Although he is presented as a maverick by the western media, the artist-activist Ai Weiwei is really just representative of the culminating frustrations of Chinese intellectuals concerning personal expression in China. Soon after the Chinese Communist Party rose to power in 1949, all artistic movements were subsumed by the soviet socialist style. By the time the Ai and the Stars Group made their debut in 1979, all remnants of the old traditions were rejected, and artistic endeavors were reduced to mere propaganda pieces glorifying the worker and promoting the cult of Mao Zedong. Thanks to the relative liberalism at the beginning of the Deng Xiaoping era, members of the Stars were able to explore the modes of western traditions and react to the more recent oppressive styles by expressing their individuality through impressionism, surrealism, and cubism. Still, they quickly learned that borrowing from the west was not enough to produce works culturally resonant for the people weary of meaningless communist propaganda in China. Ai Weiwei, deeply concerned with this notion, created paintings in the style of the father of impressionism, Cezanne. He suggested they start by taking the basic ideals of the western movements and combining them with their Chinese consciousness. However, after Deng Xiaoping eliminated the Democracy Wall in 1979, and the most prominent member of stars Wei Jingsheng was sentenced to 15 years in prison, Ai decided to move to America. If one place could nurture this fearless provocateur with abundant examples of scandalously audacious art, it was New York City. Yet even directly after he returned home to Beijing in 1993, his contribution to the “Fuck Off” catalog (co-curated with Feng Boyi) showed his moderate position and understanding of the complex history of personal expression in China. He positioned himself between two quotes attributed to Mao and Duchamp:

“Those comrades who are firm and determined in today’s ideological struggles and those who no fear of power and no compromise with vulgarization will be the hope of tomorrow’s new culture.” -Mao

“It’s just my own game. Nothing else.” –Duchamp (Merewether)

In the context of these greater artistic tensions, Ai Weiwei’s most resonant messages advocating for personal freedom in China come from his multilayered, politically nuanced moral and cultural critiques such as Fairytale, rather than his less aesthetic, overtly political statements that perpetuate Maoist doctrine of rebellion.

Historical Context: China and Freedom

Ai Weiwei and his artist-activism can be rightfully appreciated only when one understands what freedom means in the Chinese historical and ideological context. The dissolution of West-East notions of freedom due to globalization contributes to the extremely complex definition of freedom in China today. According to L. H. Taylor, freedom only has meaning in a particular context, which partially explains why pure European enlightenment ideals are not completely reconcilable within Chinese History. Despite the starkly different historical background of Chinese, however, its unique multidimensional views of freedom were not necessarily in total opposition to western enlightenment ideals during some points in history. The idea of individual freedom in China evolved in such a way that it is much too complex to be reduced to the simple tension between the interests of collective society above the individual. In light of the different historical circumstances affecting the Chinese personal-collective power struggle, one great Chinese thinker Hu Shi began to consider the relationship between the individual and the collective state (i.e. the collective self) as an organic, developing interaction (Fung 459).

In Traditional China, the rights of the people were provided for by the moral rule of the heavenly mandated emperor. According to Confucian statesmen such as Mencius, however, a tyrant who abuses his power could lose the mandate of heaven, be reduced to a mere criminal, and be rightfully overthrown by the people (1B:8). In Modern China, rebellion imperialism, tyranny, bourgeoisie thought, and exposure to some western philosophy all greatly shaped Chinese conceptions of freedom and liberty. During the May fourth and nationalist movement, Chinese viewed freedom in the context of citizenship and liberation. Yet, the May Fourth produced different versions of liberty than the Enlightenment because they were set in opposition to countless repressive institutions such as filial controls, feudalistic ritual, and intellectual monism and only defined as a negation of these ideas (Fung 460). This definition by negation grew into the idea of freedom as citizenship or loyalty to the nation and failed to draw a distinction between the public and private forms of freedom. In the early years of the Chinese Republic, Sun Yat-Sen’s notion of freedom, democracy, and human rights took precedent over others. When conditions worsened after his death, the war ravaged, and destitute Chinese populace were unable to concern themselves with these ideals, for they lacked the basic necessities. The CCP then quickly rose to power with the promise to rehabilitate the nation by placing the condition of the entire populace over just a few individuals. The idea of the “collective self” was not new; it is an idea that existed in even in ancient China and is actually very similar to Rousseau’s social contract. This rapidly became a platform for the suppression of all personal, spiritual, and cultural freedom. The Cultural Revolution and subsequent era of Deng Xiaoping began as movements toward individual autonomy, self-determination, and self-mastery, but movements like these are continually forced to capitulate to control of government that claims oppression is necessary to maintain order for collective Chinese citizenry. The omission of captions containing phrases like ‘universal human rights’ in the current exhibit on the Enlightenment in the National Museum of China captures zeitgeist of Communist repression of individualism still characterizing Chinese politics today.

Authorship, Subjectivity, Authenticity, and Value in Modern China

Like most Chinese artists, Ai Weiwei experimented with subjectivity and the role of authorship in relation to cultural authenticity and value from an early point in his career. Just as he searched for ways to express his individuality at 1980s Stars exhibitions, he continuously attempted to simultaneously produce something with relevant cultural significance. Ai became obsessed with the concept of the readymade after much exposure to Pop Art and Dadaism in New York City. The ‘readymade’ is a artistic medium popularized by Marcel Duchamp that challenged accepted notions of visual art by taking an object and modifying only slightly. Soon after he arrived back in Beijing in 1993, he produced two readymade works commentating on Chinese cultural heritage and the role of the individual (artist) in the new market-driven state: Han Dynasty Urn with Coca-Cola Logo (1994) and Dropping a Han Dynasty Urn (1995). In Han Dynasty Urn with a Coca-Cola Logo, Ai focuses on examining the impact of commodity based culture on the aesthetic values of China. Chinese culture embodied by the urn is covered by the symbol of western materialism, the bright red Coca-Cola logo. The formative elements of the readymade juxtaposed with the inherent cultural assumptions about the urn’s origin express how western commodity culture literally subsumes Chinese culture as the logo wraps around according the natural curvature of the urn. Furthermore, the opposite side containing the slogan ‘the real thing’ challenges the authenticity of symbols of Han Chinese identity, as well as the way culture is redefined by branding.

Dropping a Han Dynasty Urn can be considered a follow up to the Coca-Cola Logo urn, since this photo triptych documents the relationship between ideas of cultural history and aesthetic values in Modern China. The first photo in the series depicts Ai holding an urn representing the preserved construct of collective Chinese identity. As he drops the urn in the second photograph, he lets go of these aspects of tradition and is perceived as an individual. In the third photograph the urn inevitably hits the ground and smashes to pieces just as the ideas it embodies dissolve and stop constricting progress. Ai’s expression throughout the entire sequence is consciously understated— his resolute, unsurprised face allows the viewers to formulate their own opinions about the statement it makes. His look also emphasizes that Ai’s intentions are not destructive or antagonistic in nature but removed while documenting the violence against the past in this dialectic between art and politics in China.

Later works such as Colored Vases (2003) and Color Test (2006) extend Ai’s readymade technique in order to discuss the Chinese government’s inclination to whitewash history. According to Ai, “you cover something so that it is no longer visible but is still there underneath, and what appears on the surface is not supposed to be there but is there” (Tinari). In these instances, he takes Ming and Qing Vases and temple ruins and covers them in gaudy bright hues in the same way the Chinese government positively covers up their errors. There are places where the original piece is visible from uneven dipping and scratches in the paint to illustrate current problems that the Chinese government cannot keep covered up, such as the Three Gorges Dam. In the spirit of the Color field movement, the paint also gives the previously dynamic artifacts a flat uniformity reminiscent of manufactured goods that lose their individual significance. His most extensive exploration of the state of individuality came a few years later in his Fairytale project.

The Fairytale of Individual Chinese Identity

Fairytale, the multilayered piece created for the Documenta X11 exhibition in Kassel, Germany, epitomizes Ai’s most effective use of art as a platform to critique Chinese socio-political challenges to individualism. Ai called the piece an invasion of the West to showcase Chinese culture. The piece involved three major layers that comprehensively encapsulated the complexities of Chinese identity “beyond the physical limitations of place” (Merewether 125). The first involved the organization, preparation, and realization of sending 1,001 Chinese citizens to Kassel in order to observe and be observed. The logo “1=2001[s2] ” that appears as an F and a number one emphasizes the personal experience, individual status, and distinctive imaginations of each individual were the focus of the piece. Meticulous detail was paid to every aspect of the organization to emphasize each individual journey on the trip within the communal aspects of the voyage. Every participant’s story was captured individually through film, photography, and interviews. They all received uniform luggage with a unique fabric pattern designed by Ai on the front along with specifically designed t-shirts and colored USB bracelets labeled with the 1=1001  logo. Within the common living space, Ai designed every bedspread to be distinctive from one another. The lack of tension between individuals in the common space exhibited the possibility of retaining an ordered society when people have the freedom to pursue individual paths. The people chosen for the project range from rural peasants to art students from Beijing with different intentions about participating in Fairytale. One writer tells the camera in the documentary that this could be his rebirth: “I’ve painted myself into a corner. I’m no longer in control of my own fate.” Apart allowing extreme subjectivity in his art, Ai shows how reciprocity with China is possible through contact with Chinese people: “The whole West-East imagination or fear will be under the moon, across the street: they will meet…there area lot of fantasies and concerns about this country. I think that now it’s time all these fantasies about life and art can meet” (Merewether 126).

The second layer of the work involved 1,001 Qing Dynasty Chairs, which were scattered around the exhibit in clusters to make spaces for individual and collective places for people to lounge and meet. He also exposes a tension between appropriated visual forms representing the continued appropriated forms of Chinese material culture (the chairs) and the conversant that stops to interact with them. Each chair received the same individual attention as the 1,001 visitors with pronounced difference every other in the work. The cultural and historical significance paired with the sheer magnitude and attention to detail on these projects make them the crown jewel of Ai’s readymades. At their core, these are symbols of Chinese authenticity because they represent the last remnants of traditional Chinese culture that were demolished in the 1911 revolution. Still, the Chinese tendency to sit upon these ideas of authenticity to rebuild China and to legitimize the subsequent political institutions is literally expressed in the form of the chair. According to Philip Tinari, “it is in the poetry of this relational move—from gesture to appeal, from exposition to exhortation—that Ai Weiwei’s vision of a self-conscious modernism begins to bloom.”

Template, the third part of the Fairytale installation, is a five-layers-thick structure constructed out of 1,001 Qing dynasty windows and doors. The negative space in the center forms the silhouette of a traditional Chinese temple, further augmenting his message through the 1,001 Visitors and chairs; salvaging the past does not only involve hoarding relics and placing them in museums, but rather learning from history and taking it to produce something new. The negative space shows how one cannot rely solely on the past because then new structures cannot exist, although there is no denying that the past always influences the present. The past should only mold and support present endeavors not constrict them. Ai was ecstatic when the piece, already deemed structurally unsound by the Documenta crew, collapsed in on itself during inclement weather, an event, which he thought made the piece drastically more interesting. He was convinced this would show how institutions like these built on the past could not survive the natural passage of time. The combined presentation of these parts of Fairytale epitomizes the perpetual themes that Ai is obsessed with—the “interrogation” of artist expression and the role it should play in relation to China. Through Fairytale, Ai encapsulated and addressed almost all aspects of the complex dialectic between individual and collective identity in China today. He was adamant in interviews that he had no specific standpoint concerning the nature of the piece and was interested only in watching the contradictions that naturally emerge (Ambrozy 124). This multidimensional approach and the freedom, with which each part was allowed to develop individually, ultimately gave Fairytale the power and significance that made it arguably one of the most important effective works of the 21^st century.

#So Sorry: Blogs, Twitter, and Politics

Ai Weiwei departs from his profound philosophical commentary visible in Fairytale to overtly political protests in his more recent work, which culminated in his arrest on April 4, 2011.  For the “So Sorry” Exhibition, at the already politically charged Third Reich propaganda center Haus der Kunst, Ai used around 9,000 children’s backpacks to spell out the words of a mother who had lost a child in the Sichuan Earthquake, “she lived happily for seven years in this world. His message may still be along the same lines of his earlier works as he wrote on his blog on May 22, 2008, “the emptiness of collective memory, the distortion of public morality, drives people crazy,” but here visual presentation is extremely one-dimensional. His “Citizen’s Investigation” and protest overshadow his art, especially the more potent moral, artistic critiques inside the exhibit. Contrastingly, the formal structure of the Bird’s Nest stadium, which he designed for the 2008 Beijing Olympics, employs unique, unrepeated curving structures into its design, which meant to give each spectator the feeling that they have the best vantage point. These elements described by the design team as “organized chaos” are recognizable symbols of a tolerant, democratic society. The significance to this permanent contribution to the skyline of Beijing, however, was dwarfed beneath Ai’s protest of the Olympics on his blog.

Ai’s online writing sparks an entirely new debate in the art world concerning the artistic worth of his blog. Curator and Critic Karen Smith claims his online contributions to online public space should be considered artwork as brilliant as “any church or grand piazza was in High Renaissance Italy” (Osnos). One thing is certain; these sites definitely played a large part in expanding and publicizing Ai’s activism. During an interview with NPR, Ai told a reporter that “activism is art; the two are inseparable.” Ai’s blog, which he spent about 8 hours a day on, ran from 2006 to May 28, 2009 when authorities shut it down. This gave Ai the opportunity to experiment with Twitter, where he now has 83,593 followers in a country where public networking sites like this are still illegal. Unfortunately, in terms of his artistic development, these networking sites not only stole time from his art, but also caused his activism to become the starting point for much of it. Once his ideas became more publicized on the Internet his activism began overshadow his art.

As Ai Weiwei has been transformed more and more into the poster boy for freedom of expression in the international media, the art world in China has both lamented and attacked his increasingly politicized style. Artist Yu Gao for example called him a “traitor” whose extreme methods (such as the Ch’ang Avenue protest) ruin “the platform for discussion” with the government (Osnos). Moreover, art critic Philip Tinari, while reviewing Ai’s display of backpacks from the “So Sorry” Exhibition, perceptively stated how the intensity of Ai’s more recent works exhibit a combination “where art and politics, seem uncomfortably mixed, to the benefit of neither.” The Artist Xu Bing,Vice President of the Central Academy of Fine Arts and also former colleague of Ai Weiwei, explains why not everyone can embrace the methods of Ai: when that happens, China will never develop. Since a pure Cold War-distinction between democracy and communism no longer exists and is much more ambiguous, China will need to develop in its own way. Ai’s response to these ideas is that they are excuses for artists afraid to do their duty to create change. In an interview about the Birds Nest before the Olympics, he told reporters, “‘reform’ is the changing of ugly habits, ‘opening up’ is the introduction of other modes of thought and technology. This process will inevitably be painful” (Ambrozy 167).

Conclusion

Ai’s detainment, however, is evidence that China still has a long road ahead before it can call itself an open society. Although his art loses much of its dynamism when it becomes overly political, Chinese models of personal freedom from Mencius to Hu Shi would consider Ai’s right to express his dissatisfaction with obviously corrupt government systems legitimate since it is in the best interests of the collective. Critics of Ai who consider him a rabble-rouser and anarchist or even a celebrity constructed by the western media should take a critical look at his own words from his blog and twitter. It is obvious that Ai Weiwei successfully found the voice between Mao and Duchamp in his art and remains committed only to the idea of China where individual rights are not constantly compromised. His commitment and love for his country is further illustrated in his first public sculpture piece Zodiac Heads, which just opened in New York City during his detainment. The piece consists of enlarged versions of heads that once belonged to Qianlong meant to admonish collectors for trying to purchase these national treasures. Ai blogged in early 2006, “to speak of beautiful dreams and grand ideals is safe—you could go on forever. But to realize them through action is dangerous” (Ambrozy 13). The arrest of Ai Weiwei and other outspoken citizens like him exhibits how China continues to take two steps backward for each step forward just as they did during the eras of both Mao and Deng Xiaoping. Only when the Chinese government learns to treasure criticism as a mechanism for cultural improvement, will China be sincerely able to call itself modern.

On a bright winter’s day late in 1873, the Iwakura Embassy opened a new chapter in its exploration of the West. On December 16th 1872, the Embassy crossed the English Channel and embarked on an epic journey through continental Europe, a journey that started in France and lasted for several months (Kume). Having failed to renegotiate unequal treaties with the American and British governments, the embassy members focused all their energies on learning more about “the ways of the West.” The mission shifted from negotiating with the West to discovering the West – “wherein the success of the West lay, and which components of that success could be translated to Japan” (Thomas). Luckily, the mission diarist, Confucian scholar, Kume Kunitake, left behind an extensive description of the mission’s journey, the so-called, True Account of the Ambassador Extraordinary & Plenipotentiary’s Journey of Observation through the United States of America and Europe. Kume’s report on the embassy’s voyage to France provides valuable insights into Japan’s perception of the Third Empire at the beginning of its era. It portrays France as a superior nation that ought to be imitated. Although certain aspects deemed worthy of imitation were completely discarded by Japanese government, and vice versa, France captivated the Japanese imagination more than any other country. In the eyes of the members of the mission as well as the Meiji leaders, France was “the quintessential glory of Europe,” Japan’s City Upon the Hill (Kume). The Iwakura Embassy’s exploration of France exposes much about Japan’s past, offers insight into its present, and glimpses into its future. And as such, Kume’s report shows how the Embassy’s journey to France changed the way Japan saw the world as well as the way it saw itself.

A group of Japanese oligarchs headed by one of the most powerful political figures in Japan, Iwakura Tomoni, the Iwakura Embassy, toured the world sailing from Yokohama on December 23, 1871 and returning on September 13, 1873.6 The mission stretched to far corners of the world including the United States, United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Russia, Prussia, Germany, and other emerging European and Asian powers. Initially, the embassy hoped for a renegotiation of unequal treaties with Western powers – an attempt, which was met with little or no success. As a result, the members concentrated on their originally secondary goal: to learn about the West in order to assure progress Japan – political, economic, social, and cultural.

Kume’s account of the journey proves crucial in reevaluating the significance of the Mission. However, to fully comprehend the diary’s standing as an important revelatory tool of the embassy’s experience in France, one must place the diary and its author in the historical and literary context. First, Kume was a not a Western intellectual but a Confucian scholar. His comments on the French society were deeply rooted in his Confucian education and in the values such education emphasized. As a result, “Kume’s contribution,” as historian W. G.Beasley suggests, “was a more a matter of literary skill than of knowledge and analysis.” The Diary’s structure is equally mesmerizing. General surveys of each visited country, including an outline of its history, politics, geography, economy, religion and education, are followed by somehow completely unrelated thought pieces that cover a great range of topics from Japan’s role in the world to the meaning of history (Kume). Entertaining dialogues follow long dry passages. The diary reads as an encyclopedia, philosophical treatise and a theatre play. Nonetheless, although Kume excelled more as a literary figure than a socio-political analyst, his “True Account” still offers priceless insights into the nature of the French-Japanese relations at the opening of the Meiji era.

The interaction between France and Japan during the Tokugawa period as well as a rising French presence in Asia did not leave much space for admiration and respect on the side of the Emissaries. On the contrary however, the traveling oligarchs held France in much disfavor before embarking on their journey. There were two reasons for their mistrust of French politics. First, France played a crucial role in supporting the Ancien Régime in Japan. In fact, the French directly interfered in the Meiji Restoration, financially, militarily and politically by supporting the shogunate (Ward, Burks). France followed the Netherlands in helping to maintain the power of the old administration, by building the Yokosuka shipyard and arsenal (Ward). Unsurprisingly, the leaders of the Meiji restoration viewed France as an endangering element that once attempted to undermine their efforts to overthrow the shogunate. Second, the oligarchs feared the French imperialist expansion in Asia. They blamed France, that was “making steady inroad into the countries of south Asia,” for Japanese political and economic instability (Thomas). Firmly convinced in the French attempts to undermine the authority of the Japanese government in Asia and, consequently, in Japan, the members of the Iwakura Mission regarded France with a sense of mistrust and suspicion.

The state of France in 1872-73 did not add much to its reputation. In fact, France in the second half of the nineteenth century experienced tumultuous times that severely damaged its image abroad. The France the Iwakura Members encountered, once they arrived to Calais, was a strange amalgam of glory and humiliation. First, France faced serious unrest at home. Kume often remarked on the riotous state, from which France just emerged, bitterly commenting on the Western civilization in general: “Internal revolt against the government flared up in the shape of the Paris Commune and brought chaos to the city […] however civilized Western countries may appear from afar, this certainly did not extend to the manners of the common classes” (Kume).

Furthermore, after its defeat during the Franco-Prussian War, France had lost its hegemony in continental Europe. Several decades after Bonaparte’s epic military campaign, France had found itself humiliated by a novice in European power-politics, Bismarck’s Prussia. Not only did French national pride suffer from the defeat, the French economy was heavily burdened by war reparations, while at the same time the French government was losing much of its authority both at home and abroad. The France that the Emissaries encountered was, indeed, a sad relic of a once powerful nation. Surprisingly, however, France’s weakened position did not diminish the members’ sense of admiration. After more than two years of travels in the West, the Iwakura emissaries were as impressed by France as if they had encountered it at the peak of its cultural glory.

Interestingly, there were many similarities between France and Japan at the time of the mission’s visit. First, as historian Carol Gluck suggested, both countries were experiencing the “colonization” of the provinces. France from 1870 to 1914 – the years corresponding almost exactly to the Meiji period – saw a dramatic politicization of the provinces. In the process of “converting peasants into Frenchmen,” various regional communities were included in the national project; they were all embraced by the Parisian elite as members of the same nation. Eugen Weber portrayed the process of the colonization as Paris civilizing the unruly provinces and “instilling a national view of things in regional minds.” In the same period as the language, gestures, and perceptions of national politics penetrated the French countryside, the local elite in Meiji, Japan learned “the political lessons, demanded the fiscal trade-offs, and otherwise began to act on behalf of local interests within the national political scene” (Gluck 37). Like in France, the politics in Japan entered local life. The Japanese provinces became colonized and colonize-able. In the same way as Marseille became less of a Marseille and more of a “French” city, many Japanese provinces, under the pressure of national government, found their new identity – not as self-governing units, but as pieces of a national monolith called Japan.

Second, France’s glorification of its past struck much chord with the ambassadors who were aware of the need to preserve Japan’s unique character. Leaders of the Meiji government were all too conscious of the importance of learning from the past to progress in the present: as Kume wrote, “at the root of the march of progress in the West is a profound love of antiquity.” He and many of his contemporaries believed that “it [was] the accumulation of knowledge over hundreds and thousands of years which [gave] rise to the light of civilization” (60). The emissaries recognized that even though change played an important role, it was imperative for the new nation to build on the accomplishments of the past. French inclusion of the past into the politics of the present represented an important feature of national consciousness that the Japanese found crucial for their own agenda.

Third, closely related to the “profound love” for the past was the French ability to imitate others – to adopt foreign customs and to shape them, according to their own formula. Shortly after the Franco-Prussian war, France was able to imitate certain aspects of Prussian society, and as such, it was in line with Japan’s efforts to imitate the West while conserving its identity. Kume often mentioned the willingness of the French to learn from Germany. He claimed that although “formerly the French had never imagined copying,” they understood that if they did not do so, “France might not be able to remain France” (Nish 74). In imitating Bismarck’s Prussia – its military and economic organization – France appeared as a great example of a nation, like Japan, that borrowed from others while preserving its own identity.

Last but not least, the members of the Iwakura mission found similarities between the French secularism and their own efforts to eliminate religious discussions from the sphere of politics. In France, they found a form of Christianity that intruded less in everyday life than in United-States and Britain. Kume specifically asserted that “religious faith is as weak in France as it is strong in America” (89). Lukewarm religious sentiments in France did not only strike chord with the emissaries’ belief in the separation of the church and state, but they also enabled a much warmer welcome in France. Whereas in the United States and Britain, the mission faced harsh admonishing for Japanese treatment of the Christians on the Japanese soil, in France, the emissaries encountered little or no criticism for their religious policies. Importantly, the fact that the French had no interest in promoting religious freedom in Japan gave the Emissaries “some reassurance that Christianity was not quite the insidious vanguard of Western power that they had suspected” (Nish 83).

Based on these similarities, there were four aspects of the French civilization that the Meiji leaders deemed most worthy of replication: France’s economic and education systems, its military organization, and its foreign policy.

In terms of the French economic structure, the Japanese extolled several features of the French industry, commerce, and banking. As Kume wrote, they believed that the fast speed, at which France paid off the reparations, confirmed that “France’s financial and commercial position was healthy [ and that ] it had a rich reservoir of talented men, especially in the fields of economics and commercial law” (74). They admired that, unlike Britain and the United States, the French found the right balance between the “machinery and manual labour,” which enabled France to attain both quantity and quality in its manufacturing. In the field of commerce, all throughout the third volume of his diary, Kume paid particular attention to Paris, which he portrayed as a marketplace of the world’s manufactured goods as opposed to London’s standing as a centre for raw materials (Kume). Furthermore, the emissaries had much respect for Paris’ status as a capital of style and delicate craftsmanship, since they believed that its dominance in “style and craftsmanshiop” helped France to accomplish its dominant position in Continental Europe. Perhaps most noticeably, Kume praised the French economy for its reliance on “the refined technical ingenuity,” craftsmanship and education: Whether it is on a large or small scale, the French are fully accomplished in their craft work and technology (Kume 30).

The praise for the French economy was deeply rooted in the Japanese fascination for the French education system. On their visit to France, the Iwakura Mission spent a large portion of the two months visiting Parisian institutions of higher learning – attempting to discover the foundations of the “knowledge-based” economy. Having visited several universities and professional schools, the members of the Iwakura Mission concluded that the French education system presented a paragon of a successful organization of national schooling and was worthy of imitation. There were two aspects of the French education system that fascinated the Iwakura embassy. One was practicality, that is, the inclusion of subjects which would help those who studied them to earn a living. The other was patriotism; teaching which would reinforce “awareness of the nation and the citizen’s duties to it” (Beasly 95). The Iwakura Embassy’s interest in French education was immediately followed by subsequent education reforms under the Meiji government.

Like the education system, the French military organization proved equally appealing to the leaders of the members of the Iwakura Mission and those of the Meiji Era. The Emissaries observed that the French military organization stood at the root of French military successes abroad. They believed, Kume wrote, that “when a general of military genius emerges to spur them on, their might is so invincible that they cast ravenous eyes over the whole of Europe” (22). As a result, the French military organization was deemed worthy of imitation. In Meiji Japan, the government invited a French military advisory group to help re-model the Japanese military according to the French system. And although in March 1884 Acting Army Minister Saigo “authorized the patterning of the Army War College after the highly professional Prussian model,” the Army Academy was still kept close to the French system, which, according its advocates, placed much value on the moral of the officers (Morley 12).

Besides their interest in French economy, education and military, the members of the Iwakura Embassy paid much attention to French policy abroad. More specifically, they were interested in, what we would now denote as French imperialism. As Ian Nish claimed, one of the lessons that the mission might have learned was “the desirability of acquiring a colonial empire” (76). The members were mostly interested in the economic advantages of holding possessions abroad, describing them as “important sources of raw materials for manufacturing.” Interestingly, Kume saw a parallel between France and Japan in their respective efforts to colonize other countries. He suggested that “Algeria’s geographical position vis-à-vis France resembled that of Korea towards Japan” (Kume). Because of this, it was only a matter of time until Japan, like France, would attempt to assert its imperialistic power over weaker states.

Despite an overwhelming fascination and praise for everything French, it must be said that there were a few aspects of the French civilization that the members of the mission found unsuitable for Japan. Ironically, however, these aspects were often adopted by the Meiji government as well; many features of the French civilization deemed inappropriate were eventually embraced through a series of reforms by the Meiji administration. For instance, Kume criticized the French legal and judiciary system, claiming that the introduction of French laws and regulations to Japan would be “like trying to square [a] block of wood into a round hole” (135). He saw two major problems that would arise in the introduction of the French legal system in Japan. First, he believed that the system relied much on the people who are trained as professional lawyers, suggesting that “no one is sufficiently familiar with the study of law” in Japan (134). Second, he saw differences between the Western and the Eastern moral codes, maintaining that in Japan, unlike in the West, “it is considered a virtue not to reveal other people’s affairs, so disclosing information frankly is regarded with distaste” (135). Paradoxically, however, Kume’s fellow citizens disagreed diametrically with his critique of the French legal system, and were eager to adopt it in its entirety. The Meiji Government appointed Misukuri Rinsho to translate all five French law codes, which were viewed as so suitable for Japan that Eto Shimpei suggested that “[they] merely translate the French civil code verbatim, call it the ‘Japanese Civil Code,’ and promulgate it immediately” (Wakabayashi 41). As the enthusiastic adoption of the French legal system proved, even the features of French civilization deemed unsuitable by Kume were often embraced by the Meiji Government.

Undertaking a Vernesque Tour du Monde in less than three years, the Iwakura Embassy played an important role in shaping Japanese perceptions of the West, as well as changing Japan itself. Kume left a fascinating account of the mission’s travels in the West, exposing much about the Embassy’s goals, aspirations, and accomplishments. The ultimate accomplishment of the Iwakura Embassy, however, seemed to lie in its ability to learn, to filter and then to adopt, an ability elegantly summarized by a new national newspaper, Nihon, published on the day the Japanese constitution was announced: We recognize the excellence of Western civilization. We value the Western theories of rights, liberty, and equality; and we respect Western philosophy and morals. We have affection for some Western custom. Above all, we esteem Western science, economics and industry. These, however, ought not to be adopted simply because they are Western; they ought to be adopted only if they can contribute to Japan’s welfare (Pyle 94).

Short yet precise, the announcement epitomizes all that the Iwakura Mission stood for – the search, not for a civilization, as a monolithic entity, but for an assemblage of parts, selected for their potential contribution to Japan’s welfare. As such, the Embassy represented an important aspect in the Japanese culture in the past and in the present – a careful cultural syncretism. Syncretism, in which, foreign cultural imports have undertaken a quasi-independent development in Japan, in which foreign ideas and products have been rethought, reshaped, and reformulated to fit the Japanese context. France had long played an important role as a source of inspiration for the Japanese syncretism. Starting with the Embassy’s fascination for France in 1870s, through the popularity of the French New Wave among Japanese filmmakers in the 1960’s, the French-dreaming was, is, and will be alive and well in Japan. It might thus come as little surprise that a major Japanese cultural import of today carries a telling name – Comme des Garcons. This Japanese fashion label, that became one of the most recognizable names in the industry, imitates and reshapes the aspects of peasant style traditionally associated with rural France. In doing so, Comme des Garcons epitomizes Japanese syncretism in its purest form; in doing so, it relates, perhaps unconsciously, to the old tradition of borrowing from the West as established by the Iwakura Embassy on its quixotic journey around the World; and in doing so, it changes the way Japan sees the world, and the way Japan sees itself.

Works Cited

Beasley, W. G. Japan Encounters the Barbarian : Japanese Travelers in America and Europe, 1860-1873. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995.

Gluck, Carol. Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985. -

–. Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period. Princeton, N.J. : Princeton. University Press, 1985.

Kume, Kunitake, Graham Healey, and Chūshichi Tsuzuki. The Iwakura Embassy, 1871-73: A True Account of the Ambassador Extraordinary & Plenipotentiary’s Journey of Observation through the United States of America and Europe. 1st ed. Chiba, Japan; Princeton, N.J.: Japan Documents; Distributed in North America by Princeton University Press, 2002.

Morley, James William. Japan’s Foreign Policy, 1868-194; a Research Guide. New York: Columbia University Press, 1974.

Nish, Ian Hill. The Iwakura Mission in America and Europe: A New Assessment. Vol. 6. Richmond, Surrey U.K.: Japan Library, 1998.

Pyle, Kenneth B. The New Generation in Meiji Japan; Problems of Cultural Identity, 1885- 1895. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1969.

Thomas, J. E. Modern Japan: A Social History since 1868. London ; New York: Longman, 1996.

Wakabayashi, Bob Tadashi. Modern Japanese Thought. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Introduction

China’s energy plans have always been a function of demand and technological innovation, which are both growing rapidly in the country. But the recent tragedy at the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear plant in Japan has introduced a new variable into China’s energy-planning function: safety. The nuclear fallout at Fukushima was caused by a 9.0 magnitude earthquake and subsequent tsunami — both distinct possibilities in earthquake-prone China. (Lester, 2011) For that reason, the Chinese government suspended the construction of new nuclear power plants near its coastal cities and started a process of inspection of all its nuclear power-generating facilities. (IAEA, 2011) China’s nuclear ambitions have been put on hold, but probably not for long.

China’s current nuclear ambitions are extraordinary. If things progress as planned, China will construct more nuclear power-generating facilities than the rest of the world combined over the next twenty years. (Lester, 2008) It has not placed all its eggs in one basket either: China is already the world leader in the production of solar and wind technologies. Its growing energy needs have forced it to become a global leader in developing sophisticated energy technologies, a rarity for a developing country. This paper will focus less on China’s growing energy demand and more on its burgeoning energy supply, that is, its greater planned capacity for power generation. Although nuclear power has long been touted as the answer to China’s environmental and energy crises, recent events at Fukushima have cast doubt on its future viability as a source of clean, safe power generation. Will China choose to sacrifice its nuclear ambitions? Will it redirect its investments to other clean energies? Probably not, but its government will have to face the risk of a repeat of the Fukushima disaster.

China’s Accelerating Energy Demand

China’s accelerating energy demand has global implications. It surpassed the United States as the world’s largest carbon-dioxide emitter in 2008, despite using about 80 percent less energy per-capita. (Joerrs et al., 2009) China’s high carbon-dioxide emissions can be attributed to its heavy reliance on coal as the major source of power-generation. More than 80 percent of the country’s power generation comes from coal alone; clean power-generation by contrast accounts for just 3 percent of the total. (World Nuclear Association, 2011) China’s reliance on coal—which accounts for approximately 30 percent of its emissions—has translated into severe environmental degradation and public health problems. (Joerrs et al., 2009) Its rising affluence may not moderate these negative effects, as has been the case in other rapidly developing countries. For example, just seven out of every 1000 Chinese drive an automobile—compared with 120 per every 1000 in the rest of the world (in the developed world this statistic is even higher). If Chinese levels of automobile usage were to rise to global levels, its CO2 emissions would rise dramatically (as would oil prices). (Joerrs et al., 2009) This is perhaps one of the reasons the Chinese Government has invested so heavily in high-speed rail technology in recent years.

Figure 1: China's Energy Demand 1978-2009

China’s Clean Energy Plans

Despite its high dependence on coal and huge coal reserves, China has invested relatively little in clean coal technologies. (BP, 2011) It has instead funneled its investments into clean energy sources, namely hydro, nuclear, wind and solar power. Approximately 16 percent of China’s current electric power is generated through hydropower; 2 percent through nuclear; and the remaining 1 percent split between wind and solar. (World Nuclear Association, 2011) However, a 2010 report by McKinsey and Company estimates that if China’s current investment trends in clean energy continue, the country’s share of power generated through hydro, nuclear, wind and solar power could exceed 50 percent by 2030. (Woetzel et al., 2010) This estimate speaks to China’s clean energy ambitions and desire to diversify its energy portfolio, as outlined in the country’s 10th, 11th and 12th Five-Year Plans.

Nuclear

The McKinsey Report estimates that nuclear power generation may account for approximately 16 percent of the country’s power generation by 2030—a significant increase from its modest 2 percent share as of 2010. (Woetzel et al., 2010) Nuclear power holds several advantages over wind and solar power. Although it is capital intensive, nuclear power generation requires a relatively small use of land and is easily connected to already existing power grids. Wind and solar power, by contrast, both require the extensive use of land and can only be harnessed in remote areas where the wind and sun are more concentrated. Consequently, most wind and solar power generation occurs thousands of miles away from centers of demand. (Kong, 2010)

Figure 2

Figure 2 is a map of China’s existing and planned nuclear power plants. China’s energy demand is far from evenly distributed: all of China’s nuclear plants are concentrated in the most developed parts of the country along the eastern coast. (World Nuclear Association, 2011) This not only reflects the need for energy in the coastal areas, but also the fact that nuclear power generation requires large amounts of water, which can only be attained from the sea or large rivers. (IAEA, 2011) Even the more sophisticated nuclear power plants require lots of water, reducing the likelihood of adopting nuclear power generation as the solution to future demands for electricity in China’s interior. Wind, solar and coal will have to suffice there.

Most of the nuclear power plants under construction in China employ Generation II (Gen II) nuclear reactors. (World Nuclear Association, 2011) These Gen II reactors are largely the products of Chinese design and innovation, but in order to move up to Gen III and Gen IV reactors, China will need to cooperate with foreign governments and tech firms. It is already doing so with the construction of four Gen III plants in Sanmen and Haiyang by the State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation, which are slated for completion by 2015. (World Nuclear Association, 2011) The government acquired the Gen III reactor technology being used in the Sanmen and Haiyang plants from Westinghouse, a leader in the development of nuclear electric power generation. The decision to import foreign technology in this case was a departure from previous practices of using only domestic nuclear technology in the majority of its operations. (China is capable of producing about 70 percent of the parts needed in Gen II reactors.) However, it reflects the Chinese government’s desire for cleaner and safer nuclear technologies.

Figure 3: Westinghouse's AP1000

The Westinghouse AP 1000 Gen III reactors being built at Sanmen and Haiyang are estimated to be 100 times safer than their Gen II predecessors. (IAEA, 2011) Many of the reactors at the Fukushima-Daiichi plant were Gen II reactors. Originally commissioned in 1971, the Fukushima reactors were scheduled to be decommissioned at the start of 2011, in line with the standard 40-year life span of Gen II reactors. But improvements made to the reactors—in step with global nuclear technology enhancements and improved standards—permitted 10 more years of power generation at the plant. (Lester, 2011) The life spans of nuclear reactors are indeed long; most of the Gen II reactors (also called Gen II+ reactors because they are outfitted with the latest technology enhancements) being built in China are expected to be in operation 60 to 70 years after their original commission date. (Lester, 2008) This means that China’s use of just a few safer Gen III reactors will not cancel out the much higher safety risks posed by its use of many Gen II+ reactors.

If China’s current Gen II+ reactors were to be subjected to Fukushima-like forces, they may be unable to cool properly, which was the root of the tragedy at Fukushima. The AP1000 model employs a passive containment cooling system that does not require electric input to cool down. (IAEA, 2011) When the tsunami destroyed Fukushima’s back-up generators, the electric power supply to the cooling system was lost and nuclear fuel rods began to overheat. The resulting attempts to cool the fuel rods were what eventually cast radioactivity into the atmosphere, not the breach of any of the reactors’ containment chambers. (Lester, 2011) Fukushima proves that current safety standards that require nuclear fallout to be contained within the plant’s facility do not guarantee that radioactivity will not escape to larger areas. There is always a risk in using nuclear power, even if it steadily diminishes with the advent of new technological innovations.

Solar

China is already the world’s largest producer of solar technologies. (Li, 2009) Yet despite this, the country receives less than a percent of its total power generation from solar sources. This is a testament to the relative youth of the industry, but also to solar power’s limited viability in China today. Solar power will become more viable with increased westward expansion and constant technological upgrades. In fact, McKinsey estimates that solar power could account for as much as 8 percent of China’s total power generation in 2030. (Woetzel et al., 2010)

Adopting the use of solar power as a major generator of electricity will depend in large part on Chinese investments in the use of ultra-high-voltage (UHV) transmission lines. (Li, 2009) UHV lines transmit electricity over long distances without losing much voltage, but they are extremely costly to build and maintain. (Winning, 2009) The development of UHV lines is essential to the future success of Concentrated Solar Power (CSP). CSP involves the use of large mirrors to focus sunlight on large tanks of water to generate steam. The Chinese government has authorized the establishment of a gigantic CSP facility in Central China where the sunlight is the most intense. Transporting that energy to the coastal cities will depend on the successful development of UHV lines. (Liu, 2011)

Photovoltaic (PV) solar power is another option in addition to CSP. It does not necessarily require the development of UHV lines, but instead requires vast amounts of land in order to produce enough energy for it to be worthwhile. (Li, 2009) PV solar power is the more conventional type of solar power—photovoltaic cells are the light absorbing components of solar panels. Finding large amounts of unutilized land around China’s eastern cities is a difficult task; not to mention that buying enough land to make PV cells work would be very expensive. Despite its obvious limits to domestic use, the Chinese have invested billions of dollars in PV solar cell technology. Expected improvements in PV cell technology are expected to contribute to huge reductions in cost, and could induce an export market for the technology. (McKinsey, 2010) (Using PV solar power in China today is about 500 percent more expensive than simply burning coal, but should only be 50 percent more expensive by 2030.) Regardless of the future of a substantial market for PV solar cells in China, it is likely that there will at least be demand for such goods from the United States or Europe—both well behind China in solar technology.

Wind

In addition to investing heavily in solar technology, the Chinese are also pouring money into the development of more advanced wind technology. McKinsey estimates that electricity generated from wind power could account for up to 12 percent of China’s total power generation in 2030—a substantial increase from less than a percent today. (McKinsey, 2010) But wind power like solar polar is also subject to considerable limitations. Onshore wind generation facilities require lots of land and wind—both of which are only available in large supply in the northwestern China, the least developed part of the country. Western wind farms could be connected to eastern centers of demand via UHV lines, but this would probably be more costly than the CSP case since the distance the electricity would have to travel would be greater. Onshore wind power is limited by its remote sources.

Offshore wind farms, located in the sea, do not suffer from such limitations and are known to produce more energy (there’s more wind). The Chinese have started to build offshore wind farms off the eastern shores of the country but such projects are complicated by the unpredictable corrosive powers of the ocean. Building and maintenance fees are 35 percent higher for offshore wind farms than they are for onshore ones. (McKinsey, 2010) Those added costs might currently dwarf the costs of transmitting energy over thousands of miles from the west, but there is also speculation that China’s green future could be redeemed by an inevitable demographic trend: migration to the west. The soaring property prices in eastern China are forcing producers to move their production elsewhere, where land and labor costs are lower. China’s central and western territories—the hubs for CSP solar power and onshore wind power generation—are alluring targets for low-cost production.

Challenges

China is undoubtedly experiencing a green revolution. But contrary to popular belief that revolution is not the product of some well-developed plan on the part of China’s Central Government. (Ahrens, 2010) Energy projects in China are not driven by national policies, but instead by narrow corporate and local interests. (Lester, 2008) In fact, China’s Central Government has never really had much success in dictating national energy policy. Today, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) is in charge of planning long-term energy strategy, setting energy prices, and approving potential energy projects. Established in 2003, it is the direct successor to two failed initiatives by the Central Government to play a more proactive role in controlling energy policy implementation: the State Energy Commission (SEC) in the early 80’s and the Ministry of Energy (MOE) in the late 80’s and early 90’s. (Brookings, 2008) Both the SEC and MOE suffered from a lack of manpower and direct control. The NDRC has more of both but is operating in a much more complicated environment: while the number of decision makers has expanded, the power of regulatory bodies and policy centers like NDRC has declined. This may have serious consequences for the development of China’s cleaner technology industries.

This is especially true in the nuclear power industry. Some of China’s biggest State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are involved in the development of nuclear power generation. China has 3 major enterprises devoted to the construction of nuclear power facilities and the development of new nuclear technologies: China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), China Guangdong Nuclear Power Group (CGNPG) and the small but well-connected State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation (SNPTC). (World Nuclear Association, 2011) These three companies compete for new nuclear projects and are largely responsible for the spike in the number of planned nuclear power facilities. They do not receive the capital for their projects from the central government. Instead, they receive loans from state banks or equity investments from municipal or provincial energy development corporations—both of which are controlled by local, rather than national, officials. (Brookings, 2008) This illustrates a more serious problem in China: the growing tensions between the central government, which makes policy, and local governments, which implement it.

The disconnect between regulators at the national level and investors on the local one may lead to greater safety risks. Chinese SOEs may actually construct too many facilities for regulators and engineers to handle. If China’s nuclear ambitions are realized, the number of regulators and engineers needed to staff the new plants will have to more than quadruple. (World Nuclear Association, 2011) It is easy enough to build a nuclear power plant that satisfies all safety regulations, but the most important element to nuclear safety is constant and consistent maintenance. (Lester, 2011) It takes between 4 and 8 years to train a nuclear engineer or regulator and even longer to develop a culture of constant and consistent maintenance. Current trends have not been optimistic. (IAEA, 2011) In fact, the NDRC has recommended that the Chinese strive for 70GeV of electric power generation from nuclear power facilities by 2020 but current corporate estimates show that that number is expected to exceed 80GeV. (World Nuclear Association, 2011) CNNC is expected to invest $120 billion dollars in nuclear energy projects by 2020. (Ahrens, 2010) CGNPG, the most active of the three major nuclear companies, is expected to operate or construct 32 units new units by 2020—many of them already under construction. (World Nuclear Association) The Central Government is indirectly to blame for some of this corporate excess. By mandating that developed provinces like Guangdong maintain high growth rates, pressure is put on local leaders to stimulate growth, sometimes with inefficient energy projects.

Conclusion

China’s energy future may be heading towards disaster. The country may be home to more nuclear facilities than it can handle. The Central Government’s emphasis on supplying new energy to meet rising demand does not make a nuclear accident any more forgivable. If a massive earthquake were to strike coastal China, the social outrage would easily outweigh that of Fukushima or Sichuan. The social costs would also be much higher, and could have political consequences for the staying power of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). All indicators point toward China’s persistence in its nuclear program. Constant technological innovations will increase safety, but they will fail to reduce the risk of a disaster if there are insufficient personnel to provide maintenance. It is also worth remembering that the majority of nuclear reactors being built in China today are Gen II—comparable to Fukushima—and that they benefit from few of the technological innovations mentioned above. China’s nuclear ambitions run the risk of self-inflicted tragedy.

Wind and solar technologies are hardly perfect substitutes. Their development is attributed primarily to the interaction between corporate and local interests rather than the prescriptions of national priorities. The politics of China’s 5 major grid companies are not well understood, but it is at least clear that they impede progress in developing a smart grid. Each year China adds the equivalent of the United Kingdom’s power grid to its repertoire, gradually eroding its ability to implement a smart grid capable of connecting the country’s incredible energy potential. Ultimately, China’s long-term energy development decisions are made by corporate and local actors with neither the incentive nor the ability to see the big picture.

Works Cited

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Brookings Institute. “Energy Security Series.” Brookings Institute. The Brookings Foreign Policy Studies Energy Security Series: China, 1 Jan. 2008. Web. 28 May 2011. <http://www.brookings.edu/fp/research/energy/2006china.pdf>.

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Joerrs, Martin, Jonathan Woetzel, and Haimeng Zhang. “China’s Green Opportunity – McKinsey Quarterly – Economic Studies – Productivity & Performance.” Articles by McKinsey Quarterly: Online Business Journal of McKinsey & Company. Business Management Strategy – Corporate Strategy – Global Business Strategy. McKinsey and Co., 1 Jan. 2009. Web. 01 May 2011. <http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/Chinas_green_opportunity_2364>.

Kong, Bo, and SAIS. “Assessing China’s Energy Security.” Johns Hopkins University, SAIS. Energy, Resources and Environment Program, SAIS, 26 Oct. 2010. Web. 20 Apr. 2011. <http://csis.org/files/attachments/102610_Bkong_0.pdf>.

Lester, Richard K., Edward A. Steinfeld, and Edward S. Cunningham. “Greener Plants, Grayer Skys?” Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1 Aug. 2008. Web. 25 Apr. 2011. <http://web.mit.edu/ipc/publications/pdf/08-003.pdf>.

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Li, Dai. “China’s Solar Power Sector.” London Research International. London Research International, 1 Jan. 2009. Web. 1 May 2011. <http://www.londonresearchinternational.com/Pu09_China_PV_Final.pdf>.

Liu, Coco. “China Rebuilds Its Power Grid as Part of Its Clean Technologies Push.” The New York Times – Breaking News, World News & Multimedia. The New York Times, 20 Apr. 2011. Web. 01 May 2011. <http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2011/04/20/20climatewire-china-rebuilds-its-power-grid-as-part-of-its-72213.html?pagewanted=2>.

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-Takashi Korekiyo (Johnson 1982: 156)

There are few figures in Japan’s modern history who generate as much controversy and as little understanding as Kishi Nobusuke (1896-1987). It is not hard to understand why. At one time or another Kishi was the Japanese leader of Manchuria; the head of Japan’s Ministry of Munitions; a suspected Class A war criminal; one of the leading architects of Japan’s “economic miracle;” and the Prime Minister of Japan (Kurzman 1960). Kishi is also perhaps the most startling example of the continuity of leadership that followed Japan’s defeat in World War II: the same men who led the war effort also led Japan’s recovery from it. Although he was by no means the single most important figure either during or after the war, his thoughts and activities have had a long-lasting impact on the Japanese economy, most especially his development of industrial policy. As we will see, Kishi’s wartime experiences explain a lot of his—and by extension Japan’s—post-war success. This paper will seek to answer how Kishi’s experiences during the Second World War affect Japan’s post-war economic experience. In answering the above question we will come closer to understanding the complicated legacy of one of Japan’s most controversial 20th century leaders, and in so doing, also come closer to understanding Japan’s complicated World War II legacy, for the two can’t be understood without each other.

There was much more than biographical continuity among many of the wartime and post-war leaders of Japan—there was also a remarkable degree of institutional continuity as well (Gordon 2003). The most important post-war ministry was the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, also known as MITI which was established in 1949. Its predecessors, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI) and the Ministry of Munitions (MM), grew in importance during the war effort despite barely existing before it. The MCI was brought into being in 1924 after the split of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, and it is where Kishi Nobusuke got his start in the bureaucracy (Johnson 1982). Its recent origins made the MCI a marginal player in the Japanese bureaucracy, but its influence would grow in step with Kishi’s ambitions. By the time 1930 rolled around it was in charge of running Japan’s economy, a testament to the severe economic crises of the late 1920’s and the ability of its leaders to address them. By the time, Kishi was still a junior-ranking bureaucrat. However, Yoshino Shinji, his senior mentor, was most responsible for the economic policy that came out of MCI at the time. Yoshino was the Vice Minister of MCI from 1931 to 1936, and his and Kishi’s dominance of economic policymaking in the 1930’s has often been called the “Yoshino-Kishi Line” (Johnson 1982: 66). The two men are the inventers of industrial policy, whereby the state intervenes in markets to allocate resources to certain strategic industries and to see to it that they develop in line with larger national interests (Gao 1997).

The development of industrial policy may be the most important legacy of Japan’s tragic war effort. In 1930, it was a consequence of Japan’s own economic crisis and a much larger crisis of capitalism that had resulted in a global economic depression. That year, at Yoshino’s recommendation, Kishi left Japan for Germany, where he would spend seven months studying the experiments in state control of the economy that were already underway there (Johnson 1982). In July, he wrote to Yoshino of the German devotion to “technological innovation in industries, to the installation of the most up-to-date machines and equipment and to generally increasing efficiency” (Johnson 1982: 108). He noted how the German government had set up trusts and cartels to promote production and employment, both of which had suffered huge setbacks in the hyperinflationary 1920’s. When Kishi and Yoshino reunited in late 1930 they charged themselves with creating an economic policy that would serve as an antidote to Japan’s economic ills, which were not all that different from Germany’s.

In 1931, with the conflict in Manchuria escalating and the Depression lingering, Yoshino and Kishi collaborated to pass the Important Industries Law, which gave Japanese companies the power to cartelize, using temporary treaties, in order to boost their production. That it was a slight modification on Kishi’s 1930 statements reflects the influence of Yoshino’s personal philosophy, which differed slightly from that of his protégé. Yoshino believed that companies could control their own cartelization and that relaxing competition—coupled with state subsidies—would allow them to boost production in the national interest. Kishi was in favor of something closer to the German model where the state had control over cartelization and oversight of production (Johnson 1982). He would later employ this strategy as the head of MCI in the early 1940’s. At the time, both Yoshino and Kishi thought that the only way to boost production was to deemphasize competition.

The Important Industries Law sought to address some of the lagging concerns of the late 1920s’ and pave the way for a more productive decade in the 1930’s. Japan at the time was plagued by a “dual structure” in the economy: on the one hand, huge zaibatsu had inefficient monopolies over most means of production, while on the other hand, the small and medium firms—which paled in productive capacity to the zaibatsu but employed more workers—were engaged in cut throat competition to supply basic goods and service to the Japanese population (Gao 1997). Workers in small and medium firms made a fraction of what their counterparts in the zaibatsu were earning, and their prevalence in the population meant much social unrest and potentially destructive consequences for Japan’s government. By allowing the cartelization of industries, Kishi and Yoshino took the profit principle out of the corporate governance equation and replaced it with a concern for the public interest (koueki). (Gao 1997) Their law also benefited some companies more than others, in particular the heavy industries, which required more capital, manpower, and expertise than others. Following 1931, and for the rest of Yoshino’s tenure as Vice-Minister, MCI emphasized the development of the heavy and chemical industries in Japan. As Yoshino put it, “industry needs a plan of comprehensive development and a measure of control” (Johnson 1982: 108). This was consistent with Japanese military actions in Manchuria, and larger Japanese security concerns about the potential military threat from the United States.

Japan in the 1930’s was even more tumultuous than it had been in the 1920’s. While politicians and businessmen were largely failing to handle the situation largely because both groups failed to get public trust, industrial nationalist bureaucrats like Kishi managed the economy. These kakushin kanryou, or “reform bureaucrats” (Gao 1997: 77), were committed to Japan’s military pursuit during the war and its economic “conquests” after the war (Johnson 1982). They mistrusted the zaibatsu and had faith in the state’s ability to manage the economy and the war effort. Kishi became directly entangled in Japan’s war effort in 1936 when he was appointed the head of Japanese economic operations in Manchukuo, Japan’s puppet regime in Manchuria. After five years of occupying Manchuria, the Japanese had made only modest economic footholds. Their only source of real economic power was in the management of the South Manchurian Railway Company, headed by Kishi’s longtime friend, Matsuoka Yousuke, also from Yamaguchi Prefecture. Matsuoka was the Foreign Minister for Japan in 1940 that sealed the deal on the Tripartite Pact, forming the axis alliance. While working under Yoshino at MCI, Kishi also sent many of his most able-minded protégés to work on industrial policy in Manchukuo, making his eventual tenure there something of a reunion. In addition to working closely with Matsuoka, Kishi was also reunited with his great friend and future Vice-Minister at MCI, Shiina Etsusaburo (Johnson 1982). The 1940’s and 1950’s were often referred to as the “Kishi-Shiina line” because of their shared dominance of economic policymaking (Johnson 1982: 131). Their ideas are still relevant to understanding Japan’s economy today. Much of the policy that they enacted over the between 1940 and 1960 was at least partially borne from their experiments with industrial policy in Manchukuo from 1936 to 1939. Manchukuo was the perfect starting ground (they also referred to is as the “proving ground”) for their ideas: the government was supplying them with plenty of capital free of political or bureaucratic entanglements, and the military engagements in the region put constant pressure on the productive capacity of the region, prompting Kishi and Shiina to adopt top-down state-mandated policies. (Johnson 1982: 132) While the Yoshino-Kishi line of the early thirties was about “self-control,” the Kishi-Shiina line that would followe was about “state-control.”

Tojo Hideki, the Commander of the Kwangtung Army in Manchukuo and eventual Prime Minister of Japan, who had first requested Kishi’s presence in Manchuria, again selected Kishi as the Minister for MCI later in 1941. His Vice-Minister was Shiina; together, Kishi and Shiina would bring their practice of industrial policy to the heart of the Empire and in so doing put themselves at the heart of the war effort. The Kishi-Shiina line replaced the Yoshino-Kishi line of the 1930’s, but not surprisingly there were many similarities between the two especially concerning automobile acts (Gao 1997). Yoshino and Kishi’s last act before resigning as heads of MCI was to pass the Automobile Licensing Law, which made it mandatory for automobile manufacturers to get MCI licenses for production. Kishi granted licenses to only two firms: Nissan and Toyota. Nissan, the bigger of the two at the time, was one of the major economic forces behind Japan’s efforts in Manchuria. The law not only gave both companies clear advantages because they were the only legal producers of automobiles, but also signaled a new direction for industrial policy: now the state, not companies, was in control (Johnson 1982). Later, in 1938 while Kishi was in Manchuria, the Japanese government passed the National General Mobilization Law, which was in the spirit of Kishi’s state-controlled industrial policy and in some ways a modification of his and Yoshino’s 1931 Important Industries Law. The new law gave the state power over management and production to ensure that all resources of the nation were employed for the national interest. The cartels that the government put together were called Control Associations. The move was also seen around the world as a kind of declaration of Japanese hostility and preparation for war (Gordon 2003).

In fact, Japan was already so mired in a war in Manchuria. When Kishi and Shiina took charge at MCI in 1941 they inherited an economy that was grossly inefficient and unprepared for the coming struggle in the Pacific against the United States. The National General Mobilization Act was partly to blame. It allowed the state to organize cartels but provided little oversight over what was produced. Although there was political incentive to shift production from consumer goods to military ones, there was as of yet no economic incentive or logic for doing so. Kishi and Shiina worked to fix this. They passed the Enterprise Readjustment Act, which was geared at helping producers to transition their lines of production from consumer goods to military ones. Officials from MCI were assigned to factories to ensure that “adjustments” were made, and within 18 months of the passing of the Enterprise Readjustment Act, most producers were reined in and contributing to the war effort (Johnson 1982). The difference between this Kishi-Shiina intervention and that of the Yoshino-Kishi years was the state’s heavy hand in ensuring production for the public interest. Competition was still relaxed and the profit principle virtually non-existent, but the transition from “self-control” on the part of companies to “state-control” dominance of industry was complete.

Not surprisingly, the transition from “self-control” to “state-control” hurt consumers. Consumer goods were virtually impossible to find by the time war with the United States rolled around because they had been substituted out for military goods (Johnson 1982). This transition partially reflected Kishi’s own personal belief in the preeminence of the state and mistrust of big business, but it was probably due more to the state of economic crisis and necessity that prevailed on the eve of war with America. As before, economic policy and innovation were motivated by crisis (Gao 1997). Kishi’s 1931 Important Industries Law was an attempt to balance zaibatsu interests with the public interest—namely the livelihoods of owners and workers in small and medium-sized firms. The law was only partially successful in achieving this, but it did supply the country with consumer and military goods to satisfy the country’s growing demands. Most of its successes were erased by the consequences of the Enterprise Readjustment Act, which ironically empowered the zaibatsu and disenfranchised the consumer. In the short-term, the move was an attempt to support a hopeless war effort: companies and markets could not effectively allocate resources to the battlefields but the state could (Gao 1997). Kishi and Shiina succeeded in bringing the country to a state of “total war,” where every able- bodied man or woman was working in factories to produce munitions for Japan’s deteriorating war cause (Gordon 2003). In the long run this led to the erosion of light industries in Japan, which had been replaced by the heavy industries during the 1940’s (Johnson 1982). Silk and textile mills were converted into aircraft and shipbuilding plants—Kishi’s and Yoshino’s earlier goal of a heavily industrialized country was finally realized. But at a huge cost: just two years later Japan would surrender in World War II and its prospects for future prosperity were necessarily bleak.

Kishi was still supportive of the war effort in 1943, when he and Tojo took the final step toward complete state domination of industry with the creation of the Ministry of Munitions (Johnson 1982). MM was the direct successor to MCI and would eventually be transformed into MITI during the Occupation. It was the leader in a hopeless war effort, and Kishi began to realize such starting in 1944. When Japan finally did accept defeat in August of 1945, Kishi, along with Tojo and dozens of others, was imprisoned in Sugamo Prison to await trial by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Kurzman 1960). Tojo was hanged in 1948 but Kishi was never tried, despite being suspected of Class A War Crimes. His non-trial is probably more a testament to the American change of heart toward Japan in 1947—called the “Reverse Course”—than any absence of guilt (Gordon 2003). Throughout most of the war effort his peers and the public revered Kishi as a man of unmatched intelligence and foresight despite the fact that most of his successes extended the war and the country’s misery (Kurzman 1960). Now the country was in utter ruin and Kishi a marginalized figure of the wartime elite.

The American victors quickly established their supremacy in Occupation era Japan. They dismantled and changed many of the institutions and practices that Kishi had promoted as Minister of Munitions. They replaced an Empire with an American-style democracy and a Naval Officer Prime-Minister, Suzuki Kantaro, with an anti-war conservative, Yoshida Shigeru (Gordon 2003). Shigeru would become, along with Kishi, one of the founding fathers of the “1955 system” in Japan, but they hardly liked each other. Shigeru was suspicious of Kishi’s activities during the war, especially his heading the Ministry of Munitions (Johnson 1982). Shigeru worked with the Americans to try and reinvigorate Japan politically and economically. Kishi’s industrial policy came under fire. In 1949, the President of Detroit Bank, Joseph Dodge issued a set of policy recommendations—known as the “Dodge Line”—that attempted to inject many neo-classical ideas into Japan’s post-war economy. In particular, Dodge recommended the cessation of state subsidies to industry and the eradication of the Reconstruction Finance Bank, which was giving loans to fledging businesses uneconomically in Dodge’s view. Shigeru and his followers in the bureaucracy, who had filled the vacuum in Japanese politics left by the American Occupation, implemented Dodge’s plan in 1949 (Johnson 1982). But it was only a temporary measure. By 1951, the Japan Development Bank was created and continued the role of the Reconstruction Finance Bank.

Despite Shigeru’s attempts to populate the bureaucracy with officials loyal to him and not Kishi, he could not prevent Kishi’s idea of industrial policy from sticking. Nor did he necessarily want to; despite their political differences, Kishi and Shigeru were still devout nationalists and wanted to see an independent and economically viable Japan once more. After the reverse course, the broad goals of the American occupiers were necessarily narrowed: to make Japan a bastion against communism in the East, the Japanese would need a modest remilitarization and a substantial economic renaissance (Gordon 2003). The only way to achieve high growth in the short-term would be to have the state intervene in markets to once again effectively direct resources toward production for the public interest. Ikeda’s launch of the People’s Finance Corporation and Council for Industrial Rationalization in 1949 was a token of Kishi’s philosophy winning out, even among Yoshida’s closest followers (Gao 1997). The advent of the Korean War in 1950 woke up Kishi’s production machine as the Japanese began to fulfill American orders for munitions and battle supplies and started what would become the “high-growth era” in modern Japanese history—the start of Japan’s post-war economic miracle (Johnson 1982). Ironically, it was Ikeda’s MITI, the reincarnation of Kishi’s Ministry of Commerce and Industry, that led the economic mobilization of Japan’s resources after the war, just as Kishi’s MCI and MM had led the military mobilization during the war. By 1952, MITI was to come full circle: Ikeda was forced out due to a disparaging remark about the sacrifice of small and medium-sized firms, and Kishi, who was finally allowed back into public life, was placed at its helm (Johnson 1982).

The stunning continuity of leaders and institutions before, during, and after the war was a great contributor to Japan’s post-war economic success. The war, a tragic experience for all, was not necessarily useless: young and old leaders ambitiously pushed the envelope. The country’s meteoric economic growth in the 1950’s and 1960’s was a function of that ambition fitted to a new economic and political environment. In 1952, Kishi and his followers at MITI adapted their industrial policy to a new economic climate by passing the Enterprise Rationalization Promotion Law (Johnson 1982). By 1952, Japan and parts of Western Europe were again on their feet, supported and even propped up by the United States part of a new international order that promoted peace and the free exchange of goods and ideas (Gordon 2003). The industrial policy of the 1950’s was a product of this environment and differed from its earlier “self-control” and “state-control” iterations. The newest iteration was a synthesis of the previous two, a middle ground of sorts: they were balanced out by kyouchou, or “cooperation” (Johnson 1982: 108). This new philosophy was less about international cooperation, which was limited by Japan’s need to protect its infant industries, and more about cooperation among big business, the government, and bureaucracy.

Kishi left the bureaucracy in 1957 to become Prime Minister, but left a long and enduring legacy inside MITI. From 1952 to 1970, Kishi and his followers effectively ran MITI, and by extension the booming Japanese economy (Johnson 1982). The best example is Sahashi Shigeru, called “Mr. MITI,” who took over at MITI in 1966 after more than two decades of service under Kishi. (Johnson 1982: 215) Sahashi worked with Kishi and Shiina at MCI and was brought to MITI by Kishi in the early 1950’s. At MITI he headed the Enterprises Bureau, which was responsible for making long run economic policy, and later the Heavy Industries Bureau, which was in charge of promoting Japan’s many nascent industries including transistors, automobiles, television and steel (Johnson 1982). His philosophy perfectly mirrored the one Kishi had developed after visiting Germany in 1930 before the war had started. Japan in the 1950’s and 1960’s was known for its devotion to “technological innovation in industries, to the installation of the most up-to-date machines and equipment and to generally increasing efficiency” (Johnson 1982: 108). The theory may have existed before the war but Kishi’s experiences running the economy during and after it put that theory to the test. Those experiences weren’t just important for Kishi; they were also essential to dozens of other future leaders, including Sahashi Shigeru, Ikeda Hayato and Satou Eisaku. Kishi, Ikeda, and Satou (who was Kishi’s biological younger brother) would serve as Japan’s Prime Ministers from 1957 to 1972—all former wartime bureaucrats (Gordon 2003). Sahashi was confined to the bureaucracy by his controversial opinions on the war and extreme nationalist views. Kishi, who was similar to Sahashi in these respects, broke the confines of bureaucracy but experienced only modest success as Prime Minister.

His involvement in the war effort was never forgotten. Often remembered as the “ghost of the Showa Era,” no matter how much important Kishi’s wartime experiences may have helped his—and Japan’s—post-war success, there was always a great deal of public mistrust about him. The bureaucratic ambitions that he realized while working behind the scenes during the war did not translate well into the political spotlight (Packard 1966). Kishi’s Prime Ministership probably received more scrutiny than any other in the post-war error and was undoubtedly subjected to some of the greatest pressure in modern Japanese politics (Gordon 2003). It all came to a head in 1960, when Kishi unilaterally pushed the controversial extension of the US-Japan Security Alliance through the Diet on May 19. Yoshida Shigeru worked out the original security deal in 1951, but it called for an optional continuation in 1960. Kishi, eager to cement his legacy and tighten his grip on power, defied the public in passing the extension (Packard 1960). Protests enveloped Tokyo and precipitated Japans’ greatest democratic crisis to date—Kishi was the subject of much antagonism. As a professor at Tokyo University put it at the time, “the pent up resentment and jealousy toward all bureaucrats exploded against Kishi, whose insolence typified the worst aspects of prewar bureaucracy” (Packard 1960: 246). Kishi’s miscalculation—some say the only one of his life—cost him his political career. He resigned on June 21, 1960 (Packard 1966).

The reaction of ordinary Japanese toward Kishi’s dictatorial passage of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security highlights an ever-present dualism in modern Japanese history. It simultaneously showed how little and how much Japan had changed since the Second World War. Japan’s post-war economy was a product of the industrial policy borne from economic and political crises during the war years (Gao 1997). Ironically, the same nationalism and determination that fueled the Japanese war machine also fueled its phoenix-like economic recovery. The same institutions and people led the country before, during, and after the war (Johnson 1982). Kishi was probably one of the most important people who were in charge of one of the most important institutions during that time span. That he was loved during the war and hated after it is not just a product of his complicated personal legacy; it is a product of Japan’s even more complicated war legacy. There is no doubt that the war was a tragic experience for the Japanese. However, it is equally clear that 1945 was not the “birth” of a new Japan, as many then and now believe. Kishi Nobusuke is the perfect example.

Reference

Gao, Bai. Economic Ideology and Japanese Industrial Policy: Developmentalism from 1931 to 1965. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997. Print.

Gordon, Andrew. A Modern History of Japan: from Tokugawa times to the Present. New York: Oxford UP, 2003. Print.

Johnson, Chalmers. MITI and the Japanese Miracle: the Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1982. Print.

Kurzman, Dan. Kishi and Japan; the Search for the Sun. New York: I. Obolensky, 1960. Print.

Packard, George R. Protest in Tokyo; the Security Treaty Crisis of 1960,. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1966. Print.

A nation’s concern for its future often crystallizes around the status of its young women. As the literal and figurative keepers of the bloodline, young women in various cultures have been the subject of intense scrutiny. The patriarchal structure of Japanese society in particular upholds the traditionally chaste and obedient girl as an exemplar of womanhood, thus placing young Japanese women squarely at the “center of national racial defense” (Kinsella, 152). Yet identifying women as “the bodily vessels of national ethnicity” necessarily introduces conflicts of interest between repression and freedom, conformism and individuality, and of course, between patriarchal and feminine ideals (Kinsella, 152). In the midst of male-dominated society, young women have nevertheless managed to stage a silent but pervasive rebellion. In this paper, I will analyze women that consciously manipulate their styles, such as Lady Gaga and the ganguro (Black Face) girls, to reflect their critiques of society to expose the hidden maladies that the dominant society seeks to conceal.

Yet despite the wholehearted efforts made by these female subcultures to challenge social preconceptions, their attempts often fall flat in the face of a hegemonic social structure that ultimately absorbs new subcultures and often uses them for monetary gain. Subcultural protests are effectively and silently stripped of their power by the mass media and marketing machines that counter instances of iconoclastic self-portrayal. While they may not persist, the objections raised by these young women perpetuate the tensions between dominant and subordinate culture that ultimately enables the reshaping of society.

Changes in social perceptions are often precipitated by a traumatic national event. In Japan, WWII and the subsequent U.S. occupation intensified the conservative, traditional view of women that gave rise to the current male-dominated social structure. At the time, the threat to ethnic purity posed by American GIs raised fears that “Japanese womanhood would be raped and impregnated indiscriminately” by the incoming U.S. army (Kinsella, 153). The purity of Japanese girls required protection at all costs, and women who associated with the enemy were seen as licentious traitors by the “painfully emasculated male imagination” of the post-war period (Kinsella, 153). Indeed, the Japanese girl became a “panic site” in the sense that “visions of disaster…[and] spiritual collapse” coalesced around her image (Napier, 329). The post-WWII male establishment reincarnate is in the modern Japanese mass media. It is a field dominated by a conservative male press that decries female rebellion with racial slurs, derogatory names, and satirical articles. Regarding Japanese women as the “biological reproducers of the nation,” the press espouses traditional gender roles that view faithful schoolgirls as the “natural and enduring…partners of heroic young kamikaze pilots” (Kinsella, 152). In the context of the male media establishment, the pure girl becomes a national symbol and the torchbearer for the survival of the Japanese nation.

Yet the industrialization and commercialization that followed the Occupation resulted in a dramatic rise in disposable incomes that ushered in a new generation of young women. Unlike their forebears, these women possessed both the time and the money to cultivate a “full engagement with the culture of consumption” (Yoda, 13). The postmodern girl thus fulfilled the stipulations of time, energy, and money necessary for a rebellion against the traditional moors of society. These characteristics, coupled with an environment where “virtually any kind of person [could] be a celebrity or star,” produced a generation of self-aware, socially liberal young women not afraid to speak their minds or dress their bodies unlike any group before them (Sato, 96).

The outrageous fashion choices of these young women represent a purposeful challenge to the traditional social order. Running completely counter to the image of the faithful schoolgirl or obedient wife, women like Lady Gaga and the Japanese ganguro girls consciously use their styles to critique the underlying problems of society. Often dressed in skimpy, futuristic costumes with elaborate stage makeup and false eyelashes, Lady Gaga utterly and completely flouts existing social conventions. Although her risqué outfits – like the suit of raw meat she donned for the 2010 MTV Music Awards – draw fire from both male and female critics, she justifies her fashion choices as a pointed message against female objectification: “if [women] don’t fight for our rights, pretty soon we’re going to have as much rights as the meat on our bones” (Gaga quoted in Kit, 1). With such an explanation in mind, Gaga’s stylistic choices can be interpreted as a protest against the continued sexual objectification of women.

Like Lady Gaga, the dark-skinned, theatrically-accessorized styles of the ganguro (Black Face) girl subculture of the 1990s ran brazenly counter to traditional Japanese values. By donning tropical flowers on strings of necklaces and sporting dark fake tans, ganguro girls took on the various “hybrid ethnicities” that alternately confused and horrified media critics (Kinsella, 144). Their dark suntans prompted comparisons to “animals walking on the continent of Africa” and other social Darwinistic implications that stripped them of their humanity while denigrating darker races (Kinsella, 147). The ethnocentric, racially-tinged remarks elicited by the ganguro subculture exposed Japan’s continual insistence on ethnic purity, a national preoccupation since the years following WWII. Though the ganguro subculture may not have begun as an outright critique of racist ideology, its existence and various permutations (kogyaru and yamamba, for example) indicate that the girls discovered a racial sensitivity in the dominant Japanese culture which they relentlessly exposed in their desire to assert a new female independence. Like the ganguro girls, various other female fashion subcultures, such as the lolita and the cutie, also manipulate style as an assertion of individuality and rebelliousness.

On the whole, critics’ responses have been resoundingly negative. The media’s reception of Lady Gaga and the ganguro girls has been remarkably similar in their respective nations, with portrayals of these women as mindless, traitorous, and even less-than-human. In addition to drawing protests from PETA, Gaga’s meat outfit was derisively speculated to “smell like the rotting flesh that it is…[and] be crawling in maggots” (Collins, 1). Likewise, the ganguro girls have been not only been “accused of undermining tradition,” but have also been subjected to racial slurs and dehumanizing insults (Kinsella, 247). Epithets leveled at them include “ugly witches,” “moron black faces (ōbaka no ganguro),” and “girl-animal (gyanimal)” (Kinsella, 145-148). The harmless girls were labeled as “infantile” and “tasteless” in the uptight, conservative view of the mass media (Kinsella, 248). Criticisms by the male-dominated press clearly indicate the panic sites that these young women have become. The media sees in their blatant rejection of social standards the dissolution of traditional social moors that have ensured an orderly, smoothly functioning society. Although some critics are more sensitive to the young women’s cause, it is no wonder that the majority of popular media regards the new generation of girls as “inscrutable, amoral, and apocalyptic” (Yoda, 21).

In their experimentation with self-presentation and style, Lady Gaga and the various female subcultures in Japan may in fact be exercising a deeper form of power. The rise of such iconoclastic girls heralds the new role of sexuality as a vehicle for female ambitions – a so-called “lady power” (Bauer, 1). Starting in the post-war era and spurred by the availability of consumption, young women began to control their image as both the “objects and subjects of sexual desire,” affirming their femininity and using it as a form of control (Yoda, 20). Women like Gaga and the ganguro girls now revel in the power that overt sexuality endows, both over men and over the mass media. Yet inherent in lady power is the positive self-affirmation of a negative image. As Kinsella writes, “women debased as infantile and irresponsible began to fetishize and flaunt their shojo [girl] personality still more, almost as a means of taunting and ridiculing male condemnation” (250). Lady Gaga and the ganguro girls respond similarly to female objectification and racism, respectively—they exaggerate sexual and racial characteristics to the extreme. Such an active affirmation is inherently dangerous (for reasons described further below), but it allows the girls to turn social constructs around and “manipulate [sexism and misogyny in the society] to [their] own advantage” (Yoda, 5).

Not only does lady power grant more leverage in masculine society, it increases popularity in a capitalist social sphere. Popular Japanese bands such as SMAP often manipulate femininity as a marketing strategy and a way to attract an audience of both women and homosexual men. SMAP and their producers understand that “feminine sexuality is a social construct, [that] anyone, even a man who’s willing to buck against gender norms, can wield” to increase their popularity (Bauer, 2). Popular ever since their teens in the 1990s and featured on advertisements, billboards, and TV, SMAP clearly illustrates the power that feminine sexuality – even when completely constructed – has in the mass media. (That Lady Gaga also understands the construction of femininity is evident in the high-heeled men featured in her music videos.) Men like SMAP willing to take on more effeminate appearances are rewarded with increased popularity and a larger share of the consumer market.

Yet the wielding of such feminine power is, on the flip side, a dangerous gamble. By so clearly championing their sexuality, young women ironically risk being interpreted as the very image they seek to reject – a sexualized object. As Bauer writes, “the more successful the embodiment, the less obvious the analytic part is” (2). For Lady Gaga and her ganguro counterparts, the continuous self-affirmation of sexuality and race may in fact jeopardize the strength of their protests; the validity of their underlying messages is easily obscured by the glitz of their constructed appearances. Responses from many male critics indicate that this is in fact what is happening. Most are unable or refuse to see past the girls’ superficial getup to their implicit social critiques, preferring instead to categorize the girls in magazines resembling “illustrated picture books about birds, fish, or insects” (Kinsella, 150).

In addition to jeopardizing the very principles they fight for, female subcultures are also easily absorbed into society due to their transient nature. Like the Candies, a 1970s girl idol group, youth subcultures, such as the ganguro girls, spring up with a fervor that often lasts only as long as the adolescence of its members. Indeed, girlhood and its associated fashions and protests are seen as a transient “detour”—a “liminal girl-time” between birth and the eventual assimilation into society through marriage (Yoda, 17). Capitalizing on the transience of youth, the popular TV series Sunset Kitties marked the departure of each member into society and womanhood as a celebratory “graduation” (Yoda, 18). Although the sentimental gesture rarely occurs in real life, the entry into wifehood or motherhood in Japan is nonetheless considered a worthwhile achievement (Yoda, 17). A young woman’s time as a ganguro girl is thus clearly demarcated as a moratorium before the reincorporation of true adulthood. Given the fleeting nature of adolescence, female subcultures may only be able to protest for as long as their girlhood lasts; even Lady Gaga and the ganguro girls seem to realize the ephemeral nature of their existence and imbue its briefness with all the intensity they can muster.

These female groups are assimilated into society not only due to the transience of girlhood but also due to mass media’s active role in their incorporation. Once a new subculture is discovered, the intense media coverage that follows results in a dilution of its originality and forcefulness. Through large-scale coverage and advertising, the popularization of countercultural styles pulls subcultures into the mainstream and divests them of their unconventionality. The power of Lady Gaga and her ganguro girl counterparts does rest on public recognition to a certain extent—otherwise, their protests would never reach a wide enough audience. Yet popularity exceeding a critical point is ultimately detrimental. Mass media’s dissemination of subcultural styles relentlessly pushes the equilibrium towards the tipping point, until finally, what was once novel becomes banal. Like the “commercialization of bosozoku [motorcycle gang] style [that] facilitated nationwide diffusion of bosozoku symbolism and mass participation in the subcultural style,” the rising popularity of female subcultures only signals their eventual demise (Sato, 97).

The distinctiveness of countercultural groups is further diluted by mass market capitalism. Capitalist enterprise aggressively promotes lesser-known styles to the mainstream, “[scrambling] over one another to invent new goods, services, and gimmicks to sell on the expanding domestic consumer market” (Kinsella, 247). The resulting replicas of countercultural objects dramatically decrease the exclusivity of the subculture. Such propaganda primarily targets the mainstream population, but even the subcultures themselves fall into the lures of material gain. Female groups like the ganguro girls are characterized by their “notorious faddishness, eagerness to try new product ideas and technology, and sharp radar for detecting new trends on the horizon” (Yoda, 2). Such vehement consumption is perhaps necessary for the continual upkeep of appearances, but it ironically perpetuates the very system that the girls protest. Regardless of the target audience, capitalist marketing strategies duplicate once-exclusive subcultural styles and thus dilute their unconventionality, just as replicas of a statue diminish the aura of the original. Although motivated primarily by monetary gain, these capitalistic practices actively reincorporate nonconformist groups into society. The various imitators and duplicates produced by such fervent marketing ultimately render the original groups and their protests obsolete. When operating under both media coverage and capitalist strategies, the reincorporation of subcultures becomes continuous and complete.

Despite their transient nature and their eventual assimilation at the hands of mass media and mass markets, Lady Gaga and the ganguro girls raise issues that perpetuate long after the women themselves have reentered the dominant culture. Lady power, for example, will remain a complex issue long after Lady Gaga herself has graduated into womanhood; the gender dynamics she toys with will remain open to debate. Each subculture also has the potential to inspire new groups that branch out or supersede their predecessors and continue the implicit critiques of society. Although the ganguro girl was a phenomenon of the 1990s, the subcultures it spawned (the amazoness, yamamba, mamba, celemba, and kogal, for example) continue to work to the same ends in exposing ethnic contradictions and social prejudices (Kawamura, 788-789). Though short-lived, subcultural movements revive debates relegated to the fringes of society. Without such voices of dissent, society risks the gradual assumption of immorality and ignorance.

In analyzing the complex dynamics of rebellion versus coexistence among female subcultures and society, it becomes clear that mass media and the social constructs it espouses have the final say. The media not only perpetuates the ideal images of society—like the devoted schoolgirl and her kamikaze companion—it consequently eradicates subcultures by popularizing once-exclusive trends. In addition to the media, mass markets and the transient, consumption-dependent nature of youth subcultures also cement their eventual demise. Despite the attempts of Lady Gaga and her Japanese ganguro counterparts to dismantle or at least challenge existing preconceptions, the media and markets never fail to present an effective counterattack. In popularizing and replicating unconventional styles, the mass media and marketing machines incorporate social subcultures to maintain a homogenous, like-minded population. In the face of such opposing forces, the brazen young women of these subcultures nevertheless raise objections that perpetuate the tensions between dominant and subordinate culture. Through their efforts, issues once relegated to the edges of social consciousness become at once visible and contentious. Only in the push and pull between culture and subculture does society have a chance of evolution and ultimately, of improvement.

References

Bauer, Nancy. “Lady Power.” The New York Times Opinionator. 20 June 2010. The New York Times. 12 Oct 2010 <http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/20/lady-power/>.

Collins, Leah. “Lady Gaga’s meathead move.” The Province. 15 Sep 2010. The Province. 12 Oct 2010 <http://www.theprovince.com/business/Lady+Gaga+meathead+move/3526440/story.html>.

Kawamura, Yuniya. “Japanese Teens as Producers of Street Fashion.” Current Sociology 54.5 (2006) : 784-801.

Kinsella, Sharon. “Black Faces, Witches, and Racism against Girls.” Bad Girls of Japan. Ed. Laura Miller and Jan Bardsley. Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. 142-157.

Kinsella, Sharon. “Cuties in Japan.” Women, Media, and Consumption in Japan. Ed. Lise Skov and Brian Moeran. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1996. 220-254.

Kit, Zorianna. “Gaga insists meat garb is no cheap gag.” The Vancouver Sun. 14 Sep 2010. The Vancouver Sun. 12 Oct 2010 <http://www.vancouversun.com/entertainment/Gaga+insists+meat+garb+cheap/3522906/story.html>.

Napier, Susan. “Panic Site: The Japanese Imagination of Disaster from Godzilla to Akira.” Journal of Japanese Studies 19.2 (1993): 327-351.

Sato, Ikuya. Kamikaze Biker. Chicago: U of Chicago Press, 1998.

Yoda, Tomiko. “Kogyaru and the Economy of Feminized Consumer Society.” Zappa: the Social Space and Movements of Contemporary Japan. Ed. Sabu Kohso and Yutaka Nagahara (forthcoming), Autonomedia.

Kang Kyong-ae published From Wonso Pond in 1934 when communist organization in colonial Korea was failingAmong many contemporary revolutionaries who attempted to effect change through writing, Kang stands out for her ability to link the peasant and working class struggles in a realistic and relatable way. By paralleling the peasant and proletariat causes, Kang attempts to arouse revolutionary fervor and leadership in her audience. . Forty years later, Cho Se-hui published The Dwarf in the midst of South Korea’s rapid economic growth as a result of Park Chung-hee’s economic initiatives. The Dwarf is a story of those South Koreans who are left behind by progress. The second-class citizens of The Dwarf, like their counterparts in From Wonso Pond, must battle corporate exploitation, political repression, and social injustice in order to survive. However, Cho does not propose revolution as a solution for Korea’s impoverished population. Rather, by successfully highlighting subtle elements in society, he demonstrates a need for greater mutual understanding and cooperation among social classes. Despite this difference in perspectives, Kang and Cho imply that social change cannot happen without collective effort that includes support of the higher classes.

In 1934, Communist movements in Korea strove to unite the Korean people, improve social conditions, and ultimately win independence for Korea from Japanese rule. These movements, which were led by intellectuals and students, were successful especially in making Korea’s lowest classes realize “political consciousness” (Suh 113). However, by 1928, four Korean Communist parties had all failed mostly as a result of repression by the Japanese police and factionalism of the intellectual Communist leaders (Suh 113). After 1928, a national Korean Communist Party could never be re-established during Japanese colonial rule (Suh 127). While political activists worked to organize the proletariat and peasant masses for revolution, Korean writers prolifically produced proletariat literature. Korean socialist literature, which was mostly produced by the Korean Proletariat Artist League (KAPF), was strongest from 1924 to 1934. However, the Japanese police arrested most of its members by the end of 1934, officially disbanding KAPF in 1935. Thus, Kang Kyong-ae published her novel when Communism was clearly failing in Korea. With this background to contextualize her work, From Wonso Pond reads like a rally call to the peasants and proletariat that may have been intended to reinvigorate the Communist effort. Kang reminds the reader of the hardships that both peasants and proletariats were equally facing and challenges the reader to take actions.

For the first half of the novel (published as a series in the colonial journal Tonga Ilbo), Kang presents the reader with the oppressive conditions of colonial rural life. It quickly becomes apparent that Tokho, the local loan shark and landlord, contributes greatly to the peasants’ hardships. In one scene, Tokho cheats the farmers to turn a profit while keeping them in debt. By keeping interest rates high, he forces the farmers of Wonso Pond to borrow millet once they have run out of everything they have grown that season. The farmers pay Tokho with their own high quality millet while he loans them “coarse” one “as though it had been half mixed with chaff” (Kang 43). The peasants are depicted as helpless with “no place they could make an appeal” (Kang 44).

Soon Tokho becomes the mayor of Wonso Pond. Though Kang avoids explicitly mentioning Japanese rule, it seems likely that Japanese authorities appoint Tokho to the position. Thus, Tokho represents not only the traditional repressive landlord, but also an extension of Japanese rule. Under the imperial rule, the peasants are told that taxes are meant to help them “enjoy a richer, healthier life” and that they will “all be rich men one day” (Kang 103) as long as the peasants follow the government’s advice. However, hypocrisy Tokho shows to Kaettong gives readers difficult time trusting the words of any government official. When Kaettong goes to jail, his mother pleads with Tokho to set him free. Tokho eventually assents to securing Kaettong’s release only because “the rest of the rice still had to be threshed” (Kang 97). By doing so, he is able to serve his own interests, assert his power, and reinforce his benevolent image all at the same time. Through this incident, Kang effectively illustrates a self-serving attitude of contemporary officers that has little regard for the people.

Similarly problematic is the law that cannot protect the farmers from such corrupted officers. This message is reinforced by Chotchae’s character. Previously surviving as a tenant farmer, Chotchae loses his tenant rights soon after he and Kaettong are released from jail (Kang 105). Without a means to sustain himself, Chotchae laments his poor prospects and questions how the punishment could be just for “[breaking] some so-called law by smashing a wagon” (Kang 104). Kang juxtaposes supposed progress and government propaganda against a reality of corruption and desperation. She highlights how Koreans are asked to follow “the law” so that they can realize a brighter future that they will not see. Indeed, Chotchae sardonically thinks to himself, “Hell, I’ll probably be breaking the law if I don’t do what the magistrate said today either,” alluding to the perceived arbitrariness of the legal system at the time (Kang 104).

The 1934 Korean audience would have strongly sympathized with difficulties farmers—tenant farmers in particular—had recently faced. From 1920 to 1932, Japanese officials reported 4,804 tenancy disputes, which involved a total of 74,581 landlords and tenants (Shin 55). These disputes were most often centered on how crops were distributed between the landlords and tenants as is the case in From Wonso Pond (Shin 54). In 1926, crop prices began to decline, and thus so did farmer incomes (Shin 68). Also as crop prices fell, so did the rate of tenant victories in tenancy disputes. From 1920 to 1926 tenants won 29.3% of disputes whereas from 1927 to 1932 tenants won only 14.7% of disputes (Chin 68). Global depression in this time period led to a climate in which peasants were driven to debt and starvation while receiving little aid from the legal system (Shin 95). These conditions forced many farmers to leave the countryside, and Kang narrates the mass migration of farmers to the cities when falling rice prices ruined them (Kang 189).

Using Chotchae’s character, Kang links the peasants to the proletariats. After losing his tenant rights, Chotchae travels to the city and becomes a laborer. As a farmer, Chotchae struggled against a combination of landlords, taxes, and corruption. As a laborer, Chotchae struggles against measly wages and poor working conditions. Workdays can last as long as fourteen hours, and some days, Chotchae is unable to make any money at all (Kang 189, 196). Chotchae’s loneliness and miserable lifestyle lead him to “smoke and bottle” (Kang 227). But after meeting Sinchol, Chotchae gives up his vices and is reinvigorated with “something more courageous that glowed” (Kang 227). Indeed, Sinchol embodies the efforts of some intellectuals at the time to directly engage and organize Korea’s labor class as endorsed by KAPF in the late 1920s and early 1930s (Suh 134). Sinchol, the well-off intellectual student turned proletariat champion, has difficulty navigating working life. In addition to the poor conditions and wages, Sinchol encounters corruption as he is “duped out of missing four chon by yet more people who were out to exploit him” (Kang 189). But Chotchae helps Sinchol adjust to the laborer lifestyle while Sinchol helps Chotchae realize class-consciousness (Kang 189, 229). Together the two introduce political activism to the proletariat in Inchon by handing out leaflets, and Chotchae believes Sinchol as “important” to helping laborers obtain class-consciousness (Kang 229). Chased by spies and police, Sinchol gives the reader a glimpse into the life of the Korean Communist revolutionary that sacrifices on behalf of the working class (Kang 225, 229). Thus the reader clearly sees the connections between the peasant and proletariat struggle. Not only are many of the issues the same, but also a large group of proletariats came from the countryside.

However, Kang does not only focus upon these populations through Chotchae and, to some extent, Sinchol, but also includes women in defining the proletariat struggle by narrating Sonbi’s story. She represents women in both the peasant and proletariat struggle. Sonbi, in servitude to and raped by Tokho, escapes to Inchon where she finds work in the Taedong Spinning Mill (Kang 128, 208). However, Sonbi, despite transitioning from the rural, traditional Korean lifestyle to the new industrial centers, still cannot escape oppression. Via the Taedong Spinning Mill, Kang shows the reader some of the inhumane aspects of colonial Korea’s booming textile industry such as the “ear-splitting” noise and continuous burns from boiling water (Kang 210-211). In addition, her character reinforces the idea that little changed for the lower classes of Korean society in the colonial era.

However, more importantly, Kang ties what many people probably already knew about industrial working conditions to commonalities found in other struggles. While Tokho and the country magistrate tell the farmers that all their actions are in the best interests of the farmers, the supervisors tell Sonbi and the other textile factory workers that they give “special consideration” to the workers’ “everyday convenience” (Kang 214). This way, as the supervisors assert, the workers will have the “easy life” and will “have cash in the bank to pay for [their] weddings” (Kang 215). Yet at the same time the factory owners feed their employees cheap imported rice that cause diarrhea, similar to how Tokho gives the farmers millet mixed with chaff (Kang 213). The owners do not actually give the workers any money, but instead keeps it in savings accounts where they can deduct penalties for any kind of “slacking” (Kang 215-216). Kang ensures that the reader sees past the “wool” that the higher classes try to pull over the proletariats’ and peasants’ eyes (Kang 218). By drawing these parallels between the difficulties that different working populations face, Kang effectively shows how peasants and workers, male or female, can unite under a common cause. The original title of this series, Human Problems, supports this interpretation of the universality of social injustice in colonial Korea.

Mirroring her own society, Kang ends the series with a completely failed revolution. Sonbi dies, and Sinchol settles down with a wealthy wife after renouncing Communism (Kang 268-269). Kang may be criticizing the failing revolutionary intellectual class because Cholsu responds to Chotchae’s surprise when learning of Sinchol’s conversion by asking, “What do you expect from the so-called intellectual class?” (Kang 268). Of the revolutionary characters, Chotchae is left alone to contemplate society’s injustices. Abandoned by Sinchol, Chotchae stares at Sonbi’s body and wonders how “human problems” can be solved when nobody has yet to solve them after so many years (Kang 168). Finally, Kang asks, “which human beings will actually solve these problems in the future? Just who?” (Kang 269). While it could be argued that Kang’s ending depicts the hopelessness of the Korean peasant and proletariat situation by 1934, it seems plausible that Kang is actually challenging the reader to become a new leader in the political arena. By writing the failure of her revolutionary characters, Kang acknowledges the defeats that Korean Communists had been suffering from the late 1920s to 1934. She does not try to mislead her 1934 readership into thinking that Communists held a strong position at the time. Instead, she reminds the reader of all the hardships that peasants and proletariats face, while arguing that their causes are essentially the same. By thus blurring all class divisions, Kang challenges and pushes her audience to political action.

Roughly forty years later Cho Se-hui published his own series of short stories centered on Korean society. At the end of Park Chung-hee’s rule, many of the social issues that Kang wrote about reappear in Cho’s The Dwarf. Elected on a democratic platform, Park Chung-hee declared a national state of emergency in 1971 as a combined result of the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam, reduced international demand for Korean goods, and rapid urbanization (Pike 315). Park’s policies led to rapid expansion of the Korean economy, which grew at an average rate of 9.5% per year from 1960 to 1975 and at an average rate of 12.3% per year from 1976 to 1979 (Pike 316). However, working conditions were often terrible as revealed by a statement by a women’s textile union in 1978 detailing exhausting hours, abusive supervisors, and poor living conditions (Panayiotopoulos and Capps 146). As a result of these conditions, labor unions fought for reform but did not significantly affect politics until 1979 to 1980 (Cumings 372). Park viewed unions and labor movements as threats to his economic “big push” in the 1970s and routinely used the KCIA and police to disrupt their activities (Cumings 375-377). Though society at this time could be perceived as government and capitalist elites repressing the working class in a similar fashion to 1930s Korea, Cho, unlike Kang, avoids representing society in a dichotomous fashion.

Shinae’s story is one of the first to appear in Cho’s series and the first in which the dwarf theme appears. Having a brother who went to college and married to a man able to support their daughter through school, Shinae is likely a member of the middle class (Cho 19, 92). Even so she sees herself as a “tiny dwarf” who has yet to receive the promised “good life” (Cho 14, 18). Though by no means among the poorest members of society, Shinae cannot help but feel small when both her neighbors ostentatiously listen to their televisions (Cho 19). As a result, she experiences a visceral reaction upon seeing the defenseless dwarf who helped her with her water collection problems be beaten by the man from the pump shop (Cho 30). It is also interesting that she identifies herself the dwarf’s ally because earlier she wonders what the sides in society are. Though there may be no objective “good” or “bad” in society, Cho establishes dwarfism as a “side” (Cho 18, 31). Whatever moral judgment that accompanies dwarfism is left up to the reader. Yet, when combined with the Moebius strip allegory preceding Shinae’s story, the reader can already see part of the message that Cho is presenting.

The Moebius strip, introduced when a teacher educates his class in The Dwarf, can be made from a strip of paper. When twisted and joined end to end the strip has only one side and this surface is called a Moebius strip (Cho 2). Though Cho does not explicitly state, the Moebius is an analogy for society. The teacher wants his students to keep the Moebius strip in mind as they enter college and learn more about the world. He tells the students that the universe itself is like a solid Moebius strip with no inside or outside (Cho 12). As a pseudo-preface to the rest of his story, Cho uses the Moebius strip to introduce the idea that sides are irrelevant in society. Society is a continuum where all people are a part of the single side of the Moebius strip. By aligning Shinae with the dwarf’s side, Cho lays the foundation of his social commentary by suggesting that everyone in society is somehow connected through metaphorical dwarfism. This idea of dwarfism is central to Cho’s story. Throughout the series, Cho builds upon the idea that the one “side” in society is dwarfism. Almost all of the characters have either personal or emotional connections to the dwarf. Cho uses this metaphor to show the reader the dwarf inside each character across the social status spectrum.

The dwarf and his family are the traditional social dwarves and used to narrate much of the working class’ troubles. The dwarf who is never named in the series is unable to support his children through school, whom all eventually become laborers (Cho 59). Interestingly, the labor struggles presented via these characters mirror the proletariat cause from Kang’s writing. In the beginning the two sons work in a factory, where they cannot socialize or rest and receive just enough pay to survive. To keep the workers in line, the factory owners tell the workers that hard work is necessary so that they may become wealthy, but neither conditions nor wages ever improve (Cho 65). After being evicted and having their home demolished, the family moves into a slum (Cho 132). The three children, Yong-su, Yong-ho, and Yong-hu, work in various factories, struggling to earn enough money to survive. They endure horrendous conditions, including dangerous noise levels, heat, long hours, and physical exhaustion in order to make roughly 20,000 won, which is less than the minimum cost of living (Cho 134-135, 140). Though labor unions exist, and Yong-su tries to use the union to improve working conditions and wages, nameless employers denounce such efforts as “subversive” and accuse the laborers of having “already broken the law” (Cho 154,156). By not explicitly specifying who the employers and laborers are when he writes about a meeting between union and company representatives, Cho suggests that the names could be replaced with any employer/laborer pair, as he illustrates the difficulty of reasoning with company owners. When this fails Yong-su attempts to kill the president of the factory’s parent company because of the way he treats his employees (Cho 198).

Though it could be argued that these stories undermine a sense of Cho’s view of society without clear delineations, Cho uses Kyong-hun and his cousin to depict the dwarfism among the wealthy elite. While these characters are certainly not socioeconomic dwarves, their personal lives reveal a different kind of dwarfism. As the Ungang Group chairman’s third son, Kyong-hun constantly strives to escape from his two older brothers’ shadows and is paranoid that they would turn on him to minimize his share of the company (Cho 182). In addition, he admires his father who was responsible for Ungang’s massive expansion and success (Cho 185). While the reader may be sympathetic, he can understand the heavy burden that Kyong-hun bears that influences his aggressive attitude towards his uncle’s murderer. Kyong-hun’s unnamed cousin is in an even more precarious position in the family than Kyong-hun. As the only wealthy character who is sympathetic towards the laborers’ cause, he has little chance of inheriting any part of the Ungang Group. Even Kyong-hun decides that he would side with his brothers in disowning their cousin (Cho 192). It is sad that the cousin’s humanity makes him a dwarf in his world. Though he has the potential to help improve Ungang Group workers’ situation Cho suggests that his potential is unlikely to be fulfilled, suggesting that the Korean elite mentality must change.

Though the characters in The Dwarf certainly do not all share the same social or economic status, Cho complicates traditional social class definitions. Despite the convenience of classifying classes as upper, middle, or lower, Cho blurs the distinctions by highlighting the universality and wide-reaching ramifications of social and economic issues. The dwarf and his family are most obviously affected by 1970s Korean economic practices as they suffer from housing disputes, low wages, and unhealthy conditions. Shinae, while somewhat better off than the dwarf’s family, feels suffocated by the luxuries her neighbors enjoy that she cannot afford due to debt. As the youngest son of prominent family, Kyong-hun struggles to meet his family’s expectations in a competitive capitalist environment. His cousin, a figure of hope for the working class, faces strong opposition from his family because of his liberal attitudes. While the reader may naturally categorize characters in traditional social classes, Cho shows the reader that society makes each class feel like a dwarf. Cho does not offer an easy solution for this social dwarfism. However, by revealing the commonalities and interconnectedness among social groups, Cho rejects an antagonistic view of social issues. He shows several perspectives of society, and this complicates a hard stance against corporate executives. This approach suggests that he believed in the necessity of a collective effort to institute social change in the 1970s. Workers and intellectuals were insufficient, rather members of the political and corporate system had to be recruited as well. Social injustice, symbolized by dwarfism, is a challenge that faces the Korean population as a whole and therefore cannot be solved by an individual group of people.

Kang and Cho both recognize some of the major problems plaguing their societies in the 1930s and 1970s respectively. Despite some uncanny similarities between the two socioeconomic landscapes, Kang describes the issues in terms of a peasant and proletariat problem, whereas Cho presents the issues as more of a collective problem. In Kang’s society the capitalist regime suppresses the proletariat and peasant populations. Cho, on the other hand, presents a society in which the pressure of industrialization victimizes diverse groups of people. The acknowledgement of similar abuses and injustices, within commentaries stretching from the 30’s to 70’s, reveals a persistent recruitment for political action. Yet the changing rhetoric shows an effort to appeal to a wider base, encouraging a cooperative movement for social change.

Reference

Cho, Se-hui. The Dwarf. Trans. Bruce Fulton and Ju-Chan Fulton. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2006.

Cumings, Bruce. Korea’s Place in the Sun. New York: W. W. Norton & Comapny, Inc., 2005.

Kang, Kyong-ae. From Wonso Pond. Trans. Samuel Perry. New York: The Feminist Press at The City University of New York, n.d.

Panayiotopoulos, Prodromos and Gavin Capps. World Development: An Introduction. London: Pluto Press, 2001.

Pike, Francis. Empires at War: A Short History of Modern Asia Since World War II. London: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2010.

Shin, Gi-Wook. Peasant Protest & Social Change in Colonial Korea. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1996.

Suh, Dae-sook. The Korean Communist Movement 1918-1948. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967.

Introduction

In their influential 2003 Foreign Policy article, Yasheng Huang and Tarun Khanna made the bold proposition that India’s economy could overtake China’s in the long term because its bottom up approach of reform creates better micro level conditions than China’s top down approach of state-driven economic liberalization. Though controversial at the time, this proposition no longer seems far-fetched. In recent years, the two systems seem to be converging: India has been attracting more foreign direct investment (FDI), while China has been taking steps to encourage innovation in its private sector. China is trying to slow down its GDP growth even as India speeds up.[2] Even as the two Asian giants move to adopt each other’s best practices, the dissimilarities between their two systems become even more apparent.

The vast differences in Chinese and Indian economic landscapes may appear puzzling upon initial assessment. Both nations have undergone economic liberalization while having massive labor supply, planned economies, large bureaucracies, and a history of one party rule. Yet China has become the “world factory”, relying on FDI fueled export-driven growth for rapid GDP growth. On the other hand, India’s reform and growth has been more gradual; it has become the “world office”, developing a very competitive IT sector and a vibrant private sector. A systematic comparison of the two economies reveals that the differences are rooted in differences in their political systems.

The fundamental dissimilarities between the centralized authority of the CCP party-state in China and the multiparty democratic system in India explain much of the variation in respective state attitudes towards FDI, role of organized labor, and the balance of state-owned enterprises and the private sector.

China

The State’s Role in Economic Control

The People’s Republic of China represents a developmental paradox.  Politically, it remains an authoritarian state, but, economically, it has embraced the free market. Under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) initiated process of reform and opening to unleash market forces in order to generate economic growth.  In the 1980s, collective farming gave way to a “responsibility system” which allowed farmers to profit from their surplus crops and special economic zones (SEZs) were established to encourage foreign investment. Beginning in the early 1990s, the CCP began the painful process of SOE restructuring, ending state price control policies and protectionist regulations that shielded China’s inefficient SOEs from market competition. However, the state has retained control of so-called strategic enterprises and dominates key sectors of the economy. In 2003, the state directly accounted for 38% of Chinese GDP[3] and employed 85 million people (Pei 2006).  To sufficiently understand Chinese economy, therefore, it is essential to recognize the central role the state plays in economic affairs (Gao 2009).

Economic Reform under One Party Rule

China dealt with the pressure to reform through a three-pronged effort: FDI liberalization, SOE restructuring, and private industry development. Since FDI liberalization, China has received more FDI than any other developing countries (Gallagher 2005). It attracted FDI through policies such as the creation of SEZs and the lowering of export tariffs. Though these policies were controversial at the time, the concentration of power within the CCP ensured their steady implementation. FDI has spurred capitalism and competition, incentivized development, and sparked political reform to transform China’s markets into globally competitive ones (Gallagher 2005). This foreign sector of investment also provided the experimental grounds to test the reactions to labor reforms and company restructuring (Gallagher 2005). This was done with no direct consequence to the state, specifically SOEs.  Finally, these FDI reforms prompted an ideological shift, transferring value from public ownership and control to value in national ownership.

Because these reforms to attract FDI happened before SOE restructuring, the SOEs complained of an unfair advantage enjoyed by multinational companies. SOEs could neither make autonomous decisions pertaining to worker retention and compensation nor could they escape the provision of social welfare provision requirements. The struggling SOEs were desperate for a way to motivate productivity and efficiency in performance.  Therefore, the central government implemented structural reforms of the SOEs that liberalized these processes, leaving the enterprises with more autonomy to be competitive with multinational corporations.  From 1979 to 1983, new features were implemented in the following ways: taxable profit (enterprises paying taxes rather than turning over all profits to the state) and loans for fiscal grants (turning government appropriations into loans to improve efficiency).  These changes were more efficient on two fronts – the government sinks less money into unprofitable ventures and the individual enterprises increase their profit intake, thereby providing an incentive for continued growth and success (Lin and Zhu 2001).

The establishment of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), a specially commissioned group under the State Council charged with managing China’s SOEs, in 2003 marked a new phase of SOE reform. The founding of SASAC launched a process of redefining the relationship between the central government and the so-called “central enterprises” (zhongyang qiye), the key SOEs that have been selected by the government to form the basis from which China’s future top global companies will be created. Central enterprises account for the bulk of SOE profits and around a quarter of SOE corporate investment (Mattlin 2007). The SASAC represents yet another way that the Chinese state, particularly the central government, exerts its power in the economic realm.

The Public and the Private Sector

According to the SASAC, there are 123 centrally owned companies within China. The centrality of China’s SOEs leaves a minor role for homegrown private companies. Strategic SOEs— such as telecommunications, electricity, and railroads—are particularly important to the CCP because they allow the party to have monopoly of power within the state. Additionally, SOE assets tied to these industries make up a large proportion within the Chinese market, making these ventures a very important factor:

The 2nd National Economic Census conducted in 2008 reveals that of all the 208 trillion RMB total assets of the secondary and tertiary sectors, 63 trillion, about 30%, was held by SOEs. …Meanwhile, in terms of enterprise number, there were 154,000 SOEs at the end of 2008, only accounting for 3.1% of the total enterprise number…SOEs control a substantial part of total enterprise assets in China, despite the fact that their total number is marginal.”(Xu 2010)

While China has continued to privatize non-profitable SOEs and has encouraged competition among SOEs through restructuring, SOEs remain central to the Chinese economy. Though SOEs account for an ever smaller portion of China’s industrial output, they have become increasingly concentrated in large, capital-intensive firms that are important to the state not only economically but also politically. Many of the executives of the SOEs are party members, and are appointed to their positions by the CCP through the tradition of nomenklatura[4]. The rotation of SOE executives and government officials through party politics creates perverse incentives to stifle private sector competition.

The precarious nature of one-party CCP rule meant that China has been far bolder with external reforms but has imposed substantial legal and regulatory constraints on indigenous, private firms. As Huang and Khanna’s study reveal that numerous Chinese entrepreneurs tried, and failed, to circumvent the restrictions placed on their activities to set up private firms. Some registered their firms as nominal SOEs (all the capital came from private sources, and the companies were privately managed), only to find themselves ensnared in title disputes when financially strapped government agencies sought to seize their assets (Huang and Khanna 2003). China faces competing priorities in its economic reform agenda; political pressures push the CCP must preserve certain SOEs, but economic pressures pull it down the path of private industry development. Though China’s political system has performed admirably in attracting FDI to fuel China’s economic reform, it has also inhibited the establishment of internationally competitive industries in the private sector.

India

Consociational Politics

Unlike the centralized one-party state of China, multiparty pluralism and democratic elections characterize Indian politics. John Stuart Mill famously asserted that democracy is next to impossible in multiethnic societies and completely impossible in linguistically divided communities (Mill 1958). India flies in the face of this paradigm. Political scientists have puzzled over how India, with its deeply divided population, has managed to remain a majoritarian democracy since independence.

Arend Lijphardt shed light on this puzzle by arguing that Indian democracy has demonstrated all the crucial elements of power sharing theory and represents a consociational system. (Lijphart 1996) A consociational system is characterized by (1) grand coalition governments that include representatives of all major linguistic and religious groups, (2) cultural autonomy of these groups, (3) proportionality in political representation, and (4) a minority veto with regard to vital minority rights (Lijphart 1996). Thus, though the Congress Party (and the Nehru-Gandhi family leadership) continues to dominate India’s political arena, the multi-party democratic process of Indian politics distinguishes it from the politics of one party rule under the CCP. Without having to win majority of popular votes in parliamentary elections, the Congress party has managed to remain in power consistently since independence by balancing the interests of various interest groups(Rudolph and Rudolph 1987). This illustrated that, although India’s associational life has proved too fragmented to agree or act on alternative national political doctrines that challenge Congress’s centrist consensus, Indian politics remain a dynamic and competitive multi-party system, characterized by high levels of social mobilization, a plethora of voluntary organizations, and conflicting sets of elite interests. This stands in stark contrast to the party-state politics of CCP-ruled China where there is a much more pronounced concentration of interest within the ranks of the CCP and no outside parties pose a viable threat to force the CPP to compromise its position.

Economic Reform under a Pluralistic Democracy

India’s democratic political order defined the process of economic reform just as one party rule shaped the development of China’s economic reform; logically, the two different political systems produced very different economic configurations. The Indian system necessitated compromise among divergent set of interests, this impeded and compromised the process of economic reforms. Indian politics is dominated by coalition building amongst interest groups with divergent interests whereas Chinese politics under the CCP has been very centralized. Democratic politics also empower labor unions in India and foster local protectionism which hinder the inflow of FDI; these are challenges China did not have to tackle when it initiated reform in the 1979.

India initiated reform much later than China; indeed, the impetus for large-scale economic reform might not have ever materialized if not for a moment of crisis. In 1991, the Balance of Payments Crisis dismantled the License Raj and allowed for private sector competition against state monopolies. However, India has taken the gradualist approach to economic reform, a process that appears piecemeal and haphazard to the casual observer. In contrast to China, India pursued a policy of divestment rather than privatization (Ahluwalia 2002). Disinvestment allowed the state to retain managerial control while mobilizing revenue for the budget. This policy had very limited success for disinvestment receipts were consistently below budget expectations (Ahluwalia 2002). Many economists have criticized the gradualist approach, complaining that the gradual process of privatization also increases the chances of favoritism to self interested and rent seeking politicians, bureaucrats, and labor unions (Ahluwalia 2002).

The Economic Landscape of Post-Reform India

The reforms of 1991 reduced the number of exclusive areas reserved for the public; by 2002, this list had been subsequently reduced to only three sectors: atomic energy, atomic minerals, and railway transport. Nevertheless, the fact that 246 enterprises remain in the ownership of India’s central government shows that reform has been slow. According to The Economist, “These companies employed almost 1.6m people in 2008 and accounted for 8.3% of the country’s GDP.”[5] It is well established that the state-owned and mixed sectors of the Indian economy are significantly inefficient as compared to the private sector (Bhagwati 1993; Majumdar 1998), but due to entrenched local interest, the Indian state has been unable to proceed efficiently with SOE privatization. Thus, while the number of loss-making SOEs has fallen from 110 to 53 between 2001 and 2008, the scale of the losses has crept up again in recent years.[6] As the number of state-owned companies has held steady, countless private outfits have grown up, encroaching on their turf and liberating their customers.

Yet, despite its efforts at reform and liberalization, India’s economy continues to lag behind that of China’s and faces significant challenges. Still, the success of the private sector is encouraged by the Indian government’s following projects: industrial de-licensing, protection of property rights, devaluation that had been implemented previously. This process has been slow, the central planners of economic reform are frustrated by local elites (Majumdar 1998). Small and medium scale companies still suffer from lack of finances and state barriers to expansion. Additionally the absence of a regulatory structure and infrastructure also hinder growth.

The modern Indian economy excels in the Information and Communications Technology (ICT) sector but lags behind China in manufacturing. Its economic landscape is shaped by local interests at the state level due to the legacy of licensing. A divergence in performance has taken place—firms in those states and sectors with the best institutions gaining, and those in the more tightly regulated states and sectors falling further behind.[7] The need for further institutional reforms is urgent, focusing on product and labor market regulations at the central and state levels.[8] However these reforms have been slow in coming due to India’s democratic politics, where the centrist Congress party consensus is increasingly challenged in recent years by political mobilization pressing for immediate and hard-to-fill demands, by the rise of religious fundamentalism and class/caste divisions, and the deinstitutionalization of the Congress party and state structure (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987).

Role of Labor Unions

Organized labor play a much more active role in the Indian economy than their Chinese counterparts. The number of unions grew considerably after independence; in the early 1990s, total membership rose to over 9 million. Many unions are affiliated with regional or national federations, the most important of which are the Indian National Trade Union Congress, the All-India Trade Union Congress, the Centre of Indian Trade Unions, the Indian Workers’ Association, and the United Trade Union Congress (Heitzman 1995). Politicians have often been union leaders, and some analysts believe that strikes and other labor protests are carried out primarily to further the interests of political parties rather than to promote the interests of the work force (Heitzman 1995). Thus, labor unions also play a strong role in the reform the Indian economy. Organized labor is an important player in democratic coalition building; thus, they have a distorting influence in labor market regulation. It is only India’s organized sector that is subject to labor market regulation, and here employment has actually fallen. Unsurprisingly, private sector gains in India have arisen primarily in the unorganized and informal sectors of the economy, where productivity and wages are generally much lower than in the formal organized sector, where unions are entrenched.[9]

The Role of FDI

Due in part to the weakness of organized labor in China, foreign investment and foreign firms played a much greater role in China’s economic development than they did in India. As Huang Yasheng notes in Selling China, “foreign firms, either singly or as JVs with Chinese firms, have established a ubiquitous presence in China”(Huang 2003). The inflow of FDI has allowed the Chinese government to shift the political dynamic from a public vs. private sector issue to a Chinese vs. foreign issue, diverting attention from the painful process of SOE restructuring which resulted in massive job loss. In India, FDI has been a much less important part of export; today, FDI driven exports accounts for less than 10% of India’s total. Chinese domestic firms lack the political clout available to their Indian counterparts because of nondemocratic CCP one party rule; they could not protect themselves against competition from the influx of foreign firms. However, strong state control allowed China to develop more business-oriented, FDI-friendly policies than India, where regulations caused excess bureaucracy (Wei 2005). According to the World Bank Group, it takes 90 days to start a new business in India compared to 30 days in China (Wei 2005).

Conclusion

India and China, the largest developing countries in the world, garner a great deal of attention individually and in comparison.  The roles two governments play in private companies and state owned enterprises are very different mostly due to the political differences between the two countries. These differences have motivated fundamental changes in market participation, creating each distinctive economic landscape that reflects a political structure.  

The Chinese party-state under the CCP has historically favored SOEs and foreign MNCs over domestic enterprises. Deprived of state support and squeezed between domestic and multinational giants, China’s private sector has exhibited rapid growth (largely due to the weakness of organized labor) but few enterprises can compete internationally. On the contrary, India’s democratic system retards the rate of reform and restricts labor law. Indian economic reform began later and has proceeded haltingly, attracting a much smaller inflow of FDI than its Chinese counterpart. While it is no match for China’s rate of growth at the macro level, India has managed to produce more private enterprises that are competitive on the international market.

As time continues and policies change, the two states seem to be growing towards a point of convergence.  China began with great inflows of FDI and little additional investment in SOEs and local, private companies.  India saw a lack in FDI and developed very insular private corporations.  In recent years however, China is now more focused on encouraging research and development within its national corporations to further growth.  India is welcoming FDI as a way to improve many of the structural deficits it faces in furthering its development.  It remains to be seen what this second phase of reforms will do for either country politically and economically.

References

Ahluwalia, M. (2002). “Economic reforms in India since 1991: has gradualism worked?” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 16(3): 67-88.

Bhagwati, J. (1993). India in transition: freeing the economy, Oxford University Press, USA.

Gallagher, M. (2005). Contagious capitalism: Globalization and the politics of labor in China, Princeton University Press.

Gao, B. (2009). “The Rubik’s Cube State: A Reconceptualization of Political Change in Contemporary China.” Research in the Sociology of Work 19: 409-438.

Huang, Y. (2003). Selling China: foreign direct investment during the reform era, Cambridge Univ Pr.

Huang, Y. and T. Khanna (2003). “Can India Overtake China?” Foreign Policy 137: 74-81.

Lijphart, A. (1996). “The puzzle of Indian democracy: A consociational interpretation.” American Political Science Review 90(2): 258-268.

Lin, Y. and T. Zhu (2001). “Ownership restructuring in Chinese state industry: An analysis of evidence on initial organizational changes.” The China Quarterly 166: 305-341.

Majumdar, S. (1998). “Assessing comparative efficiency of the state-owned mixed and private sectors in Indian industry.” Public Choice 96(1): 1-24.

Pei, M. (2006). “The Dark Side of China’s Rise.” Foreign Policy 153: 32-40

Rudolph, L. and S. Rudolph (1987). In pursuit of Lakshmi: The political economy of the Indian state, University of Chicago press.

Wei, W. (2005). “China and India: Any difference in their FDI performances?” Journal of Asian Economics 16(4): 719-736.

Xu, G. (2010). “State-Owned  Enterprises in China: How Big are They?” World Bank.

In today’s increasingly globalized world, China’s role as an international superpower is a topic of constant discussion as the country continues to define itself within the complicated realities of current geopolitical structures. In addition to its growing importance in the global economy, China’s identity as a superpower is rooted in its increasing political power in the world theater. Although the exact advent of China as a global political force is debatable, its potential power on a global scale certainly came to the fore in 1971 when the People Republic of China’s assumed China’s seat in the United Nations. Since then, China’s role in the UN has changed from that of a passive one to an active one, and I will argue that as China has grown more confident in its role in the international sphere throughout the years, it has become more assertive in pursuing its strategic and foreign policy goals, as evidenced by its performance in the UN. Like all states, China has sought to use the United Nations as a forum for projecting its foreign policy and achieving its national interests. This was especially apparent in its early years, during which time China’s objectives were (1) to advance its reputation in the international community, (2) to enhance its national security, and (3) to seek solidarity with the developing world so as to avoid isolation in the international community. These three themes have been consistent throughout China’s track record in the UN and have continued to mark its involvement and performance in the UN up to the present day, though with notable changes from a passive to a more active approach. The underlying motivation for this change has been China’s desire to be seen as a leader in the UN and the international community.

Historical Overview

An understanding of the context of Beijing’s complex entrance into the UN is necessary before analyzing China’s participation in the United Nations. In 1945 during the founding of the UN, China was one of the five permanent members of the Security Council after it ratified the Charter alongside France, Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. At this time, China was governed by Chiang Kai-Shek’s Nationalist government as the Republic of China (ROC). However, shortly after the Chinese Civil War was won by Mao Zedong’s Communist Party in 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded, and Chiang’s Nationalist government was forced to retreat to Taiwan. Since “China” itself was an original Permanent Member of the UN Security Council, the question was not one of admission, but one of deciding which “China” – Taipei’s Republic of China or Beijing’s People’s Republic of China – would represent China in the UN. The two parties’ simultaneous claims to China’s UN seat defined the 22-year representation issues that marked China’s first phase of UN involvement.

From 1949 until 1971, the issue of representation was at the center of the PRC’s UN agenda. The legal status of China’s UN representation by the Nationalist delegation was first questioned in 1949, when the PRC assumed control of the Mainland and the Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China sent a letter to the President of the General Assembly. This challenge was then supported by the Soviet Union’s representative to the Security Council who also challenged the Nationalist government’s claim to represent the Chinese people. China’s contested representation from 1949 to 1971 can be understood as three stages. First, there were substantive discussions in 1950, during which the General Assembly and the Security Council dealt directly with specific reference to the China participation and recognition issue. From 1951 to 1960, known as the moratorium period, the General Assembly, under the influence of the U.S. and its allies, postponed consideration of the China question by rejecting proposals to include the discussion onto the official agenda. Using these procedural maneuvers, the U.S. led a campaign to block the PRC’s UN recognition as part of its menu of items used to contain Chinese Communism expansionism. Substantive discussion then began in 1961 when China’s case was first included in the official agenda. The question was then considered and debated, with U.S.-backed Taipei slowly losing ground to Beijing over the 10 years until 1971 when Beijing was recognized and Taipei removed as China’s representative in the UN. Because this resolution was on an issue of credentials rather than one of membership, it was possible to bypass the Security Council where the United States and the ROC could have used their vetoes. From 1950 to 1955, the Soviet Union was China’s most active supporter due to the two countries’ Communist connections, and from 1955 until the Sino-Indian border conflicts of 1960, India was also China’s advocate. However, as Sino-Soviet relations worsened over the course of the 1950s and further deteriorated in the 1960s, Albania and Cambodia introduced draft legislation on China’s behalf in 1965, and in 1966, eleven countries submitted a proposal to seat the PRC: Albania, Algeria, Cambodia, Congo, Cuba, Guinea, Mauritania, Mali, Pakistan, Romania, and Syria.

The eventual seating of Beijing in 1971, marked the first major defeat of the U.S. in the General Assembly and also signified the emergence of developing countries with China emerging as the “self-appointed champion of the new actions initiated by the Third World”. The turning point occurred on October 25, 1971, ten years after General Assembly discussion began on the China question. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 passed with 76 votes in favor, 35 against, and 17 abstentions, and declared “that the representatives of the Government of the People’s Republic of China are the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations.” The PRC, with the support of the newly-recognized developing countries in the General Assembly, was finally granted China’s seat in the UN, and Beijing would not forget these roots.

Analysis of Abstention Strategy

China’s track record of abstentions has led many to describe China’s UN participation as that of a “non-participant” policy. China’s non-participation and use of abstentions stems from a historical ideological aversion to interfering in the domestic affairs of countries or undermining their sovereignty and territorial integrity in addition to its own aversion to taking a firm stand on issues. Since Beijing’s ascension to the UN in 1971, China has used its veto power very sparingly, instead opting for non-participation in voting in the 1970s and abstentions in the 1980s. Although it no longer employs a strategy of passive non-participation and has a much more active role in UN activity as compared to its early years, Beijing still retains abstentions as a key part of its UN strategy. By abstaining, Beijing has been able to send a message and yet avoid the necessity of taking sides and alienating allies.

China’s justifications for its non-participation and abstentions have remained fairly consistent over time. As mentioned earlier, China considers sovereignty and territorial integrity to be its banner issues and dislikes interfering in what it considers to be the domestic affairs of other countries. Beijing has been particularly sensitive to sanctions and use of force under the UN name, particularly when its own interests are at stake. However, because it does not want to be labeled as an obstructionist or stand in opposition to the West – particularly the United States and its allies – Beijing has never voted against the imposition of sanctions or the use of force.

During the 1970s, China created and consistently used a policy of non-participation in the Security Council voting process. Of the 101 resolutions adopted by the Security Council between November 24, 1971 and December 22, 1976, China posted a 39 percent rate of abstention and non-participation. Beijing was especially apprehensive about the legitimacy of UN peacekeeping operations, and opposed such actions for ideological reasons. First, China viewed such UN peacekeeping as a means for the U.S. and the Soviet Union to play out their power struggle, and Beijing disagreed with both Washington and Moscow. Second, state sovereignty and non-intervention were of utmost importance to China, especially in light of its own domestic situation with the continued Taiwan problem. This commitment to non-intervention is seen in China’s track record throughout the years, but especially during its first few years in the UN, ideological issues played a major role in Beijing’s avoidance of UN participation.

Another factor for China’s passivity during then 1970s was its relationship with the developing world. Beijing was aware of the support it received from developing nations during its 21-year struggle to claim China’s UN seat prior to 1971. To the PRC, this proved that its efforts in supporting decolonization had paid off politically. As the only developing country on the Permanent-Five Security Council, China felt that it had both a responsibility and an advantage in protecting the interests of developing nations. In 1974, Mao Zedong outlined the “Three-World Theory” and Deng Xiaoping, who was Vice Premier at the time, further outlined this theory at the Special Session of the UN General Assembly of that same year. As succinctly noted by Yeshi Choedon, “China identified itself with the Third World.” As such, China had an additional interest in using sovereignty and non-intervention as reasons for sitting out on UN activity.

However, despite this aversion to UN activity and participation, China’s inactivity did not translate to vetoes against peacekeeping operations. In response to the U.S. and Soviet Union’s power struggle, China did not want to appear to take sides and was unwilling to take its commitment to sovereignty and non-intervention to a level where its newly-recognized international reputation would be put on the line and on the record. Perhaps even more importantly, China did not want to appear obstructionist to either Washington or Moscow, or even relevant Third World countries who had interest in seeing such resolutions pass. As a result, China started its practice of non-participation: being present during the Security Council voting process but not voting. Thus, Beijing chose not to participate in or was absent from the vote on almost every UN peacekeeping operation during the 1970s.

This attitude changed with the adjustment of China’s foreign policy in the early 1980s, and China began participating in UNSC voting. Though most votes were actually abstentions, this was still a move towards a more participatory approach. During this period, China’s increased interactions on both bilateral and multilateral levels, particularly its newly normalized relations with the U.S. as marked by President Richard Nixon’s 1979 visit to China, helped Beijing to realize the importance and potential of the UN as a platform to slowly increase its activity and presence in the international community. Also during this time, Deng Xiaoping began rolling out his Reform and Opening Up policies. New leadership gave higher credence to engaging in international cooperation and multilateral diplomacy. This new international and domestic environment caused Beijing to re-evaluate its approach to the UN and led to its adjusted voting behavior in the 1980’s. However, China’s concern for sovereignty and non-intervention still ranked high among its issues with UN involvement, and China maintained a rather passive approach in the 1980’s.

Up to this point, China’s position in the UN was one of consistent passivity, frequently abstaining from resolutions that would interfere with what it considered a country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. But starting in the late 1980s into the 1990s, China began to take steps toward more active participation in UN activities, particularly peacekeeping. Between 1988 and 1998, 36 UNPKO were established, and China voted in favor of all missions that carried out traditional peacekeeping tasks and those that were continuations of traditional missions established during the Cold War era. However, it still chose to abstain from new peace enforcement missions with the exception of voting in favor of the United Nations Operations in Somalia II.

Between 1990 and 1999 China abstained 41 times when contentious issues, like the use of force, humanitarian intervention, and the establishment of international criminal tribunals, were at the negotiating table. Between 1992 and 1996, China voted in favor of a resolution authorizing the use of force seven times and abstained seven times. China maintained its commitment to sovereignty and non-intervention concerns, but allowed itself flexibility to make decisions dependent on the situation at hand. This can be seen in two of its decisions during the 1990s – Iraq and Cambodia. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 led to Resolution 678, the UNSC’s first peace enforcement action. Beijing disagreed with Iraq’s invasion, but did not want to vote for a U.S.-led coalition attack due to its historical apprehensions about use of force. However, this occurred on the tails of the PRC’s near-universal condemnation for the Tiananmen Incident of 1989, and Beijing was anxious to regain its reputation and credibility within the international community. Thus, China relied on its tried and true tactic of abstention to allow the vote to past, and its cooperation with the West – or at least its lack of obstruction to U.S. leadership – was viewed favorably, thus putting Beijing back on track to be seen as part of the international community.

Cambodia in 1991 was an easier decision for China. In the aftermath of decades of civil war in Cambodia, China joined the rest of the Security Council’s vote for Resolution 745. This established the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), the UN’s first mission that involved taking over the administration of an independent state, organizing and running elections and overseeing human rights at a national level. China was eager to improve its international image and viewed Cambodia as a relatively straightforward and safe mission that Beijing felt comfortable supporting along its foreign policy goals of increased engagement with its Asian neighbors. As such, China sent 800 PLA engineering troops to UNTAC, marking the first time it contributed military troops for a UNPKO. Over the course of the decade, China also sent 437 military observers on five peacekeeping operations.

Thus, we see the beginnings of a flexible policy where Beijing has been more willing to change its historical policy of abstention and act in cooperation with other UNSC members based on both the particular situation and the stakes China itself stands to gain or lose from the international community.

Analysis of Veto Strategy

Despite these cautious steps towards activism, China is still sensitive to precedents that international peacekeeping could set for its domestic situation. Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, use of force, and intervention remain key points of concern for China. In order for Beijing to support any form of international intervention, three requirements must be in place: there must be UN authorization, the resolution must “respect sovereignty,” and action must be at the invitation of the target state. When China feels that such conditions are not met and does not want to support such a measure, its two options are to abstain or veto. China often chooses to abstain when it does not want to take a stand and when it disagrees with the policy – for example, Iraq in 1990 – yet does not want to go against countries such as the U.S. who wish to see the resolution through.

The second option – the veto – is much more rarely used by China, having occurred only six times since Beijing assumed China’s UN seat in 1971. China will veto a resolution only if it disagrees strongly enough to take a firm stand against other members of the Permanent-Five and stop the resolution from passing. Otherwise, Beijing usually expresses its disapproval via abstention. These six vetoes can be loosely categorized into: (1) vetoes directly related to its own national sovereignty, most notably issues related to the recognition of Taiwan; and (2) vetoes alongside the former Soviet Union and its successor state Russia, most notably on issues of sovereignty and intervention.

Of the six resolutions Beijing has vetoed, only three have been resolutions on which China was the sole veto, meaning that China’s active negative vote effectively prevented the resolution from passing. The other three would have failed regardless of China’s veto since the Soviet Union / Russia also vetoed the measure. Beijing’s first veto came in 1972, one year after its inclusion into the UN system. China vetoed the admission of Bangladesh into the UN because it had an alliance with Pakistan, from which Bangladesh sought independence. This vote is unique in China’s voting record, as the veto was not even in China’s own interest, but Pakistan’s. The fact that China allowed the resolution to pass two years later when the Bangladesh’s admission came to a vote again shows that China was uncomfortable with Bangladesh being denied admission solely because of Beijing’s veto, which did not even represent its own interests. From then on, Beijing was much more careful in deciding how to use its veto and even its vote. This experience evolved into the strategies of nonvoting and abstention we observed earlier. This more passive approach was one China was much more comfortable with, since it allowed the Chinese to send a message but avoided the necessity of alienating allies, taking sides, and assuming responsibility.

China’s other two deciding vetoes were regarding the ceasefire in Guatemala in 1997 and the extension of UN observers to Macedonia in 1999, both of which were vetoed because of the two countries’ recognition of Taiwan, which China considers to be a nonnegotiable threat to its own sovereignty. After China’s veto against Guatemala on January 10, it lifted its veto ten days later to allow peacekeeping troops into Guatemala after bilateral discussions that resulted in “a settlement to the dispute with Guatemala that had led to the veto.” In other words, Guatemala discontinued its diplomatic ties with Taiwan, and the Macedonia situation in 1997 played out similarly.

With the exception of its uncharacteristic veto in its second year of UN participation, these two vetoes mark the only times in Beijing’s 40 year history at the UN where it has been the determining negative vote that prevented a Security Council resolution from passing, and Beijing reasoning was clear – recognition of Taiwan, which Beijing views as an affront to its sovereignty. Beijing’s historical record shows that it unlikely China will disagree with an issue so strongly as to block its passing by veto unless the country in question recognizes Taiwan. As such, we can conclude that the issue of Taiwan is the only issue for China which is nonnegotiable.

China’s three other vetoes – regarding the Middle East in 1973, Myanmar in 2007, and Zimbabwe in 2008 – have all been alongside vetoes by the Soviet Union or its successor state Russia. In other words, these resolutions would have failed irrespective of China’s additional veto, so why was Beijing willing to take a firm stand on these three issues in particular, unlike the other resolutions it abstained from despite also disagreeing? Unfortunately, except for the commonality of a double veto with Russia, there is not a straightforward rule on such situations unlike those concerning Taiwan. However, we can still observe where China broke with its usual trend in these three situations.

In 1973 China voted with the Soviet Union against the ceasefire in the Middle East. Since the Yom Kippur War was during the Cold War, the U.S. was seen as the backer of Israel while the U.S.S.R. was considered the ally of the Arab states. China’s veto alongside the Soviet Union in 1973 was an aberration from its many Cold War-era abstentions, which reflected its desire to align itself neither superpower. As such, it is more difficult to pinpoint China’s rationale for its veto on the Yom Kippur War. China’s historical ties with the Soviet Union most likely played a role in its decision, though it is less clear why China gave a firm veto on this issue whereas it abstained from vetoing alongside the Soviet Union in many other issues during this era.

China’s rationales for its vetoes alongside Russia in the 2000s are more easily analyzed. In 2007, Beijing vetoed with Russia against criticizing Myanmar on human rights. China is particularly sensitive to criticisms on its own human rights record, which it sees as a domestic issue to be handled internally, not subject to international commentary. Clearly, it had a national interest to protect itself by vetoing the resolution, less China become the next target of such criticisms. In addition, because Russia was also going to veto the resolution, the political costs were significantly lowered since China would not have to singly bear the burden of being the reason for the resolution’s rejection.

China’s most recent veto was in 2008 against sanctions on Zimbabwe. Several factors distinguish it from other cases in which China expressed concerns about intervention, but did not feel strongly enough about to go beyond abstention and actually veto the resolution. First, Beijing was most likely willing to take a strong stance on nonintervention in Zimbabwe because it would be a sign of solidarity with the developing world, particularly one in Africa. China’s policy on nonintervention reflects its belief that a country should solve its own problems – and have the option of defining such problems itself – instead of having outside sources such as the UN, which China and the developing world often view as a proxy for the West, impose its values via sanctions and force. This policy of nonintervention protects China against possible future intrusions on its own domestic situation and builds solidarity with the developing world, as seen in this veto against Zimbabwean sanction.

A second reason the Chinese were perhaps willing to veto on Zimbabwe’s behalf in 2008 was Beijing’s relationship with Zimbabwe specifically and its hopes for future relations with Africa generally. In 2006, China signed a $1.3 billion energy deal with Zimbabwe that would provide the African country with coal mines and thermal power stations from Chinese companies. In addition to trade opportunities, Zimbabwe provided chrome. One commentator described it as: “For Harare, an international pariah, China represents its only major international supporter…” While China did not explicitly state its relationship with Zimbabwe alongside calls for nonintervention in defending its veto, it is doubtful China did not take such matters into consideration when deciding to veto measures against sanctions on Zimbabwe. Thus, the most logical conclusion for why China chose to go one step forward beyond its usual stance of abstention was because of existing bilateral ties with Zimbabwe and hopes for future ties with Africa and other developing nations.

Based on China’s historical record, the following conclusions on China’s veto strategy can be made: (1) China will be unlikely to use its veto unless there are very special circumstances. It has done so only six times since Beijing’s inclusion into the UN system in 1971, even though it has expressed disagreement with many more resolutions. (2) China will be unlikely to cast a deciding veto on a future resolution unless it feels that the country in question is challenging Beijing’s sovereignty on the issue of Taiwan. In this case, China will most likely use the situation to negotiate bilaterally with the country in question on the issue of Taiwan. (3) China will be unlikely to use its veto on an nonintervention issue unless an existing veto, most likely from Russia, is already established. In addition, China’s interests must also be fairly clearly at stake. Issues of highest concern are most likely: human rights precedence, current and future investments in Africa, and building solidarity with Africa and developing nations. In sum, China’s veto record reveals clear patterns and prerequisites that reflect China’s strategic objectives and how it selectively uses its veto power to achieve such goals.

Case Study: Sudan

Sudan is an important example of an issue where China has used its veto power to not only react to given situations, but to proactively shape the UN agenda through the threat of a veto in conjunction with its bilateral relationship with Sudan. The Darfur conflict has been described as guerrilla conflict, civil war, and genocide, and revolves around accusations of the Sudanese government oppressing and committing genocide against black Africans in favor of Arabs. Between 2004 and 2006, China abstained from six UN resolutions regarding Sudan, where the state-owned company China National Petroleum Corporation owns 40% of the consortium that dominates Sudan’s oil fields. In 2004, when the Security Council neared votes on a series of resolutions threatening to sanction Sudan’s oil sales,Wang Guangya, China’s ambassador to the U.N., confirmed China’s veto threats but dismissed suggestions that its oil interests played a role in the decision, instead saying that the resolutions would have eliminated the Sudan government’s incentive to cooperate. Based on the characteristics of the situation in Sudan, we can see that Sudan is a prime candidate for a potential Chinese veto based on its strategic objectives – (1) The proposed sanctions and use of force fall under China’s longstanding concerns of nonintervention; (2) China has vested interests in the country, most notably the large oil industry on which it depends for fuel; and finally (3) China sees its support and defense of Sudan as a way to build traction in its relationship with Africa and the developing world. These factors have given China’s threats of vetoes of the year a certain level of credibility, and as a result, the rest of the Security Council and world at large has learned to listen to or at least negotiate with China’s lead on Sudan-related issues.

However, China has never actually vetoed any sanctions on Sudan, despite threatening to do so on several occasions. As previously noted, China abstained on several votes, thereby expressing its disapproval but still allowing the resolutions to pass. For example, in 2006, when China chaired the Security Council, China allowed Resolution 1672 to pass, imposing sanctions on four Sudanese individuals – including government officials – accused of being involved in the Darfur atrocities. However, China’s lack of actual vetoes does not necessarily mean that the threats lack legitimacy or efficacy. On the contrary, China’s threats have successfully resulted in changed language in several resolutions. This is in line with its strategy of working behind the scenes before the voting record to convince other countries to drop or modify the severity of a resolution’s language. Resolutions 1564, 1591 and 1672 were passed with China’s abstention, but the penalties of the sanctions on Sudan were lessened due to China’s lobbying.

Sudan also serves as a useful case study in examining China’s increasing role in the international sphere. In 2007, China voted along with the Security Council in favor of Resolution 1769, which gave UN troops “all the necessary means” to protect themselves, defend civilians, and secure the safe passage of aid in the region under Chapter VII. Although China most likely would not have supported Resolution 1769 had it not received Sudanese government acquiescence, this was a decisive resolution nonetheless.

China’s changing policy on Sudan is yet another indicator that Beijing is in the midst of adjusting its stance on noninterference policy into one that is more flexible. Historically speaking, China’s policy towards nonintervention has stemmed from its fears that precedence for sanctions and other measures may be used against it in the future. Its behavior regarding such concerns have been based both on matters of principle, as in the many cases from which China abstained in its early years of UN participation, and on a practical basis, as seen on the issue of human rights in Burma, a sensitive issue for China. In the case of Sudan, China’s stance against sanctions was initially rhetorically couched in the language of nonintervention and more realistically concerned with protecting its oil supply in Sudan and relationship with Africa. However, China began to realize that it was not UN sanctions that would risk its investments in Africa, but rather the lack of sanctions leading to the deteriorating stability, growing public outrage, and increasing possibility of military intervention which would threaten its stake in the region. Thus, China began to leverage its relationship with Sudan to convince it to engage with the UN. This led to the breakthrough Resolution 1769 mentioned earlier – China played a key role in securing the Sudanese government’s acceptance of the UN peacekeeping plan. Chinese president Hu Jintao even raised the issue with Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir at a summit during his visit to Sudan.

As China’s record and initiative on Sudan within the UN structure shows, a new Chinese foreign policy practice is emerging. China’s willingness to use its Security Council veto on the issue of Sudan, whether actual or merely apparent, reflectes Beijing’s continued movement from its previously passive role in the UN to a much more proactive one. In addition to its relationship with Sudan and convincing its government to engage with the UN on the Darfur issue, China is clearly making marked moves towards a proactive role in the international sphere, one that may even be arguably considered as that of a leader on issue such as Sudan.

Conclusions

Analysis of China’s behavior in the Security Council over the past 40 years has shown an increasingly active and flexible UN policy in Beijing, especially on peacekeeping operations and voting pattern in the security council. This can be seen as part of China’s current efforts to present itself as a “responsible power” in the international community. There is no better place for China to pursue legitimacy, improve image, and develop political standing in the international sphere than the UN. China’s increasingly active role in international efforts such as UN peacekeeping has been a conscious effort by Beijing to present itself as a partner and leader in the UN and the international community at large.

The transition from passive observer to active participant in the UN can also be seen as part of China’s wider multinational diplomacy strategy. The foundations of China’s modern international diplomacy strategy comes from Deng Xiaoping’s idea of ensuring world peace to ensure domestic development. Throughout the mid-1990’s, China developed the “new security concept,” which saw security as something to be increased through diplomacy and economic interaction, not competition as in the Cold War. This merged with the “peaceful rise” and “peaceful development” concepts often used by Chinese leaders such as President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao to describe China’s goals of becoming a partner, not threat, to the international community. The application of this foreign diplomacy and engagement strategy to its UN policy has led to China developing a more engaged role in the Security Council.

China’s status as an emerging power and aspirations for becoming a great power have shifted Beijing’s approach to its UN policy over the years. Realizing that it needed to begin acting in a way expected of a “responsible power,” Beijing has begun a period of unprecedented international activism in the UN. As we saw in the Sudan case study, Africa has been one such key ground, and China’s relations with other pariah countries may be of use to both the UN, which needs a way to dialogue with difficult regimes, and also to China, who seeks to prove itself in the international community.

China has shown that it is willing to adapt its previous attitude towards nonintervention issues and use its diplomatic relations with problematic regimes to convince them to be more cooperative with the UN. China’s changing economic and political interests have partly driven this shift, with increased investment in developing countries and increasing hopes for others to see it as a partner and not a threat. Looking forward, we can expect China to continue to increase its presence in the Security Council and its role in the international community.

References

China Institute of International Affairs. “China and the United Nations”. New York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 1959.

Chen, Lung-Chu. “Formosa, China, and the United Nations”. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1967.

Stoessinger, John George. “The United Nations and the Superpowers: China, Russia and America”. New York: Random House, 1977.

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758. Accessed 11 Nov. 2010 <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/327/74/IMG/NR032774.pdf?OpenElement>.

Shichor, Yitzhak. “China’s Voting Behavior in the U.N. Security Council.” Association for Asian Research, 2006. Accessed 9 Nov. 2010. <http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/2947.html HYPERLINK “http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/2947.html./”.>.

Kim, Samuel S. “China, the United Nations and World Order”. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979.

He Yin. “China’s Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations”. Singapore: Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2007.

Choedon, Yeshi. “China’s Stand on UN Peacekeeping Operations: Changing Priorities of Foreign Policy.” China Report, Vol. 41, No. 1: 2005.

Wang, Jianwei. “Managing Conflict: Chinese Perspectives on Multilateral Diplomacy and Collective Security.” Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang, eds. In the Eyes of the Dragon: China Views the World. Lanham, MA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999.

Staehle, Stefan. “China’s Participation in the United Nations Peacekeeping Regime,” MA Thesis for the George Washington University, 2006. Accessed 1 Nov. 2010. <http://etd-gw.wrlc.org/theses/submitted/etd-05092006-104506/withheld/Thesis_Staehle_Final.pdf.>.

Huo Hwei-ling. “Patterns of Behavior in China’s Foreign Policy: The Gulf Crisis and Beyond.” Asian Survey, Vol. 32, No. 3: 1992.

Alden, Chris and Paula Cristina Roque. “What China’s New Activism in UN Means for Africa.” South African Institute for International Affairs. 4 Dec. 2007. Accessed 26 Nov. 2010. <http://www.saiia.org.za/china-in-africa-project-opinion/what-china-s-new-activism-in-un-means-for-africa.html >.

Tyler, Patrick E. “China Asserts Taiwan’s Ties to Guatemala Led to Veto.” The New York Times, 12 Jan. 1997.

Lewis, Paul. “China Lifts U.N. Veto on Guatemala Monitors.” The New York Times, 21 Jan. 1997.

“China Vows Veto of Macedonia Force Renewal.” The Los Angeles Times, 25 Feb. 1999.

Morphet, Sally. “Resolutions and Vetoes in the UN Security Council: The Relevance and Significance.” Cambridge University Press: Review of International Studies. Vol. 16, No. 4: 1990., pp. 341-359.

Tsvangirai, Morgan. “Russia, China Veto UN Sanctions on Zimbabwe.” CNN. 11 July 2008.

“Zimbabwe Signs China Energy Deal.” BBC. 12 June 2006.

Eisenman, Joshua. “Zimbabwe: China’s African Ally.” The Jamestown Foundation. Volume 5, Issue 15: 2005.

Large, Daniel. “Beyond ‘Dragon in the Bush’: The Study of China-Africa Relations.” Oxford University Press: African Affairs. Vol. 107, 2008: pp. 45-61.

“Changing Patterns in the Use of the Veto in the Security Council.” Global Policy Forum. Accessed 2 Nov. 2010. http://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/tables-and-charts-on-the-security-council-0-82/use-of-the-veto.html.

Straus, Scott. “Darfur and the Genocide Debate.” Foreign Affairs. Jan/Feb 2005.

Houser, Trevor and Roy Levy. “Energy Security and China’s UN Diplomacy.” World Security Institute: China Security. Vol. 11, Issue 5.

Goodman, Peter S. “China Invests Heavily in Sudan’s Oil Industry.” The Washington Post. 23 Dec. 2004.

Medeiros, Evan S. China’s International Behavior: Activism, Opportunism, and Diversification. Rand Corporation: 2009.

Kleine-Ahlbrandt, Stephanie and Andrew Small. “China’s New Dictatorship Diplomacy.”

Introduction

Election of Barack Obama was a landmark event in American history, many Americans hoped that the popular new president would be revive the image of the US abroad and correct the perceived blunders of the Bush administration. This paper seeks to explore the reaction to Obama in the world’s most populous country; more specifically, to situate the official media coverage of the Obama presidency within the wider context of Sino-American relations. I will assess Chinese attitudes and portrayal of the United States and the Obama administration by examining two newspapers: the People’s Daily (both the Chinese and English editions) and the Southern Weekend (Chinese online edition). These two papers target different segments of the Chinese and international audience and reflect very different organizational priorities but both ultimately speak on behalf of the state and the Party. The opinions expressed in the People’s Daily reflect the official position of the top leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) while the Southern Weekend, operating far from Beijing, represents the liberal end of governmental opinion in China. Analyzed together, they allow for interesting comparison within the spectrum of Chinese official attitudes towards President Obama and towards the United States. Contrasting the English and Chinese editions of the same story also sheds some light on the subtle differences in tone between the Party’s message directed towards domestic versus international audiences.

This paper focuses on coverage of one particular moment in the Obama presidency – his Inaugural Address on January 20, 2009 —  and its implications for US-China relations. The way these two state-owned media outlets frame Obama’s Inauguration speech reveal their image of the US and convey a certain image of the US to their readership. Obama’s inauguration not only drew a record breaking crowd to Washington but attracted millions of viewers across the world, including China, where, due to the time difference, viewers had to stay-up into the wee hours of the morning to watch the live event. Aware of the international reach of his speech, President Obama devoted a significant portion of his speech to address an international audience. It is thus important to note that these are precisely the sections of his speech that were not translated into Chinese and were not analyzed by either of the two newspapers examined in this study. Obama’s effort at public diplomacy along with a mention of communism was systematically expunged from the Chinese news coverage of the event. The People’s Daily in particular went to great lengths to highlight the ailing economy of the US; its English edition glibly contrasts the message of hope delivered by the new president and the “reality” of a struggling Wall Street. The Southern Weekend, was less critical of the US economy and more fixated by Obama’s race.

I. Historical context of the Obama Inaugural

The 2008 campaign and election of Barack Obama represented a watershed in American politics, one which sent ripples around the world. A powerful orator who effectively used new media, Obama cast himself as an agent to deliver much needed change to dishonest Washington politics. His campaign speeches drew adoring crowds at home and abroad and his candidacy inspired young people in a way that recalled the Camelot of John F. Kennedy.  To many, his presidency also represents a turning point in American politics; as America’s first African American president, Obama promised “change you can believe in” and represented hope against all odds.

Obama’s presidential campaign coincided with the height of the Global Financial Crisis, considered by many economists to be the worst shock to international markets since the Great Depression. The crisis, which began in late 2007 with the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the US real-estate market, led to the collapse of major financial institutions like Bear Sterns, Merrill Lynch, and Lehman Brothers in 2008, destroyed hundreds of billions of dollars worth of consumer wealth, and put millions out of work.[1] The crisis point came in September 2008, when the controversial $700 billion Emergency Economic Stabilization Act bought troubled assets–mainly mortgage-backed securities– from failing financial firms. Capitalizing on the popular disillusionment directed at Washington and Wall Street, the Obama campaign’s anti-incumbency message and promise of change proved very effective.

Dwarfed somewhat by the enormity of the Financial Crisis, foreign policy issues still loomed large in the 2008 campaign. The incumbent President Bush, who had reached an all time low in popularity at home and around the world, was blamed for waging the War on Terror and causing America’s disastrous invasion of Iraq. The unpopularity of Bush created challenges for the McCain campaign on foreign policy issues especially. However, as an early opponent of the War in Iraq, then Senator Obama made withdraw from Iraq and focus on Afghanistan central to his foreign policy. [2] His campaign also made rebuilding America’s image abroad, confronting nuclear proliferation, and diplomatic engagement with America’s adversaries important elements of his platform.[3]

Despite this popular platform, the success of Obama in the Democratic Party primaries came as a shock to many spectators at home and abroad when he defeated the favored Hilary Clinton. His campaign was able to mobilize previously marginal voters, raise funds at astonishing rates, utilize new information technology, to score a stunning victory against John McCain. It should be remembered above all that, President Barack Obama was elected amidst the direst economic crisis since the Great Depression, a crisis that shook the American establishment to its core and gave a Washington outsider with well run campaign a shot at the most powerful office in the world.

The Global Financial Crisis also created opportunity across the Pacific, where the CCP’s policies to restrict capital outflows shielded Chinese firms from the shock of the US sub-prime mortgage crisis. On November 10, 2008, China announced a historic $586 billion stimulus package aimed at encouraging growth and domestic consumption in ten areas of Chinese society ranging from infrastructure investment to environmental protection and disaster rebuilding. Thus as the governments of Europe and the United States struggled to keep pace with the crisis, the CCP’s stimulus plan was welcomed as a source of stability in the turbulent international economy.  While the Global Financial Crisis shook the confidence of Americans, it bolstered the confidence of Chinese. According to a 2008 Pew Survey, the Chinese were the most confident in their economy and the Americans the least. This in the aftermath of the successful 2008 Beijing Olympics looked to many to mark China’s emergence as a great power.[4]

Nevertheless, China shared great interest in the recovery of the US economy, which is the largest market for Chinese exports. Since China initiated economic reform in 1979, foreign direct investment (FDI) has played a major role in China’s rapid growth. The Chinese government estimates that the foreign trade sector employs more than 80 million people, of which 28 million work in foreign-invested enterprises.[5] Unemployment was a key issue of concern, “The Chinese government in January 2009 estimated that 20 million migrant workers alone had lost their jobs in 2008 because of the global economic slowdown.”[6]Thus, China which had been cautious with its hold vast foreign exchange reserves was compelled to boost its purchases of U.S. securities in order to help fund the hundreds of billions of dollars that are expected to be spent by the U.S. government to purchase troubled assets and stimulate the economy.

China’s decision to purchase American debt became controversial both in the US and within China. In May 2009, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao made an usually blunt comment about his concern for the safety of China’s one trillion dollar investment in American government debt.[7] Commentators have argued that “As the financial crisis has unfolded, China has become increasingly vocal about what it perceives as Washington’s mismanagement of the global economy and financial system, joining a chorus of foreign critics of unbridled American capitalism.”[8] The US owes China over $700 billion debt. Indeed, in the realm of US-China relations, Obama’s historic election is overshadowed by the shifting economic balance across the Pacific. The global financial crisis brought about a dramatic reversal in perceptions of geopolitical order, though as time passed the disparity of power between the US and China continues to remain great, the perception in 2008 and 2009 was very much that of a China with the upperhand, poised to overtake the US.

However, it should be noted that despite his unpopularity, President Bush did leave office with a sound China policy predicated on Robert Zoellick’s “responsible stakeholder” formulation. As Professor Thomas Christensen notes, “for addressing what is perhaps the greatest long-term strategic challenge facing the United States — managing U.S. relations with a rising China–change is not what is needed.[9] Bush’s second term reversed many of the policy blunders of his first term, and built a sound China policy which consisted of high-level exchanges, cooperation on a range of regional security issues, as well as engagement of economic issues.

It is within this context that the Obama’s election was viewed from the Chinese perspective. For the leaders of Zhongnanhai, China’s rapid response the Global Financial Crisis in contrast to the struggling American efforts represented milestone in the reemergence of Chinese power. The sharp criticism Chinese central bankers directed at US financial irresponsibility and the statement made by Premier Wen at the G20 all seem to affirm the growing confidence.[10] Yet the Chinese leadership was less confident on January 20^th than they appeared to be; the China-US relationship had improved markedly during Bush’s second term, they were uncertain whether or not America’s new president will take his message of change too far.  As the economy deteriorated in the US relative to China’s during the campaign season, the specter of protectionism reared its ugly head. At the same time, China increased its holding of US debt substantially in order to finance the US government bailout, further increasing the level of interdependence between the two nations. Thus, on the morning of Obama’s Inauguration, the question the future of the American economy no doubt loomed large in the minds of the CCP leadership.

II. Chinese Media Environment

To understand the newspaper coverage of the Obama inaugural requires an understanding of the Chinese media environment as well as the historical context.  Many of China’s major media outlets began their lives as part of the Soviet style propaganda wing of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). As Party mouthpieces, their duty was to propagate the Party line and give guidance to the people according to Party doctrine. The press’s role as an independent check on government power was explicitly rejected.[11] But since China adopted the “Open Door Policy” in the late 1970s, traditional Party-run newspapers, in particular, came under increasing pressure from the impact of China’s accession to the WTO and the information revolution, to move towards liberalization and commercialization. These traditional Party newspapers are still used by the political authorities to serve as a propaganda vehicle, but must now compete both with the new popular tabloids and with new media (Radio, TV, and increasingly the Internet) must attract their target audiences. After the 2003 “Marketing Economy” initiative, the Party set aside the “Five Big Publications” under its control—People’s Daily (人民日报）, Guangming Daily（光明日报）, Economic Daily（经济日报）, Liberation Daily（解放日报）, and the magazine Seeking the Truth（求是）— and announced that all other media would no longer received direct financial support from the government and, thus, must respond to market demand and seek out advertisers to support themselves financially.[12] The commercial liberalization of Chinese media have led to the proliferation of media groups; increasing competition, and driving diversification of content.

The People’s Daily Group

In China today, there are 39 press groups and more than 2,000 newspapers[13]. The giants within the Chinese media industry remain the state-run media outlets such as China Central Television, Xinhua News Agency, and the People’s Daily Group. Of the “Five Big Publications”, the People’s Daily is still the most widely distributed newspaper in China; ever since its founding in 1948, the People’s Daily has remained under control of the Party’s top leadership. Its editorials are regarded as official statements of government policy and it remains the public forum the Central Committee’s voice. Today, it is one of the five publications subsidized by the government and along with Xinhua News Agency and the State Administration for Radio, Film, and Television, one of the key media organs of the Party. [14] It reached its heyday of influence during the Cultural Revolution where it became Mao’s instrument of mass communication. However since “Opening and Reform”, it has been receiving fewer subsidies and must innovate to reform.  In 1997, the People’s Daily launched its website and has since maintained a popular BBS.

The Nanfang Media Group

While the People’s Daily represents one end on the spectrum of state-run newspapers, Southern Weekend published by the Nanfang Media Group represents the opposite.  Though the Nanfang Media Group is owned by the Guangzhou Provincial Communist Party, Southern Weekend and its sister publications (Nanfang Daily, Nanfang City News, etc) represent some of the most liberal voices in Chinese mass media. The media credibility and sense of social responsibility of Nanfang Media Group has earned it praises of the general audience. For six consecutive years, it had been elected as the nominees of the fifty “Most Respectable Enterprises in China” which was selected by the Management Case Center of Peking University. In 2001 and 2006, as the only print media who wins this reputation, Nanfang Media Group was in the gold list of “Most Respectable Enterprises in China”[15]. The content of Southern Weekend is still censored but its stories are on the whole much more colorful and less politically charged. Despite being a municipal newspaper, the Southern Weekend is one of the most widely circulated papers in China with a readership of nearly one million; it rivals the centrally owned People’s Daily in circulation. Being far from Beijing politics, it is operated with a greater degree of autonomy. It exists to generate profit and its worried more about consumer demand and less about party orthodoxy than the People’s Daily.

III. President Obama’s Inaugural Address

In this section, I focus primarily on the coverage of the inauguration of Obama in the English language (online) and Chinese language (print) versions of the People’s Daily and in the Chinese language (online) coverage by Southern Weekend. This comparison will identify how the CCP’s official account of the new President of the United States differs depending on the target audience. The analysis of Obama’s inaugural address provides a point of reference to examine the primary sources. What is emphasized and omitted from the inaugural address reveals more about the thinking of the Chinese Communist Party than about Obama or his speech.

Question of Censorship

President Obama’s inaugural address, delivered on January 20, 2009 to a live crowd of 400,000 on the mall, reached an audience of millions around the world, even in China. However, the live broadcast of this speech on CCTV was censored as was the transcript of his speech. When President Obama said: “Recall that earlier generations faced down fascism and communism not just with missiles and tanks, but with sturdy alliances and enduring convictions”, the CCTV broadcast promptly faded out before the translator could translate the statement, instead the announcer asking a question about the challenges Obama faces in the economy.[16]

The party decision in what to translate and what to omit is very telling of their attitudes towards the different audiences they must face. That entire passage was retained for an English-language version of the speech that appeared on the website of state-run Xinhua news agency. But in the Chinese-language version, the word “communism” was omitted from the translation.

Original Content

The full text of President Obama’s inaugural address, transcribed by the New York Times, can be found in Appendix A. His speech was humble in tone; acknowledge the weakness of the economy, but slowly builds to a rousing call for all Americans to face the challenges ahead with courage. It echoes the themes that were central to his campaign without downplaying the dire national situation. He calls for “A new era of responsibility”, confidently asserts, “challenges we face are real, challenges will be met”, and urges Americans to chose hope over fear.[17]

He is very much aware of his global audience and uses the opportunity to engage in direct diplomacy, stating “And so, to all other peoples and governments who are watching today, from the grandest capitals to the small village where my father was born: know that America is a friend of each nation and every man, woman and child who seeks a future of peace and dignity, and we are ready to lead once more.”[18] While asserting the return of US leadership in world affairs, he attempts to distinguish himself from his processor. He makes the case for soft power, stating that Americans could not “do as we please” but instead rely on “the justness of our cause, the force of our example, the tempering qualities of humility and restraint”.[19]

Aside from the aforementioned comment about overcoming fascism and communism, Obama’s inaugural contains another phrase that was not translated into the Chinese newspapers. He states, “To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history, but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.” This statement can be read as a direct challenge against the Chinese Communist Party, which is ironically scrambling to censor this very statement in its live broadcast. It seems that the CCP felt that this statement could be read by a domestic audience as critical to its legitimacy, which points to a guilty conscience of the leadership and an acknowledgement of the corruption, deceit, and oppression that exists within the Party.

English Language Coverage on the People’s Daily Website

The English language report on the People’s Daily website was an article taken from Xinhua news agency commenting on Obama’s speech. The headline of the article read “Obama’s inauguration gives hope on economy, but enormous challenges ahead”. Its coverage emphasized America’s failing economy, declining fortunes of America, and ignored major themes of the speech such as the call for responsibility, responsible exercise of power, and the restoration of American confidence. Instead, the opening paragraph reads:

Hope is one thing, the reality is another. On Tuesday, about 2 million people gathered in Washington D.C. to celebrate the inauguration of Barack Obama as new U.S, president, hoping he will save the economy, but the Wall Street plunged more than 4 percent in New York.[20]

Thus, the opening paragraph frames the entire speech in terms of false hope, casting serious doubts, from the onset, about the efficacy of the reforms that President Obama is setting forth. It also suggests that the exuberant crowds in Washington are simply misled, that the “reality” is the economic despair on Wall Street. It goes on to quote new president in a statement that apparently affirms this theme of American decline, “Our economy is badly weakened, a consequence of greed and irresponsibility on the part of some, but also our collective failure to make hard choices and prepare the nation for a new age.” The article does not dwell on the rhetorical power of the speech nor does it include any mention of foreign policy. The sparse quotes that they draw from the speech… The conclusion drives home the message of false hope:

But the Wall Street cannot wait. The U.S. stock market plunged more than 4 percent on Inauguration Day Tuesday as bank woes spread while investors failed to find confidence from President Barack Obama’s inauguration speech. The Dow Jones Industrial Average was down more than 330 points, or 4 percent, falling below 8,000 for the first time in 2009, while the Standard & Poor’s 500 and the Nasdaq indexes dropped more than 5 percent.[21]

Similarly, an article covering the “highlights of U.S. President Barack Obama’s inaugural address” on the People’s Daily website emphasizes the economic aspects of the address and completely omits the “sensitive” references. It does a better job of objectively covering the key elements of Obama’s speech that are not considered “sensitive”: US foreign policies, leadership, restoration of American confidence, and the importance of American responsibility.[22] The People’s Daily, the Communist Party’s mouthpiece published a translated text of the speech on its website, omitting the word communism. The line about dissent was cut entirely. However the content seem to have been removed. The message to the international reader echoes propaganda of a bygone era, dwelling on the challenges facing the US economy and casting doubt on the hope promised by the new president. However, its choice to censor statements that only ambiguously refer to China reveals that insecurity lurks below the venire of confidence brought about by American economic weakness.

Chinese Language Coverage in the People’s Daily Newspaper

The Chinese language coverage in the People’s Daily newspaper took a more measured and conciliatory tone. It frames the event within the context of US-China relations, acknowledging the importance of this bilateral relationship. The article acknowledges the impact of the financial crisis but it also urges cooperation, a word that is not mentioned in the English language story. It takes a much weaker editorial stance and more faithfully presents Obama’s intended message. The article states that, “责任”和“团结”是奥巴马就职演说的主题词(“Responsibility” and “unity” are the key themes of Obama’s inaugural address) and quotes him at his most eloquent:

美国正面临战争和金融危机所引发的各种困难。“我们今天聚在这里正是因为我们选择了战胜恐惧的希望，选择了团结。(America faces various difficulties, from its wars to the financial crisis but “We have gathered here today because we have chosen hope over fear”)[23]

The article also quotes many international newspapers: the Washington Post, the New York Times, Argentina’s Chronicle, Mexico’s El Universal and referencing the Russian media, European media. Despite the historic significance of the event, this article remained in page 3 of the People’s Daily newspaper, a page which is usually devoted to international news. Characteristic of the People’s Daily banal news about where prominent CCP officials visited took precedence over this story, which was honored with a picture. The decision to not print the Xinhua News Agency’s story, which was very similar to its English language edition in tone and dwells on the struggling American economy, is also very telling. Indicating that the story printed reflect the importance of the story to the Party leadership.

Nevertheless, the People’s Daily article also concludes with a healthy dose of skepticism. It quotes a Chinese expert at the Carter Center:

美国民众希望奥巴马带领国家战胜当前面临的严重危机。奥巴马的就职演讲仍维持了其一贯激动人心的风格。美国人关注奥巴马强调的希望和梦想，更关注他就任总统后的政策实施。目前奥巴马的支持率达到了80%，但从明天起，奥巴马的“政治蜜月”可能将宣告结束，他要面对的是来自内政和外交方面的一系列严峻的挑战。(The American people hope that Barack Obama can lead the country and prevail over the serious crisis that it faces. Obama maintained his motivating style in his inaugural address. Americans pay attention to Obama’s emphasis on hopes and dreams, but they will be paying even greater attention to his ability to implement these policies. Obama’s approval rating may be at 80% today, but tomorrow, Obama’s “political honeymoon” may be an end, and he will have to face a series of difficult domestic and diplomatic challenges.[24]

The overall tone of the People’s Daily article is very professional, following the conventions of journalism, any editorializing voice is hard to detect. However, it is important to note that it does not give anymore coverage to Obama’s efforts at public diplomacy than the English language Xinhua story published by People’s Daily Online.

Southern Weekend Coverage

The coverage of Obama’s inauguration was much less political than the People’s Daily’s reporting of the same event, instead it dwelled much more on President Obama’s identity as a black man. Given time constraints, only the online version rather than the hardcopies of Southern Weekend could be located for this paper. However, the story probably took front page news in this publication. The online version features a colorful photo essay displaying 20 pictures of the inauguration parade, of Obama and his kids, of the Obama family and the Bush family.[25] The article ran by Southern Weekend was by far the shortest, it also appears as if much of the content was added later and chronicles the first days of President Obama’s stay in the White House. Additionally, both the English and Chinese versions of President Obama’s speech are easily available on the website, unlike the People’s Daily website. However, probably obeying a central edict, the entire section of Obama’s message to the outside world is omitted from the Chinese translation of the speech while it is included in full in the English version.

Another noteworthy feature of the Southern Weekend article was its emphasis on Obama’s race. It article title, 白宫主人不再“白” (Owner of the White House No Longer “White”), immediately frames the event somewhat humorously through a racial lens. It describes Obama as “美国第一个非洲裔总统” (America’s first African-American President), refers to the “黑人第一家庭” (the first Black First Family), and followed up with an extensive discussion of Obama inauguration as riding on the “Lincoln Wind.”[26] This emphasis is completely missing from the People’s Daily coverage which reported Obama’s race only in passing and never more than once in an article. The Southern Weekend also ran another story a day later called “黑人掌控美国？(Blacks Controlling America?) which chronicles African-American history and Black culture in the US. [27] The Southern Weekend’s interest in Obama’s race may stem from the fact that a large portion of its readership is in Guangzhou, a city with the largest concentration of Blacks in China. [28] The so-called “Chocolate City” in Guangzhou is home to a growing community of African traders and has been the focus of some degree of racial controversy.

Conclusion

After eight years of what many perceived as American waywardness under President Bush, Americans looked to President Obama to revitalize America’s image abroad and rebuild American soft power. However, the unraveling of the Global Financial Crisis brought America to her knees and came to define the early days of the Obama presidency. As much as the Global Financial Crisis tarnished America’s image and appeal abroad, it seemed to strengthen China’s and reinforced the extent of US-China interdependence. This paper examines how President Obama’s election was reported in China by two state-owned newspapers: the People’s Daily and the Southern Weekend.

Despite the growing assertiveness of Chinese leaders after they led their economy through the most severe economic crisis since the Great Depression, their choices in the coverage of Obama’s inauguration speech reveal deeper insecurities that lurk beneath the venire of confidence. Because of the massive stimulus package put into effect in 2008, China maintained its rapid growth even as the advanced economies of the US and EU struggled. China also became the largest holder of US treasuries, playing a significant role in financing the government bailout. Yet the CCP still scrambled to censor parts of Obama’s inaugural address, making sure that mentions of communism and a vague reference to corrupt and repressive governments was omitted from Chinese versions of the speech. The English language edition of the People’s Daily takes the additional step of highlighting America’s economic hopelessness. The Chinese edition and the Southern Weekend both frame Obama’s inauguration in more favorable terms but neither included his mention of “sensitive” topics. The decision to censor vague references in the Obama Inaugural address reveals the insecurities of the CCP leadership. At a time when America was at her weakest vis-à-vis China, when her democratic system seems too inefficient to deal with the enormity of the challenge, Chinese leaders did not find the courage to let the Chinese public decide the merit of Obama’s words. While Obama is calling for the people to choose hope over fear, the CCP fears its own people.

References

“奥巴马宣誓就任美国总统”. 人民日报2009.01.21第3版。 《http://data.people.com.cn》

“美国当选总统奥巴马宣誓就职.” 南方周末。2009.01.21《http://www.infzm.com/content/23046?page=16》

“白宫主人不再’白’”. 南方周末. 2009.01.20《http://www.infzm.com/content/22925》

黑人掌控美国？南方周末. 2009.01.22《http://www.infzm.com/content/23032》

“Highlights of U.S. President Barack Obama’s inaugural address.” People’s Daily Online. 2009.01.21 <English.peoplesdaily.com.cn>

“Transcript: Barack Obama’s Inaugural Address.” New York Times. 2009/01/20. <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/20/us/politics/20text-obama.html>

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Christensen, T. (2009). “Shaping the choices of a rising China: recent lessons for the Obama administration.” The Washington Quarterly 32(3): 89-104.

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Appendix A

Transcript

Barack Obama’s Inaugural Address

Following is the transcript of President Barack Obama’s Inaugural Address, as transcribed by CQ Transcriptions:

PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA: Thank you. Thank you.

CROWD: Obama! Obama! Obama! Obama!

My fellow citizens: I stand here today humbled by the task before us, grateful for the trust you have bestowed, mindful of the sacrifices borne by our ancestors.

I thank President Bush for his service to our nation…

(APPLAUSE)

… as well as the generosity and cooperation he has shown throughout this transition.

Forty-four Americans have now taken the presidential oath.

The words have been spoken during rising tides of prosperity and the still waters of peace. Yet, every so often the oath is taken amidst gathering clouds and raging storms. At these moments, America has carried on not simply because of the skill or vision of those in high office, but because We the People have remained faithful to the ideals of our forebears, and true to our founding documents.

So it has been. So it must be with this generation of Americans.

That we are in the midst of crisis is now well understood. Our nation is at war against a far-reaching network of violence and hatred. Our economy is badly weakened, a consequence of greed and irresponsibility on the part of some but also our collective failure to make hard choices and prepare the nation for a new age.

Homes have been lost, jobs shed, businesses shuttered. Our health care is too costly, our schools fail too many, and each day brings further evidence that the ways we use energy strengthen our adversaries and threaten our planet.

These are the indicators of crisis, subject to data and statistics. Less measurable, but no less profound, is a sapping of confidence across our land; a nagging fear that America’s decline is inevitable, that the next generation must lower its sights.

Today I say to you that the challenges we face are real, they are serious and they are many. They will not be met easily or in a short span of time. But know this America: They will be met.

(APPLAUSE)

On this day, we gather because we have chosen hope over fear, unity of purpose over conflict and discord.

On this day, we come to proclaim an end to the petty grievances and false promises, the recriminations and worn-out dogmas that for far too long have strangled our politics.

We remain a young nation, but in the words of Scripture, the time has come to set aside childish things. The time has come to reaffirm our enduring spirit; to choose our better history; to carry forward that precious gift, that noble idea, passed on from generation to generation: the God-given promise that all are equal, all are free, and all deserve a chance to pursue their full measure of happiness.

(APPLAUSE)

In reaffirming the greatness of our nation, we understand that greatness is never a given. It must be earned. Our journey has never been one of shortcuts or settling for less.

It has not been the path for the faint-hearted, for those who prefer leisure over work, or seek only the pleasures of riches and fame.

Rather, it has been the risk-takers, the doers, the makers of things — some celebrated, but more often men and women obscure in their labor — who have carried us up the long, rugged path towards prosperity and freedom.

For us, they packed up their few worldly possessions and traveled across oceans in search of a new life. For us, they toiled in sweatshops and settled the West, endured the lash of the whip and plowed the hard earth.

For us, they fought and died in places Concord and Gettysburg; Normandy and Khe Sanh.

Time and again these men and women struggled and sacrificed and worked till their hands were raw so that we might live a better life. They saw America as bigger than the sum of our individual ambitions; greater than all the differences of birth or wealth or faction.

This is the journey we continue today. We remain the most prosperous, powerful nation on Earth. Our workers are no less productive than when this crisis began. Our minds are no less inventive, our goods and services no less needed than they were last week or last month or last year. Our capacity remains undiminished. But our time of standing pat, of protecting narrow interests and putting off unpleasant decisions — that time has surely passed.

Starting today, we must pick ourselves up, dust ourselves off, and begin again the work of remaking America.

(APPLAUSE)

For everywhere we look, there is work to be done.

The state of our economy calls for action: bold and swift. And we will act not only to create new jobs but to lay a new foundation for growth.

We will build the roads and bridges, the electric grids and digital lines that feed our commerce and bind us together.

We will restore science to its rightful place and wield technology’s wonders to raise health care’s quality…

(APPLAUSE)

… and lower its costs.

We will harness the sun and the winds and the soil to fuel our cars and run our factories. And we will transform our schools and colleges and universities to meet the demands of a new age.

All this we can do. All this we will do.

Now, there are some who question the scale of our ambitions, who suggest that our system cannot tolerate too many big plans. Their memories are short, for they have forgotten what this country has already done, what free men and women can achieve when imagination is joined to common purpose and necessity to courage.

What the cynics fail to understand is that the ground has shifted beneath them, that the stale political arguments that have consumed us for so long, no longer apply.

MR. The question we ask today is not whether our government is too big or too small, but whether it works, whether it helps families find jobs at a decent wage, care they can afford, a retirement that is dignified.

Where the answer is yes, we intend to move forward. Where the answer is no, programs will end.

And those of us who manage the public’s dollars will be held to account, to spend wisely, reform bad habits, and do our business in the light of day, because only then can we restore the vital trust between a people and their government.

Nor is the question before us whether the market is a force for good or ill. Its power to generate wealth and expand freedom is unmatched.

But this crisis has reminded us that without a watchful eye, the market can spin out of control. The nation cannot prosper long when it favors only the prosperous.

The success of our economy has always depended not just on the size of our gross domestic product, but on the reach of our prosperity; on the ability to extend opportunity to every willing heart — not out of charity, but because it is the surest route to our common good.

(APPLAUSE)

As for our common defense, we reject as false the choice between our safety and our ideals.

Our founding fathers faced with perils that we can scarcely imagine, drafted a charter to assure the rule of law and the rights of man, a charter expanded by the blood of generations.

Those ideals still light the world, and we will not give them up for expedience’s sake.

And so, to all other peoples and governments who are watching today, from the grandest capitals to the small village where my father was born: know that America is a friend of each nation and every man, woman and child who seeks a future of peace and dignity, and we are ready to lead once more.

(APPLAUSE)

Recall that earlier generations faced down fascism and communism not just with missiles and tanks, but with the sturdy alliances and enduring convictions.

They understood that our power alone cannot protect us, nor does it entitle us to do as we please. Instead, they knew that our power grows through its prudent use. Our security emanates from the justness of our cause; the force of our example; the tempering qualities of humility and restraint.

We are the keepers of this legacy, guided by these principles once more, we can meet those new threats that demand even greater effort, even greater cooperation and understanding between nations. We’ll begin to responsibly leave Iraq to its people and forge a hard- earned peace in Afghanistan.

With old friends and former foes, we’ll work tirelessly to lessen the nuclear threat and roll back the specter of a warming planet.

We will not apologize for our way of life nor will we waver in its defense.

And for those who seek to advance their aims by inducing terror and slaughtering innocents, we say to you now that, “Our spirit is stronger and cannot be broken. You cannot outlast us, and we will defeat you.”

(APPLAUSE)

For we know that our patchwork heritage is a strength, not a weakness.

We are a nation of Christians and Muslims, Jews and Hindus, and nonbelievers. We are shaped by every language and culture, drawn from every end of this Earth.

And because we have tasted the bitter swill of civil war and segregation and emerged from that dark chapter stronger and more united, we cannot help but believe that the old hatreds shall someday pass; that the lines of tribe shall soon dissolve; that as the world grows smaller, our common humanity shall reveal itself; and that America must play its role in ushering in a new era of peace.

To the Muslim world, we seek a new way forward, based on mutual interest and mutual respect.

To those leaders around the globe who seek to sow conflict or blame their society’s ills on the West, know that your people will judge you on what you can build, not what you destroy.

To those…

(APPLAUSE)

To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history, but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.

(APPLAUSE)

To the people of poor nations, we pledge to work alongside you to make your farms flourish and let clean waters flow; to nourish starved bodies and feed hungry minds.

And to those nations like ours that enjoy relative plenty, we say we can no longer afford indifference to the suffering outside our borders, nor can we consume the world’s resources without regard to effect. For the world has changed, and we must change with it.

As we consider the road that unfolds before us, we remember with humble gratitude those brave Americans who, at this very hour, patrol far-off deserts and distant mountains. They have something to tell us, just as the fallen heroes who lie in Arlington whisper through the ages.

We honor them not only because they are guardians of our liberty, but because they embody the spirit of service: a willingness to find meaning in something greater than themselves.

And yet, at this moment, a moment that will define a generation, it is precisely this spirit that must inhabit us all.

For as much as government can do and must do, it is ultimately the faith and determination of the American people upon which this nation relies.

It is the kindness to take in a stranger when the levees break; the selflessness of workers who would rather cut their hours than see a friend lose their job which sees us through our darkest hours.

It is the firefighter’s courage to storm a stairway filled with smoke, but also a parent’s willingness to nurture a child, that finally decides our fate.

Our challenges may be new, the instruments with which we meet them may be new, but those values upon which our success depends, honesty and hard work, courage and fair play, tolerance and curiosity, loyalty and patriotism — these things are old.

These things are true. They have been the quiet force of progress throughout our history.

What is demanded then is a return to these truths. What is required of us now is a new era of responsibility — a recognition, on the part of every American, that we have duties to ourselves, our nation and the world, duties that we do not grudgingly accept but rather seize gladly, firm in the knowledge that there is nothing so satisfying to the spirit, so defining of our character than giving our all to a difficult task.

This is the price and the promise of citizenship.

This is the source of our confidence: the knowledge that God calls on us to shape an uncertain destiny.

This is the meaning of our liberty and our creed, why men and women and children of every race and every faith can join in celebration across this magnificent mall. And why a man whose father less than 60 years ago might not have been served at a local restaurant can now stand before you to take a most sacred oath.

(APPLAUSE)

So let us mark this day in remembrance of who we are and how far we have traveled.

In the year of America’s birth, in the coldest of months, a small band of patriots huddled by dying campfires on the shores of an icy river.

The capital was abandoned. The enemy was advancing. The snow was stained with blood.

At a moment when the outcome of our revolution was most in doubt, the father of our nation ordered these words be read to the people:

“Let it be told to the future world that in the depth of winter, when nothing but hope and virtue could survive, that the city and the country, alarmed at one common danger, came forth to meet it.”

America, in the face of our common dangers, in this winter of our hardship, let us remember these timeless words; with hope and virtue, let us brave once more the icy currents, and endure what storms may come; let it be said by our children’s children that when we were tested we refused to let this journey end, that we did not turn back nor did we falter; and with eyes fixed on the horizon and God’s grace upon us, we carried forth that great gift of freedom and delivered it safely to future generations.

Thank you. God bless you.

(APPLAUSE)

And God bless the United States of America.

(APPLAUSE)

Appendix B

WASHINGTON, Jan. 20 (Xinhua) — Hope is one thing, the reality is another. On Tuesday, about 2 million people gathered in Washington D.C. to celebrate the inauguration of Barack Obama as new U.S, president, hoping he will save the economy, but the Wall Street plunged more than 4 percent in New York.

In his address just after taking the swearing-in oath, Obama admitted that the U.S. was “in the midst of crisis is now well understood,” listing war, economy, healthcare, home foreclosures, jobs, energy and other challenges.

“Our economy is badly weakened, a consequence of greed and irresponsibility on the part of some, but also our collective failure to make hard choices and prepare the nation for a new age,” said the new president.

But Obama assured Americans that although “the challenges we face are real, serious many,” and “will not be met easily or in a short span of time,” America’s goals “will be met.”

The new president’s words were echoed by Dean Glenn, an entrepreneur from Virginia, who told Xinhua that he is optimistic and believes Obama will save the economy and be great leader.

He said: “The economic crisis is a tough problem, it require some smart person to figure it out, I think he is surrounded himself with some very smart persons.”

Glenn, who had never been to inauguration before, said: “Today is a day we look forward to for long time,” adding that he believes Obama will bring changes to the U.S.. “We will have a new spirit of cooperation, hopefully a respect of the world.”

Witnessing Obama was sworn in as the 44th U.S. president, the first black president in America’s history, hundreds of thousands of people, like Glenn, erupted in roars of approval, and cheered in the same tone: “Obama, Obama!”

A recent national poll also showed that Obama’s approval rating had risen to nearly 80 percent, revealing people’s satisfaction with his work in the transition of power, establishment of his cabinet, as well as high expectations of his administration after Jan. 20.

“I think he (Obama) is going to do a magnificent job, he has several teams that would change the nation,” said David S. TorainII, head of Mathematics department of Hampton University, who joined the jubilation near the Washington Monument, which stands at the central of the National Mall.

As for the economy, however, he seemed to be not so optimistic. Inheriting a series of economic problems on a scale not seen since the Great Depression, Obama will have a hard time reviving the nation’s sagging economy, he noted.

“It might took long time to get out of the meltdown. I don’t think anybody can turn around in next 6 months,” he told Xinhua.

But he believed that Obama would help improve the situation. “I think he will be the greatest president since John F. Kennedy, he has great ideas, let’s wait and see what happens,” he said.

But the Wall Street cannot wait. The U.S. stock market plunged more than 4 percent on Inauguration Day Tuesday as bank woes spread while investors failed to find confidence from President Barack Obama’s inauguration speech.

The Dow Jones Industrial Average was down more than 330 points, or 4 percent, falling below 8,000 for the first time in 2009, while the Standard & Poor’s 500 and the Nasdaq indexes dropped more than 5 percent.

Appendix C

奥巴马宣誓就任美国总统 (人民日报2009.01.21第3版)

中方愿与美方一道推动中美建设性合作关系在新的时期长期健康稳定向前发展

本报华盛顿1月20日电  （记者李学江、马小宁）美国当选总统、民主党人奥巴马20日在华盛顿国会山宣誓就任美国第44任总统（见上图，新华社记者  张  岩摄）。来自全美及世界各地的200万人，共同见证了美国历史上第一位非洲裔总统宣誓就职这一历史性时刻。当选副总统拜登同日宣誓就职。

美国东部时间11时30分（北京时间21日零时30分）许，美国总统就职典礼在国会大厦西侧的露天平台上举行。除当天卸任的布什总统之外，美国前总统卡特、老布什和克林顿等前政要和社会名流也应邀出席奥巴马的就职典礼。

奥巴马在就职演说中呼吁美国民众树立坚强的信心、团结一致面对各种挑战和困难。他说，美国正面临战争和金融危机所引发的各种困难。“我们今天聚在这里正是因为我们选择了战胜恐惧的希望，选择了团结。”他呼吁全体美国民众端正心态，努力提高公民责任感，为克服危机、振兴国家经济贡献自己的力量。

奥巴马表示，美国将以“负责任的”方式撤离伊拉克，同时巩固在阿富汗得来不易的和平。他说，美国将为消除核威胁作出不懈努力。他还强调，美国将继续打击恐怖主义活动，并郑重宣布美国能战胜恐怖分子。美国政府将在相互尊重和互利的基础上，寻求与伊斯兰国家发展关系的新方式。

“责任”和“团结”是奥巴马就职演说的主题词。长期研究美国政治史的美国国会历史协会的柯农博士说，阐述具体内外政策是未来国情咨文的任务，就职演说的要义在于重温美国的政治理念，并将其应用于当今时代所面临的特殊问题。

奥巴马可谓“临危受命”。今天的美国正处于上世纪二三十年代大萧条以来最严重的经济衰退中。信贷停滞、消费冷清、房市下滑、股市动荡、失业率攀升，美国经济面临严重挑战。而导致这场危机的主要根源之一就是从华尔街到华盛顿的责任缺失。

现代经济本质是信用经济，而责任则是构成信用的基石。美国政府迄今所采取的一系列救市措施的实际效果表明，一旦责任缺失导致信用不再，要想恢复格外艰难。美国舆论认为，对奥巴马而言，赢得国会通过巨额经济复苏法案、短期内为经济注入强心针并非难事。真正的挑战是重建责任意识，恢复市场信心，这不仅是将美国经济推上复苏轨道的当务之急，也是保证美国经济健康运行的长远之计。

奥巴马就职适值美国前总统林肯诞辰200周年。其典礼主题“自由的新生”，取自林肯总统1863年发表的葛底斯堡演讲，就职宣誓时使用的《圣经》也是1861年林肯就职时使用的原件，此前，奥巴马乘火车从费城经巴尔的摩抵达华盛顿特区也是重温了当年的林肯“路线”。同奥巴马一样，林肯也来自伊利诺伊州，他一直是奥巴马心目中的英雄。1865年，林肯举行第二任期总统就职典礼时，非洲裔美国人首次参加了就职典礼游行。此间舆论认为，奥巴马希望借助林肯“元素”传达责任意识和加强团结共克时艰的信息。

本报洛杉矶1月20日电  （记者管克江）对于奥巴马宣誓就任美国总统将给美国社会带来何种变化，美国《华盛顿邮报》专栏作家尤金·罗宾逊20日撰文说，一名黑人当总统并不能魔法般地消除在收入上的种族不平等，无法改善内陆城市的学校、重建破落的社区或弥合不健全的家庭。但从心理上，“它改变了一切，整个国家满怀希望地等待他成功”。

一些媒体在评论时，再次强调了奥巴马提出的“变革”口号。《国家》杂志20日发表题为《历史性的转折点》的文章。美联社的文章说，奥巴马就职正值美国人民充满焦虑、期待，而又重新燃起希望的时刻。美国有线电视新闻网的网站则发表了题为《变革到了华盛顿》的文章。

《纽约时报》20日的报道强调说，奥巴马的就职演说显示，他的政府在国家安全上的某些政策与布什政府有明显的区别。

中国外交部发言人姜瑜２０日表示，中美关系处在承前启后的重要时期，中方愿与美方一道，坚持从战略高度和长远角度来审视和把握两国关系，不断加强对话、交流与合作，尊重和照顾彼此核心利益，推动中美建设性合作关系在新的时期长期、健康、稳定向前发展。一个良好、不断发展的中美关系不仅符合中美两国和两国人民的根本利益，也有利于世界的和平、稳定与发展。

俄罗斯媒体认为，俄美关系不仅是世界稳定的重要因素，而且对解决许多国际问题具有重要意义。俄罗斯期望奥巴马就职后俄美关系得到改善，双方在对等和坦诚的基础上发展建设性合作关系。但从目前形势来看，持续不断的北约东扩和美国在东欧部署导弹防御系统仍将成为影响俄美关系发展的关键障碍。国际文传电讯社评论说，奥巴马入主白宫后，俄美两国总统应在近期加强电话交流。

欧洲舆论认为，欧美能否抓住契机改善关系取决于两个因素：奥巴马必须改善美国在欧洲的形象、欧洲必须向奥巴马表明它是一个有效的盟友。如果美欧合作，从气候变化到伊朗核问题都可能处理得好些。问题是欧洲能否扮演有效的盟友角色，并动员其资源以应对重大国际问题。分析人士认为，跨大西洋关系的三个当务之急是：阿富汗问题、气候变化与能源问题、国际金融危机。

拉美媒体认为，奥巴马就职对拉美具有重要意义。阿根廷《纪事报》表示，奥巴马变革的成败不仅是美国的事情，且具有全球意义。奥巴马握有让阿根廷成功度过当前金融危机的金钥匙。墨西哥《宇宙报》发表社论，将奥巴马的就职称为一个新时代的象征，并将奥巴马称为“重生的希望”。委内瑞拉舆论认为，因为众所周知的原因，查韦斯与奥巴马的关系可能会面临一个较为缓慢的调整期。

美国卡特中心中国项目中心主任刘亚伟认为，美国民众希望奥巴马带领国家战胜当前面临的严重危机。奥巴马的就职演讲仍维持了其一贯激动人心的风格。美国人关注奥巴马强调的希望和梦想，更关注他就任总统后的政策实施。目前奥巴马的支持率达到了80%，但从明天起，奥巴马的“政治蜜月”可能将宣告结束，他要面对的是来自内政和外交方面的一系列严峻的挑战。

本报记者  丁大伟  于宏建  李永群  陈晓航  王新萍  张卫中  张慧中

【本文来源于人民数据库, 网址：http://data.people.com.cn】

Appendix D

1月20日：白宫主人不再“白”

“我谨庄严宣誓，我一定忠实执行合众国总统职务，竭尽全力，恪守、维护和捍卫合众国宪法。”

美国当地时间1月20日12时（北京时间21日凌晨1时），在美国最高法院首席法官约翰·罗伯茨主持下，贝拉克·奥巴马（Barack Hussein Obama）宣誓成为第44任美国总统，成为美国第一个非洲裔总统。

宣誓就职以后，在国会大厦西面一个半圆形木质讲台前，奥巴马发表了他历史性的就职演说。他以一段接近十九分钟的演讲，激励美国人民“必须凝聚力量，重新塑造美国”。

他首先谈及经济。奥巴马说，我们都知道，我们现在正处于危机中。人们失去家园，失去工作，企业关门；我们的卫生保健费用太高，我们的学校有太多不足；每天，都有更多的证据证明，我们使用能源的方式威胁到了我们的星球。

他说，数据和统计证明，我们正面临危机。我们的信心受到侵蚀，美国的衰退是不可避免的。挑战是真实存在的，情况严重，数量众多，不能轻易、在短 时间内解决。但奥巴马强调，美国必须面对这些挑战，并最终解决这些挑战，“选择希望而不是担心，团结而不是意见，克服抱怨和不切实际的承诺。”

奥巴马谈及责任感：我们需要一个有责任感的新时代。每个美国人都应认识到对国家、世界的责任。要推动这一责任感，塑造我们的个性。这是每个国民的承诺，是信心来源。

最后，奥巴马说：让我们告诉未来的世界，在隆冬时，只有希望和美德可以生存下去。美国正在面临我们共同的困难，在困境的严冬中，让我们铭记这些永 恒的话语。让我们勇敢的面对可能到来的冰流和风暴，我们不会回头，也不会动摇。我们将把自由这个伟大的礼物，安全的传给我们的后代。

就职午宴过后，首个“黑人第一家庭”将穿过白宫北门廊正式入住白宫，打破白宫主人一直“白”的历史，一个新的时代开始了。

【南方周末】本文网址：http://www.infzm.com/content/22925

估计有200万至400万人涌入华盛顿特区参加奥巴马就职典礼，打破1965年约翰逊总统就职典礼120万名参加者的最高纪录。估计全球有15亿人通过电视观看就职典礼。

当局调派7500名现役军人、1万名国民警衞队成员、2.5万名特工和警员，并有2.5万名现役军人做后备，规模比美国在阿富汗的驻军还要大。联邦政府首次宣布首都特区进入紧急状态，以便调配人力物力，这是美国历次总统就职典礼最大规模的保安。

值得注意的是，国防部长罗伯特·盖茨没有参加奥巴马的就职典礼。

美国白宫发言人佩里诺19日曾表示，如果第44任总统奥巴马在就职典礼当天因恐怖袭击或自然灾害而意外身故，将由国防部长罗伯特·盖茨担当领导国家的重任。

就职典礼强刮“林肯风”

此次奥巴马正式就职的主题是“自由的新生”，该表述来自林肯1863年在美国内战期间的盖茨堡演讲辞。而他宣誓就职使用的圣经就是林肯当年用过的那本。林肯圣经属于国会图书馆的收藏。总统就职典礼委员会表示，奥巴马将是头一位使用林肯圣经宣誓就职的总统。

奥巴马在宣誓就职后吃的午餐也与林肯总统当年享用的饭菜类似，就连就餐用具也力求还原当时情形。

1861年，林肯首度入主白宫，他就餐用的瓷器是时任第一夫人的玛丽·托德·林肯 挑选的。这些瓷器的复制品在时隔近150年后将出现在奥巴马就职午餐的饭桌上。

就职宣誓之后，奥巴马与200名宾客一切共享了就职餐，这顿就职餐由三道菜组成，同样基于林肯口味。正餐前的开胃菜是以扇贝和虾为原料做成的糕点——林肯当年酷爱海鲜；主菜是 酸辣酱野鸡配马铃薯——幼年林肯在印第安那州爱吃的东西；甜点是苹果桂皮软糕——林肯爱吃苹果。

餐厅的布置也是林肯式的。据报道，奥巴马餐桌的背后将悬挂“约塞米蒂峡谷风光”油画。该油画展示的是约塞米蒂峡谷黎明时的景象。此画也是为了纪念林肯在1864年宣布约塞米蒂峡谷作为国家公园供民众休闲观光。

“林肯午宴”在国会山“雕像厅”举行，与奥巴马共进午宴的大约200名宾客包括最高法院成员、奥巴马内阁成员以及国会领导人

The relationships between the producer, product, and audience have long been studied in the larger context of consumption practices and the social factors that affect them. In this paper, I will examine these relationships as articulated in the South Korean pop music industry to provide a check on Adorno and Horkheimer’s view of the culture industry as being an all-powerful, ubiquitous menace to the creative individual. First, I will briefly outline Adorno’s invectives of the culture industry and provide a brief overview of the South Korean pop culture industry. I argue that initially, through highly streamlined and rationalized corporate strategies, SM did hold considerable ideological sway over the production of popular music and culture. However, as I attempt to show in the second part of my paper, such a balance of power is undergoing a fundamental shift, as the corporate machine, which manufactures popular culture, is increasingly confronted and opposed by the users of its products. Through this study, I hope to gain insights into the nature of the pop music industry and the pop idol phenomenon in South Korean society, as well as to call into question Adorno and Horkheimer’s pessimistic conception of a society dominated by the culture industry.

In “The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception”, Adorno and Horkheimer present a clear stance regarding the balance of power between producers and consumers of cultural products. From Adorno’s perspective, the culture industry is an oppressive and impenetrable entity that works to homogenize culture. In a society where “something is provided for everyone so that no one can escape,” the individual is effectively marginalized within the economic structures imposed by the dominant capitalist order. All decisions regarding the production and classification of cultural commodities are made by corporate executives before any product reaches store shelves or screens, leading consumers to be passive and unquestioning of the status quo. Any perceived differences within a type of popular culture product are superficial and are only there to provide the illusion of choice. With the commodification of music, consumers are at no less of a disadvantage. Adorno views consumers of popular culture as powerless spectators whose passive intake of entertainment commodities requires no thought on their part and only serves to perpetuate the dominance of certain corporate interests. He writes, “Entertainment is the prolongation of work,” in that people seek it as a relief from the daily grind of work, yet it only serves to compel them to work more in order to retain their leisure hours. The work of the culture industry ultimately results in “the abolition of the individual”. By reducing individuals into customers and employees, it renders humans as “absolutely replaceable, pure nothingness.” From Adorno’s perspective, individuals are hopelessly disempowered and serve as mere material for those in control to use and manipulate to their sole benefit. Thus, he positions the culture industry as an indomitable entity and leaves very little room to consider consumer agency.

Before going on to discuss the dynamics of a particular producer-audience relationship in the South Korean music industry, some background information to the pop culture industry would help to situate that relationship in a larger historical and social context. The origins of popular music and a popular music industry in South Korea can be traced back to the 1920’s during the period of Japanese occupation. The term, yuhaengga, meaning “song in fashion” was first used in 1926 when the song “Adoration of Death” became an immensely popular hit. From then on, as more people recognized the profits that could be realized through a popular song market, recording companies emerged to capitalize on the demand. Initially, subsidiaries of foreign companies like Columbia and Victor produced the majority of recordings of Korean popular songs, and it was not until the 1930’s that Korean-owned recording companies would appear. In the years after World War II and through the Korean War, America’s presence was felt in most parts of South Korean society, not least in the significant influx and widespread popularity of Western pop songs, which would come to have a lasting influence on domestic pop culture. From the early 1960’s on, supported by the United States and Japan, South Korea embarked on an ambitious project of modernization in hopes to stimulate economic growth. Along with rapid industrial development from the early 1960’s on, the South Korean economy underwent a significant transformation to Western-style capitalism. During the 1960’s, the state began to see Western pop music as a corrupting influence on society and the rise of individualism promoted by globalization as potentially destabilizing, causing popular culture to be subject to strict censorship. When Chun Doo Hwan staged a military coup in 1979 and made himself head of state, he actively sought to control the media, shutting down commercial television stations and maintaining the practices of media censorship, effectively delimiting the kinds of music considered suitable for broadcast and airplay. During the 1980’s the “star system” also emerged, wherein singers who were perceived to have the suitable qualities for TV presentation were selected through contests and by talent scouts. After Chun Doo Hwan left office in 1987, anti-authoritarian activists succeeded in bringing democracy to Korea and the 1988 Olympics held in Seoul opened up Korea to a myriad of outside influences. As a result, state censorship of many forms of cultural expression was eased significantly, and the music industry, which had been resting in a rather uncomfortable slumber, was reinvigorated. The 1990’s saw a marked growth in the domestic music industry, with most of the growth attributed to domestic pop music rather than foreign popular music.

It was at the end of what has been a turbulent century in terms of Korean and South Korean history that the SM Entertainment Corporation emerged to become one of the leading manufacturers of pop culture. Officially founded by former singer and TV and radio host Lee Soo-Man in 1995, SM can trace its roots back to a small studio in Seoul in which Lee had first opened SM Studio in 1988. After Lee nearly lost SM because of the drug scandal involving one of his first protégées in the mid-1990’s, he was determined not to expose himself to the same risks of laboriously promoting a new artist only to have them fail to deliver on his investments later on. Lee set out to systematize his idol-making business. He modified and extended the scope of the “star system” which had emerged during the 1980’s to create his own system for training and developing young people into stars. After a student passed the audition process, they would be subject to training in a range of entertainment fields including singing, dancing, and acting. The aspects of personality, character, and looks thus become just as important, if not more, than their ability to sing and dance, since any minor shortcomings in the latter areas would be made up for by the rigorous training process that all SM trainees had to undergo in order to debut under the SM label. Thus, Lee effectively rationalized and industrialized the process of developing an idol star. In his efforts to minimize risk, he molded his trainees with a series of standardized procedures, just as factory machines manipulate and shape raw material: as a result, he created standardized cultural products, which were roughly interchangeable and also disposable, since there were always more copies coming down the production line. This type of star-production system has since become a norm among the companies that dominate the Korean music industry, such as YG and JYP Entertainment. In 2005, producers estimated the average cost of grooming and launching a new artist to be around $400,000, including music and dance training, the stars’ costumes, cars, managers, and other expenses. Since its inception, the idol-making machine has changed little besides becoming further streamlined with the help of information technologies, which help to identify what kind of pop star is currently in demand. SM has since begun to hold global auditions annually, and has moved to merge with or buy out other media companies, including a DVD distributor, a karaoke machine distributor, a music video channel, new media platforms, and more.

As a prime model of the rationalization and bureacratization that characterizes the modern production of culture in a capitalist framework, SM is an apt representation of the culture industry as characterized by Adorno. In his conception of a society where the “control of consumers is mediated by entertainment,” SM is a leading producer of pop culture products that serve to both pacify and suppress the masses. As Keith Negus writes on the nature of the Western pop music industry, corporate strategy “provides a means of rationalizing and ordering the activities of consumers and audiences. Record companies maintain extensive collections of consumer data, gathered from sources such as electronic monitoring of sales, consumer panels, and publications of industry-wide figures. They then utilize this data to develop and promote new stars and songs. Under such corporate strategy, consumers are reduced to charts and graphs, which is another aspect of the culture industry that Adorno rails against. With its assembly-line method of churning out the next idol stars, SM is also responsible for infecting everything with the homogeneity that Adorno sees as detrimental to the creative individual. Although it attempts to differentiate its idol stars from each other, such as by marketing them as purveyors of different genres (TRAX is marketed as a rock band, while Dong Bang Shin Ki is marketed as an acappella group), it hardly hides the fact that all these idol stars are products of the standardized SM training process. Any differences between them are therefore fabricated and intended to delude consumers. In some ways, the manufacturing process does not even end at the idol’s debut. The company often controls what costumes they wear in performances, their casual clothing, and even the kind of car they will drive. SM has to constantly monitor, shape, and repackage its idols according to current fads. With its recent evolution from a music label into a full-fledged media conglomerate, SM seems to be moving further to homogenize the experience of popular culture as well. From Adorno’s perspective, the commodification of music that is carried out by large media corporations like SM only serves to “intensify the impoverishment of the aesthetic material so radically that the identity of all industrial cultural products…will triumph openly tomorrow.” In many ways, SM’s cultural clout seems to have exceeded that point. Nowadays, it is rare to find someone who is at least somewhat immersed in Korean pop culture and cannot trace SM’s idol groups back to SM. Videos and pictures showing idols during their auditions and pre-debut training are widely circulated online and can be found on Youtube. By extensively marketing the audition process, SM even presents the opportunity to be an SM trainee as something desirable. In being widely identified with the idol-making machine, SM’s cultural products already seem to be recognized for what they really are: the products of an industrial process that are mass-produced for mass consumption.

SM is in the business of actualizing Guy Debord’s concept of the spectacle. In the context of this corporate strategy, music plays a minor role in the success of its cultural products, although idols put out scores of music albums. As Debord writes, a spectacle is “the omnipresent celebration of a choice already made in the sphere of production, and the consummate result of that choice.” It is “a social relationship between people that is mediated by images.” The dissemination and control of images is paramount in SM’s corporate strategy. Whether through music videos, magazine spreads, TV advertisements, or guest appearances on game shows, SM consistently manages to impose a pre-packaged, meticulously tailored image of their idol stars on their audiences. Because it establishes and maintains social relationships with its customers through images, SM can essentially hide the fact of an unequal power relationship between it and its customers. In accordance with Adorno’s characterization of the culture industry, Debord’s notion of the spectacle deemphasizes any notion of consumer agency, and individuals are depicted as powerless in the face of the spectacle and all the economic capital it embodies.

Manufactured to be spectacles, the cultural products, which SM puts out in the form of cute boy bands and spunky girl groups, often become objects of fetishization, especially among South Korean youth, to the extent that consumers develop solid, verging on obsessive, loyalties to particular artists. These loyalties manifest themselves in the formation of large fan clubs, each self-proclaimed to be exclusively devoted to a certain product of the idol-making machine. For the purposes of this study, I am only focusing on the fan club of Dong Bang Shin Ki, a boy band under the SM label, although many other SM idol groups, such as SHINee and Super Junior, have also gained significant followings since their debut.

All five members of the popular boy band, Dong Bang Shin Ki (officially abbreviated by SM as TVXQ), are products of SM’s star system. Each member was individually scouted out through auditions and then subjected to training in singing, dancing, and acting in the years leading up to their debut. TVXQ debuted in 2003, performing their hit single “Hug” during a showcase featuring Britney Spears and BoA, another pop star under SM. Since the release of their first single, they have rapidly acquired an impressive fan base. The fan site devoted to them on the Daum website, a large online community, now boasts nearly 760,000 fan members, comfortably beating the second largest fan page by more than 300,000 members. A quick Google search easily turns up more TVXQ fan communities based in countries around the world, including Malaysia, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United Arab Emirates. Despite geographical and linguistic barriers, all these various fan communities are self-consciously united under one name: Cassiopeia. In 2008, Cassiopeia made the Guinness Book of World Records for being the largest fan club of any artist, numbering at around 800,000 members, according to KBS, the state-owned television station.

Members of Cassiopeia, known as Cassiopeians and Cassies, are mostly internally organized and managed on many different fan sites and forums. There is no single website that claims to unite all 800,000 plus Cassiopeians within its servers, although the Daum fan cafe certainly comes close to it. These online gathering spaces for fans often demonstrate an impressive level of organization. The Daum fan site, for example, is housed in a neatly organized webpage, on which each member’s picture, date of birth, height, weight, and blood type are listed. In order to be a member, you must fill out the application and be accepted. Members of the fan site are organized hierarchically. Depending on various factors, such as the frequency with which you post and the nature of your posts, the president of the cafe can choose to upgrade your status within the club. The current president of the Daum fan cafe goes by the screen name of Cha-Jun. A series of tabs and links on the left side of the page direct you to the various divisions of the cafe. There is a forum where the daily schedules of each of the members are listed and another one about news of the members’ activities outside Korea. Pictures and cuts from television dramas are also provided and organized by members of the fan page. Another TVXQ fan site, Cassiopeia-Family, exhibits a similar structure of organization. Each of its nearly 14,000 members is given a rank based on the number of posts they have contributed. The rankings range from Dust (0 posts) to Red Giant (300 posts) to Cassiopeia (4000 posts). The structure of these rankings are detailed in a thread named “CSSPF Laws,” which was posted by the founder of the site to provide a comprehensive list of guidelines to govern the behaviors of members on the site. These rules range from dealing with etiquette issues, such as the use of vulgar language and personal attacks, to stipulating the dimensions of avatar and banner images.

Through their large numbers and sound organizational methods, Cassiopeians are able to carry out many of the promotional activities that normally would be left to SM and its marketing department. One forum of the Daum fan cafe organizes members to vote together on weekly music shows as well as international polls where TVXQ is featured, helping to increase TVXQ’s visibility at home and abroad. When Ellen DeGeneres uploaded a blog post on “The Ellen DeGeneres’ Show” website asking for international music suggestions, comments from Cassiopeians flooded the site recommending their favorite idol group. Cassiopeians also work to disseminate the images of TVXQ to a wider audience. In addition to providing pictures and clips on fan sites, Cassiopeians also add subtitles to many of TVXQ’s videos on Youtube. Whereas the official music video of “Mirotic” that is provided on SM’s official channel is only in Korean, further searching turns up versions with subtitles in English, Spanish, Thai, Chinese, and French. The noticeable group presence that they exert wherever they go helps to increase TVXQ’s presence in online discussions about Korean pop music. On Soompi.com, one of the largest English-language online communities dedicated to Korean pop culture, there are a total of five threads devoted to TVXQ while most other groups only have one. Cassiopeians also create avatars and banners using their favorite members of TVXQ and use these on other non-TVXQ forums, such as Soompi.com, as proclamations of their loyalties as well as advertisements for their idols. Cassiopeians have also helped improve the images of their favorite members. Last year, Cassiopeians donated a large sum of money under the name of Xiah Junsu (a TVXQ member) to Adra Korea, an international development and relief agency, to help them rebuild a small village in Cambodia. In gratitude, villagers named it Xiah Junsu Village.

Adorno would see these Cassiopeians as a deluded mass and as the victims of an oppressive manifestation of the culture industry. However, the limits to his argument are already becoming apparent. In his scathing portrayal of the culture industry, Adorno does not consider the possibility that audiences have the power to manipulate the images of cultural products. By donating to charity in Junsu’s name and improving TVXQ’s image in the process, Cassiopeians are demonstrating that it is possible for them to shape the cultural influences of their idols. In his outline of Lisa Lewis’ insights from her studies on fans and their activities at public events, Keith Negus writes, “fans create communities with a collective shared sense of identity,” and they are able to “contribute directly to the meanings attributed to performers.” Thus, through their impressive presence, Cassiopeians are able to influence how others understand and experience TVXQ and Korean pop culture in general. One of the major scandals that came out of the Korean pop music industry in 2008 involved unruly fan behavior at the “I Love Korea 2008 Dream Concert.” According to several online forums, when it came time for Girls’ Generation, an all-female idol group under SM, to perform, other fan groups, including Cassiopeians, banded together and gave them the silent treatment. Physical violence also allegedly erupted between the fan groups of different SM idol groups. Whether or not these events are exaggerated or even happened at all, the news provoked a flood of responses on web forums. On the thread devoted to this scandal on AsianFanatics.net, many forum members expressed their horror, disbelief, and disapproval. The user ‘marmar’ writes, “what the ppl in charge of the dream concert should do for next year should just banned all sm artists for just next year. since it’s mainly there fanclubs that are immature. don’t ruin it for the other artists that would like to perform for there fans…if they do need to invite an sm artist then invite one where there fans are not as immature & crazy like the soshi heads, elfs & cassies…”. Another user, ‘hippocathy88’, adds, “i cant really see anything hostile from them lol but what they did were so immature. such bad reputation for sm fans.” These forum posts demonstrate how the actions of fan groups like Cassiopeia are taken to reflect the general nature of fans of SM’s idol groups. The image of SM thus becomes inextricably linked to and shaped by the behavior of the consumers of its products, and thus SM’s cultural influence can no longer be considered a monopoly. That most of the groups involved in the conflict were fan clubs of SM idol groups only adds to the irony of the situation. More importantly, these fans do not at all resemble Adorno’s characterization of the passive and thoughtless consumer.

Another area where Adorno’s argument falls short is that for all the concern he shows for the individual, he also de-individualizes consumers and treats them as a homogenous mass. From Adorno’s perspective, the utility of a cultural product is destroyed as it is consumed. Michel De Certeau, on the contrary, views consumption as a form of production, in which consumers use the cultural products that are imposed on them to further their own interests. De Certeau argues that “the imposed knowledge and symbolisms become objects manipulated by practitioners who have not produced them.” A tour through a Cassiopeia forum will serve to substantiate his claims. On the forum Cassiopeia-Family, besides the usual personal blurbs, all members divulge their favorite member and favorite couple within TVXQ underneath their avatar. In fact, during registration, I had to provide my favorite member and my favorite couple. Although the TVXQ images that SM puts out rarely have any homosexual insinuations (most TVXQ music videos involve a female love interest), it has been very common for fans to portray pairs of members as romantic partners. On the Cassiopeia-Family forum, we thus find a salient example of SM’s cultural products being vastly reinterpreted to pursue interests and desires divergent from that of the dominant capitalist order. These reinterpretations also serve to distinguish Cassiopeians from each other and reflect the variety of personal preferences within the TVXQ fan community. The forum also features a large collection of fan fiction written by fans, in which they use the members of TVXQ as characters in their own original stories. In the fan fiction ‘Salvation of Love’, the author reimagines Jaejoong as a vampire and recasts Yunho as his lover, clearly straying from the images that SM seeks to spread of its idols. These authors literally “select fragments [being] taken from the vast ensembles of production in order to compose new stories with them,” effectively using SM’s cultural products to pursue individual interests and desires which are reflected in the stories they write.

Thus, the culture industry is not without its virtues. It provides the material with which consumers can use to fulfill certain individual interests. As Dick Hebdige writes, “All aspects of culture possess a semiotic value, and the most taken-for-granted phenomena can function as signs: as elements in communication systems….” Corporate giants such as SM provide a common ideological space in which subordinate groups are able to function and interact. Cassiopeians are only able to use the images of their idols to fulfill their personal interests and share their reinterpretations with other fans because there is a corporation like SM to produce those idols and build a fanbase for them. Thus, the culture industry might serve a social function by providing a common language of signs that audiences can creatively manipulate and practice what John Fiske terms “textual productivity,” as cited in Bertha Chin’s work on East Asian cinema fandom.

Recent high profile events involving Cassiopeia and SM seem to further challenge the validity of Adorno’s threatening characterization of the culture industry. On July 31, 2009, three members of TVXQ filed an application at the Seoul Central District Court for provisional disposition to terminate their contract with SM Entertainment. Within the month, Cassiopeians mobilized a boycott of SM products. In a lengthy official statement, they detailed their main reasons: “1) SM Entertainment’s own decision of cancelling SM TOWN LIVE ‘09 that ridiculed the consumers 2) The insincerity and neglect that SM Entertainment showed for years to consumers’ complaints, and 3) SM Entertainment’s unfair treatment of TVXQ that caused a great danger [to] TVXQ’s existence”. On August 28, Cassiopeians submitted a petition of 121,083 signatures to the Korean Human Rights Commission to defend the human rights of their idols. Through their actions and their stated reasons, Cassiopeians clearly demonstrate how they think the producer-consumer relation should be. They hold SM responsible for not providing the cultural products it promised and believe that SM should be aware and responsive to the needs and opinions of consumers, needs and opinions which diverge enough from the dominant ideology to be called “complaints”. These Cassiopeians thus demonstrate a capacity for consumer agency that Adorno does not consider them to be capable of. The third and last reason provided for the boycott in the official statement also shows that their ultimate loyalty rests with their idols and not with SM. They conclude their lengthy statement with a proclamation of their everlasting loyalty: “We always support TVXQ. Please always keep the faith! =)”.

The fact that Cassiopeians’ loyalties are firmly anchored to their idols rather than to SM points to an inherent weakness in the culture industry. Being in the business of manufacturing human spectacles, SM encourages the consumer to develop strong attachments to the cultural product while simultaneously distancing itself from it. In Bertha Chin’s summary of Christine Yano’s work on fan cultures, she writes that “this sense of intimacy is centered on the fan relationship to the star rather than a specific cultural text or event”. At the same time, the nature of the spectacle involves distorting SM’s role as the producer. The typical producer-consumer relationship is obscured by the images which mediate it, to the extent that in the minds of audiences the images themselves come to take precedence over the entities which produced them. SM is increasingly seen as a separate entity from its cultural products, and the two are perceived to have divergent interests, as exhibited by the Cassiopeian efforts to defend the rights of their idols against the transgressions of SM. These intimate idol-fan relationships come to take precedence over the relationship that Cassiopeians have with SM. When an event arises where fans have to make a choice between their idols and SM, the choice is clear. Hence, SM, and the culture industry in general, can be said to be at a natural disadvantage precisely because their cultural hegemony is sustained by the production of spectacles.

Adorno’s impassioned critique of the culture industry thus seems to overlook the very thing he is trying to defend. While he mourns the loss of the individual, he ignores the capacity of the individual to exercise their creativity and agency within the economic structures imposed by the dominant capitalist order. Consumers, as per the perspectives of De Certeau and Hebdige, retain much of their creative potential despite the cultural hegemony of giant entertainment corporations like SM. The many practices carried out by Cassiopeians serve to attest to the productivity that audiences are capable of, as well as to their ability to confront and challenge those in power. Another way to view the role of the culture industry is that it provides a common context in which audiences can interact and be textually productive. Such a notion suggests that it may have some redeeming qualities that Adorno does not acknowledge. This study also reveals a fundamental weakness of the culture industry which lies in its production of spectacles. By putting forward some of the weaknesses of both Adorno’s critique and the culture industry, I hope to lend some optimism to the gloomy view that Adorno presents of modern popular culture.

References

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