for the Study of Popular Music 1991, 16) I would draw particular attention here to the “self” of “self-expression,” as the folk boom represented a more conscious effort to define a Japanese identity than most other postwar music movements.

Part of this effort was the so-called “rock in Japanese” debate which arose in the 1960s with the growing popularity of rock and roll in Japan. For much of the decade, Japanese rock and roll bands were expected to sing in English, even if the songs were original compositions, as this was viewed as the “authentic” language of the genre. (Bourdaghs 2005, 123) As the decade drew to a close, however, musicians like those participating in the folk movement worked to create a wasei (“made in Japan”) style that was more directly accessible and meaningful to a Japanese-speaking audience. Michael Bourdaghs emphasizes the importance of folk music’s Japanese lyrics when he analyzes it as a genre in which musicality was “a secondary medium, one important only in so far as it conveyed the primary message contained in the lyrics.” (Bourdaghs 2005, 122) The sparse sound of the acoustic guitar used by the majority of folk musicians was thus not only important because it was different from extant musical styles, but also because it was intended from the start to be secondary to the singer’s lyrics.

Perhaps one of the most famous artists to come out of the folk boom of the late 1960s was Okabayashi Nobuyasu (born 1946). His songs, sometimes controversial enough to be banned by the Recording Industry Association of Japan, dealt with many different politically sensitive topics. Roger Goodman lists just a few of the issues covered on Okabayashi’s debut album, saying:

“Watashi wo Danzai Seyo contained songs criticizing the Vietnam War (‘Sensou no Oyadama’), Japanese labor conditions (‘Sanya Blues’), and the perils of Japan’s capitalist aspirations (‘Sore de Jiyuu Natta no Kai’). Okabayashi also wrote songs that explored taboo topics like the discrimination against descendants of Edo Japan’s pariah caste, the burakumin (‘Tegami’).” (Goodman 2010)

In the tradition of folk singers in the United States such as Bob Dylan, Okabayashi’s songs profiled Japanese on the margins of mainstream society, the same Japanese whom student radicals claimed to represent in their struggles, as a way of criticizing the social structure that created their disadvantaged position. Ironically, these students “came from relatively higher upper-status households” that were most likely separated from the working class with whom they chose to identify in their activist political orientation (Krauss 1974, 52).

Furthermore, by participating in demonstrations, these students put at risk the elite futures guaranteed by attending their respective universities. Steinhoff describes “an ideology of self-denial and rejection of privilege” that the students mobilized in the second half of the decade toward a twofold goal. (Steinhoff 1999, 5) First, they distanced themselves from their upper-class roots in order to position themselves as more in-tune with the plight of the working class. Secondly, they used it as an ideological tool to bind the group of students together more closely in self-sacrificing solidarity. The music that students listened to and produced both reflected and reproduced their self-sacrificing beliefs, such as in Okabayashi’s quietly reassuring song “Tomo yo”:

Folk music not only served as a forum in which students voiced their complaints, but also reflexively addressed the students themselves, urging them on to selfless acts of denial that they felt positioned them symbolically alongside the disadvantaged lower classes for whom they sought to act as standard bearers.

In sum, the students felt that, through their own self-denial, they would be able to create a Japan that was sensitive to the needs not only of the ruling elite, but also the marginalized working class and rural citizenry. Folk singers drew upon imagery of these classes to call attention to the failings of the postwar Japanese government to make good on the notion that democracy was a system that benefited all members of society. The students and musicians called for a Japan truly run by its people, or in the words of “Watashitachi no nozomu mono wa,” another song by Okabayashi, “What we wish for / isn’t ‘us for the sake of society.’ / What we wish for / is ‘society for the sake of us.’” (Watashitachi no nozomu mono wa / shakai no tame no watashi de wa naku / watashitachi no nozomu mono wa / watashitachi no tame no shakai na no da.) This meant not only a reform of Japanese government policy, but also a reconfiguration of Japan’s relationship with the United States, which the students felt was embodied in Ampo. For protest folk singers, the wasei philosophy applied not just to their music, but to their hopes for society.

In contrast to protest folk stood the genre of enka, which could be loosely defined as “Japanese country western” in its frequently pessimistic subject matter. Enka was born out of similar feelings of alienation from society at large, but rather than being the voice of student dissent, it was an expression of emotional isolation by Japanese in middle-age or older. Ironically, however, enka also has its roots in protest movements. The IASPM states, “The word enka originated during the people’s freedom movement of the 1880s as the name of a kind of protest song.” (International Association for the Study of Popular Music 1991, 12) After a lull in popularity during the first half of the twentieth century, the modern form of enka “came into use in the latter half of the 1960s… in reaction to Japanese pop, and perhaps also as a reaction to the wider Western presence in popular culture.” (Stevens 2008, 45) Though it shared foundational roots with protest folk music – one could even reasonably consider it to be the protest folk of Meiji Japan – enka would come to represent a completely different view of Japan and its people than folk music.

Socially, enka is completely different from folk music. Unlike the often solo artists of the folk music world, enka music is the product of group collaboration at every level, to the point that singers become essentially interchangeable. Songs are written and performed following kata (patterns) which Yano describes as being used so that “a 1993 hit is… easily mistaken for a 1953 one, and for the duration of the song, the forty-year gap is neatly erased.” (Yano 2002, 3) The purpose of this erasure is to bind together in extratemporal solidarity the listeners and performers and to make them as timeless as their conception of “authentic” Japan. Within enka is another path for Japanese identity, separate from that of folk music. It is a perpetual Japan that has existed unchanged forever, merely being superficially covered up by the progression of urbanization. For those that listened to it in the 1960s, the proper way forward for Japanese society was actually to go backward, back to a morally “purer” time of tradition.

Although enka music calls for a return to a more traditional time in Japanese history, i.e. before the U.S. Occupation following World War II, it uses primarily western instrumentation to create its sound. Enka performances are accompanied by “some combination of guitar, violin, mandolin, saxophone, clarinet, oboe, and accordion,” with only occasional additions of Japanese instruments “to impart a traditional Japanese ‘flavor’ to the music.” (Yano 2002, 103) But even though these additions are infrequent, the “flavor” they create is the part of the music that becomes most important to its creation of tradition.

In production, as well, enka represents an entirely different school of thought from folk music. Yano describes the enka industry as one defined by metaphors of “perseverance, effort, spirit, repetition, and rank.” (Yano 2002, 45) Through its hierarchical production system in which deference must be paid to one’s seniors in the industry, regardless of relative success, enka becomes an example in practice of the values in its songs. As a genre, it is seen as the underdog persevering in competition with “the showy, facile, heavily western-influenced ‘pops’ whose popularity looms large.” (Yano 1997, 117) The genre itself becomes metaphorical for the perseverance of the old way of Japanese life, and those that listen to and produce it are positioned as “the vanguard of Japanese tradition, both culturally and psychologically.” (Stevens 2008, 45) These fans are not just stewards of a genre, but of Japanese culture itself. Through concert attendance, record sales, and fan club memberships, they are contributing to the perpetuation of Japanese culture in the midst of the westernization that took place during and after the Occupation. Their ideas of what Japan should be in the future were contained not just in the lyrics of enka, but in its very structure as an industry.

For its listeners, enka’s strength as a cultural pillar lies in the collective solidarity it encourages. “The enticement of enka,” says Christine Yano, “is that it suggests a forum for collective nostalgia, which actively appropriates and shapes the past, thereby binding the group [i.e. listeners] together.” (Yano 2002, 15) The shape that that past takes, specifically, is that of the furusato, which is directly translated as “old village,” but which carries meaning much greater than such a simple translation can convey. Enka songs contain images of fishing towns on the outskirts of Japan, villages set amongst rice paddies, and other rural cultural signifiers that, to those who consume them, define “Japan.” Furusato is a shared nostalgia, the simple life of rural Japan from which listeners of enka all imagine they come, and to which they all can return through music.

But just as important as furusato’s universality to its listeners is its distance, for it is in this distance that it becomes desirable. Yano writes that although enka offers to erase the distance between its listeners and their mythical homesteads, “the erasure of distance threatens the very need for desire.” (Yano 2002, 16) This distance is more than simply geographical or temporal, however; it is metaphorical and even spiritual. For as Robertson states, “with the rapid urbanization of the countryside since the postwar period, the Japanese ‘can’t go home again.’” (Robertson 1988, 497) With no referent, the nostalgia for furusato is at risk of fading into historical memory and disappearing. How, then, is enka able to sustain itself? As a genre whose subject matter is by definition illusory, how does enka continue to thrive on images of the furusato?

The answer lies in the rhetorical process of furusato-zukuri (furusato-making). This is an active process present in enka as well as many other institutions that seek to capitalize on the nostalgia for “Japan.” Robertson describes it as being motivated by “nostalgia for a sense of nostalgia” which is created through “a diffuse sense of homelessness” brought about by the loss of the same traditional rural villages that would later be appropriated by the rhetorical device of the furusato. (Robertson 1988, 497) In enka, furusato-making is accomplished by keeping the discursive distance between the modern listener and the traditional subject just small enough that it seems to be just around the proverbial corner. While the most common word found by Yano in enka lyrics was “yume” (“dream”), the third was “anata” (“you”). (Yano 2002, 94) From this, it can be inferred that the lyrics are often addressed directly to the listener, creating a personal identification with the furusato described in the lyrics. Furthermore, this “old village” is described as something that waits for the listener in their dreams (yume), giving it an exoticized immediacy: it is at once close at hand and far away. Though the listeners may not be able to inhabit the furusato physically, they need only to go to sleep to find it.

As could be expected, enka’s audience is no more representative of the figures in its songs than their urban lifestyles are of its furusato imagery. “The characters that inhabit the enka world – bar hostesses, gangsters (yakuza), sailors – are today marginalized.” (Yano 2002, 15) In addition to the socially marginalized characters mentioned by Yano are the geographically marginal figures of the rice farmer or the fisherman. These characters in turn often end up – thanks to the “diffuse homelessness” endemic to urbanization as mentioned above – as migrants to urban centers, pining for their country homes and working low-paying, physically strenuous jobs.

These subjects, however, are the same kind of blue-collar laborers seen in the rhetoric of the student radicals and their socialist protests. In fact, based on lyrics alone, it would be very difficult for most to tell whether folk singer Okabayashi Nobuyasu’s song “Sanya Blues” is of the folk or enka genre:

Kyō no shigoto wa tsurakatta Today’s work was painful

Ato wa shōchū wo aoru dake Afterwards, I’ll just gulp down some liquor

Dōse dōse San’ya no doya zumai In any case, I’ll live in the flophouses of San’ya

Hoka ni yaru koto arya shinai There’s nothing else to do

Hitori sakaba de nomu sake ni I miss the past I can’t return to

Kaeranu mukashi wa natsukashii that I see in the sake I drink alone at a bar

Naite naite mitatte nan ni naru I start to cry and cry, what will become of me?

Ima ja San’ya ga furusato yo For now, San’ya is my home

The tale it tells of a rural migrant to Tokyo doing construction work – likely as a day-laborer without permanent employment – is very similar to most tales of urban isolation found in enka.

The key difference between the two genres is represented in the line “I miss the past I can’t return to that I see in the sake I drink alone at a bar.” According to Stevens, “Other kayōkyoku [popular music] artists such as the Crazy Cats too poked jest at the new urban lifestyle, but returning to the countryside was never an option for them; in contrast, enka singers sang of an idealized Japanese rural life that was always waiting for them.” (Stevens 2008, 45) This is a very interesting statement when taken with Robertson’s concept of furusato-zukuri, as described above. Whereas folk singers sing for a working class forever robbed of its rural past – the past they see only in their sake cups – enka singers assert that such a past still exists, even if only in enka music. By doing so, enka music in effect states that such a “Japan” is real: an imaginary place that exists truly in the enka community’s collective emotional life. As a result, the values of this past become a lived present, and the “Japan” proposed by enka suddenly takes on the appearance of a community-wide furusato. As a way forward for society, enka proposes an ideological furusato-zukuri that would create a nationwide furusato, or Furusato Japan, to borrow Robertson’s term. With twentieth century mass communications technology, furusato no longer need be a small mountain hamlet; instead, it can be disseminated across all of Japan, becoming a shared emotional space among all Japanese that is mediated by the institution of enka.

It comes as no surprise, then, that enka today “has the reputation of a genre which appeals to blue-collar more than white-collar workers, to rural-dwellers more than urbanites.” (Yano 1997, 116) It would seem that the rural laborers over whom folk and enka battled for representation chose to listen to music that positions them at the forefront of national furusato-zukuri, rather than as being at the mercy of an exploitative capitalist government. As a result, enka has continued on in varying degrees of popularity to the present, whereas folk music in the form that it took in the late ‘60s has largely faded from Japanese popular music. To be sure, both genres proposed visions of Japanese society that would require large-scale social change, but the more conservative enka, which held that “Japan” was already present within the hearts of its people, proved more attractive to the blue-collar audience whose old-fashioned values it extolled.

Conclusion

The onset of 1970 in many ways signaled the end of the protest folk movement and the student protest movement in general. The passage of a University Control Law in July of the previous year placed increased pressure on universities to end campus conflict quickly by giving the government the option to take control of persistently disrupted schools. By mid-1970, student radicals had largely been quelled. (Steinhoff 1999, 6) In the following decade, Japan would witness the “ideological conversion” of the student radicals, who would give up their dissident views and even try to hide that they ever had them in order to succeed in careers in the very capitalist system they had decried. (Krauss 1974) In the face of strengthening government crackdowns and the prospect of losing their chance at a profitable career, many protestors gave up.

Along with the student movement went the protest folk genre, which began to be viewed as overly polemical and, moreover, out-of-touch with the working-class subjects it sought to represent. Later popular music would take a more optimistic view of what Japan was at present, with bands like Happy End, which was formed by the members of folk singer Okabayashi Nobuyasu’s backup band, consciously rejecting the messages of their predecessors’ music. (Bourdaghs 2005, 122) These bands viewed Japan as fully capable of standing in parity with the United States, in contrast to folk singers’ implicit assumptions that Japan held an inferior position after the occupation. It could even be argued that they made these claims in a more “Japanese” manner; for while folk singers drew heavily on American influence (even singing translated versions of songs by artists like Bob Dylan), Stevens describes a “growing trend in popular music” that took place over the latter half of the twentieth century, one in which musicians moved “from the West… to Japan as the source of inspiration of J-pop and rock” and eventually “defined itself as self referential, its own ‘source of tradition.’” (Stevens 2008, 61) In a debate about Japanese identity which relied to a large degree on appropriating images of “tradition,” this was an important transition for popular music to make if it hoped to gain legitimacy.

The debate over the Japanese identity in the years following the end of the Allied Occupation was obviously one of critical importance if Japan was to move ahead as an independent, self-sufficient country. In the context of essentially one-party rule by the reigning Liberal Democrats, however, it would not be a debate that was carried out in government. Rather, it was waged by the Japanese people themselves, partly through the medium of popular music. The two “camps” that emerged were divided largely along generational lines, with the student protestors at Japanese universities promoting a Socialist image of Japan through folk music and middle-aged Japanese producing and listening to enka as a way of recreating their idea of Japanese traditional life. The artists operating in these genres reproduced and reinforced the images of Japan held by their listeners, at once shaping and shaped by their discourses.

Interestingly, folk and enka performers used similar methods to promote their view of Japan. Both genres attempted to appeal to the working classes of Japanese society. These were the rural laborers – many of whom moved to the cities to find industrial work – that appeared so frequently in the lyrics of singers at the time. Imagery of these workers was manufactured and performed by singers, highlighting either the ways in which the government took advantage of the workers, as in the folk songs of the students, or their longing for their furusato to emphasize the cultural “purity” of pre-modern Japan in enka. Eventually, it was to be enka that found more lasting traction with the Japanese people, and protest folk had faded by the end of the decade.

The political implications of the Japanese people’s choice would be played out over the remainder of the twentieth century. Japan’s politics were markedly conservative in nature, leading to a stalling government when the economic bubble that had built throughout the ‘70s and ‘80s burst in the mid-90s. The forms of popular music that would arise in these decades, chief among them the genre of “idol pop,” were similarly conservative in their contents and, moreover, largely non-political. The 21st century, however, has been marked by a proliferation of non-mainstream musical forms. While these “indie” genres can trace their roots to the 1980s, it was not until the turn of the millennium that independent artists and labels began to multiply, perhaps due to the lowered cost of publicity afforded by the Internet. (Stevens 2008, 58-59) Whether this is indicative of a changing political climate is yet unclear, but it is undeniable that popular music – far from being a politically toothless, purely commercial form – is often highly ideologically charged, and capable of galvanizing an entire generation.

References

Beer, Lawrence W. “Japan, 1969: ‘My Homeism’ and Political Struggle.” Asian Survey 10, no. 1 (January 1970): 43-55.

Bourdaghs, Michael. “What it Sounds Like to Lose an Empire: Happy End and the Kinks.” In Perspectives on Social Memory in Japan, edited by Yun Hui Tsu, Jan Van Bremen and Eyal Ben-Ari, 115-133. Kent: Global Oriental, 2005.

Goodman, Roger. “Sayonara America, Sayonara Nippon: Part Two (Kansai Folk and Japanese Rock).” Something America. December 14, 2010. http://www.somethingamerica.us/blog/?p=417 (accessed March 8, 2011).

International Association for the Study of Popular Music. A Guide to Popular Music in Japan. Monograph, Takarazuka: International Association for the Study of Popular Music, 1991.

Krauss, Ellis S. Japanese Radicals Revisited: Student Protests in Postwar Japan. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974.

Robertson, Jennifer. “Furusato Japan: The Culture and Politics of Nostalgia.” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 1, no. 4 (1988): 494-518.

Steinhoff, Patricia G. “Student Protests in the 1960s.” Social Science Japan 15, 1999: 3-6.

Stevens, Carolyn S. Japanese Popular Music: Culture, Authenticity, and Power. New York: Routledge, 2008.

Tsurumi, Kazuko. “Some Comments on the Japanese Student Movements in the Sixties.” Journal of Contemporary History 5, no. 1 (1970): 104-112.

Tsurumi, Kazuko. Student Movements in 1960 and 1969: Continuity and Change. Monograph, Tokyo: Sophia University, 1970.

Yano, Christine R. “Inventing Selves: Images and Image Making in a Japanese Popular Music Genre.” Journal of Popular Culture 31, no. 2 (1997): 115-129.

—. Tears of Longing: Nostalgia and the Nation in Japanese Popular Song. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002.

Mai homu shugi, or “my homeism,” is a Japanese linguistic phenomenon that originated in late-1960s Tokyo. It served to increase the acceptance of the notion that personal ownership and individualism need not necessarily be viewed in a negative light, and stressed the importance of the nuclear family unit as Tokyo began to expand and grow as a modern metropolis.

As Henry D. Smith II discussed at length in “Tokyo as an Idea,” Tokyo underwent numerous changes during the post-Edo period, and amidst rapid industrialization and a huge population increase, the interpersonal relationships that existed between its constituents were also subject to modification. Perhaps spawned from the pre-war perception of Tokyo as “a problem,” “escapism,” and “corruption and change” by non-urbanists and those from the countryside, post-war Tokyoites found strength in following Western influence in the late 1960s by making all concerns of the non-immediate family periphery, and focusing on that which is of one’s direct family’s concern. The phrase mai homu was coined in reference to one’s own home and the family members of which it is made, which began trending after a boom in housing purchases due to a widespread increase in income.

This article will explore how mai homu shugi, “my homeism,” both expressed and shaped the restructuring of Tokyo family life in the late 1960s. While this paper cannot delve so deep into the larger economic, political and social effects of mai homu shugi as to disambiguate its correlation with contemporary issues in Japanese society, it will serve to shed light on its complexity as a linguistic phenomenon and address its key role in the reshaping of Tokyo families as a smaller, nuclear unit. Like Andrew Kipnis in his examination of the Chinese word suzhi, my exploration of “my homeism” will discuss its linguistic properties, the contexts in which it arose, and its impact on the social underpinnings of Tokyo family life at the time.

Syntactically speaking, the American English-language phrase “my home” was incorporated into the Japanese lexicon as two lexically separate entities: the first person possessive “my,” which remains unchanged in all contexts, and a given noun-phrase unit, most commonly, “home.” These two lexical entries retain their English-language syntactic properties as possessive phrasal units such as “my home,” and “my car” as they were inserted smoothly into the Japanese grammar. In short, the English syntactic properties remain such that these possessive phrases are never bifurcated (i.e. the Japanese possessive particle is not inserted between the possessor “my” and the object, “home”), function together as a normal Japanese- language subject and object, take the proper subject and object marking particles, and can be generated in perfectly grammatical Japanese sentences. As seen in the application of the “my” possessor to other English-language nouns that have been incorporated into the Japanese lexicon such as “pace” and “iPod,” constructions such as mai pesu “my pace,” and mai aipoddo “my iPod” can be generated. Here, we see the English-language possessor “my” function morphologically as an affix to these borrowed nouns, “home,” “pace,” and “iPod,” such that it has the same possessive meaning constructed as watashi no ie (lit. “my home”), watashi no mama de (lit. “by my way”) and watashi no aipoddo (lit. “my iPod”) in Japanese. Semantically, however, by using the phrase mai homu, which was imported into the Japanese grammar by way of English-language contact, the connotation of possession, selfishness and western-ness can be felt.

As we have seen above, the incorporation of this English-language phrase into the Japanese grammar is a very intimate, fluid merger of two syntactic and morphological systems. This intimate form of language change by way of language contact was most likely viewed by some in the late 1960s as an unwelcome change in attitude among what used to be a very socially closed Japan. However, it is this penetrating use of language that served to illustrate and influence the changes occurring within the Tokyo family structure at the end of the 1960s. Geographically, mai homu shugi was born in the incredibly dense population of the metropolis, Tokyo. While some may argue that due to other cities such as Nagasaki and Kobe having ports that would allow for more English-language contact by way of trade, because the majority of people immigrating from the countryside to the city moved to the capital, Tokyo, and the majority of Japanese-American politics and relations was conducted in Tokyo during the Korean War, it makes sense for Japanese-American culture contact to have occurred at the largest level in Tokyo over all other Japanese cities. As shown at length in Morris-Suzuki’s “The Invention and Reinvention of “Japanese Culture,”” we can see that culture contact is largely the cause for societal changes. This could shed light on how incorporating an English-language phrase such as mai homu into the Japanese grammar served to describe the changes occurring within the typical Tokyo family in the late 1960s. The population density of Tokyo supports the notion that mai homu shugi was able to spread quickly as a new linguistic construct in Japanese, and it characterized the growing trend of Tokyo families focusing on its immediate members who lived in the household.

The tendency for Tokyo families to focus their attention on the concerns of their direct family members in their household spawned from the economic boom in the 1950s and rise in income in the 1960s, whereby Tokyo residents who could afford to purchase their own living space increased in number. This monetary affluence and the subsequent purchases of residences allowed for the sense of possession to be promulgated throughout Tokyo society as a new norm. From this personalized view of one’s life at home, whereby buyers could feel a sense of ownership in their household and its constituents, the notion of making periphery all other issues that were not the concern of one’s immediate family began to take root. As this trend began to grow, the phrasal incorporation of mai homu into the Japanese grammar gave a sense of reality to the societal change; it expressed the foreignness of the concept of the nuclear family, and solidified the notion as a tangible, increasingly popular way of thinking. In that way, mai homu shugi both demonstrated the changes taking place in the Tokyo family and influenced the popularization of the nuclear family among Tokyo households.

From a sociolinguistic standpoint, mai homu shugi served to normalize the concept of possession in Japanese culture, beginning with the Tokyo family unit by way of possessive speech. It underscored the foreign quality of possession with respect to Japanese culture at the time, and was perhaps coined for the sake of reflecting the restructuring of Tokyo families at large. The use of mai homu in speech both reflected this change and promulgated the concept to other Tokyo constituents at the same time. In effect of choosing to use mai homu rather than speaking indirectly, Tokyo constituents were able to make the phrase popular, not only as a fresh, new expression of a change in Tokyo family life, but as a challenge to the social norms of the Tokyo family during the prewar and wartime eras.

It is by examining mai homu shugi from its sociolinguistic impact on discourse involving Tokyo family lifestyle that we can observe how the phrase mai homu both expressed and shaped the trend of making Tokyo families focused on their immediate members. While it is certainly true that the phrase itself did not cause the trend to start, it helped to establish the social change as a new, valid component to the Tokyo family lifestyle, and allowed the concept to reach a multitude of residents living in Tokyo as it began to take root in family culture during the late 1960s. By a given interlocutor’s decision to use the phrase mai homu, he effectively described the phenomenon taking place at the time as well as introduced it to his fellow interlocutor, thereby propagating the idea of the Tokyo nuclear family. In this way, mai homu shugi both expressed and shaped this trend among Tokyo families in the late 1960s.

While mai homu shugi certainly reflects the trend of how Tokyo families became nuclear units, as well as normalized the foreignness of possession and the nuclear family in the late 1960s, it cannot be said that the phrase itself caused this phenomenon to occur. As seen above, it was a combination of Japanese-American culture contact and the boom in housing purchases after the economic upturn of the 1950s that pushed Tokyo constituents to focus on those things that were of one’s immediate family’s concern. It can definitely be said, however, that the phrase mai homu served to establish the existence of the growing trend for Tokyo families to focus inward, and allowed the concept to reach a multitude of Tokyo constituents as they began to approach the cusp of social change in Tokyo family life in the late 1960s. In contemporary Tokyo, the use of the phrase mai homu is certainly less foreign than it was 40 years ago, and naturally, the connotations of foreignness and deviance are not as strong as they once were. However, the phrase is still associated with a certain amount of western-ness, emphasizes the notion of possession with respect to one’s household, and continues to reflect the concept of a nuclear Tokyo family. As mentioned earlier in this article, the mai affixation phenomenon has taken to other imported English-language words such as “car” and “iPod,” and they continue to be used among Japanese today. However, more fieldwork and research is needed to explore the connotations of the application of the mai affix to other imported English language words in contemporary Japanese discourse.

References

Allen, G.C. 1958. Japan’ s Economic Recovery. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Beer, Lawrence W. 1970. Japan, 1969: “My Homeism” and Political Struggle. Asian Survey 10: 43-55.

Buckley, Sandra, ed. 2002. Encyclopedia of Contemporary Japanese Culture. New York:Routledge.

Fraser, Angus M. 1970. “The Political Viability of the US Base System in Asia after a Vietnam Settlement.” Thesis. Arlington, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, International and Social Studies Division.

Goffman, Erving. 1961. Encounters: Two Studies in the Sociology of Interaction. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.

Gordon, Andrew. 2009. A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press.

Gumperz, J. J. 1982. Discourse Strategies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kipnis, Andrew. 2006. Suzhi: a Keyword Approach. The China Quarterly 186: 295-313.

Lincoln, James R., and Arne L. Kalleberg. 1990. Culture, Control and Commitment: A Study of Work Organization and Attitudes in the United States and Japan. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Linhart, Sepp. 1988. From Industrial to Postindustrial Society: Changes in Japanese Leisure-Related Values and Behavior. Journal of Japanese Studies 14: 271-307.

Morris-Suzuki, Tessa. 1995. The Invention and Reinvention of “Japanese Culture.” The Journal of Asian Studies 54, no 3: 759-780.

Nippon: Japan Since 1945. 1990. Performed by Jack Perkins. A&E Premiers. Videocassette.

Saeed, John I. 2009. Semantics. 3rd ed. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.

Skelton, Tracey, and Tim Allen. 2000. Culture and Global Change. London: Routledge.

Smith, John D. III. 1978. Tokyo as an Idea: an Exploration of Japanese Urban Thought until 1945. Journal of Japanese Studies 4: 45-80.

Spencer, Andrew, and Arnold M. Zwicky, ed. 2001. The Handbook of Morphology. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.

Ussishkin, Adam, and Andrew Wedel. 2002. Neighborhood Density and the Root-Affix Distinction. Proceedings of NELS 32 1: 1-12.

Introduction and Strategic Context

“China’s interest in a peaceful and stable environment that will support the country’s developmental goals is difficult to reconcile with new military capabilities that appear designed to challenge U.S. freedom of activity in the region and, if necessary, enforce China’s influence over its neighbors, including our regional allies and partners.”

Adm. Robert Willard, chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, 13 January 2010

A successful bilateral strategic relationship between the United States and China is widely regarded inside the national security communities of both countries as key to maintaining a peaceful and prosperous international system in the twenty-first Century. Whether one thinks about nuclear proliferation, piracy and freedom of the seas, climate change, or international financial stability, there will be very few global problems that can be tackled effectively without the cooperation of these two great military and economic powers. Therefore, an escalation of tensions between the two countries, particularly when military issues are involved, is often a source of concern for American and Chinese strategists alike. In recent months, Washington media outlets reported that there is a growing anxiety amongst American government analysts regarding China’s “defiant” and “strident” tone in its recent dealings with Western governments. In this environment of a perceived worsening of relations between the two countries, remarks about China’s growing military power, such as the comment made recently by Adm. Robert Willard, can have an inflammatory impact and contribute to increased suspicions and tensions between the two governments. If the Obama administration wants to continue to develop a constructive ‘grand strategic’ relationship with China, it will have to incorporate in its policy framework a more coherent and explicit response to Beijing’s military build-up.

Despite a general acceptance of the notion that the United States and China are mutually interdependent financially, and therefore a war between the two is extremely unlikely, there is nevertheless a vocal debate going on among Washington national security analysts on how the United States should respond to China’s continuing increase in the kinds of military capabilities that some analysts argue is meant to counter US influence and freedom of action in the region. At a strategic level, the Obama administration could respond to China’s military build-up by pursuing two different strategies: one option would aim to contain China’s expanding military influence by increasing the US military presence in the region and working with its allies to restrain China’s growing power, while another option would aim to engage the Chinese in a constructive dialogue and hope to integrate their emerging capabilities into a larger effort to address common interests such as fighting piracy, preventing nuclear proliferation, or maintaining peace and stability in the East Asian littoral region. Whether one chooses one or the other depends on how one judges a series of factors such as China’s medium and long-term strategic intentions, the extent to which their current capabilities pose a real military threat to US regional interests, and the ability (and desirability) of the United States to invest the material resources necessary to maintain the current balance of power in the region.

There are several aspects of the Chinese military build-up that are worrying American defense analysts inside and outside the government. The most traditional concern has been the so-called “Taiwan Scenario”: in a hypothetical conflict over the island, China’s modern military systems could deny access to US Navy carrier groups in the region and thus prevent the United States from intervening to defend Taiwan. A second issue that has garnered a lot of recent attention has been that of China’s development of high-end asymmetric strategies and tactics, so-called shashoujian, or “assassin’s mace.” According to Andrew Krepinevich, “shashoujian forces can be expected to engage in attacks to disrupt and/or destroy US battle networks, to include cyber attacks and the use of Anti-Satellite weapons.” The third aspect of the build-up is China’s sustained investment in maritime capabilities, both submarines and blue-water surface ships. In many ways, the debate over how to deal with China’s increasing maritime capabilities is a microcosm of the larger grand strategic debate on how to accommodate China’s rise, and therefore it is this naval component of the Chinese military expansion that will be the topic of this article.

The Pessimist View of China’s Naval Build-up and the Containment Policy Option

For realist scholars of world politics who believe in the zero-sum nature of world power politics, China’s continuing increase in military power and influence in the region will eventually come at the expense of American geopolitical interests. As MIT’s Thomas Cristensen explains in International Security:

“The debate about China as a peer competitor revolves around simple realist notions of how international politics work: Power is what matters; and what matters in power is one’s relative capabilities compared with those of others, especially other great powers. For the pessimists, the Chinese military of the twenty-first century is replacing the Soviet military of the pre-Gorbachev years and the Japanese economy of the 1970s as the next big purported threat to American global leadership.”

Even though China’s military power is in relative terms far behind that of the United States, Cristensen argues that “…with certain new equipment and certain strategies, China can pose major problems for American security interests, and especially for Taiwan, without the slightest pretense of catching up with the United States by an overall measure of national military power or technology.” Similar to the reasoning underlying the “assassin’s mace” concept popularized by Krepinevich, Cristensen worries that the Chinese investment in sophisticated asymmetric weapon systems that could allow them to deny access in the vicinity of China’s coast to the qualitatively superior US Navy warships.

For the proponents of this “pessimistic” school of thought, the People Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) weapons procurement programs in recent decades, as well as PLAN’s new operational doctrines, are a great source of concern. China’s sustained purchases of attack submarines has been regarded by these analysts as indicative of an aggressive intent to “push” the US Pacific Fleet further away from the East Asian littoral. MIT professor Taylor Fravel noted in an extensive study of China’s military development that “Since 1995, China has commissioned 28 new submarines, including 12 advanced Kilo-class Russian vessels as well as several classes of domestically developed diesel and nuclear- powered attack boats.” Krepinevich warns that these modern Kilo-class submarines could pose a deadly threats to US Navy carrier strike forces operating in the region: “The Kilos are armed with advanced wake-homing and wire-guided torpedoes of Russian design…The eight newer Kilo SSK are armed with the highly capable Russian-designed Klub ASCM (Anti-Ship Cruise Missile) Sizzler. The Sizzler’s attack profile is specifically designed to defeat the US Aegis anti-air warfare system, penetrate a task force’s defenses, and strike high-value surface warships, to include carriers.” Chinese naval analysts often openly admit that even though they will not be able to build a carrier strike force similar to the US Navy’s anytime soon, the use of fast attack submarines could allow them to accomplish their strategic objective of sea denial at a much lesser cost. To sum up this argument, the “China hawks” argue that the procurement program of the PLAN betrays a clear desire to reduce the ability of the US Navy to operate in the East Asian theater, and that the PLAN will soon be coming dangerously close to accomplishing that goal.

In addition to the short-term concern about “sea denial”, there is also a longer-term aspect of the Chinese naval build-up that worries the “pessimists.” In recent years, the PLAN appears to have taken important initial steps to develop a blue water “Mahanian” maritime capability meant to accompany China’s rise to ‘superpower’ status and protect its rapidly expanding commercial interests. The acquisition of nuclear-power submarines and of advanced surface combatants are regarded as signs of China’s long-term ambitions to expand the mission of their fleet beyond sea denial and control of their nearby littoral areas. Professors James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara have documented how the theories of sea power advocated by Alfred Thayer Mahan have a strong influence on how Chinese strategists perceive the present and future roles of the PLAN in China’s grand strategy. After examining a large amount of Chinese documents and research papers dealing with this topic, the two authors uncovered some worrisome trends in how at least some Chinese strategists think about missions of the PLAN in the 21st century. Some passages from Holmes and Yoshihara’s study are worth quoting at length below, as they offer a valuable perspective into modern Chinese naval doctrine:

“Mahan’s appeal to economics resonates powerfully in today’s China, which is at once preoccupied with economic development and increasingly reliant on seaborne commerce for oil and other commodities. So does his call for a powerful navy— suggesting that China’s maritime strategy will take on an increasingly military hue… In Zhongguo Junshi Kexue { the influential journal of the PLA Academy of Military Science and the China Military Science Association}, a senior officer used Mahan to justify China’s control of communications, especially the “strategic passages” which goods and materials had to traverse… The author cited Mahan’s dictum that economic prosperity hinged on the deployment of naval forces at strategic locations… ‘It is extremely risky for a major power such as China to become overly dependent on foreign import without adequate protection’.”

While the potential threat to US interests from a Chinese blue-water navy is significantly less clear (at least in the short- to medium term) than in the case of the PLAN’s sea denial capabilities, the advocates of the “pessimistic” school of thought nevertheless argue that the United States needs to take this long-term challenge seriously and consequently increase its investment in naval forces to maintain its advantage over China’s navy in the long run.

If one accepts the analysis of the proponents of the “pessimistic” school of thought regarding the offensive nature of the Chinese naval build-up, and of its potential to harm US interests, how do they suggest that the United States should address this problem? The set of policies proposed by these analysts could best be described as a muscular, Reaganite version of containment. They emphasize the need to engage in a sustained US military build-up of naval and air forces designed to counter China’s emerging asymmetric capabilities, and to strengthen our alliances in the region. One of the most vocal advocates of these policies, Princeton professor and former Bush administration official Aaron Friedberg, writes in gloomy terms about the consequences of failing to adopt such counter-measures to China’s build-up:

“America’s influence in and access to Asia will be drastically reduced, with harmful long-term consequences for its security, prosperity and ability to promote the spread of liberal democracy, if it is seen to be in long-term decline relative to China or, even worse, if it appears irresolute, incompetent, unwilling or simply unable to fulfill its commitments… If it wants to reassure its strategic partners and bolster deterrence, Washington must find ways to counter China’s evolving anti-access capabilities. If it does not, America’s long-standing military dominance in East Asia will quickly disappear.”

Friedberg and other members of this school of thought are skeptical of potential opportunities for cooperation with authoritarian China, and instead emphasize the opportunity to “balance” against China’s rising power by deepening the US alliance relations with fellow regional democracies such as India, Japan and Taiwan.

The “Optimistic View” of China’s Naval Build-up and the Engagement Policy Option

At the core of the “optimistic view” of China’s development of maritime capability is not so much a rosy view of Beijing’s present and future intentions, as a belief that China’s naval capabilities, at least in the medium term, cannot pose a significant threat to US regional security or strategic interests. On the contrary, some of China’s emerging capabilities could serve the common interests of both countries to the extent that PLAN and the US Navy could find ways to work together to address shared challenges such as piracy, humanitarian crises caused by natural disasters, or the proliferation of WMD materials. Therefore, rather than hyping the potential threat from China and adopting counter-measures that worsen the “security dilemma” between the two countries, US leaders should follow a policy of engagement that promotes increased cooperation between the two militaries.

The first important area of disagreement between the “pessimist school” and the “optimist school” is the extent to which China’s recent build-up could really threaten the US Navy’s operations in the East Asian littoral. Contrary to the opinion of Aaron Friedberg and others, Boston College professor Robert Ross argues that:

“America’s vital security interests, including in East Asia, are all in the maritime regions. With superior maritime power, the United States can not only dominate regional sea-lanes but also guarantee a favorable balance of power that prevents the emergence of a regional hegemon. And despite China’s military advances and its challenge to America’s ability to project its power in the region, the United States can be confident in its ability to retain maritime dominance well into the twenty-first century.”

For example, Ross contends that even though China indeed purchased a number of quiet Kilo-class diesel submarines in recent years, the US Navy in turn constantly increased its capability to accurately track Chinese submarines. Moreover, the electronic-warfare capabilities of US carrier strike forces could seriously hamper PLAN’s command-and-control and intelligence collection systems during any potential conflict. Regarding China’s blue-water “Mahanian” ambitions, even if the PLAN were successful in its long-term quest to build an aircraft carrier, this would still pose almost no threat to the United States in a crisis due to the likely vulnerability of such a carrier to advanced US anti-ship missiles. Ross’s military assessment of the limited potential of PLAN to challenge the US Navy is not unique. In his study “Bear Facts and Dragon Boats: Rethinking the Modernization of Chinese Naval Power,” Marshall Beier stated that the “PLAN’s comprehensive submarine procurement efforts are most appropriately characterized as necessary modernization of the sort to be expected of any major navy and not as anything akin to an ominous ‘build up’.” Similarly, regarding China’s emerging blue water capabilities, he is far less worried than the analysts from the pessimist school: “Despite the PLAN’s modernization program and the adoption of an ‘offshore’ defensive posture, China is nowhere near about to acquiring a ‘blue water’ capability in the (neo)Mahanian sense of projecting power or securing control of the sea.”

A second relevant point of contention between the China “pessimists” and “optimists” refers to how much stock one should put in the doctrinal and strategic pronouncements that come out of the PLAN. While “pessimists” often quote some of the most hawkish Chinese officials, the “optimists” make the point that one should take the more belligerent declarations with a grain of salt because they may reflect the influence of domestic politics or parochial interests rather than a purely strategic decision that would guide future policies. A recent International Security article documents how Chinese “naval nationalism” influences the thinking of important groups both within the PLAN and also within the Chinese government elite more broadly. Moreover, the “pragmatic” wing of the Chinese elites who argue that the cost of a truly blue water navy would be prohibitive given China’s many other national priorities, and that moreover China’s soft power and its peaceful rise image in the region would be hurt by such a build-up. Ross worries that the more bombastic pronouncements of the PLAN hardliners could be used by American adherents of a more belligerent policy towards China to justify a US counter-build-up and more generally a policy of containment. As he puts it, even though China’s naval nationalism will not challenge US maritime security, “U.S.-China naval competition has the potential to politicize the full agenda of U.S.-China relations and challenge cooperation on a wide range of issues, including cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation on the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan issue, bilateral economic issues, and human rights.”

A third way in which the “optimist” and the “pessimist” schools differ is on how much potential for cooperation exists between the PLAN and the US Navy (and other regional powers) in addressing certain global problems. Perhaps not too surprisingly, Chinese scholars and academics portray Chinese maritime policy in a way that emphasizes its “soft power” aspects rather than the hard power ones discussed by some PLAN officials. Professor Mingjiang Li, for example, who is one of the main proponents of the less military-focused view of China’s maritime role in East Asia, argues that the focus of the PLA has broadened in recent years from merely addressing immediate security threats to engaging in a broader range of missions such as non-proliferation, peace-keeping, disaster relief, and military cooperation exercises and with other regional partners. Li concludes that, given Beijing’s desire to maintain a peaceful international environment that would allow it to focus on domestic development, the PLAN’s activities will be part of this broader grand strategy of “proactive engagement.” Therefore, he argues, the opportunities for cooperation between the PLAN and the US Navy are more significant than some in Washington realize.

The “optimist” school favors a policy of engagement on the part of the United States as well. Jonathan Holslag argues in the pages of Washington Quarterly that China’s increase in military capabilities is only natural given its expanding economic interests, and that this need not necessarily worry the United States. On the contrary, the U.S. should consider China more of a “partner rather than a rival”, recognize the many common threats such as piracy, maintaining the flow of commerce, stabilizing failed states, or non-proliferation, and ultimately explore “options for cooperation” more vigorously. Holslag even goes on to state that: “It is widely recognized that for various economic, diplomatic, and security reasons, the U.S.—China partnership is inevitable. Bringing in the military dimension can make this relationship even more robust and stable.” Therefore, for advocates of engagement, the rationale is not only based on a more positive assessment of China’s current naval capabilities and its intentions, but also on a grand strategic analysis which leads them to conclude that cooperation with Beijing, including in the military realm, is a core component of an effective American grand strategy in the 21st century.

Policy Recommendation: Incremental naval engagement with China

Defense and military policies are an integral part of a country’s overall grand strategy. In the context of Obama’s grand strategy towards China, I believe that a maritime policy of incremental engagement towards the PLAN would best serve the United States national interest at this point in time. My recommended policy of incremental naval engagement incorporates many of the elements of the engagement strategy advocated by the “optimist school” discussed in the previous section of the paper. One important difference of nuance is my emphasis on the incremental nature of the policy. Before the US can fully embrace China’s increasing military role in the region and beyond, Washington must begin with small steps such as confidence-building measures and small-scale military cooperation exercises. If after these steps some of the concerns regarding Chinese capabilities and intentions diminish, then one could move more strongly towards developing a full-scale partnership aimed at addressing the shared challenges cited earlier in the article. However, if the PLAN does not seem interested in working closer together with the US Navy, and if they continue to advance their naval modernization program in a manner that could be judged to realistically imperil US freedom of action in the region, then one must reassess whether the cooperation-oriented naval policy strategy that I’m recommending is the most appropriate one.

Moreover, I believe that devoting more material resources to countering China’s build-up would not only increase the risk of a naval arms race that worsens the security dilemma between the two states, but also imply some trade-offs in the allocation of American defense investments. Specifically, an increase in focus on a potential yet unlikely future conflict in East Asia means devoting less military resources to addressing current conflicts such as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Given that defense spending overall is unlikely to increase in the coming years, such a trade-off is a real concern and it is the reason why Secretary Gates warned the Pentagon planners against “next war-itis”, the exaggerated concern with potential future conventional threats to the detriment of current irregular ones.

Another reason why an incremental engagement strategy is the most appropriate response to China’s naval build-up is that it could lay the foundation for a stable transition in East Asia from an almost unquestioned hegemonic position of the United States, a legacy of World War II, to a power arrangement more reflective of the realities of the twenty-first century. There is no reason why the United States and its regional allies should continue to provide the bulk of international public goods such as maintaining freedom of the seas in the face of piracy attacks or conducting counter-proliferation maritime operations; as China’s economy grows, so do its responsibilities to participate in collective international actions meant to counter threats to international security such as piracy or proliferation of WMDs. Many Chinese strategists understand this, and the United States should adopt a policy aimed at encouraging China to become a “responsible stakeholder” in the realm of maritime power as much as Washington does on other policy arenas such as climate change, trade, or international finance. As Robert Ross showed, there is a current debate inside the PLAN between “naval nationalists” and “naval pragmatists.” The United States should try to support the moderate/pragmatist faction by adopting a policy that encourages stronger partnership in securing the region.

Lastly, in addition to being strategically sound from a geopolitical perspective for the reasons presented above, a policy of cooperation could also be more politically feasible than the alternatives. An aggressive containment policy is likely to generate resistance on the part of the business community which is heavily involved in commercials relations with China, as well as in general on the part of the left-leaning Democratic members of Congress who favor in general relying on engagement and diplomacy rather than military power. On the other hand, a full-fledged cooperation policy may leave Obama vulnerable to criticism from the Republicans and the more “hawkish” or conservative Democrats and thus make it difficult to implement such an approach. As I believe that the most successful foreign policy strategies over the long term usually enjoy a significant amount of bipartisan support, I think an essentially centrist incremental engagement approach is more capable of sustaining such support than either of the two more partisan alternatives.

References

John Pomfret, “Newly powerful China defies Western nations with remarks, policies”, The Washington Post, March 15, 2010

John Pomfret, “China’s strident tone raises concerns among Western governments, analysts”, The Washington Post, January 31, 2010

Rick Maze, “US officials wary of Chinese military buildup”, Army Times, January 13, 2010

Andrew Krepinevich, “Why AirSea Battle”, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington, DC, 2010

Aaron Friedberg, “Here Be Dragons: Is China a Military Threat?”, The National Interest, September-October 2009

Thomas Cristensen, “Posing Problems without Catching Up: China’s Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy”, International Security, vol. 25 no.4 Spring 2001

Taylor Fravel, “China’s Search for Military Power”, The Washington Quarterly, vol. 31 no.3 Summer 2008

James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “The Influence of Mahan upon China’s Maritime Strategy”, Comparative Strategy, no 24, 2005

Robert Ross, “Here Be Dragons: Is China a Military Threat?”, The National Interest, September-October 2009

J. Marshall Beier, “Bear Facts and Dragon Boats: Rethinking the Modernization of Chinese Naval Power,” Contemporary Security Policy, vol.26, no.2

Robert Ross, “China’s Naval Nationalism: Sources, Prospects, and the US response”, International Security, vol.34 no.2 (Fall 2009)

Mingjiang Li, “China and Maritime Cooperation in East Asia: recent developments and future prospects”, Journal of Contemporary China, no.19 (62) March 2010

Jonathan Holslag, “Embracing China’s Global Ambitions”, The Washington Quarterly, July 2009

“Gates: Pentagon must focus on Iraq, not future war”, Associated Press, May 13, 2008, accessed at http://cbs13.com/national/robert.gates.pentagon.2.722676.html

“I used to be endlessly pestered with unsolicited warnings and advice about the dangers of accepting Chinese cooperation. When it became abundantly clear even to the worst detractors of China and the greatest enemiesof African freedom and development that China had no imperialist ambitions in Africa, another question was raised. And the question was: “Why is China, a Third World country, being so correct and so generous in dealing with thepoor?” My answer to this rephrased suspicion of China is “Ask the leaders of the super-rich countries why they areoften so arrogant and so mean in their dealing with the nations of the Third World?”

– Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, first President of the Republic of Tanzania, speech at the Official handing-over Ceremony of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA) toTanzania and Zambia; Kapiri Mposhi, Zambia: 14th July 1976.

Introduction

Tanzania is one of several Africancountries currently experiencing a wave ofChinese migration into and within its territory.According to statistics from the TanzaniaInvestment Centre (TIC), currently,there are approximately three hundred‘investments with Chinese Interest’ in theUnited Republic of Tanzania, which alsocomprises the island of Zanzibar. This datacovers the period 1990 to 2010. In 2006,there were only one hundred and forty. These investments can be found in varioussectors, including health, agriculture, construction,manufacturing, natural resources,transport, service industry, telecommunicationsand tourism. Some investments arejoint-ventures between Chinese-owned andTanzania or other African companies.

The German Colonial Administration

Chinese presence in Tanzania didnot start in 1990. It started during thecolonial period. Four hundred and ninety one Chinese and Indonesian labourers were brought to Tanzania by the German colonial administration to work in the Usambara plantations during the colonial economy’s struggle for labour towards the end of the nineteenth century. According to Illiffe (1979) the results were disastrous therefore Nyamwezi and Sukuma workers began to be recruited in 1895 by European employers. Again in 1906 over one thousand Chinese nationals were brought into Tanzania by the German colonial administration to help construct Tanganyika’s first railway (Liang, 1961).

The Tanzania-Zambia Railway

At the official handing over ceremony of the Chinese-financed Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA), on the 14th of July 1976, Tanzania’s first president, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere gave a speech in the city of Kapiri Mposhi in Zambia. His speech was titled ‘Tazara-From a Caricature of a “Chinese” Railway to “our” Railway’. In it, he said that talk about a railway had been going on for decades. In addition, the first report on the wish for a Tanzania-Zambia Railway had been prepared by the East African Railways and Harbours in 1952. According to Nyerere “Nothing happened. There was more talk and further reports, but no railway”. At this time, Tanzania and many other countries in Africa had not gained independence.

In 1964, shortly after Zambia gained independence, President Kenneth Kaunda announced that the railway linking Tanzania and Zambia would be constructed. Nyerere noted that back then, Tanzania and Zambia were still “suffering from something of a hangover from colonialism” and hence they “sought financial and technical assistance from the wealthy and developed countries of the world; that is the West.” Nyerere went on to say;“We knew the West, we did not know China. The West was very rich, while China, like ourselves, was a developing, Third World country. So, I repeat, we sought aid from the rich West. We, sometimes, got outright rejection; being told that the Railway was both unnecessary and uneconomic. Sometimes we were heard with apparent sympathy, and answered with pleas of poverty! It did not occur to us that the great, but poor, Third World country of China, would be able to help, even if it was willing to do so. So, when in 1965, I first talked on this subject with the Chinese leaders, I was doing so as one who talks about his ambitions to a sympathetic but equally powerless friend. I had underestimated the revolutionary commitment, and the internationalism, of the Chinese people under the leadership of Chairman Mao and the Chinese Communist Party. They told me, without hesitation: If Tanzania and Zambia need this railway, we shall build it for you. I must admit, to our shame, that we remained a little skeptical.”

In 1965, Chinese engineersbegan doing preliminary work on the TAZARA. After the signing of a tripartite ‘basic agreement to built the railway’ by Tanzania, Zambia and China in 1967, and another loan agreement in 1970 the People’s Republic of China financed the 1969-1974 construction of the TAZARA. The 1970 agreement specified a loan of 988 million Yuan to cover the total cost of the project, including both import and local costs. The loan was interest-free and repayment was to start in 1983. The necessary technicians and professional people coming from the Republic of China were to live at the standard of their African fellow-workers.

In 1969, the Chinese ocean linerYao Ha had brought 1,000 Chinese railwaytechnicians to the Dar es Salaam harbour(Monson, 2009). They disembarked fromthe ship to the tunes of Chinese militarymusic, dressed in identical grey cotton suitscarrying small blue suitcases on their shoulders.According to Monson, they spentone night at Kurasini harbour and weretransported on the backs of large trucksto southern Tanzania where they startedconstructing the railway line.

This railway line linking Dar esSalaam on the Indian Ocean to KapiriMposhi in Zambia’s copper-belt was constructedby an estimated 25,000 to 50,000Chinese construction workers and approximately50,000 Tanzanians and Zambians.Monson (2009) estimates the number ofChinese workers between 25,000 and30,000, while Xinhua (2006) estimatesthem at 50,000. Bailey (1975) mentions that labour-intensive methods were usedand that up to 15,000 Chinese and 45,000African workers were on the project duringits peak period. Bailey (1975) submits thatat the time, apart from military instructorsand railway engineers, there were approximately500 Chinese technicians working onaid projects at any one time in Tanzania.

There were immense engineeringdifficulties involved in the 1,860 kilometresRailway construction. Approximately 89million cubic meters of earth and rock hadto be moved. There were 320 bridges built,with an aggregate length of over 16,500meters, 22 tunnels totalling nearly 9,000meters in length, and culverts which total alength of nearly 43,000 meters. Every oneof those bridges and tunnels meant bitterhard slogging, often in water-logged holes,or in the face of thick dust.The culverts,and the retaining walls, the 800,000 metersof drainage and ditches, meant hard physicallabour. Apart from the constructionitself, it was dangerous since most construction sites were wild country infested withwild animals that resented the intrusioninto their territory.

Over 160 workers died in the constructionof the TAZARA. According toNyerere “They died for greater freedom, ofAfrica.” 64 of the dead were from China,“men who had come from their homesto help the people of another continent.”Nyerere urged his listeners that “we mustnever forget any of them. Their namesshould be inscribed in a Roll of Honourand displayed for all to see – Chinese, Zambian,and Tanzanian together. For, all thesepeople died in our service, and the serviceof human progress and brotherhood.”

At the end of the TAZARA project,owing to worldwide inflation in the early60s, the cost of building the railway hadgone up by about 106 million Yuan. Tanzaniadid not have to look for the moneyanywhere else; instead, as Julius Nyerereput it later, “the construction was continuedon a “work first and talk afterwards”basis.” The Chinese government informedTanzania and Zambia that the loan wasstill 988 million Yuan since China made a106 million Yuan grant to TAZARA. Afterlearning this, Nyerere noted;If China was a rich and developed country, thisloan would be generous. But, China is not rich; it isnot developed. It is a truly Third World developingcountry. Its people live very simply indeed. Theyprogress by desperately hard work, and by movingmountains with their own shoulders, and by their revolutionary spirit. So, this Railway exists because of the hard physical labour, the ingenuity, and the willingness of the Chinese people to share what little they have. And, it has all been done as between equals: we in Tanzania and Zambia have been left with our dignity; and, with a deep sense of brotherly obligation. China has shown us the real meaning of revolutionary commitment and international solidarity. I would like to think that we shall at least make a genuine attempt to live up to the example which you have shown us. Yet again, that is not all. We have also been shown the meaning of hard, disciplined, and dedicated work. This railway was scheduled to take six years to build, to reach Kapiri Mposhi from Kidatu. Work officially started in October 1970, but from Dar es Salaam, which means an extra 340 kilometers. Yet, by July 1975, the Railway was running on a trial basis, all the basis work was complete. Now, still not six years after construction was scheduled to begin, the Railway was already running on a trial basis. All the basic work is now complete, and the Railway is being handed over to us.

On behalf of all the people of Tanzania, Nyerere paid tribute to all those who worked to make the Tazara construction possible and successful, “in whatever capacity.” He particularly praised “all those who worked loyally and well on the actual construction.” He acknowledged that their work was very hard, very challenging, and often unpleasant as well as dangerous. They had received low wages. Their real reward, Nyerere suggested, “has to be in the pride they can feel today and in the coming years; that they will be able to say “I worked on the construction of the Tazara Railway.” Nyerere thanked them all: Zambians, Tanzanians, and Chinese. According to him, the Zambians, Tanzanians and Chinese had worked in partnership, for a common purpose.

Chinese Experts Cemetery in Dar es Salaam

Today, the Tazara headquarters building that still is an imposing sight is a stark reminder of China’s past in Tanzania. Moreover, the Chinese Experts Cemetery serves as a memory that peoples lives were at stake during Tazara’s construction. As of October 2006, there were 66 graves (Xinhua, 2006). As of October 2008, when we visited the cemetery, we counted 69 graves housed there. This number had not changed when we again went to the cemetery in 2009 and 2010. The Chinese Experts Cemetery in Tanzania is located 24 kilometres from Dar es Salaam at a place called Gongo la Mboto within the vicinity of the Julius Nyerere International Airport. The Kampala International University shares the fence with the cemetery. The concrete signpost by the roadside indicating where the cemetery is located was sculpted in March 2003 by China Civil Engineering Company, but the graves are much older. The Chinese Experts Cemetery is a neatly tended graveyard that lies behind a low white-washed wall with a marble plinth, inscribed with Chinese characters;中国专家公墓异国青山埋忠骨 往昔峥嵘今犹酣巍巍德业馨赤土 未竟成真报九州为援坦赞铁路建设及技术合作而牺牲的烈士英灵永垂不朽为中坦经济往来做出贡献的英灵永垂不朽中坦友谊万古长存公元二零零柒年十月二十三日敬立At the Chinese Experts Cemetery in Dar es Salaam, we were informed that the 69 graves do not necessarily contain complete dead corpses. We learned fromsomeone who together with another personhad opened one grave out of curiosity, thatthey actually contain golden shiny boxeswhose description fitted urns. They howeveronly opened one grave briefly, just tocheck whether “there is anything worth thesecurity we provide here day and night”and feared to explore further. He said thataccording to his understanding of whata grave in his tradition is, “these Chinesegraves are empty”. He went on to explainthat the lid covering the top of each graveis very heavy since it is made of thick concrete.According to information passed onto him, some graves contain at least a pieceof a bone or whatever could be salvagedfrom remnants of Chinese constructionworkers’ corpses after former graves locatedelsewhere along Tazara were done awaywith so as to centralise the resting place ofthe dead Chinese workers.

As of October 2006, there were66 graves (Xinhua, 2006). As of October2008, when we visited the cemetery therewere 69 graves housed there. This numberhad not changed when we again went tothe cemetery in 2009 and 2010. All gravesare made of concrete and all are inscribedin golden Chinese characters. The gravestonesare square-shaped and are madeof concrete. Chinese characters are visibleon the front and on the back of eachgravestone. The name, date of birth anddate of death are engraved on each graveexcept for very few where a birth or deathdate is missing. At the back of every gravestone,the cause of death is explained in redChinese characters. Some causes of deathlisted include celebral hernia, celebral malariaheart disease, cardiopathy, coronaryheart disease, oesophagus perforation etc.

张凤岭 Zhang, Fengling, born 06.August1944 died 29.03.1970 张凤岭，男， 河北省唐山市人，中国援坦藏铁路技术组 技术员, 因公牺牲。Male, Tangshan City, Hebei Province,China, a technician constructing TAZARA,died on duty

李荣安 Li, Rongan, born February 1933died 26.11.1970李荣安，男，四川省资阳县人，中国援坦赞铁路技术组开山工，脑疝病故Male, Ziyang County, Sichuan Province,explosives worker in TAZARA technologygroup, died of cerebral hernia李景普 Li, Jingpu, born Mar 1927 died15.04.1971

李景普，男， 河北省丰润县人，中国援坦赞铁路技术组队长，因公死亡 Male,Fengrun County, Hebei Province, leader ofthe TAZARA technology group, died onduty付帮成 Fu, Bangcheng, born Jan 1945 died15.04.1971

付帮成，男，四川省重庆市人，中国援坦赞铁路技术组汽车司机，因公死亡Male, Chongqing City, Sichuan Province,driver of the TAZARA technology group,died on duty陈学智 Chen, Xuezhi born June 1931 died15.04.1971

陈学智，男，四川省大足县人，中国援坦赞铁路技术组汽车司机，因公死亡The Chinese in Tanzania: Migrants and Investors2010 DUKE EAST ASIA NEXUS 11Male, Dazu County, SichuanProvince, driver of the TAZARA technology group, died on duty

The cemetery’s eternal security and existence is guaranteed by the fact that it is located next to land allocated for the Tanzanian military with which it shares a fence. Approaching it from the tarmac road, one notices armed forces sitting nearby. The Tanzanian military has placed signs warning those approaching the general area that they are nearing military property. It’s a green neighbourhood overlooking a blue sky with only a few buildings in sight, beautiful palm trees and a small shopping centre, which is basically a collection of kiosks built using timber and iron sheets where locals shop for basic items and students from Kampala International University buy snacks like chipsi mayai (pommes frittes and eggs) amongst other local delicacies.

The cemetery is well fenced using a wall made partly of metal and partly of concrete. A local Tanzanian security company referred to as Sunrise Security has been contracted by the Chinese Embassy in Tanzania to maintain it. Two Tanzanian gentlemen are employed to guard it at night and one gentleman cleans and guards the graveyard during the day. There exists a roofed-dais where visitors can sit and offer prayers. Some graves have wilting flowers placed on them or some objects like a scarf, all being indicators that there are visitors to this place, at least once in a while.

Past visitors include Chinese President Hu Jintao who visited in February 2009 and “paid tribute to Chinese experts who worked and died in Tanzania.” Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited in 2006 together with the then Tanzanian Prime Minister Edward Lowassa to lay wreaths and pay respect to the dead Chinese experts. Mr. Wen was quoted saying “the Chinese, Tanzanian and Zambian peoples would not forget these Chinese martyrs”, and Mr. Lowassa wished them “rest in peace in a home away from home” (Focac, 2006). In 2005 Li Changchun, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee visited the cemetery (People’s Daily, 2005).

Since the establishment of the two Chinese expert’s cemeteries in Tanzania and Zambia, the respective Chinese embassies in both countries annually organise an event to pay homage to the dead Chinese nationals buried there. This occurs in the month of May annually and the embassies organise the event together with Chinese nationals who work in both countries. Though we did not get further details, we learned that Chinese nationals visiting Tanzania frequent the Chinese Experts Cemetery just as much as they frequent Tazara headquarters in Dar es Salaam. These two places are important historical symbols of Chinese presence in Tanzania.

We learnt that foods and drinks have been left on the Chinese graves during past commemorative ceremonies with keen respect to what the dead loved eating. Something that baffled the person that showed us around is that amongst all the Chinese he had seen visiting, none of them wept for the dead. Finally, we learnt that the researcher concerned with this dissertation was the only “black person” or African that has ever visited the Chinese Experts Cemetery alone and shown such interJohnNjenga Karugia12 DUKE EAST ASIA NEXUS Vol 2 Issue 1est in it. While there have been African or“black” visitors, they have only been therewhen there is a Chinese gathering honouring the dead ones and they came eitherbecause they were accompanying Chinesevisitors or part of the media and security.

Contemporary Migration

Since the early 1990s, Chinesemigrants have been migrating from various departure points and moving to Tanzania.Let us expound on the intricate algebra ofthe dynamics of various sources of Chinese migrants who end up in Tanzania;some migrants move directly from China,some move to Tanzania having alreadyspent time in one other country in Africa,some move to Tanzania after having spent time in two or three or four other countriesin Africa, some will have first moved to a country in Africa then moved back toChina and then eventually moved to Tanzania,some migrants will have spent sometime on other continents like Europe or theAmericas before moving to Tanzania, somemigrants will have spent time on othercontinents before moving to China as wellas later on to either one or several countriesin Africa or elsewhere and then eventuallyending up in Tanzania. Some Chinese entrepreneurs in Tanzania are Chinese-Africans from South Africa.

So why are Chinese migrating toTanzania? There exists a myriad of motivationsand explanations for Chineseinvestors to move to Tanzania. There isno universal general answer to this question. Almost every Chinese migrant wecame across had a personal migrationstory. We can generally, but very carefullystart of by saying that Chinese migrantscome in search of markets for their goodsand services as well as in search of ideasand various resources. Some of the ideasand resources they get in Tanzania findtheir way to China through various means.They also bring ideas with them and someideas remain in Tanzania even after theparticular Chinese migrants leave as weshall discuss later. Some migrants moveto Tanzania to join a family member or afriend or a friend of a friend who alreadymoved to Tanzania and is involved in someactivities in Tanzania. Very few move aloneand start a business. While most Chinesemigrants move to Tanzania as proprietorsor employees of the aforementioned Chineseinvestments, some migrants move toTanzania without an idea of what they aregoing to do. As far as motivation for movingto Tanzania is concerned, one Chinesemigrant whose family moved to Tanzaniain 2008 explained that he and his familydecided to set up a car repair garage sincethey knew that:“Tanzania has no limitation on driving afterdrinking, which causes more accidents; and moreaccidents bring us more business. Even though weare new here, our garage is full of cars everyday;sometimes even there is not enough space for us topark our own car. The traffic conditions in Tanzaniaare very bad. Tanzanians don’t have the skillsand techniques to repair cars by themselves. That iswhy there are many Chinese-run garages…almostall the Chinese garages are doing good business.There are just too many cars to be repaired!”Another migrant, who came to Tanzaniain 2004 and now owns several businesses,explained his and his family’s presence in Tanzania as follows:“God always prepares the road for me.First we examined the investment climate in Congo, Kenya and Uganda, it just wouldn’t work out. We couldn’t make any money. And finally, God answered my prayer and led me to Tanzania. When he wants to show something to me, he always blocks other possibilities. We are making money here.”

After moving to Tanzania, some migrants live with their acquaintances, friends or families as they seek ideas and opportunities. This is the effect of migrants or immigrant social networks and there are various kinds of migrant’s networks, all with their own characteristics. Different migrants attach different meanings to their networks i.e. what roles the people involved play for each other, or the value they attach to the various people in their network e.g. some Chinese teach others Kiswahili although mostly Chinese business owners learn Kiswahili from their Tanzanian employees. Amongst Chinese people, ‘guanxi is undoubtedly one of the most popular terms used to describe social relations and it carries a much ‘deeper’ meaning and significance than the simple English translations of “relations” or “connections” would indicate since guanxi is a dominat form of exchange among the Chinese (Lin, 1998). We came across Tanzanian businessmen who helped Chinese businessmen in the processes of clearing and forwarding goods that arrive from China and in return, Chinese businessmen helped Tanzanian businessmen with finding good bargains on not only goods in China but also cheaper shipping means. Chinese migrants can find all manner of information through the various people that make up their guanxi, as well as through their social networks in Tanzania and also through QQ (online chat) groups e.g. about accommodation, security, banking services, finding Tanzanians that speak and translate Chinese etc.

Chinese migrants learn or hear about Tanzania through various means and ‘their guanxi’ play a pivotal role in this as in many other aspects before, during and after the migration processes. Some migrants said that during their school days, they heard about Tanzania in the media because Chinese construction workers helped build the TAZARA. Various companies that are aware that the Tanzanian government is offering tenders for the supply of goods and services browse the internet in order to find out the latest needs of Tanzania’s government. Additionally, the Chinese Embassy and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Dar es Salaam is a key source of information about the investment climate and investment opportunities in Tanzania. The main institution though, that handles all foreign investments in Tanzania, is the aforementioned Tanzania Investment Center. This is a one-stop center for all companies and individuals who wish to invest in Tanzania.

Tanzania participates in Trade Fairs in China e.g. the Canton fair and this serves as a connector to people looking for opportunities to invest abroad. Tanzanians from all walks of life travel to China to seek business opportunities. In China, they meet Chinese businessmen as well as make other contacts. Later on, these contacts are important in many ways; importing goods to China or exporting goods to Tanzania, starting joint-businesses, supplying each other with market information, helping each other with clearing and forwarding procedures at harbors and airports etc. The Tanzanian Embassy in China is also a vital source of information for those Chinesewho wish to inform themselves eitherbefore planning to move to Tanzania.

Tanzanians and other Africans alsoplay a role in passing information. Someare businessmen who travel often to buyand or sell goods and services. There areTanzanians who are either privately studying in China or as part of the scholarships awarded by the Chinese government in African countries so that students can studyin China. They also play a vital role in theinformation flow from Tanzania to China and vice versa. Former Chinese migrants who have since returned to China also area vital factor in providing pertinent informationto people planning to start a businessin Tanzania.

Chinese migrants also use theinternet a lot, not only to communicateand conduct business, but also to join, findpeople that share similar interests, successes,failures and challenges. They use thesecyber social networks e.g. the QQ groupsto find out all kinds of information eitherbefore they migrate or after they have migrated.They use the QQ groups to discusslocal politics like the just ended presidentialelections in Tanzania.

Chinese migrants enter Tanzania through land, air and sea. Once Chinese migrants arrive in Tanzania, they arereceived in various ways. Some alight fromaircraft at the Julius Nyerere InternationalAirport, they board a taxi and request tobe driven to an address they would alreadyhave gotten from the people or institutionsthey are associated with. Other Chinese migrants are welcomed to Tanzania by other Chinese waiting for them at the airport.Those waiting are either family members,friends, acquaintances or fellow colleaguesfrom a company that has already set basein Tanzania. They are then driven off tovarious destinations in Dar es Salaam in eitherprivate cars, taxis or company vehicles. Mostly Chinese men travel light. Chinesewomen travel with more luggage. Chinesewomen and men who already live or own businesses in Tanzania utilise the entireallowed luggage weight to transport somemerchandise and presents and other thingsas well. Chinese construction workers and engineers involved in construction travelvery light. They either hold on to a smallplastic or hand bag or hang it on theirshoulders. This is because those involvedin construction receive uniforms and other clothing to wear during construction work.They wear these uniforms almost all thetime, except for a few days when they leave construction cites. Chinese women generally have more pieces of luggage, eitherbecause they are transporting presents andtheir as well as their partner’s or children’spersonal items.

From our own observation andfrom interviews with taxi drivers (some ofwhom have worked at the Julius InternationalAirport for ten to fifteen years) welearnt that at any one time, it is mostlymen entering or leaving Tanzania. Onlyrarely did we see Chinese women arriving.Only once in a while did we see childrenarriving or leaving the airport. We mustadmit, that we can not necessarily concludethat the people we saw were of Chinesedescent since it could very well have beenSouth Koreans, Taiwanese or other peoplefrom East Asia or people with the physicalresemblance to Chinese but probably theyare citizens of other countries.

We must therefore define who we refer to as a Chinese migrant. Any person we came across during our study who holds the citizenship of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), or any person who left China and moved elsewhere and attained citizenship there and still identifies himself or herself as Chinese due to known or unknown ancestry links and finally any person who identifies themselves as Chinese due to any other reasons. Some examples include Chinese Americans, Chinese South Africans, Chinese Australians and generally Chinese Diasporas across the globe. In our study, Taiwanese is not the same as Chinese.

We must also discuss whether we are right in generally labeling the Chinese people in Tanzania as migrants or whether we should refer to some of them as guest-workers. There are various types of Chinese people in Tanzania. There are a few that have lived in Tanzania for over twenty years, some have intermarried with Tanzanians and gotten children out of this unions. Some Chinese people have lived in Tanzania for a couple of years but have their child or children in China or have brought them to Tanzania. Some Chinese people live in Tanzania without a spouse or a child either in Tanzania or in China.

Chinese migrants and Tanzanians of all walks of life experience all manner of challenges and successes in their various endeavors to deal with each other in Tanzania. Their lives and social interactions are filled with all manner of experiences. There are Chinese businessmen that told us that they have good Tanzanian friends both inside and outside their business circles. Some have become part of their guanxi.There were also Tanzanians who told of good friendships with Chinese migrants. Despite this, there are some difficulties that some Chinese encounter. Some Tanzanian employees of Chinese migrants complain about being overworked even over the weekends but being paid too little. Some responses in reference to Chinese included but were not limited to:“this are not good people,”“they do not pay well…they definitely make a lot of money here in Tanzania,”“if you work hard they love you, you win their respect,”“…they work very hard, they work all the time”Chinese migrants complain mostly about the laziness, unpunctuality and theft from both their employees and from other avenues. One Chinese supervisor working for a Chinese Multinational Company that is constructing a vital building in Dar es Salaam complained that:“We are loosing tools every day. We can not be alert 24 hours a day, we need to eat and sleep. So they have plenty of time to steal these things while we are away… believe me, it’s not that easy. They can simply put one small tool in their pocket, and throw it out of the wall of the construction site while another person is catching it from outside. What about if one worker does this ten times a day every single day? Not even mention that the safeguards that we hired [from a local security company] conspired with others and drove in a truck to steal our steel pipes at night! We’ve already sued the company. We just can’t bear it anymore!”

Conclusion

All presence of Chinese investmentsand migrants should be researched withinthe particular contexts of that countryso that we avoid too much generalisationacross the board in Africa. Chinese migrant’ssuccess or failure in Tanzania willdepend on how social interactions will bemanaged both by Chinese and Tanzanians.If Tanzanian employees of the Chineseinvestors perceive that they are welltreated especially in terms of remuneration,we have observed that they supportthe investor’s endeavours to succeed. OurTanzanian respondents repeated againand again the fact that they are happy toat least be earning some money for theupkeep of their families even though it wasnot enough and they hoped to get bettersalaries. In some cases some Tanzanianswere underpaid below the minimum wageset by the Tanzanian government. How Chinese migrants, the Tanzanian governmentand individual Tanzanians manage tonegotiate the advent of Chinese migrants and how responsive all sides are of eachother’s demands will determine the dynamicsof Chinese presence in Tanzania and byextension, Tanzanians in China as well asmany issues linked to their various partnershipsand relations.

References

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